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ABSTRACT 
 
This research examines the impact and consequences of inspection by the Commission for 
Social Care Inspection (CSCI). 
 
The study begins with a Systematic Review (SR) of existing literature that is divided into 
effectiveness and process questions. The results of this review show there is no 
international literature on the effectiveness of inspection at improving residential care for 
older people. There is also very little process literature. 
 
The second part of the research uses a multi-site case study approach with a longitudinal 
element, to qualitatively examine the impact of inspection in relation to the quality of care 
provided by residential care homes for older people. Four CSCI inspectors from four 
different inspection offices across England took part in the study. 
 
The case studies show inspection struggled to induce quality improvements in services and 
had little direct impact on residents. A ‘culture of ageism’ existed within the services and 
this influenced both provision and residents expectations of care. Provision in all four case 
studies was still dominated by institutional routine and a lack of service user 
empowerment. 
 
In this context despite clear evidence regarding the value of outcomes focused care this 
had, by enlarge, not filtered through to the services in this study and there was still a 
tendency to focus on outputs without relating these to service user outcomes. 
 
I argue that the complexity of residential care, which depends upon an interaction between 
environment, care home management, staff, residents, their relatives, and the government 
inspectorate means that the most successful method of quality improvement comes through 
partnership and negotiation between the these groups. My findings have shown that it is 
very rarely one group who is decisive in determining an improvement in quality and that 
change must come about through negotiation.  
 
Although inspection must incorporate a notion of ‘assessment’ that is standardised and 
measurable, it should also encompass professional judgement and actively seek to include 
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elements of user-expertise. I argue that despite rhetoric that advocates this approach the 
inspection regime is hamstrung by a particular form of management values and practice. 
Constant ‘modernisation’ of the inspectorate has further emphasised a model of inspection 
that sees care as a series of discrete events, where each issue is clearly defined and 
decisions are taken by inspectors who choose between a prescribed set of judgement 
criteria. To this extent inspection is increasingly focused on audit. I raise the question 
whether in the changing landscape of inspection the CSCI has marginalised inspectors and 
risks losing a very valuable method of effecting change. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis reports a study of the character and practice of social care inspection and 
investigates the relationship between inspection and quality of care in residential care 
homes for older people. 
 
To do this I examined existing evidence on the effectiveness of inspection by conducting a 
systematic review of current research. Following this analysis, and informed by the 
findings, I completed longitudinal, multi-site case studies of four residential care homes for 
older people to qualitatively examine the consequences and impact of inspection on quality 
of care.  
 
In these opening pages I outline the reasons for my interest in this topic and the rationale 
for the study. I go on to describe the main features of the study and the structure of the 
thesis. These opening pages only describe my initial rationale for developing the study and 
as such are only lightly referenced. 
 
There is a lengthy academic and policy literature on improving the experiences of older 
people who receive social care services in England (see Chapter 1). For too long social 
care service providers have treated users as dependent and frail which has resulted in 
services with, in general, a very narrow perspective of service aims and delivery. In order 
to challenge and breakdown this antiquated notion of care within services, through a wide 
consultation with older people, the government in England has developed seven broad 
outcomes areas that older people should expect to achieve while receiving social care 
services: 
• Improved health; 
• improved quality of life;  
• making a positive contribution;  
• exercise of choice and control;  
• freedom from discrimination or harassment;  
• economic well-being; and  
• personal dignity. 
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A large body of evidence (see for example Glendinning, et al. 2006; Hudson, et al. 2005) 
on the benefit and nature of outcome focused social care for older people, and national 
policy documents such as the National Service Framework (NSF) for Older People 
(Department of Health 2001d) and the Green Paper ‘Independence, Well-being and 
Choice’ (Department of Health 2005), suggests that these outcomes can only be 
satisfactorily achieved if services are provided in conjunction with older people rather than 
on their behalf. This prevailing notion of service delivery is neatly summed up by Hudson 
et al (2005: 4): 
 
‘Services developed on a sound understanding of what people believe, want or need 
are more likely to deliver intended outcomes effectively’ 
 
This new outcomes-focused policy direction, coupled with recent scandals in residential 
care, has redirected attention to the private1 nature of much social care, and the importance 
of ensuring the quality of care afforded people who use services. 
 
The role of inspectorates is seen as central to ensuring the quality of care in the UK, with 
the emphasis being variously on the protection of consumers, the regulation of standards of 
service, and the regulation of procedures and financial integrity of services (Johnson, et al. 
1998).With a refined emphasis on the outcomes of services for those who use them - in the 
context of the historical inability of residential services to achieve these goals - the 
improvement potential of inspectorates has been emphasised.   
 
Studies by Gibbs and Sinclair (1992a) and Day et al (1996) suggest local level regulation 
of residential care homes for older people was ineffective because of large variations in 
standards across inspection and inconsistent interpretations of standards by inspectors. This 
led to the conclusion by national policy makers that there needed to be universal standards 
across the country and inspectors needed to be clear about standards in order to effectively 
ensure services are not only providing an acceptable minimum standard of care but also 
working towards constant improvements. 
 
                                                 
1
 I use the term ‘private’ to convey two meanings. First, residential care provision by 
private providers. Second, the notion of social care as ‘an invisible trade’ in the same way 
in which Andrew Pithouse (1999) describes the practice of Social Work. 
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Based on these concepts the Commission for Social Care Inspection (CSCI) was launched 
in April 2004, and was created under the Health and Social Care [Community Health and 
Standards] Act 2003. This Act both transfers powers from the predecessor bodies (the 
Social Services Inspectorate [SSI], the SSI / Audit Commission Joint Review team, and the 
National Care Standards Commission) to the CSCI and afforded it new or enhanced 
powers, especially to encourage and drive improvement in social care.  
 
The Commission’s modernisation of the regulation of social care began with the 
publication of Inspecting for Better Lives (CSCI, 2005), which set out a plan for the 
development of the process of inspection with a specific focus on standardisation and 
quality as measured.   
 
The rationale for this study follows directly from this strategy. The Commission’s scoring 
system ‘makes us focus on each standard rather than whether the people using those care 
services are getting what they need’ (CSCI, 2005a: 11), this reflects Etzioni’s observation 
that ‘frequent measuring tends to encourage over-production of measurable items, and 
neglect of less measurable items’ (Etzioni 1964: 9). The newness of the inspectorate and a 
recently evolved commitment to inspection that focuses on the direct experiences of 
residents means the appropriateness in terms of both technical function and effectiveness 
in improving quality has not been examined.   
 
This thesis uses a case study methodology and as such is focused on the English policy 
model, as this is where the CSCI operates. In the context of devolved government it is no 
longer helpful for this study to make generalizations about inspection regimes across the 
four Home Countries. The study was not simply focused on inspection per se but on the 
dynamics and interplay of the stakeholders involved in the processes of inspection and 
reactions to the findings of inspection. 
 
As of April 2009 the CSCI amalgamated with the Healthcare Commission and the Mental 
Health Act Commission into one body: the Care Quality Commission (CQC). Although 
this has an impact on the findings of my thesis, currently the CQC has retained the 
majority of the CSCI inspection techniques and remains on the path of a stepwise 
evolution of practice that would have still been occurring should the CSCI have remained. 
In this context my findings and conclusions have relevance to the wider conceptual debates 
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about the form and nature of inspection and aim to inform further development of the 
CQC. 
 
OUTLINE OF THE STUDY  
Aims  
To explore, from the perspective of inspectors, service providers and service users: 
• Existing international literature on effectiveness of inspection on residential care 
for older people. 
• The inspection as an ‘Event’. To appraise the process of inspection by considering 
how well the process works, what the difficulties are, and areas for development. 
• The impact inspection has on service provision – the reaction to inspection 
findings, the extent to which it leads to improvements over the case study period, 
the barriers to implementing service improvement. 
• The impact inspection has on residents – reaction to inspection and their 
understanding of the process; the extent to which it improves the quality of service 
to residents; whether inspection focuses on outcomes important to residents. 
• What constitutes good quality inspection of residential care homes for older 
people? 
 
The design of the study  
In addition to a literature review, the study consists of two phases of data collection and 
analysis. The first phase of the study comprised a systematic review of existing 
international literature on the effectiveness and impact of inspection on residential care for 
older people. The purpose of the review was to help identify the quality of the current 
evidence base and highlight implications for practice and for further research.  In doing 
this it also informed stage two of the data collection. The Systematic Review was 
undertaken as a one-off endeavour at the start of my PhD as it was required by the CSCI to 
inform ongoing deliberation and internal policy discussions. As such it stands alone as a 
piece of work and I have not attempted to update it as this would contradict the rationale 
for initially undertaken the review. 
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The second phase of the study utilised a multi-site case study approach with a longitudinal 
element, to qualitatively examine the impact of inspection in relation to the quality of care 
provided by residential care homes for older people. Four CSCI inspectors from four 
different inspection offices across England took part in the study. From their caseloads 
four residential care homes for older people were chosen as case study sites. These services 
agreed to be observed for nine months beginning at the point of their next inspection. In 
total 108 interviews were carried out with inspectors, the respective care home managers, 
two members of staff working in the service, three residents and their corresponding 
relatives - all interviewed at the three data collection points: 
1. At the point of inspection. 
2. A week after the report was sent to the service (approximately 8 – 12 weeks after 
inspection). 
3. Nine months after the inspection. 
 
STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS 
The thesis consists of four parts. The first is a review of the literature. This review starts in 
Chapter 1 with a review of the general literature on the theoretical underpinning of the 
model of social care to provide context for inspection.  It then proceeds to examine models 
of regulation and provide a context for the investigation into the CSCI’s inspection 
activity. 
 
The second part consists of a systematic review of the effectiveness of inspection in 
improving the quality of residential care (Chapter 2). At the outset my sole focus was on 
effectiveness but after initial scoping work when developing the review protocol I divided 
the review into two questions, one with a focus on effectiveness and one with a focus on 
process. As well as reviewing existing literature I also discuss methodological questions 
concerning systematic reviews, with particular attention to the synthesis of qualitative 
research.  
 
In the third part of the thesis I turn my focus to a qualitative examination of the 
consequences of inspection. I begin this in Chapter 3 by discussing my methodology. I 
give a reflexive account of the development of my thinking about an appropriate 
methodology for this part of the study, an account of what I actually did in practice, and an 
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explanation of how my approach draws on the literature about research methods. 
 
In the fourth part of the study I present the findings of the qualitative study. This begins in 
Chapter 4 with an account of the ‘Event’ of inspection, where I observe and reflect on the 
process, supplementing the data with interviews of the four inspectors directly after they 
conducted the inspection. In Chapters 5 and 6 I turn to looking at the impact of inspection 
on the case study services over the 9-month study period. Chapter 5 examines the impact 
on the service, with focus on how managers and their staff reacted to the process of 
inspection and, over the longitudinal period, to the findings of the inspection report. 
Chapter 6 turns my attention to the residents in the case study services and examines the 
impact inspection had on the group on which its aims are focused. In Chapter 7 I use 
interviews with all participants, as well as themes from the proceeding three chapters, to 
build a picture of what constitutes good quality inspection of residential care homes for 
older people. 
 
In the fifth and final part of this thesis, Chapter 8, I draw together my conclusions by 
synthesizing the key findings of the study, drawing conclusions for policy and practice, 
and reflecting on both my methodological and analytical approach. 
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CHAPTER 1: A MODEL OF RESIDENTIAL SOCIAL CARE 
FOR OLDER PEOPLE 
  
This chapter discusses the development of social care in England in order to understand the 
rationale for a study into the impact of inspection on older peoples’ residential care. 
THE STATE OF SOCIAL CARE IN THE UK 
In the UK alone £8 billion was spent on personal social care services in 2004/5, and the 
most conservative forecast projects that this will increase 139 % by 2026 (Wanless 2006: 
72). At any one time, up to 1.7 million adults and 400 000 children and families rely on 
social workers and social care staff for help and support (Commission for Social Care 
Inspection 2005). As these figures suggest, social care pervades the lives of a significant 
proportion of the UK population and represents a sizeable but, according to recent 
independent and government figures, (see Wanless 2006; Local Government Association 
2006) currently insufficient portion of public spending. These figures take on added 
significance if we consider that people who come into contact with social care services are 
often the most vulnerable and/ or excluded people in society – precisely the people who 
benefit the most from collective assistance. That is not to say that individuals who are 
vulnerable or excluded cannot speak or act for themselves, but they require some form of 
assistance from the state to either protect them from the dangers of (in the case of, for 
example, neglected or abused children), or facilitate their active participation in (in the 
case of the physically disabled), society.  
 
It is inevitable that older persons’ social care is going to take on a much more important 
role as the post-war ‘baby boomer’ generation enters the later stages of their lives. The 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) predict that in the UK 
the ratio of the population aged 65 and over to the population aged between 20 and 64 will 
rise from 27 % in 2003 to just under 50 % in 2050 (OECD 2004). Evidence suggests that 
due to demographic and sociological changes it is unlikely that families will be able to play 
such an important role in care (Assous 2001). This means that in the future there is going 
to be an ever-increasing strain on the UK’s public service infrastructure and a need, more 
than ever, to produce efficient, cost effective social services. 
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In this context, at the start of the twenty first century social care operates at a crux of 
society, bridging the gap between tensions created, on one hand, by a desire for an egoistic, 
consumer driven lifestyle and, on the other, altruistic, caring tendencies of social justice 
delineated by society’s shared values and beliefs (such as conceptions of human rights and 
citizenship), which Durkheim (1984) termed ‘mechanical solidarity’. In the post-war 
period the focus of both theory and policy has been on achieving a balance between 
altruistic and egoistic tendencies and providing the necessary infrastructure to allow this to 
happen. During the last two decades the focus in the public sector has shifted from a 
socialist ideal of equality and provision for all, to the pragmatic solution of opportunities 
and choices available to individuals in a mixed economy of services (Jordan 2005a). 
However, along with choice and opportunity comes a shift in accountability and a dilution 
of solidarity brought about by a greater individualisation of risk. Analysis of the 
relationship between globalisation, individualisation and the service economy has shown 
that constraints on national government spending can be directly related to the mobility of 
capital (Scharpf 1999) and this produces greater inequalities of incomes (Iverson and Wren 
1998). Liberal, Christian Democratic and Social Democratic regimes have all, in their own 
ways, tried to adapt to the economic imperatives of mobile capital while adjusting their 
social policies to protect the most vulnerable populations from the impact of global change 
(Hood, et al. 1999b). The debate about how to deliver social care is a reflection of wider 
themes in the national policy agenda (choice, individualisation versus pooled risk and 
solidarity), which address the nature of social inclusion and citizenship and form the 
debate on how to best promote social welfare.  
 
It is in this context that I situate my research into the impact of inspection. In the remainder 
of the chapter I will trace the development of the shift in service provision from an 
ideological driven model to the current pragmatic model of choice and empowerment. I 
will discuss how this model of provision has developed through a re-conceptualisation of 
the concept of citizenship. I will then argue that in the context of this conceptual shift 
regulation has become the primary tool in protecting citizenship rights and upholding a 
notion of social justice within social care. I will also discuss the impact and merits of this 
change and the implications for service users. I will proceed to discuss regulation of older 
peoples’ social care and, using this specific field of care, show why research into the 
process, impact and consequences of inspection is important; specifically the role of the 
CSCI into which there has been little research. 
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JUSTICE, CITIZENSHIP AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
A concept of citizenship defines the rights and obligations to which an individual of a state 
or community subscribes, these rights centre around three main areas: civil (e.g. free 
speech and movement, rule of law), political (e.g. right to vote, run for electoral office) and 
social (e.g. welfare, health care, unemployment support) rights (Marshall 1950). The 
function of the social service sector is to operationalise a conception of social justice into 
practice and facilitate the social rights of an individual or collective. In any society or 
nation state a typology of rights (that may be manifest in many different forms) dictates the 
way in which citizenship may be attained and is dependent on prevailing national 
frameworks of political democracy, welfare state and market economy. A concept of 
citizenship is dependent upon these factors and the role of welfare policy can be seen as 
being bound with society’s concept of citizenship. Welfare policy of a particular state is 
influenced by the prevailing concept of citizenship (along with political and economic 
considerations – which themselves are born out of citizenship ideology). In the UK welfare 
policy works to allow everyone in society to access the same rights as citizens, helping 
those who are in a position of disadvantage or social exclusion that is preventing them 
from fulfilling their role as a citizen; for example, helping people with physical disabilities 
to enter work by facilitating their access to the workplace. In the context of a concept of 
citizenship social services act as means of solidarity, redistribution, equality and security 
(in the form of pooled risk) within society, by providing infrastructure to facilitate 
appropriate interactions between equal and interdependent citizens (Dean 2004). Thus the 
framework for social service infrastructure is determined by the prevailing concept of 
citizenship. 
Defining Citizenship: a critique 
Since its inception in ancient Greece around 700 B.C. a concept of citizenship has been 
used as a basis for rights and entitlements afforded to individuals under the jurisdiction of a 
state or nation. The issue of citizenship has been a central, but contested concept within 
policy discourse and there has been debate, both within and between nation states, over the 
nature of citizenship and the modes of protection and obligation it dictates. While there is a 
broad agreement on the need for pooled resources, there are conflicting ideas of who 
should be entitled to enter into any solidarity agreement and who should be protected 
under the title ‘citizen’. 
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T. H. Marshall (1950) wrote the twentieth century’s seminal work on citizenship. He 
offered a historical description of the development of industrial societies. His classic 
formulation of citizenship contained three main elements, which developed over 
proceeding centuries. First, in the eighteenth century came civil rights, which dictated the 
establishment of legal citizenship and the notion that all citizens were of equal standing in 
relation to the law. Second, in the nineteenth century came political rights, which allowed 
the access of all citizens to the democratic apparatus that exercise political power (although 
not for all until the early 20th century). Third, in the twentieth century came social rights, 
which established the provision that all citizens should have sufficient means to engage 
fully in society (Marshall 1950). 
 
This Marshallian typology has been widely criticised as too narrow, neglecting the rights 
of women, minority cultures and unpaid workers (such as carers) amongst others (see 
Arksey, et al. 2005; Levitas 2001; Lister 1990; Sevenhuijsen 1998). It has been accused of 
forcing social exclusion on those who cannot participate in the prevailing notion of society. 
In this sense citizenship is a ‘contextualised concept’ (Siim 2000: 1), because minority 
groups experience exclusionary citizenship practices and battle for full inclusion ‘from the 
vantage point of specific, differentiated cultures and practices of citizenship as they are 
consolidated in the countries in which they live or are forced to live’ (Saraceno 1997: 32).  
 
These various criticisms prove that a Marshallian typology of citizenship is not appropriate 
to ensure the rights of vulnerable people are upheld (Lister 2001). Esping-Anderson (1990) 
attempts to approach the concept of citizenship in a different way, by analysing the welfare 
policies of states and categorising them into three broad typologies. These typologies 
reflect the state’s approach to citizenship because contrasting approaches to welfare are 
underpinned by the rights of individuals as defined by the prevailing concept of 
citizenship. 
 
Esping-Anderson (1990) develops a typology of welfare states in the context of a concept 
of citizenship. To do this he includes a political dimension in an attempt to ally the 
normative concept with prevailing political ideology and understand how citizenship is 
facilitated across western states. He conducted a comparative study of different countries 
across the Western world and developed a typology of welfare states that takes into 
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account political forces in its analysis. His widely regarded book ‘The Three Worlds of 
Welfare Capitalism’ (1990) analyses different types of capitalist welfare state regimes that 
exhibit contrasting levels of generosity. His argument is that different countries organise 
social policy provision around three main features:  
1. Level of state intervention 
2. Stratification of social groups 
3. The extent of de-commodification    (Manning 2003) 
 
Countries can be classified into three welfare provision types, dependent upon the effects 
of these three criteria on the welfare effort of a particular country. The first are ‘(neo-) 
liberal’ welfare states, which exhibit a low level of state intervention to encourage the 
market; this creates a large stratification of social groups in terms of income equality as 
benefits are often minimal and associated with stigma and a low level of de-
commodification. Second, ‘corporatist’ regimes exhibit high levels of de-commodification 
through regulation of non-profit providers of social welfare, which leads to high levels of 
stratification (through both income and social status). The third, and as Esping-Anderson 
points out ‘clearly the smallest’ (Esping-Anderson 1990: 27) welfare regime is made up of 
countries where ‘social democracy was clearly the dominant force behind social reform’ 
(Esping-Anderson 1990: 27). From this perspective the nature of the welfare state is very 
much dependent on political decisions, especially the alliances that form between different 
social classes (Manning 2003). 
 
It is argued that neither Marshall’s normative concept nor Esping-Anderson’s political 
typology offers suitable, uncontested analysis of modern citizenship. In Britain 
Government social policy today has followed the cultural shift in economics towards 
individual autonomy, mobility and self-realisation (Giddens 1991, 1992, 1999) in order to 
form the basis of a new ideology of ‘social (or active) citizenship’. Although there has 
obviously been a shift in middle class interest from a state provision of welfare, the shift in 
the UK is also deeply rooted in political forces, which Esping- Anderson (1990) identified 
as a crucial factor in state welfare regimes. Rather than simply having a reciprocal 
relationship where the citizen works, pays taxes, serves on juries and defends the state 
(when appropriate), and in return the state offers protection and shared risk, this new 
concept requires citizens to seek fulfilment of their own potential by being responsible for 
choices in education, health and welfare. In return the government provides opportunities 
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for enterprise and restructures public services, to allow citizens to choose the type of 
service they want and make choices between suppliers, using evaluative information 
published by official agencies and regulators. In essence the New Labour notion of ‘social 
citizenship’ was summed up by Tony Blair in a 1996 lecture to the Fabian Society: 
 
‘A modern notion of citizenship gives rights but demands obligations, shows 
respect but wants it back, grants opportunity but insists on responsibility’ (Blair 
1996: 218) 
 
It is a concept that has a lot in common with Marshall’s (1950) notion of ‘strong 
citizenship’. New Labour accepts that the state should assume some responsibility for 
creating job opportunities and work training opportunities. But in return citizens have a 
responsibility to make the right choices and take up opportunities. Otherwise they can 
expect little support from the national government in the form of welfare. 
 
A conception of citizenship underpins political structures and, in conjunction with 
technical considerations, provides the basis for their construction. I will now proceed to 
discuss the development of social care provision in the UK and trace this in conjunction 
with the prevailing conceptualisation of citizenship and rights. 
 
MODELS OF SOCIAL SERVICE PROVISION: A REFLECTION OF 
THE PREVAILING CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP 
Ever since the inception of 'Social Insurance and Allied Services' in 1942 there has been 
constant ideological and practical debate in Britain about, not only how welfare provision 
should be funded, but also how it should be administrated and controlled. Prior to changes 
that began in the 1980s services were administered in a ‘top-down’ manner, in which civil 
servants controlled the provision of services. The belief was that civil servants were 
professionals who were in the best position to provide fair and effective universal services 
underpinned by a notion of ‘unconditional positive regard’ (Thompson 2005: 119-20); 
where services are provided to anyone who needs them irrespective of ability to pay or 
affiliation. 
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However, in the 1980s this notion began to change. The election of the Thatcher 
government in 1979 represented a clear break with past community care policies, 
particularly with regard to the reduction in the role of local authorities as service providers 
and the promotion of private, for profit provision (Barnes and Walker 1996b). The idea of 
‘value for money’ rippled through the 1980s and early 1990s, which led to a drive for 
greater financial prudence and management of the UK economy; there was no longer the 
guarantee of year on year public expenditure growth (OECD 1994). A lot more emphasis 
was placed on planning, with calls for greater accountability and justification of actions 
from those (individuals or companies) that provide public services. Thus notions of 
participation and acceptability on behalf of the citizen (consumer) became important 
drivers for the need to measure performance and ensure quality. If the government was no 
longer to provide services then it must at least ensure a minimum level of quality in order 
to fulfil its role as a guardian of society’s collective good. With the principle of individual 
choice and accountability enshrined in service provision the main debate today concerning 
provision of social services comes from whether notions of participation and accountability 
should be enacted through a combination of consumerism, and the forces of the market and 
citizenship rights. 
 
New managerialism: the political zeitgeist of public service provision 
In the 1980s under a Conservative government led by Margaret Thatcher a consumerist 
method of providing social care came to the fore. This change in political ideology and 
working came from a shift in values by central government, which led to the rise of ‘new 
managerialsim’ (Davies 1987) within the social services and led to what Rouse (1997) 
summarises as: management decentralisation, financial devolution, ‘new’ human resource 
management, strategic thinking and a quest for quality. The new ideological approach to 
managing public services, was underpinned by a belief in the ‘state regulation of and 
manager power over services and their employees’ (Deem and Brehony 2005: 219). 
 
Stemming from a fear that the market could be swamped by an exponentially increasing 
number of dependent older people this market ideology was reinforced by a familiarist 
ideology that stressed individualism, insisting that in the main older people should depend 
on care provided by their families, rather than the state. With these changes came a seismic 
reprisal of the technologies and functions of the public sector, leading to a focus on 
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judging the performance and quality of the services on offer using performance reviews 
and measurement of efficiency and effectiveness. This shift in agenda can be seen across 
societies and is characterised by certain features: the creation of a mixed economy of 
welfare, diminution in the role of the state and increase in the role of the 3rd sector; the 
separation of provider and funder roles; care packaging and the beginnings of a policy 
tailoring services to individual users (Barnes and Walker 1996b: 375). 
 
Researchers have identified that this movement was not just about social justice and 
efficiency of provision, but about doing different things by transforming services to make 
them fit within technologies that managerialsim brings to them (Hough 1995). The effect 
of these multitude of new managerial influences has caused problems for end users and in 
some ways marginalised empowerment and choice by forcing service provision process 
and care outputs to be construed by recording formats and practice guidelines (Carey 2003; 
Dearmen 2005). Indeed instead of helping services improve and deliver better services in 
partnership the monitoring and constant surveillance has often become the focus of service 
providers (Harlow 2004). 
 
The move towards marketisation induced some real problems amongst users of services 
(Barnes and Walker 1996b). Harding and Beresford (1996) in a report for National 
Institute for Social Work (NISW) found that service users were complaining about the lack 
of organisation and responsiveness to needs within the new market driven sector. Carer 
groups, along with support from researchers have shown that policy in the 1980s took the 
carers role for granted and justified this as part of familiarist ideology (Hirst and Arksey 
2000). Taking this position allowed the government to ignore a large proportion of the 
vulnerable population because according to the neo-liberal model it should be taken care of 
in the private sphere. Consequently the government did very little to support the activities 
of people who were caring for dependent family members (Twigg, et al. 1990). 
 
The 1990 NHS and Community Care Act represent the culmination of policies throughout 
the 1980s and established a new framework for services based on these principles. In 
building on these principles the Act entrenched ‘marketisation’ into the UK social care 
field, not only promoting privately run services, but also creating a ‘quasi-market’ within 
social services (Le Grand and Bartlett 1993). The Government White Paper that led to the 
1990 Act, Caring for People (1989a), justified this change as ‘giving people a greater 
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individual say in how they live their lives and the services they need to help them… (by 
offering)… a wider range and choice of services for the consumer’ (Department of Health 
1989a: 2). However, while the Audit Commission, working to implement the 1990 Act 
claimed ‘The first aim is to empower the service users and their carers’ (Audit 
Commission 1992: 11), the only input into provision that the service user has under this 
model was a very simplistic notion of ‘exit’  – that they can choose to not purchase a 
service (Marquand 2005). In practice this is not viable and in a lot of cases people were 
still passive receivers of care: if an individual needs a bed in a residential care home 
because they can no longer support themselves in their own home, or a person needs help 
to get out of bed in the morning after they have fallen and injured their hip they cannot 
choose to simply not purchase a service because they do not deem it to be appropriate or of 
sufficient quality.  
 
Many of those who are frail are unlikely to be in a position to ‘shop around’ so have no 
real prospect of exit unless this principle is supported by the state, rather than leaving the 
individual to negotiate the market on their own. This meant that there was a dispute about 
how the individual should be involved in their role as a citizen. The model is also 
problematic because although service users may be able to purchase elsewhere the White 
Paper still envisages ‘Care Managers’, professionals who will determine packages of care, 
thus marginalising the individual. Consequently there is less scope for innovation because 
there is little or no involvement of the service user. A purely consumerist model also 
leaves service provision open to the ‘tyranny of the majority’, where priority is given to 
specific common needs and other services, which are less economical to provide, become 
marginalised, or in the worst case scenario do not survive – leaving the people who benefit 
from that care marginalised. 
 
This market-driven model retains some of the problematic features of the ‘top-down’ state-
led model of the early welfare state, which made people passive recipients of professional 
interventions. It also meant the removal of solidarity and a shift in accountability towards 
the individual, making them responsible for making their choices as a consumer, rather 
than allowing the state to carry the burden.  
 
In this context the ideological shift has a also been characterised by a new kind of state 
regulation in the form of performance indicators, league tables, benchmarking and 
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performance management through pre-ordained targets (Hood 1991; Kirkpatrick and Lucio 
1995). As Munro explains regulation allows the government to check: 
 
‘…whether procedures were properly followed (rather) ... than whether the 
professionals made accurate assessments’ (Munro 2004: 1090). 
 
21ST CENTURY OLDER PERSONS’ SOCIAL CARE IN THE UK: 
HOBSON’S CHOICE? 
The influence of third way ideology over politics since New Labour came to power in 
1997 and its insistence on a choice agenda in social care has led to questions over both the 
efficacy of the policies (both long and short term) and the suitability of the mantra. Do 
current older persons’ social care policies offer choice or is the choice agenda simply a 
slogan, which if repeated often enough pushes the right buttons with the general public, but 
when analysed is simply a tautological reification of a system that has changed the process 
of providing welfare (to favour individual autonomy over state accountability) but in fact 
offers no greater choice? 
 
The central tendencies of New Labour’s older peoples’ welfare reforms agenda have been 
articulated by Giddens since the middle of the 1990s.  He claims that  
 
‘Old age at sixty-five is a creation, pure and simple, of the welfare state. It is a form 
of welfare dependency much more widespread than any of the dependencies noted 
by the rightist interpreters of the underclass’ (Giddens 1994: 170).  
 
Giddens argues that old age at sixty-five is a social creation resulting from outdated 
concepts of the welfare state. From this perspective people over the age of sixty-five are 
conceived as a financial and medical burden; a position that has been forced upon them. 
Society has constructed a notion that once people reach sixty-five they are disqualified 
from full membership of society and need to be looked after by the rest of the population. 
By arguing this in the mid 1990s Giddens, and New Labour policy makers, were able to 
claim that themes of dependency and passivity induced by the welfare state are neither 
good for individuals nor society as a whole. The publication of ‘New Ambitions for our 
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Country’ (Department of Social Services 1998) was primarily concerned with shifting 
responsibility away from what New Labour see as passivity and dependency on services 
administered by the state. The policy continued in the direction of the Conservatives’ 
conceptual shift, from the belief that the state should provide adequate support and welfare 
for those who are excluded from participation in mainstream society for reasons of health 
or circumstance, to empowerment and choice where individuals are ‘consumers’; able to 
make decisions tailored to the best welfare support for them, administered by a mixed 
economy of services, and supported by an invigorated information agenda of accessible 
assessment and evaluation. While this re-conceptualisation of old age is entirely 
appropriate because the historically held opinion that older people are helpless is a fallacy, 
if this conceptual shift is used to move accountability away from the state and shift the 
burden onto the individual then there are both moral and practical questions to be asked. 
 
There was undoubtedly a political consideration in the re-conceptualisation of citizenship 
and the implications of this for older peoples’ care provision. State provision had become 
widely derided as inefficient (Clarke and Newman 1997). The implications for cost 
coupled with the ever-increasing older population meant that without a significant increase 
in taxes for the population the means of provision would have to change. To increase taxes 
was deemed to be political suicide, so change and efficiency savings were necessary. A 
primary tactic in this change was a shift towards third sector provision and a greater 
involvement of the service user. 
 
This shift in agenda also came from the practical need for welfare reform. The OECD 
claim that the welfare state could not have survived if it maintained the Beveridge ideal, 
problems associated with ageing alone would bring it to its knees (see OECD 2004). 
However, the road of choice and empowerment was a political option, born out of ideology 
as much as pragmatism. As the Scandinavian model demonstrates, state administered 
welfare can be effective if governments are prepared to raise taxes. As in Scandinavian 
countries a political decision to justify the imposition to raise taxes could have been made. 
The choice to shift responsibility onto individuals and treat services as analogous to goods 
has been preferred and justified as progress; but there is considerable doubt as to whether 
this is to the benefit of either individuals or society. 
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Indeed this shift in responsibility, pushed by New Labour as new and progressive, can be 
traced certainly to the Thatcher government of the 1980s. The conservative notion of a 
‘dependency culture’ in Britain during the 1980s led the neo-liberal reform government of 
Margaret Thatcher to lay the foundations for New Labour’s policies by beginning what 
David Marquand sees as a crucial ‘kulturkampf’ (Marquand 2005: 105) between the state 
and ‘the ethic, culture and operational codes of the public domain’ (105). They did this by 
arguing, as Nigel Lawson did in his book The View from No. 11, that they needed to ‘… 
change the entire culture of a nation from anti-profits, anti-business, government-
dependent, lassitude and defeatism’ (Lawson 1993: 64-5). By rooting out these anti-market 
sentiments the Thatcher government opened the public domain to market forces by 
changing attitudes and behaviour of the public and neutralising public institutions and 
practices. As Marquand points out ‘the crusade did not follow a predetermined path, 
derived from a carefully considered strategy’ (Marquand 2005: 106), but as with most 
political action followed an organic, piecemeal trajectory. 
 
Is an active citizenship model of welfare appropriate? 
A key question to address the success of New Labour’s choice agenda is to question 
whether a choice in services is improving our subjective well-being? Research suggests 
that despite increases in income, subjective well-being of the population is declining 
(Helliwell 2002). It has stalled as a result of  ‘hidden costs’ in the choice / opportunity 
agenda that has permeated Anglophone countries. It is argued that the erosion of solidarity 
and the extra stress as a result of individual autonomy (financially, politically and socially) 
over decision-making is responsible for the stagnation of subjective well-being. Although 
the Government presents schemes where the individual is in control, the primary 
stakeholder in their own welfare, it is plain that they are expected to make the right 
choices. As Mann points out individuals are expected to ‘be saving more, working for 
longer and expecting less from the state’ (Mann 2006: 79).  
 
To make choices requires careful consideration and sufficient information to make an 
informed decision. In the case of social care, the Commission for Social Care Inspection 
(CSCI) offers detailed reports of care services which stakeholders can consult before they 
make their decision on which to choose. However, for those who make the wrong choices 
CSCI also has the power to recommend the closure of a service despite the ‘choice’ (of 
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course in reality this may not have been a choice due to external constraints) that 
stakeholders have made. Policies led by this agenda aim to promote a certain type of 
consumer but cannot do this in a completely free market, because of popular attachments 
to certain public provisions and highlighted previous failures in the private market (e.g. the 
case of staff from the Welcome Care Agency in Birmingham feeding a home care client 
talcum powder (Carvel 2006)).   
 
The jury us still out on whether a social care service centred around the conception of 
social citizenship is promoting better lives for the vulnerable population of Britain. Are 
choices in social care really improving older peoples lives? Some have argued that the 
choice agenda has been deficient in producing greater happiness and well-being than 
collective, state-led provision that offers solidarity as the fabric of society; a ‘social glue’ 
(Jordan 2005a).  
Older persons’ residential care: A focus on outcomes 
Challenges to a concept of ageing that characterise older people as requiring a decreased 
need for social engagement have been articulated since the 1950s (see for example Shanas 
1962; Townsend 1963; Tunstall 1966). The Joseph Rowntree Foundation, in a project 
designed and implemented by older service users, identifies current social care as still 
largely operating on a ‘deficit model’ of service provision: 
 
‘In this model old age is seen an illness for which there is no cure, with the 
‘patient’ losing rights because of the need to accept health or social care 
interventions to treat their ailments or to minimise risks’ (JRF 2004: 12) 
 
This means there is a need to confront stereotyping and challenge ageist perceptions, 
which Department of Health and academic evidence suggests is still a facet of service 
provision. Prevailing political and social conceptions of an active citizenship model of 
welfare provision mean that empowerment is seen as the way to reframe negative 
conceptions of old age, using older people themselves to control their own service 
delivery. 
 
In this context there has been a large amount of research into what service users want from 
the social care they receive. In challenge to former negative conceptions research has 
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shown that good quality care is best delivered if the services focus on outcomes for service 
users (Glendinning, et al. 2006; Netten, et al. 2005; Netten, et al. 2002). Glenndining, 
Clarke et al (2006: v) developed three very useful outcome groups older people identified 
as being important: 
 
Outcomes involving change 
• Improvements in physical symptoms and behaviour. 
• Improvements in physical functioning and mobility. 
• Improvements in morale. 
 
Outcomes involving maintenance or prevention 
• Meeting basic physical needs. 
• Ensuring personal safety and security. 
• Having a clean and tidy home environment. 
• Keeping alert and active. 
• Having social contact and company, including opportunities to contribute as well as 
receive help. 
• Having control over daily routines. 
 
Service process outcomes 
These refer to the ways that services are accessed and delivered and 
include: 
• Feeling valued and respected. 
• Being treated as an individual. 
• Having a say and control over services. 
• Value for money. 
• A good ‘fit’ with other sources of support. 
• Compatibility with, and respect for, cultural and religious preferences. 
 
In terms of policy this evidence has manifest in a set of condensed broad outcome areas: 
• Good social relationships 
• Standards of social comparison and expectations in life 
• Involvement in social and voluntary activities 
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• Pursuing personal hobbies and interests 
• Good health and functional ability 
• Feeling safe 
• Psychological well-being 
• Feeling valued and respected    (Department of Health 2005) 
 
Service users feel that good quality social care is exhibited when care homes provide a safe 
environment, which assesses residents’ needs, provides assistance where it is required and 
gives the residents the opportunity to live a good quality of life. These findings are 
supported by the International Federation of Social Workers, who state in their 
‘International Policy for Older Persons’ policy paper that older people should be able to 
‘exercise the right of self-determination and choice’(IFSW 1999), pursue their interests, 
and have the right to ‘protection, empowerment, initiation and support’ (IFSW 1999) while 
receiving care. 
 
In line with government agenda the focus of social care is now firmly based on creating 
choices, opportunities and interdependence for service users and ‘embedding these new 
approaches into the social care system’s culture and practice’ (Department of Health 
2005). To achieve this the government is committed to fund user-controlled organisations 
in order to create a ‘participatory process of social care development’ (Wistow 2005). But 
along with these new ‘rights’ come the ‘responsibilities’ rooted in the consumerist model. 
 
According to the government White Paper Our Health, Our Choice, Our Say care services 
should be focused on an ‘outcomes led approach’, judged on the extent to which they 
contribute to older people achieving their desired outcomes; to achieve this services should 
work in partnership – both between agencies and professions (Department of Health 2005). 
The regulatory agency, in the case of England the CSCI, has a responsibility to ensure that 
service users receive good information with which to make choices about their care and 
ensure a minimum standard of care in order to protect the safety and well-being of service 
users.  
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A MODEL OF REGULATION AND INSPECTION 
Having established the political context of social care provision this section attempts to 
understand the role of inspection within the regulatory model of social care. 
Modes of regulation 
There are four ways to regulate social care: 
 
1. The first is through public regulation: commissioning an independent, public 
service body to oversee social care services by policing their operation and 
encouraging improvement through enforcing standards and working with service 
providers, within the public and private sectors, to drive up standards.  
 
2. Secondly care could be left to the forces of market competition, which in theory 
should eliminate poor providers. However, there is no evidence to suggest that 
competition takes the form of rivalry to push up quality, rather than keeping prices 
down and profits up.  
 
3. Third would be to rely on the self-regulation of providers, using accreditation by 
provider associations in place of public regulation. However, this would inevitably 
be perceived as self-fulfilling and lacking legitimacy. Organisations cannot be 
trusted to regulate themselves effectively. History has shown that in a liberal 
economy independently run, commercial businesses will inevitably primarily 
function within their own economic interests in an attempt to maximise profit, with 
all other functions, including standards of care, only existing secondary to this 
modus operandi. They must therefore be monitored, checked and scrutinised by 
external agencies in order to be held accountable (Hood, et al. 1999b) 
 
4. Finally regulation could be left in the hands of local authority purchasers, 
regulating by ceasing to buy from poor quality providers and using bulk 
purchasing power to force providers to drive up quality or face a drastic reduction 
in income. This method would leave self-financing users unprotected and create the 
possibility of them being left to purchase from the poorer quality services which 
local authorities decline to buy from due to concerns about standards. 
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These forms of regulation can be characterised in a matrix of public or private and 
economic or social (see Table 1). The vertical axis of the matrix demonstrates regulation 
that takes place within either the public sector, if the work is conducted transparently and 
subject to public scrutiny; or in the private sector if it is conducted ‘in-house’ or by co-
operatives who represent the interest of the organisation being regulated. The horizontal 
axis of the matrix demonstrates how regulation can be characterised as either proactive, 
when it is conducted in response to a set of devised criteria that need to be adhered to in 
order to ensure minimum safety and consistency amongst services, or responsive when 
regulation is left to actions made in response to economic or social failings: 
 
Table 1. Matrix of regulatory frameworks 
 
 Proactive Responsive 
Public (1) Public body 
regulation 
(4) Local authority 
purchases 
Private (3) Self-regulation 
by provider 
associations  
(2) Market 
competition 
 
A system that only acts responsively to a situation once a significant incident occurs or set 
of concerns has been raised, does not provide effective safeguarding of people who use 
services; it is simply securing the gate once the horse has already bolted. Similarly a 
system of privately operated regulation, conducted by providers themselves is not 
acceptable for a service which deals with individuals’ safety and well-being; it lacks 
legitimacy in the eyes of those who use the service, and is often self serving. A proactive 
situation in which an independent, publicly accountable regulator works with service 
providers and users to co-operate in defining standards of practice and implements these 
standards in a transparent, effective manner (number 1 in Table 1) is the optimum method 
of regulation for a service which deals with the safety and well-being of a vulnerable 
section of the population. 
 
The administrative prerogative in public body regulation 
The work of regulatory bodies has a defining impact on regulation outcomes but traditional 
analysis of the regulatory process predominantly focused on legislative inputs as the 
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primary factor in regulatory decision-making. In other words, it is often implied that it is 
possible to explain and predict regulatory outcomes without any attention to either the 
processes involved in implementation, or outcomes generated (Macdonald 1999). Instead 
regulatory outcomes are seen to be a direct result of legislative inputs, inferring legislators’ 
incentives and impediments are key to understanding regulation. Yet as Croley points out, 
the administrative process remains implicit in any theory of regulation (Croley 1998). In 
fact government can affect only limited regulatory change without relying on regulatory 
bodies. So within this thesis I aim to address the deficiency of research in process and 
impact of inspection by considering the views of the stakeholders involved and in doing so 
explicitly highlight the role of the administrative process in regulatory decision-making. 
 
Regulation of social care in the UK demonstrates the importance of the administrative 
process and shows how the appointed administrative body is required to do the bulk of the 
regulatory work. Administrative agencies inevitably fill the gap in legislative policy and 
these ‘gaps’ often constitute much more than minor details, allowing the regulatory body 
to interpret legislation and effectively shape regulation. Legislators determine specific key 
standards (usually around safety and consistency of service) and a broad ideological 
position (e.g. equality of service; individual choice), but the regulatory body interprets how 
to define and apply the legislation, providing it with scope to define meaning. Currently in 
the UK the Care Standards Act (2000) created the broad remit for regulation in the Social 
Care sector and established the CSCI as the regulatory body.  In effect government 
regulates by deferring decision-making to administrative bodies, whose activity is shaped 
by legislated rules and practices but which are open to interpretation and elaboration by 
professionals (Croley 1998). 
 
The CSCI not only implements the regulatory process but crucially in relation to extent 
and influence over regulatory decision-making it also has a remit to develop the knowledge 
base of social care by informing government decision-making, by making annual reports to 
parliament and promoting ‘improvements in social care for the benefit of people who use 
care services’ (CSCI 2006d). The influence the CSCI has on regulatory outcomes is 
extensive and any theory of regulatory impact needs to take administrator influence into 
account. Table 2 shows the process of government regulatory activity: 
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Table 2. Incorporating Administrator Input into Regulatory Activity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While legislative incentive and constraints should not be elided, given that legislators do 
not directly regulate, any attempt to explain regulation by only alluding to legislator 
motivation is misguided. There has to be an examination of the processes by which 
legislative incentives and goals are implemented, sustained and altered. A prime example 
of the influence that regulatory administrators have over outcomes can be demonstrated by 
CSCI’s implementation of the Inspecting for Better Lives (IBL) programme, a new method 
of inspection that required no change in legislation but which aims to drastically alter 
inspection process outcomes. By focusing on effecting changes through dramatically 
increasing the elicitation of service user views and acting more frequently and efficiently 
in direct response to these views, the CSCI hopes to more effectively improve outcomes 
for the individuals who use social care services and improve its regulatory activity. A 
regulatory shift designed and implemented by administrators, rather than legislators, of 
regulation. 
 
Assessing the impact and effectiveness of inspection 
In order to understand how effective inspection works and what it does, it is helpful to 
break down the ‘regulatory environment’ into a structured framework. The terms 
‘inspection’, ‘audit’ and ‘regulation’ tend to be used interchangeably, however a regulatory 
organisation uses many instruments to assess the behaviour and function of services. 
Instruments currently used to regulate performance include registration of providers, site 
visits (to examine organisational process and records), review of strategic plans, 
assessment of performance indicators, financial reviews and annual reports (Boyne, et al. 
2002).  
Incorporating Administrator Input into Regulatory 
Activity 
 
Legislative         Administrator  Regulatory 
Input           process                           outcomes 
  
39 
 
Inspectorates have a dual role, which is usually explicit, of both policing and raising 
standards of the service or institution being inspected. Policing involves detecting and 
dealing with failures to provide services to a minimum standard. These standards can be 
developed in two ways: they are most commonly provided for by government legislation, 
or less frequently can be devised by consultation of all stakeholders with interests in a 
particular regulatory field. Raising standards is achieved by increasing the knowledge base 
of the particular area or field being inspected and devising strategies to work in 
conjunction with the service provider to encourage improvements in performance and 
facilitate the timely adoption of new trends and improvements. However, the effect of 
inspection at raising standards is by no means proven and certainly in terms of education, 
where there has been a comparatively large amount of research, the results are mixed 
(Cullingford 1999b). Inspection can also have a third, less explicit, ‘symbolic’ importance; 
offering reassurance to those using or intending to use the service, regardless of the 
regulators actual impact. While symbolic importance may not be particularly significant 
from an efficacy point of view (although one would expect inspection which has been 
proved effective to offer a greater symbolic importance because the inspection regime is 
well regarded), it is influential on the opinions of service users and therefore the perceived 
impact of inspection. This is most effective when the regulator is held in high public 
esteem. 
 
According to  Boyd and Walshe (2005), in their systematic review of literature on the 
impact of regulation of healthcare provision, there are a number of typologies that describe 
regulation in a number of different environments. Having examined these, and considered 
them in relation to social care regulation, I agree with Boyd and Walshe and find it useful 
to analyse the regulatory environment as broken down into four components – (1) purpose 
and objectives; (2) regulatory agency; (3) the range, nature and scope of the regulated 
organisation; (4) and the legislated regime of regulatory organisations. These four 
normative components deserve further attention within the context of social care, before 
consideration of the regulation of social care in England. I will examine them in turn: 
 
1. Purpose and objectives 
Boyd and Walshe (2005) consider the purpose and objectives of regulation to centre 
around three main purposes: 
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1. Improving the performance of regulated organisations (by encouraging reflection 
and self-evaluation from the regulated organisation and positive guidance and 
encouragement from the regulator in order to encourage the service to achieve 
legal standards and better practice), 
2. Making organisations more accountable for what they do, 
3. Providing information about regulated organisations that others can use in making 
decisions. 
 
While I am in agreement with the broad sentiment of these 3 main objectives I think it is 
necessary to be more specific. In order to develop further specificity it is useful to add a 
collaborative element to objective 1, ensuring that both the regulatory organisation and the 
provider cooperate rather than developing a frictional relationship (see additional italics in 
purpose and objectives). This places emphasis on service improvement coming from the 
service provider, creating a situation in which responsibility for quality rests with the 
provider rather than the regulator. This creates a subtle but important distinction in 
accountability between regulator and provider, by tipping the balance of accountability 
toward the provider.  
 
Shifting this balance has a two-fold effect. First, it raises the esteem of the registered 
manager and places faith in their professional ability. In order to be a registered manager 
an individual must hold a minimum of a level 3 National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) 
(or at least be in the process of completing) (Department of Health 2001). By emphasising 
the professionalism of the managerial position the belief is that the job will attract capable 
and skilled people, who have to be abreast of current standards and best practice and are 
capable of running a modern care home. The regulator can then be confident that the 
manager will be responsible for running a good quality home and because their 
professional reputation depends on the performance of their service. 
 
Second, a shift in responsibility reduces the ‘policing’ requirement of the regulator, freeing 
it to work in a more positive manner at the forefront of innovative quality development. 
Inspectors are free to engage with service providers to cooperatively develop quality, 
rather than fostering an antagonistic police / offender relationship where the regulator is 
(perceived to be) looking to catch the provider out. In the context of social care regulation I 
would also add two subsequent objectives: 
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1. Maintaining minimum standards of safety for both service users and staff, 
2. Encouraging involvement of service user groups in decision-making in social 
services, regulatory organisations and social care providers. 
 
It must be acknowledged that these regulatory purposes can often conflict, forcing the 
regulator to prioritise one purpose over others (Walshe and Boyd 2005). This dilemma 
places an emphasis both on the professionalism (technical and tacit knowledge) of the 
regulator and the relationship of the regulator with the provider. Professionalism of the 
regulator is important because it encompasses both the technical and tacit knowledge 
required to do the job effectively. Technical knowledge represents the regulators 
knowledge of the rules and regulations. Tacit knowledge is the wisdom and experience of 
the regulator and their ability to use their professional experience to make judgements over 
what represents particular importance in specific cases; this helps to prioritise, and 
demonstrates the need for well trained and qualified regulators.  
 
The relationship between the regulator and provider is important because it may be 
necessary for the regulator to determine and understand why priorities are made. This 
requires the manager to have both the professional ability to determine priorities and to 
justify to the regulator, using appropriate evidence, why a particular decision has been 
made or course of action taken, possibly at the expense of other areas. 
 
2. Regulatory body or agency 
The regulatory body or agency – its nature, legal form, powers, funding and governance - 
are crucial to any form of regulation. A regulatory agency can take the form of a statutory 
body with clearly defined legal powers and a remit entrenched in law, or it can be 
voluntary, working from a mandate stipulated by the organisations it regulates. Depending 
on its structure the body could be funded by government, or through contributions from 
regulated organisations. Decisions concerning the body’s legal form and funding determine 
whether it is held accountable by elected officials in government or a governance structure 
determined by funders and key stakeholders, independent of government (Walshe and 
Boyd 2005).  
 
With respect to social care, a system of privately operated regulation, with a mandate 
stipulated by the organisations it regulates and compliance checked by providers 
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themselves is not acceptable for a service which deals with individuals’ safety and well-
being; it lacks legitimacy in the eyes of those who use the service, and is often self serving. 
Historical instances of mis-treatment and abuse clearly demonstrate the need for publicly 
accountable regulation. In this context a proactive situation in which an independent, 
publicly accountable regulator works with service providers and users to co-operate in 
defining standards of practice and implements these standards in a transparent, effective 
manner through inspection is the optimum method of regulation for a service which deals 
with the safety and well-being of a vulnerable section of the population. 
 
3. Range, nature and scope of regulated organisations and activities 
The range, nature and scope of regulated organisations and activities consists of 
factors such as size, composition (homogeneity or heterogeneity) of regulated 
organisations, and extent of scope both horizontally (across organisations) and vertically 
(within organisations) (Walshe and Boyd 2005).  
 
Within social care the scope of regulation needs to be wide and focused on all aspects of 
care. Reports from across the world in the 1980s demonstrated that regulation has to first 
and foremost be interested in resident / patient care matters. The focus must be on 
outcomes of care, rather than inputs into service provision. Changes to the ethos and scope 
of regulation were recommended by the Giles Report (so called as the Senate Select 
Committee was chair by Senator Patricia Giles) in Australia (1985) and the Homes Are for 
Living In report by the Department for Health in the UK (1989c); reports which are 
reflective of a change in thinking regarding the composition of social care regulatory 
agencies. These reports demonstrated that it was no longer good enough to simply look at 
traditional measures of quality of care, such as size of rooms. Regulators must also to look 
at quality of life issues, which may not be demonstrated by simple objective indicators. 
 
In order to be effective at maintaining safety and quality of life the regulatory agency has 
to be large, in both size and scope. Social care providers offer a diverse range of services, 
so they require a flexible and multi-faceted regulatory organisation that can understand the 
characteristics of the particular service they provide. Social care encompasses: nursing care 
homes, residential personal care homes (for the elderly, adults with learning disabilities 
and children) and domiciliary care. Although these services appear heterogeneous they all 
have the same fundamental responsibilities of providing care that offers users two 
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fundamental rights: safety and a good quality of life. The heterogeneity of social care 
services means that the regulatory body also has to be relatively heterogeneous and have 
the scope to regulate across the various organisations and types of services. It must also 
have the scope to infiltrate vertically within an organisation to gain a heuristic 
understanding of service practices. This offers a vantage from which to locate and 
eliminate bad practice and offer useful, constructive advice to help a service provider 
improve. 
 
4. Regulatory regime 
‘The regulatory regime is the activities and process which make up the work of the 
regulator’ (Walshe and Boyd 2005: 4). It is usually divided into three areas – direction, 
detection and enforcement – and is shaped by the regulatory agency’s philosophy and 
remit, which in turn is determined by the legislation set out by government and the 
interpretation of this by the regulator. The regime is also dependent on how the regulator 
interprets the regulated organisation and how it views the relationship between the two. 
The regulated organisations can be seen as compliers, willing to cooperate and take advice 
in a productive manner or deceivers who act amorally by nature and attempt to avoid and 
subvert the regulatory process through deception and calculated non-cooperation. The way 
the regulators and the providers interpret the regulatory regime determines their approach 
to the process (Walshe and Boyd 2005).  
 
Consultation of services users within social care has shown that the direction of the 
regulator must be orientated towards maintaining and improving safety and quality of 
service, with particular attention to the quality of life of service users (see Department of 
Health 2005). Comparative analysis of European models of social care provision shows 
that although there are often significant differences in provision across countries this is 
often the result of political and policy limitations, driven by finite resources. Despite the 
limitations on delivery of service there is still a consensus that there should be clear 
minimum levels of care (Leichsenring 2004).  
 
Detection involves both a ‘policing’ role to keep providers in check, but also a 
‘cooperative’ role to encourage service providers to self-assess and be constantly seeking 
improvement. How the regulator balances this duality can have an effect on both the role 
and scope of the regulator, in terms of how it operates, and the relationship of the regulator 
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with the provider. A regulatory system that encourages a self-critical role for the provider, 
and a regulator that works with the service to drive improvement is very different to one 
that fosters an antagonistic relationship of police and perpetrator. It is inevitable that the 
relationship is never this clear cut, but the ethos and direction of the regulator can have a 
huge influence on the type of regulatory system that evolves.  
 
Enforcement can be achieved both directly and indirectly. At the extreme, direct 
enforcement can be asserted through closure notices, but only after a lengthy engagement 
with a service to attempt to rectify the issue and the due process of legal action. More often 
enforcement is conducted through the administering of ‘requirements or 
recommendations’. These stipulations indicate to a service that they need to improve a 
particular aspect of their service, sometimes within a certain time frame. A second, indirect 
method of enforcement can be provided by a rating system, which is made public and 
allows the public to see how well a service is performing. People are then free to choose 
which particular services they want to use, providing an incentive for services to maintain 
quality, or face a bad reputation and people opting to use and crucially pay for other 
services.  
 
In order to mitigate the demand this new choice agenda places on the autonomy of the 
individual, to make the right choice when deciding upon a particular service, the 
government has promulgated that individuals should have the ‘best possible’ information 
to make a choice of service. A system of regulation has been developed that places 
information in the hands of the public. The key to achieving this goal in social care has 
been to implement a rigorous and transparent inspection regime, with outcome information 
readily available to the public. This process of inspection and dissemination reflects a 
wider movement (also in education, health) in public service provision, toward ‘new 
managerialism’ (Kirkpatrick and Lucio 1995) and what Hood et al (1999b) argue is the 
creation of the regulatory state.  
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSPECTION PROCESS: PATH TO AN 
OUTCOMES APPROACH 
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There is a variety of legislation, beginning in 1948, that has shaped both the way that 
residential care has developed in England and how local authorities have a primary role in 
providing and financing residential social care services. 
 
The National Assistance Act 1948, which was updated in 1992 with the Choice of 
Accommodation Directions (1992), and then further updated in 2001 with the National 
Assistance (Additional Payments and Assessment of Resources) (Amendment) 
(England) Regulations 2001 stipulates in sections 21 and 47 that local authorities have a 
duty to provide accommodation for people in need of support and care ‘otherwise not 
available to them’. It sets out what individuals should expect from the council that is 
responsible for funding their care, subject to the individual's means, when arranging a care 
home place for them. Any individual with less than £13000 of assets is entitled to safe and 
secure accommodation and care paid for by their local authority. If an individual has assets 
between £13000 and £21500 then they are expected to make some contribution towards the 
cost of their care. Anyone with more than £21500 of assets is expected to make the full 
contribution towards the cost of their care until their assets fall below that threshold; assets 
include both savings and property (CSCI 2007b). Accommodation should also be allocated 
based on the individual’s preference, providing their assessed needs will be met and the 
cost is not over the ‘usual cost’ – i.e. what the council would expect to pay for 
accommodation based on the assessed needs of the individual. It also stipulates that 
individuals can choose to pay a ‘top-up’, to make up the difference between the fees and 
the price the local authority will pay in order to move into somewhere of their choosing. 
 
There was a long gap in legislation to the NHS and Community Care Act 1990, which 
essentially tried to shift local authority practice from resource-led placing, i.e. fitting 
people into services already available, to needs led placing, in which the individual’s needs 
are assessed by a social worker and are given the option of a range of services based on a 
decision (jointly arrived at between the social worker and the service users) about what 
service(s) would best fulfil these needs. The Act heralded the shift towards a care planning 
process based around the needs of the person, which sets out to jointly determine an 
individual’s needs with the full involvement of the service users. From April 1991 local 
authorities were made responsible, with collaboration with necessary health care 
professionals, for assessing the needs of any individual who requested public support for 
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their social care. Together the social worker and the service user decide on appropriate 
services to meet their needs and then monitor these services by measuring the outcomes.  
 
The 1990 Act also introduced the need to develop a mixed economy of care in which the 
local authority will play a major role in stimulating the growth of non-statutory, 
independent service providers that meet the required standards of care (Department of 
Health 1989b). This was justified because it was thought to be the most cost-effective way 
to develop new and innovative service provision, free from the expensive, bureaucracy 
laden local authority ‘in-house’ provision of earlier decades. The role of the service users 
as a ‘partner’ in their care provision was not explicitly stated in the 1990 Act and its 
associated documentation, this came later, but it was definitely implicit in the format of 
their care assessment. 
 
In terms of regulation the 1990 Act was crucial because the role of Local Authorities was 
redefined: to become purchases rather than providers of care. Second, any remaining Local 
Authority run homes were to move from their position immune from systematic inspection, 
to be scrutinised by the regulatory process; the shift from provision to regulation 
represented a paradigmatic shift in welfare provision. To ensure greater authority and 
legitimacy, the one hundred and seven Inspection Units in England were given semi-
autonomous status, but kept within the social services departments. Lay assessors were 
also introduced into the inspection process and inspection reports were made public 
documents for the first time. The foundations of stakeholder involvement were also 
developed by the creation of Advisory Committees to work alongside each Inspection 
Unit, crucially these included representatives of providers but not service users, and so 
only represented the first step of modernisation (Day, et al. 1996). 
 
According to Day et al (1996) ‘the new inspection units set up in the 1990s have had to 
invent themselves’ (Day, et al. 1996: 2). Their new duties included familiar responsibilities 
in current regulation, such as registration of all new and existing care homes and day care 
facilities. However, although the scope of the regulatory framework was increased 
dramatically by the inception of the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act the requirements 
and regulations that the new bodies had to enforce were still defined by the 1984 
Registered Homes Act. In order to respond to the new changes the 1984 act was simply 
reviewed and translated into regulations by the SSI, rather than there being a new set of 
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legislatured regulations to compliment the advent of a new inspection process. This gap in 
legislation meant that regulations were left to be defined by the non-elected process 
administrators – further evidence of the administrator prerogative. However, because of the 
limited confines within which they could interpret the 1984 Act the SSI were placed in a 
policy straight jacket, unable to affect the same wide ranging changes to the process of 
inspection as was made to the structure of the inspection units.  
 
The ambiguous and poorly conceived language of the 1984 Act also meant that national 
requirements were set out in general terms of ‘adequacy’ and ‘sufficiency’ as opposed to 
the more stringent and ambitious language of ‘requirements’ and ‘national minimum 
standards’ that is used today. The generalness of the terms and ambiguity of the Act also 
required the regulatory authorities to beef up and expand upon the local guidance to 
providers, and the conditions of registration, which gave a greater professional role to 
administrators of the inspection process, but sacrificed consistency and ultimately 
accountability by placing a large proportion of the regulatory decision-making in the hands 
of local level non-elected public servants (Day, et al. 1996). The regulatory system at this 
point was further fragmented, because local authorities were responsible for registering 
and inspecting residential care homes and health authorities responsible for nursing homes. 
A lack of attention to the regulatory mechanisms in the early 1990s further suggests that 
the Conservative government was preoccupied with marketisation and felt that this would 
root our poor providers, eliminating the need for lengthy, interfering government 
legislation. I have argued that this proved to be misguided and by neglecting regulatory 
policy in the 1980s and 1990s the Conservative government only served to further fracture 
the social care system and reify the inappropriateness of marketisation to develop and 
improve provision. 
 
Fragmentation and ambiguity continued throughout the 1990s until the Labour government 
published the 1998 White Paper Modernising Social Services (1998). Regulatory structures 
before the White Paper were regarded as bureaucratic and snapshot, doing little more than 
maintaining minimum standards of care (Reed, et al. 1999). This contrasted with the 
prevailing political impetus of the New Labour Government which focused on evidence 
from quality assurance processes outside of social care that demonstrated the benefit of 
engaging with service users and soliciting their views. Although it addresses social 
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services as a whole the paper was devised partly in response to three main criticisms of 
regulation: 
1. Standards were inconsistent across the country 
2. Local authority inspection units are insufficiently independent 
3. The division between health and social care is an artificial one 
(Burgner 1996) 
 
The White Paper outlined plans for the development of eight regional Commissions for 
Care Standards in England, which would alleviate fragmentation by bringing the regulation 
of all residential, domiciliary and nursing home care for both adults and children under one 
new ‘joined-up’ authority, working to new national standards.  
 
In response to the impetus of new legislation the Department of Health commissioned the 
Centre for Policy on Ageing to devise a set of National Required Standards to be the 
enforced by the National Care Standards Commission (NCSC). The draft of these 
standards were submitted in 1999 and the final version was published in 2001 by 
Department of Health as ‘Care Homes for Older People: National Minimum Standards’ 
(2001b). These standards formed the basis for inspection, dictating the benchmarks to 
which providers of social care had to conform. They were devised through consultation of 
stakeholders and represented a change in tact from preceding governments, towards a more 
inclusive, ‘bottom-up’ legislative process.  
 
Legislation for these changes occurred in the Care Standards Act 2000, which replaced 
the by now debunked and grossly inefficient Registered Home Act 1984. However, instead 
of eight regional commissions, as envisaged in the Modernising Social Services White 
Paper, the National Care Standards Commission (NCSC) took control of regulation in 
April 2002. 
 
With the implementation of this new act the vague, unenforceable standards, which led to a 
lot of confusion were replaced by NMS that specified exact criteria that had to be met in 
order to adhere to the standard. To remove the ambiguity and inconsistency caused by 
uncoordinated, local regulation the 2000 Act introduced the NCSC to regulate services 
nationally.  
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NMS are not set out in legislation and are therefore not enforceable in law, but they do set 
out the terms and conditions of what the regulator deems to be the minimum level of care a 
service must provide. The regulator, working as an independent public service body, must 
decide whether services meet The Care Home Regulations 2001, which are mandatory 
and to do this takes into account NMS. However, these standards do not represent the only 
regulations and a care home can still be deemed as not meeting The Care Homes 
Regulations 2001 even if it is meeting all or most of the NMS. The NMS ‘focus on 
achievable outcomes for service users’ (Department of Health 2001b: 9) and measure the 
impact the services provided by the home have on these outcomes. After significant 
consultation with service users the Department of Health grouped the NMS into seven 
outcome groups, which correspond to the most important aspect of people’s lives 
highlighted during the consultation: 
• Choice of home  
• Health and personal care  
• Daily life and social activities  
• Complaints and protection  
• Environment  
• Staffing 
• Management and administration   (Department of Health 2001b) 
 
These seven areas cover all 38 NMS, which each fall under one of the general headings. 
Each of the seven outcome areas are justified by a statement of good practice that sets out 
how these outcomes should be met. The regulations then state that evidence to assess 
whether the 38 standards are being met should be sought from:  
• Discussions with service users, families and friends, staff and managers and others 
• Observation of daily life in the home 
• Scrutiny of written policies, procedures and records  
(Department of Health 2001b) 
 
An assessment of whether the home has sufficiently met the 38 NMS combined with a 
wider assessment of whether the home has met The Care Homes Regulations Act 2001 
determines whether a care home service is providing sufficient quality under the Care 
Standards Act 2000. These decisions are also made within the wider context of 
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government policy around whether service users are having their independence and choice 
promoted. 
 
In April 2004, as a result of the enactment of the Health and Social Care (Community 
Health and Standards) Act 2003, the NCSC ceased to exist and the CSCI took over 
responsibilities for regulating care services in England. The CSCI was created to bring 
together all aspects of inspection and regulation under one umbrella and create a joined up 
form of regulation. The Act brought together the work of three previously independent 
bodies: 
 
• The Social Services Inspectorate (SSI) 
• SSI / Audit Commission Joint Review Team 
• The National Care Standards Commission (NCSC) 
 
This created a commission with a much wider remit than its predecessors, forming an 
organisation with an overview of the whole of social care; focusing on the five main roles 
of a regulator: inspection, registration, development, complaints and enforcement. As well 
as the inception of this new regulatory body the Health and Social Care Act 2001 also 
explicitly states the CSCI has two main functions under section 76: 
 
(1) The CSCI has the general function of encouraging improvement in the provision of 
English local authority social services. 
 
(2) In exercising its functions under subsection (1) and sections 77 to 81 in relation to the 
provision of such services the CSCI shall be concerned in particular with— 
(a) the availability of, and access to, the services; 
(b) the quality and effectiveness of the services; 
(c) the management of the services; 
(d) the economy and efficiency of their provision and their value for money; 
(e) the availability and quality of information provided to the public about the 
services; 
(f) the need to safeguard and promote the rights and welfare of children; and 
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(g) the effectiveness of measures taken by local authorities for the purpose 
specified in paragraph (f). 
  (Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003)  
The Act was intended to increase the role of the regulator to focus on quality outcomes for 
the service user, with particular attention to their choice and empowerment. There is also 
provision under the Act that the CSCI should, when asked by the Secretary of State, give 
advice on matters relating to the provision of registered social care services in England. 
 
The model of UK regulation 
Today the UK regulatory framework is structured using the public / proactive system (see 
Table 1). The ‘regulatory state’ functions in two ways: first, it determines, through 
consultation, a set of minimum standards for a particular sector of society (e.g. social care, 
education). An assessment of quality is used, based on the set of standards devised by an 
independent body, legislated or otherwise. These rules aim to primarily protect the safety 
of users, and allow them the opportunity to live a dignified life, free from marginalisation, 
by ensuring the services they require meet social, cultural and emotional needs. In this role 
the state fulfils a paternalistic function – consulting upon and then determining an 
acceptable level of provision for a public service body. 
 
Secondly, regulation has an equally important goal of driving improvement, a goal that can 
be achieved by two means. The first runs interdependently with the choice agenda and is 
based on the assumption that if an individual is given a choice of service and is given 
sufficient information to make that choice, because they will only choose services of the 
highest quality all service will be forced to ‘raise their game’ and improve the quality of 
their provision. A choice agenda provides key regulatory quality assurance mechanism, if 
services fail to live up to expected standards they will face being driven out of the market. 
This belief draws on aspects of free market economics (albeit only small aspects, within 
the context of government led regulation), whereby poorly performing services are pushed 
out of the market, as they cannot compete with better services. Doing this removes a large 
proportion of accountability for the quality of services away from the state and places it 
firmly in the arms of the consumer – they are being given information on standards and 
quality of service, so if people, either individually or collectively, end up with poor quality 
services it is because they choose to, rather than because the state offers poor provision. 
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In this theoretical context I now present the findings of a systematic review into the 
effectiveness of inspection in residential social care. 
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CHAPTER 2: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF THE IMPACTS 
OF INSPECTION AND REGULATION ON OLDER 
PERSONS’ RESIDENTIAL SOCIAL CARE 
 
Effective Inspection: Why conduct a Systematic Review (SR)? 
There is little existing evidence to suggest what constitutes effective inspection in social 
care, or whether effective inspection promotes factors which older people claim improve 
their lives. It is unclear what impact inspection has on outcomes of social care or what 
outcomes designate effective inspection. There are various ways the inspection process 
could be judged to improve quality of care, including: 
• Improving care homes’ performances against a set of measurable standards 
• Improving the lives of residents as measured, for example, by an increase in 
participation, or increase in measured objective well-being. 
• Inducing an increase in staffing levels, which research in both Australia and the 
United States has shown corresponds directly with improved care (Braithwaite 
2001; Harrington 2001).  
• Impacting on whether care is purchased from a particular home. As yet there is 
little international work on establishing links between care home performance and 
purchasing of residential care services, either by individuals or by government 
authorities (Harrington 2001).  
 
It is unclear whether inspection works in all instances, in all older persons’ care homes, or 
whether it has a greater effect on some homes compared to others and particular outcomes 
over others. This protocol is driven by the necessity to improve the knowledge base of 
social care inspection and inform policy making by facilitating decision-making that is 
well informed by evidence. 
 
A lack of existing evidence 
The CSCI has very little information on the efficacy of the inspection process, which 
suggests there is a dearth of accessible research. This apparent lack of impact research is 
not just limited to social care inspection. There has been little policy research done in the 
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UK on outcomes research per se, with the Department of Health instead focusing much of 
their work on monitoring the impact of legislation (Macdonald 1999).  The rhetoric of 
governments, built on or influenced by the Third Way pragmatism of ‘what counts is what 
works’ and the subsequent belief that polices should be ‘evidence based’ is left wanting 
when there is no systematic body of evidence on the benefit and costs of inspection and 
regulatory regimes (see Boyne, et al. 2002; Hood, et al. 2000).  
 
The apparent lack of research on effectiveness seems to represent a certain level of 
scepticism social care researchers have towards the epistemology of evidence-based policy 
making and its affiliation to health based research. However, in order to be accountable, 
social care regulatory bodies, as regulators of government policy (or at the very least social 
justice), need to reflect on the efficacy of their work and establish a knowledge base from 
which they can begin to assess their performance. What this review aims to achieve is to 
begin to build a map of international evidence on the efficacy of social care inspection and 
help to inform evidence based decision making in the social care sector by systematically 
searching for, and analysing all relevant studies in the field of inspection and regulation of 
older people.  
 
There is also a need to build upon questions of efficacy and determine what makes 
inspection more or less effective. Within the UK there has been a paradigmatic shift to 
place service users, not just social care professionals, at the forefront of improving social 
care. In light of this inclusive direction and in concomitance with considering the impact 
and effect of inspection, it is necessary to examine why inspection has an effect (either 
negative or positive) on the users of social care and understand how the inspection process 
directly effects the individuals it aims to serve. 
Objectives 
The aim of this review was two-fold and it was conducted in two separate parts: 
 
A. Effectiveness question: Assess evidence for the efficacy or otherwise of the 
regulation and inspection process to improve living conditions and well-being in 
older people (over 65) living in residential care 
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B. Process question: In what conditions are inspection and regulation more or less 
effective? How do service users view the inspection process? 
 
In order to answer question A I used the best available evidence from well-designed and 
explicit trials, whether randomised or not. 
 
Question A locates studies which show what works but which do not tell us why or how 
they work therefore I propose that the second part of this review will look at process 
issues. Question B will be answered using data from qualitative research and other types of 
process research and evaluations that reflect key contextual and implementation issues of 
regulation and inspection. 
 
PROTOCOL 
For a full protocol please see Appendix 1. 
SYSTEMATIC REVIEW FINDINGS 
Mapping the research 
The search spanned 21 websites or databases and initially located 12386 articles, books or 
conference papers (for the table breakdown of each database sources see appendix 2). 
From this initial number 12308 were eliminated based on title or abstract2, leaving me with 
78 full text articles. For an overview of this process see Appendix 1. 
 
Full text versions of the 78 articles were retrieved and examined to determine whether they 
fit the inclusion criteria of the Systematic Review. The results were as follows:  
Excluded articles 
For table of all articles excluded after the full text stage see tables at end of Appendix 1. 
 
                                                 
2
 Most databases gave an abstract as well as title with their output. For those databases 
which only gave a title I ordered full text articles for any output which I could not make a 
decision to eliminate based on title alone. However, in order to be consistent, these were 
only registered as full-text articles in the search table, if I could not eliminate them after 
reading the abstract. 
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There were 69 articles excluded after looking at the full text. 
 
Articles I could not locate, or retrieve 
I could not get access to 2 research articles:  
1. Davies, B. (1999) The Regulation and Deregulation of Social Care, a PhD Thesis. 
Not available through The British Library Document Supply Centre. 
 
There were 6 studies which fit the inclusion criteria of the SR and which are included in 
the analysis: 
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Table 3: Included articles for process question 
 
Author Title Date 
Published 
Publication Database / 
web portal 
Sinclair, I. and 
Gibbs, I. 
Consistency: a 
pre-requisite for 
inspecting old 
people’s homes? 
1992 British Journal 
of Social Work 
CSA 
illumnia 
Sinclair, I. and 
Gibbs, I. 
Residential Care 
for Elderly 
People: The 
correlates of 
Quality 
1992 Ageing and 
Society 
Social Policy 
and Practice 
Fleishman, R. 
et al 
Improving the 
quality of 
institutional care 
on urinary 
incontinence 
among the 
elderly: a 
challenge for 
government 
regulation 
1999 International 
Journal of 
Health Care 
Quality 
Assurance 
CSA 
illumnia 
Counsel and 
Care 
Under Inspection 1995 Counsel and 
Care report 
Ovid 
Redmayne, S. Spotlight on 
Homes for the 
Elderly: an 
analysis of 
inspection reports 
on care homes for 
the elderly 
1995 Bath Social 
Policy Papers 
Social Care 
Online 
Day, P. Klein, 
R. and 
Redmayne, S. 
Why Regulate? 
Regulating 
residential Care 
for elderly people 
1996 Policy Press 
and Joseph 
Rowntree 
Foundation 
Social Policy 
and Practice 
 
Effectiveness studies 
The limited scope of research design in many studies, coupled with the limited information 
provided in published accounts (journal articles, reports), means that it is difficult to 
establish an evidence base for the effectiveness of inspection in social care. In order to best 
assess the effectiveness of inspection it is necessary to focus on the outcomes of the 
process, to determine whether inspection delivers the best consequences for social care 
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service users. When examining the impact of inspection on social care services there are 
six main outcome areas: 
1. Resident’s reaction to the inspection 
2. Stimulation – new activities undertaken by residents 
3. Behaviour change of residents 
4. Behaviour changes of staff – change in attitudes or perceptions towards service 
users 
5. Changes in organisational practice – relates to changes in service delivery 
6. Benefits to users and carers – improvements in well-being and quality of life for 
people who use the service and staff. 
 
It is appropriate to conceptualise inspection both as a motivator for change in service 
delivery and as a causal determinant of changes in resident and staff behaviour. In acting 
as a motivator inspection provides a ‘check mechanism’ to keep the service ‘on its toes’; 
the manager is aware that there could be an inspection at any time (theoretically). The 
second function of inspection is to provide a ‘change mechanism’, which will pick up on 
areas in which the service is failing to attain standards. Inspectors will alert the service to 
this situation and demand that something is done to rectify the problem. 
 
By looking at outcomes using these two mechanisms it focuses attention on possible 
different levels of inspection effectiveness and places a focus on service-user views; 
determining whether inspection has had a positive outcome on their lives. 
 
This review located 0 studies of effectiveness that reach the methodological standards 
stipulated in the guidelines developed in the protocol for this review.  
 
This SR demonstrates a lacuna in the field of research that examines the appropriateness of 
current arguments about the effectiveness of inspection by attempting to ascertain whether 
it is effective in practice. Without any literature examining how effective inspection is at 
safeguarding older people, assuring their needs are met and their choices respected, or 
determining if the regulation is cost-effective, it becomes increasingly difficult to judge 
whether inspection is achieving its purpose or whether it could be carried out more 
effectively. 
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There is little dispute that inspection of older persons’ residential care is necessary, but at 
present there is no research, that meets appropriate scientific methodological criteria, to 
support its success. There is a plethora of anecdotal evidence, from residents, family, staff 
and others involved in residential care, to suggest that this is the case, but in a society 
increasingly occupied with targets and evidence, anecdotes are not enough to influence 
policy decision-making, unless they are collected in a systematic and unbiased way, in a 
manner that adheres to conventions of methodological rigour. 
Process Studies 
Evaluation of the process of inspection and regulation of older persons’ residential social 
care provides a context to understand the results of policy-making more fully. It is 
designed to describe what goes on, rather than to establish whether or not something 
works. Studies on the process of an intervention may lead to suggestions for 
improvements, especially if the intervention is to be rolled out on a larger scale. As 
Kavanagh et al (2006) explain: 
 
‘Process issues make a vital, and sometimes underestimated,  contribution to 
the effectiveness and sustainability of a programme.  This is particularly the 
case where an intervention is designed for  mainstream use in complex and busy 
working environments such as  schools and colleges, youth clubs, or health 
care settings.’          
 (Kavanagh, et al. 2006: 40) 
 
This review found 6 studies that met the inclusion criteria of objective B. 
Synthesis 
There were 0 studies which fulfilled the inclusion criteria of objective A. Therefore I will 
only discuss the synthesis of studies included to answer the objective B question. 
Processing Objective B studies 
The high volume of studies in systematic reviews means that on the whole quality 
appraisal is conducted separately to data extraction. As recommended by Fisher, et al. 
(2006) the synthesis was conducted with reference to information recorded on the data 
extraction forms (see Appendix 1). These forms were constructed from a template 
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designed to allow the included studies to be analysed and presented in an accessible form. 
Using these records greatly expedited the writing process because data and analysis could 
be drawn from the pre-compiled record and incorporated into the review. Keeping a record 
for each of the included studies also provides a useful way of organising included studies, 
which when over 12000 returned across the databases, can be a difficult task.  If I was 
unsure about a particular theme or idea I occasionally referred back to the individual 
research papers for clarification.  
 
As there was only one person conducting the review there was no scope for an inter-rater 
reliability test. 
Rationale for synthesising qualitative research  
Estabrooks et al (2004) claim that analysis and synthesis of an ‘aggregation’ of qualitative 
studies can contribute more powerfully to theory-building than any single study. Synthesis 
of evidence in this way allows for the development of larger narratives and more 
generalisable theories. In this way it can overcome the common problem of isolation, often 
associated with qualitative research, allowing for the construction of cross-study themes 
and more robust analytical categories (Dixon-Woods, et al. 2004). 
 
The pooling of qualitative studies also allows for the optimum use of primary data. As 
Thorne (1994) asserts, some questions can only be answered using a range of data sources, 
especially when occurrences are too rare to be identified by a single study, e.g. the use of 
observation may uncover issues not picked up by interview studies, such as instances of 
incompetence. A synthesis also generates a larger sample of data that can provide more 
significant explanations than one study alone (Sherwood 1999). To combine the data of all 
available studies is incredibly useful for research on vulnerable or hard to reach groups 
because it maximises the available evidence from an area which might be very sparse on 
research. In conjunction with this Campbell et al (2003) found when they investigated 
seven qualitative studies on patients’ experiences of diabetes, that not one referred to the 
other. A problem with obvious connotations in fields where there is already a dearth of 
research. As systematic search and synthesis allows for well-informed conclusions and 
paves the way for research that provides continuity and builds upon existing data. 
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Unlike quantitative research, methods of synthesising qualitative forms of data have 
developed slowly and the optimum method is still contested (Dixon-Woods et al 2004). 
Work such as that by Dixon-Woods and Fitzpatrick (2001) concede that analysing 
qualitative research is still a matter for debate and they demonstrate the need for further 
research and development in this area. 
 
The studies were analysed from the data extraction records using a non-computer based 
coding scheme. The analysis was ‘interpretive’ rather than ‘integrative’ (Noblit and Hare 
1988). Integrative approaches are more common with quantitative data and work on the 
assumption that pooling similar data that examines the same variables will enhance the 
reliability of the review. The studies included in this review, looking at the impact of the 
inspection process on the lives of residents, were varied and all looked at different aspects 
of the inspection process. This made it impossible to quantify the qualitative data to 
conduct ‘integrative’ analysis, nor would it have been appropriate considering the types of 
studies the search uncovered. 
 
An interpretive synthesis focuses on data that provides concepts, the theories which may 
integrate those concepts and then check for the consistency of them in relation to all of the 
available data. The synthesis will avoid specifying the concepts in advance of the study 
and rather than being about just an aggregate, or summary, of the data analysis will also 
lead to ideas, or concepts.  It must be pointed out that an interpretative study still has to be 
‘grounded’ in the data from the studies synthesised (Dixon-Woods et al 2004). 
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Methodological Critique 
Table 4: Examining the methodological quality of the included studies 
 
Study Sample Data Collection Data Analysis Generalisability Implications for 
policy / practice 
Gibbs and 
Sinclair 
(1992a)  
Consistency: a 
pre-requisite 
for inspecting 
old people’s 
homes? 
48 homes (16 
LA, 24 private, 
8 voluntary) 
across 5 local 
authorities (2 
boroughs and 2 
councils) in 
different 
regions of 
England were 
used in the 
study. 
 
Non-random 
allocation, each 
Local Authority 
asked to select 
an agreed 
number of 
homes from the 
local authority 
Two pre-existing 
instruments were adapted to 
measure quality. The tools 
used six basic values, 
which were deemed to 
contribute to the quality of 
a home: privacy, dignity, 
independence, choice, 
rights and fulfilment. 
Statements about the ‘good’ 
home became criteria 
against which professional 
judgements can be made 
about the home in question. 
Checklists were consulted 
with staff from local 
authorities and SSI. 
 
The homes were visited in 
two stages – stage 1 
involved a visit to each of 
the 48 homes from a 
member of staff from the 
corresponding LA. At stage 
The authors examined the 
reliability of the rating 
system by cross-tabulating 
ratings made on the first 
visit with those made on 
the second to see how far 
the inspectors agreed. The 
data were analysed using 
kappa statistics (measure 
of degree of non-random 
agreement between 
observers and/or 
measurements of a specific 
categorical variable) – a 
measure of agreement 
which allows for both the 
fact that inspectors may 
plump for particular 
ratings and reflects the 
degree to which their 
actual agreement exceeds 
that which could be 
expected on this basis. 
 
Not sufficient for 
results to be 
generalised, but 
justified as a test 
of a tool which 
might act as an aid 
to inspection.  
 
The authors hope 
their results would 
lead to a further 
larger study 
 
There were 
methodological 
problems with 
Gibbs’ and 
Sinclair’s study. 
To develop any 
form of 
consistency for 
judgements using 
items developed 
from the HAFLI 
Potential to 
develop quality 
checklist for 
inspectors 
 
To develop 
innovative methods 
of inspecting older 
person’s residential 
homes. Provide 
‘aide memoire’ for 
inspectors, 
reminding them to 
cover certain areas, 
rather than creating 
an instrument 
yielding a score on 
which homes will 
pass or fail. The 
authors also 
recommend further 
research into 
‘reliable and hard’ 
performance 
  
63 
2, 4-6 weeks later homes 
were re-visited by a 
different inspector (in 50 % 
of homes this was a 
different inspector from the 
same LA, in the other half 
this was a member of staff 
from SSI). The visits lasted 
between 6h 15 mins and 6h 
30 mins each. 
 
No mention of ethical 
approval being obtained. 
No mention of ethical 
considerations. No mention 
of informed consent from 
homes, but inspectors have 
jurisdiction to visit. 
To develop any form of 
consistency for 
judgements using items 
developed from the 
HAFLI3 checklist, they 
could only utilise 12 
items, which inevitably 
led to deficiencies in the 
areas of service provision 
inspected. 
 
The desire to avoid bias in 
the second stage of 
analysis also meant that 
the statistical test for 
efficiency was only 
carried out on a very small 
number of homes, a 
number not sufficient 
enough to produce 
generalisable results. 
 
Adequate evidence is 
provided to support 
analysis, which 
acknowledges the 
limitations of the 
checklist. They do not 
make robust statistical 
claims, nor from these 
checklist, they 
could only utilise 
12 items, which 
inevitably led to 
deficiencies in the 
areas of service 
provision 
inspected. The 
desire to avoid 
bias in the second 
stage of analysis 
also meant that the 
statistical test for 
efficiency was 
only carried out on 
a very small 
number of homes, 
a number not 
sufficient enough 
to produce 
generalisable 
results. 
 
indicators; tools for 
identifying 
opinions of 
residents and 
relatives, and a 
procedure to 
encourage 
‘whistle-blowing’. 
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claims do they infer 
generalisation of the tool. 
The checklist is advocated 
as a helpful tool to be used 
alongside other inspection 
measures. 
 
The aim of the study was 
to provide a trial for a new 
form of inspection 
checklist and determine 
whether a statistically 
significant level of 
agreement between 
inspectors using the 
checklist was possible. 
The aim was to break new 
ground and set up further 
research. There was no 
inter-rater reliability, but 
this is justified because the 
aim of this research was to 
develop a ‘heuristic 
device’ to help make 
quality judgements and in 
practice inspection teams 
do not have the time or 
resources to perform inter-
observer reliability. 
Gibbs and 48 homes (16 Two pre-existing The authors attempted to Findings suggest Guidance for local 
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Sinclair 
(1992b)  
Residential 
Care for 
Elderly 
People: The 
correlates of 
Quality 
LA, 24 private, 
8 voluntary) 
across 5 local 
authorities (2 
boroughs and 2 
councils) in 
different 
regions of 
England were 
used in the 
study. 
 
Non-random 
allocation, each 
Local Authority 
asked to select 
an agreed 
number of 
homes from the 
local authority 
instruments were adapted to 
measure quality. The tools 
used six basic values, 
which were deemed to 
contribute to the quality of 
a home: privacy, dignity, 
independence, choice, 
rights and fulfilment. 
Statements about the ‘good’ 
home became criteria 
against which professional 
judgements can be made 
about the home in question. 
Checklists were consulted 
with staff from local 
authorities and SSI. 
 
The homes were visited in 
two stages – stage 1 
involved a visit to each of 
the 48 homes from a 
member of staff from the 
corresponding LA. At stage 
2, 4-6 weeks later homes 
were re-visited by a 
different inspector (in half 
homes this was a different 
inspector from the same 
LA, in the other half this 
was a member of staff from 
examine the quality of 
care across different 
dimensions, which could 
then influence an overall 
quality of care. In 
examining the correlates 
of their measure of quality 
they grouped their 
hypotheses under four 
main headings: Head of 
Home; Staffing; Resident 
Dependency; Buildings 
 
They also examined the 
consistency of inspector’s 
judgements when using 
the checklists they had 
developed in conjunction 
with HAFLI and 
Bradshaw. 
hypotheses rather 
than prove 
conclusions. 
 
Findings appear to 
be consistent with 
professional 
opinion. 
 
There were 
methodological 
problems with 
Gibbs’ and 
Sinclair’s study. 
To develop any 
form of 
consistency for 
judgements using 
items developed 
from the HAFLI 
checklist, they 
could only utilise 
12 items, which 
inevitably led to 
deficiencies in the 
areas of service 
provision 
inspected. The 
desire to avoid 
bias in the second 
authorities and 
home proprietors 
to improve the 
work they do. 
Guidance for 
managers to look at 
staff training and 
other practice 
issues. 
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SSI). The visits lasted 
between 6h 15 mins and 6h 
30 mins hours each. 
 
No mention of ethical 
approval being obtained. 
No mention of ethical 
considerations. No 
mentioned of informed 
consent from homes, but 
inspectors have jurisdiction 
to visit. 
stage of analysis 
also meant that the 
statistical test for 
efficiency was 
only carried out on 
a very small 
number of homes, 
a number not 
sufficient enough 
to produce 
generalisable 
results. 
 
Fleishman, R. 
Heilbrun, G. et 
al. (1999) 
Improving the 
quality of 
institutional 
care on 
urinary 
incontinence 
among the 
elderly: a 
challenge for 
government 
regulation 
Regulatory data 
from The 
Service for the 
Aged shows  
14406 residents 
in 196 
residential care 
homes. Further 
in-depth 
analysis was 
then conducted 
on 48 homes 
that underwent 
at least 4 
regulatory 
cycles between 
1987 and 1996 
Each institution completes 
a form for each resident 
ever year – which includes 
a number of questions on 
urinary incontinence (UI) 
and assistance needed for 
using the toilet. 10 residents 
are randomly chosen from 
each institution to be 
interviewed by a social 
worker or nurse about their 
care, including toilet habits 
and urinary incontinence. 
The social worker and 
nurse also reviewed 
resident records and 
perform observation of the 
Summary of indices of 
quality, the percentage of 
institutions with deficient 
items and those showing 
change. 
 
The study looks at the 
correlation between UI 
and other related 
functional conditions. 
There were calculations of 
UI prevalence in 
residential homes and by 
ownership, a description 
of functional status, the 
percentage of institutions 
with deficient items, a 
The study used 
data from nearly 
all residents in 
care homes in 
Israel for a 
summary of the 
prevalence of UI 
in care homes in 
Israel and the 
regression looking 
at ‘average rate of 
deficiencies in the 
UI care process’. 
This data is very 
generalisable. The 
regression has a p 
value <0.000 so is 
The study shows 
that regulation 
does improve the 
overall 
performance of 
care homes in 
relation to urinary 
incontinence. 
However, 
structural changes 
required to 
improve UI 
deficiencies (e.g. 
number of 
physicians per bed, 
number of nursing 
aides per bed) did 
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were subject to 
deeper analysis. 
(The study also 
looks at data 
from 8278 
patients in 159 
hospitals, but 
this is reported 
separately). The 
residential 
population 
includes 
approx. 7 % 
nursing 
patients, which 
although breaks 
Israeli rules is 
allowed on 
small scale for 
social reasons 
(e.g. near to 
spouse). This is 
acceptable in 
terms of my cut 
off of no more 
than 15 % of 
population not 
older people 
residential. 
care processes. They also 
interview the institution 
director, ‘house mother’ 
and nurse (where 
applicable). 
summary of the indices of 
quality and a calculation 
of the rate of change 
between inspection cycles 
for the institutions with 
deficient items. To 
indicate the quality of care 
multiple regression is used 
to explain the variance in 
the rates of deficiencies 
through institutional 
independent variables. 
 
Quality of care is 
evaluated through 
structure, process and 
outcome areas. 
statistically 
significant. 
 
For the in-depth 
part of the study 
examining how 
regulation affects 
UI 48 out of 
approx. 200 total 
homes in Israel 
were used. 
not improve 
significantly over 
the regulatory 
cycles studied. 
Day, P.  Klein 11 local A one year study that Narrative policy analysis Good development Good research into 
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R. and 
Redmayne, S.  
(1996)   
Why 
Regulate? 
Regulating 
residential 
Care for 
elderly people 
authority areas 
of various sizes 
and settings 
(e.g. rural, 
urban, 
metropolitan), 
ranging from 
50-100 homes 
within the 
authority to 
>1000. 9 
Providers were 
consulted, 6 
user groups and 
8 other groups 
(e.g. SSI Kings 
Fund) 
 
There was no 
specification of 
inclusion or 
exclusion 
criteria. 
 
involved interviewing local 
authority inspection staff, 
home providers and users 
in England. It also made 
use of existing data (from 
the Social Services 
Inspectorate) to examine 
the performance of 
inspectorates against 
government targets and 
compare the SSI units. 
 
Authors claim to begin 
‘from a position of 
agnosticism in the 
‘deregulation’ debate. 
using policy papers and 
inspection reports. 
Analysis of participants’ 
responses to questions on 
how they applied and 
interpreted policies and 
regulations in practice. 
 
Poorly described method. 
No method section, only 
very limited information 
in introduction. 
 
Use of existing data from 
SSI and other forms of 
evidence (such as DoH 
statistics, Association of 
Directors of Social 
Services survey etc). Use 
of quotes from 
interviewees to depict 
their views on regulation. 
of 
recommendations 
resulting from 
analysis of current 
policy (both 
positives and 
deficiencies) and 
consultation with 
stakeholders in the 
provision of 
residential care for 
older people. 
and discussion of 
issues facing 
inspection in 1996, 
from user, provider 
and regulator 
perspective, even if 
sample and 
methods are poorly 
described. A lot of 
the 
recommendations 
have subsequently 
made their way 
into policy. 
Redmayne, S. 
(1996)  
Spotlight on 
Homes for the 
Elderly: an 
analysis of 
200 reports for 
older persons 
residential care 
homes, from 7 
local authorities 
encompassing 
7 local authorities were 
selected, which were a 
mixture of northern and 
southern counties, and 
county and urban 
authorities. All reports from 
Data were analysed by 
simple frequency 
calculations of 
requirements and 
recommendations, as they 
appeared in reports. There 
Only used 7 local 
authorities, but 
these were 
purposively 
chosen to be 
representative. 
Provides guidance 
for development of 
standards and 
methods of 
standardising the 
construction and 
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inspection 
reports on 
care homes for 
the elderly 
northern and 
southern 
localities and 
county and 
urban 
authorities.  
homes inspected over a 2 or 
3 month period were 
examined. 200 reports were 
analysed, from residential, 
Dementia and dual 
registered elderly homes. 
 
Issues mentioned in the 
report were graded 
depending on whether they 
were mentioned negatively, 
positively or not at all. 
Requirements and 
recommendations were also 
coded and given a value 
from 1 to 3 depending on 
the perceived severity 
(arbitrary, subjective 
ratings). The overall picture 
of the home was taken into 
account as well as the fact 
that some requirements 
may have been carried over 
from previous reports. 
Timescales for 
requirements were also 
coded. 
 
were no statistical tests. 
 
The aim was to find out 
how useful reports 
inspection reports can be 
as intelligible information 
to potential customers of 
residential care. The main 
questions were: What 
standards are the homes 
achieving and which 
standards cause problems? 
Are there inconsistencies 
over whether 
improvements are 
enforced as requirements 
or only made as 
recommendations? Does 
analysis of the reports 
reveal anything about the 
nature of the inspection 
process? 
Research provides 
a ‘snap shot’, 
which can act as 
guidance to the 
issues, both 
negative and 
positive, facing 
inspection 
reporting. 
dissemination of 
inspection reports. 
 
Builds on method 
of reporting and 
provides 
recommendations 
to standardise 
reporting across 
local authorities. 
 
Indicates areas that 
should be 
incorporated into 
inspection reports, 
e.g. continual 
picture in one 
report rather than 
several 
disassociated 
reports. 
Counsel and 
Care (1995) 
Residential care 
homes for older 
The aim of this study was 
to gain a view of inspection 
The report only used 100 
out of 103 responses for 
325 randomly 
selected residents 
Can provide advice 
to inspectors and 
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Under 
Inspection 
people in the 
Greater London 
area. 
as seen by the homes, 
consulting residents, 
relatives and home 
managers. The study took a 
very similar form to the 
Day et al report, also 
included in this review. 
 
Questionnaire – managers 
The revised questionnaire 
was sent to 325 homes in 
the Greater London area, 
chosen by random selection 
from the counsel and care 
database.  
 
They received 103 
responses, but for ease of 
analysis only used the 1st 
100. The questionnaire was 
completed by: the manager 
in 48 % of homes; Owner 
in 17 %; Owner and 
manager in 28 %; 7 % were 
filled in by senior care staff 
or assistant directors of the 
home 
Interviews – residents  
20 interviews in 10 homes, 
all of which the researchers 
‘ease of analysis’. 
 
The randomness of the 
selection is also 
questionable because 
presumably those who 
replied felt strongly about 
the inspection issue. 
 
The interviews of 
residents were not 
randomly selected, and 
were taken in homes 
which the manager had 
already agreed to 
participate. This suggests 
the home would be better 
at disseminating 
information about 
inspection and therefore 
the residents and relatives 
might  
know more about it than 
usual. 
selected from the 
greater London 
database  were 
sent 
questionnaires; 
103 replies. 
 
Interviews 
Residents –20 
residents were 
interviewed. Not 
representative. 
 
Relatives –In total 
13 relatives were 
interviewed; not 
representative. 
legislators about 
stakeholders views 
on inspection, both 
its impact and 
effectiveness. This 
can lead to 
suggestions for 
changes in the 
process to make it 
both more effective 
and more relevant 
to those who the 
process works to 
help. 
 
Help inspectors to 
improve their work 
practices, provide 
better inspections 
and be more 
reflexive. 
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had already received a 
reply from the 
questionnaire they sent 
Interviews relatives 
They also used homes that 
had already participated to 
make contact with relatives. 
They sent 92 letters to 23 
homes asking relatives to 
participate. In the 10 homes 
they visited to do the 
resident interviews, they 
left 5 letters with the 
manager to be passed on to 
relatives, who then had to 
make contact. 
 
In addition the authors 
contacted the Relatives 
Association for names of 
people who might be 
willing to participate. In 
total 13 relatives agreed to 
participate from the 
relatives association. 
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FINDINGS: THEMES 
The 6 studies provided 13 themes of data. 
 
Theme 1: Consistency of inspection 
Gibbs and Sinclair (1992a and 1992b) in two papers, based on the same study, included in 
this synthesis looked at the consistency of judgements between inspectors and quantified 
their findings using the kappa statistical test.  
 
Although this study looked at the consistency of inspectors judgements, and in doing so the 
efficacy of inspection at producing consistent and accurate judgements of the quality of 
older persons’ residential care, because data were only collected at two points in time the 
study did not meet the criteria for the effectiveness section of the SR. The authors 
examined the reliability of inspectors judgements by cross-tabulating judgements made on 
the first visit with those made on the second visit, to see whether the judgements of the two 
inspectors corresponded. 
 
Level 1 and 2 judgements – no reliable measure of quality  
Initially the authors examined what they termed, level 1 and 2 judgements. To form these 
judgements inspectors were asked to make a judgements based on criteria for 49 individual 
variables within the home. These 49 variables were taken from a checklist developed in 
conjunction with the Homes are For Living In (HALFI) checklist developed by the SSI and 
another developed by Jonathan Bradshaw, the authors’ colleague at the University of York.  
 
Examination of consistency of inspection showed that only 2 of the 49 level 1 HAFLI 
items reached kappa values which placed them in the ‘moderate’ levels of agreement 
between two different inspectors making judgements using the same checklist (a kappa 
value between 0.41 - 0.60), 13 were ‘fair’ (a kappa value between 0.61 - 0.80); and the 
remaining 34 were either ‘poor’ (0.01 – 0.20) or at best ‘slight’ (0.21 – 0.40). This 
demonstrates the lack of consistency between the judgements of inspectors, even when 
they were supposed to be checking against a standardized checklist. 
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Sinclair and Gibbs (1992a) claim that inspectors coming ‘cold’ to a home that they are not 
familiar with cannot make consistent judgements on the quality of care. If there is to be 
consistency between judgements of services then there needs to be a formal mechanism, 
and criteria for making specific judgements. There has to be some kind of formalised 
guidelines that present explicit criteria the service must fulfil if it is going to receive a 
certain score for a certain quality item, as well as familiarity with the service. 
 
Although the results were very poor across all types of homes the findings could not 
provide any form of reliable measure of quality for local authority homes. Gibbs and 
Sinclair speculated that this was either because inspectors were less accustomed to 
inspecting these homes, or because of the greater complexity and size of local authority 
homes. They argued that what was needed were adequately trained staff deployed in 
appropriate numbers, calculated based on an assessment of the challenges they face. 
 
The authors concluded that the unreliability of the measure on local authority homes is 
more likely to be as a result of an absence of findings than as a result of misleading ones; 
therefore variables that do indicate some measure of quality are still interesting. According 
to their findings quality of care in local authority homes is dependent on the following 
variables: proportion of trained staff on duty, the number of staff on duty and whether this 
is adequate to cover the duties required – these conclusions fit with other findings, for 
example Evans et al (1981) and their findings on poorly trained staff and severely 
dependent residents. 
 
Inspection of the independent sector provided more reliable results, they were mainly small 
homes and the findings suggest that those in charge have a major impact on how the homes 
are run. The impact of staff qualifications and single rooms should be approached with 
more caution. In the case of charges it is necessary to determine what actually produces 
quality (e.g. is it because a home charging more can afford to employ better qualified 
staff?). What is most needed is good managers of homes supported by well trained staff. 
This requires increased professionalisation, which in turn raises costs. 
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Level 3 ‘global’ judgements  
After finding deficiencies using the level 1 and level 2 judgements the authors then 
examined the consistency of an overall judgement, by considering the holistic workings of 
the services, ‘taking into account all the items… rated in the previous sections and any 
other important considerations not covered’ (Gibbs and Sinclair 1992a: 540). This 
produced, what they coined, a ‘global judgement’. To do this they were given a scale with 
six values ranging from extremely poor (1) to extremely good (6). This measure was 
related to more detailed ratings the inspector had to make about the home at levels 1 and 2, 
for example the level of autonomy of residents, suggesting the inspectors were consistent 
in the values on which they based their overall ratings, even if they did not agree on the 
quality of more specific level 1 and 2 variables. 
 
When applying this scale inspectors appeared hesitant to be overly critical of homes, 
demonstrated by the fact that none of the inspectors in the study were prepared to use the 
extremely poor (1) or very poor (2) global judgement. However, they used poor on 15 
occasions (5 on the first visit, 10 on second visit) and extremely good on 5 occasions (3 on 
first visit, 2 on second visit), from a total of 96 judgements (from 48 homes, which were 
judged twice; initially, and then 4-6 weeks later). Of the 15 homes rated poor only 3 were 
rated so on both occasions. None of the homes rated ‘extremely good’ during the first visit 
received an equally high appraisal from the second visit.  
 
Not surprisingly, using the kappa assessment rating the agreement between inspectors on 
all homes was only ‘slight’ (kappa = 0.17) (in terms of the Landis and Koch (1977) 
benchmarks: <0.00 = poor; 0.01 - 0.20 = slight; 0.21 - 0.40 = fair; 0.41 - 0.60 – moderate; 
0.61 - 0.80 = substantial; 0.81 - 1.00 = near perfect). There was, however, a stark 
difference between the types of home: the kappa values for local authority homes were 
0.18, for private homes 0.33, and for voluntary homes 0.35. There was no agreement 
between inspectors over local authority homes; for private and voluntary homes the 
agreement was greater than that of chance but lower than the authors would have hoped. 
 
Sinclair and Gibbs’ (1992a and 1992b) findings show that there is a problem with the 
reliability of global inspection judgements when made using a checklist developed from 
HAFLI. This problem appears to be two-fold. First, if there is no consistency between the 
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inspectors on the more specific, lower level judgements it is unlikely there will be very 
good agreement at the ‘global level’. Secondly, there is obviously not a sufficient 
mechanism to translate the lower level, itemised scores from the level 1 and 2 judgements 
into a corresponding ‘global judgement’. However, translating the specific judgements into 
global judgements is not straightforward, while doing so might be expedient in terms of the 
consistency, it can pose difficulties in terms of equating the values of each individual item 
and determining whether some factors have to be ‘weighted’ as being more important to an 
overall quality judgement than other items. It is also important to note that the consistency 
between the standardised level 1 and 2 judgements was still very poor, which demonstrates 
that formal standardisation of judgements does not always lead to consistency either. The 
possibility of ‘any other important considerations not covered’ (Gibbs and Sinclair 1992a: 
550), provides further scope for inconsistency.  
 
However, more positively, allowing inspectors the freedom to include any other 
considerations, maybe through less rigid, prescriptive means, into their overall rating of the 
homes gives scope for the use of professional judgement of the inspectors. This important 
caveat means that inspectors can use tacit knowledge, which may, for example, give the 
inspector the impression that even though a service achieves good scores on certain 
standardised criteria, their overall professional opinion of the home is less favourable, or 
visa versa. 
 
Second stage analysis: Could judgements be predicted? 
The lack of consistency within Gibbs and Sinclair’s (1992a) first analysis of the data led to 
a second stage of analysis to further test the pessimistic conclusions. The authors wanted to 
analyse whether they could predict the judgements of the second inspection based on the 
judgements made in the first. They believed their ability to do this would be enhanced if 
they: 
a. Developed a score for quality based on the most reliable of the first round 
items 
b. Took into account the type of home, on the grounds that it is easier to make 
a judgement over some than it is of others 
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The authors selected items from the first stage of the research, based on the level of 
agreement between ratings over the two inspections, assuming that a higher kappa value 
indicated ‘better’ items. To eliminate the possibility that these items were only reliable by 
chance they split the second sample in two (based on odd an even reference numbers they 
were assigned at the start of the project), creating new scores for homes with even 
reference numbers and testing the reliability on homes with odd reference numbers. This 
had the disadvantage of producing scores based on only a small number of cases, but the 
reliability was not biased. 
 
Examination of the second stage research shows that even when using the ‘best’ items for 
consistency, some still show ‘slight’ or ‘poor’ kappa values. Despite these difficulties 
Sinclair and Gibbs created a ‘care’ score based on the 12 ‘best’ HALFI instruments 
selected on the basis of the even number homes. They then calculated this score for the 
first visit to the odd numbered homes and then the second. The correlation between these 
two scores was 0.60 (level of significance not reported), and the kappa values of 0.25 
(‘fair’). 
 
The authors were then interested in how the HALFI scores for the first visit correlated with 
the inspectors overall ‘global’ evaluations of the first and second visits. They correlated 
0.66 with the first evaluation and 0.46 with the 2nd (r = 0.60). Thus it was possible to 
derive a checklist score that correlates with both the first and second visit ‘global’ 
evaluations, but reliability is poor. The authors cannot be sure that the correlations they 
report represent causal connections rather than other kinds of associations. They also 
cannot tell whether residents in homes that score highly on their quality measure are 
indeed happy. 
 
Can quality be reliably measured? 
In testing the correlates of quality it is necessary to determine whether quality can be 
reliably and validly measured. Gibbs and Sinclair (1992b) conclude that professional 
judgements tend to focus on process rather than outcomes. If inspection is concerned with 
questions regarding registration or with providing guidelines to care managers on what is a 
good home, then reliability is crucial. However, if inspection is more concerned with 
improving performance then reliability is, arguably, less crucial. Thus it is important to see 
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how professional judgement relates to that of the residents and relatives, and to indicators, 
such as staff turnover, occupancy rates, residents mental / physical health. It would also be 
useful to see if the findings can be supported by new research, for example, how do better 
qualified staff members improve quality of homes (e.g. what does training provide that 
makes staff better at their jobs?). 
 
Similarly to the study by Gibbs and Sinclair (1992a and 1992b), Day et al (1996) found 
great variations between the consistency of local authority inspection, in terms of: 
standards, budgets (irrespective of the number of homes in the area), interpretation of 
standards by individual inspectors. However according to their interviews, providers and 
inspectors agreed that overall standards have risen in homes in the ten year period they 
examined (1985 to 1995). 
 
A third study in the review Counsel and Care (1995) found inconsistency was a problem 
and took many forms. In interviews with care home managers they found (each question is 
stand alone): 20 % had experienced inconsistencies between the same inspector on 
different visits; 27 % had experienced inconsistencies between different inspectors from 
the same inspection unit; 28 % between the fire officer and an inspector and 19 % between 
the inspector and environmental health officer (Counsel and Care 1995). There were also 
comments from managers who had worked in different homes across authorities and 
noticed considerable inconsistencies between local authority inspection teams (Counsel 
and Care 1995). The Counsel and Care survey was of 100 people and while it gives an 
interesting indication and insight, it is not representative of the national care home 
population. 
 
Although none of the studies in this review categorically determine how to make 
inspection more consistent they do show the system in the early 1990s was deficient. Gibbs 
and Sinclair could not provide a tool that greatly improves the consistency of inspection 
their work undoubtedly added to the ‘cumulative knowledge base’ and subsequent 
legislation has developed ways to improve consistency. This review shows that there is 
still no robust research to show that the new national method of inspection actually works. 
Theme 2: Inconsistency of reports 
Redmayne (1996) found inconsistency in the written reports composed by local authority 
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inspectors. There study was conducted in 1994 at a time when there was no national 
regulator or standardised methods of inspection and all inspections were carried out by 
local inspectors.  The authors found surprising inconsistencies and gaps in the information 
presented in the reports. They found that reports varied greatly in style, content and length 
between the local authorities (from 1-2 to 10-12 pages). Two authorities only addressed 
physical, structural standards in the reports and assume that resident well-being stems 
directly from these factors. Some reports contained ‘bold statements’ that gave the reader 
very little information on the home; comments such as: ‘Those aspects relating to staff 
which were inspected were found to be satisfactory’. There were also differences in the 
tone of reports – some positive and some negative. Only one local authority included an 
action plan in its reports, which it claims “details the agenda for development of the 
facilities and practices of the home”. An indication of a timetable for changes is only 
sometimes included. 
 
The only similarity between reports across authorities found in the Redmayne (1996) study 
was that announced reports were longer than unannounced, because they covered the 
whole service rather than a certain trouble area. Within local authorities content is 
consistent, demonstrating that each inspection unit, rather then individual inspector appear 
to have their own agenda. This finding suggests inconsistency across offices rather than 
across individuals. A finding that indicates if there was a more consistent inspection 
procedure and set of regulations, then practices and judgements could be consistent across 
the country. However, this finding contradicts the findings from Gibbs’ and Sinclair’s 
study, which shows that even using a standardised checklist for inspection it is still 
unlikely that judgements will be completely consistent, especially for local authority run 
homes. Although some level of consistency can be achieved by using the right indicators 
(Gibbs and Sinclair 1992a). 
 
In a demonstration of further inconsistency across authorities Redmayne (1996) showed 
that the threshold of what might be considered a requirement varied; requirements made by 
one inspectorate could be more serious than requirements made by others. For example, a 
report from one inspectorate could contain only two requirements, but they could be on 
major issues, where as another report in another inspectorate may contain ten or more 
requirements, but they were only on minor issues (Redmayne 1994).  
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To demonstrate this Redmayne’s report (1996) graded the requirement on a level of 
seriousness from 1 (lowest), 2 or 3 (highest). Of the 200 reports examined in the study: 
27.9 % of requirements rated level 1; 52.3 % rated level 2; and 18.6 % rated level 3 (n = 
678). Reports with one requirement were split roughly in half between requirements that 
were rated 1 and 2. There were no very serious requirements in reports with only one 
requirement in total. The fewer the requirements, the more likely they were to be rated 1 or 
2, suggesting that quantity and severity of negative comments goes hand in hand: the 
reports that contain the most requirements tend to also be the reports for services with the 
major problems. 
 
Almost half of the minor requirements concern the administration and running of the 
home (47.1 %), reflecting slight changes being made to polices and record keeping in the 
home. Almost as many were based on structural issues (43.9 %), such as. The rest attract 
very few minor requirements: staffing (4.8%), quality of life issues (3.2 %) and facilities 
for residents (1.1%). Of the level 2 requirements, almost half were again structural matters 
(48.2 %) and over a quarter (28.6%) concern administration of the home. The other 
categories were: staffing (10.2%), facilities and services for residents: (6.9%) and quality 
of life (6.1%). The most serious requirements were dominated by structural issues (58.7%), 
staffing matter concerned 21.4%, quality of life issues attracted 10.3%, while 
administration concerned 5.6% and facilities and services 4.0% (Redmayne 1994).  
 
The top ten requirements (including an amalgamation of requirements around the same 
issue) stipulated within inspection reports, were (in descending order, n = 678):  
1. Fire safety,  
2. Health and safety,  
3. Miscellaneous records,  
4. Administration of medication,  
5. staff fire and training skills,  
6. staff training / induction,  
7. care plans,  
8. kitchen,  
9. internal decoration,  
10. number of staff. 
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The top ten recommendations were (in descending order, n = 355):  
1. Care plans,  
2. Water temperature,  
3. Lift,  
4. Lockable bedrooms / cupboards,  
5. Health and safety,  
6. Staff induction and training,  
7. Miscellaneous records required or need updating,  
8. Internal decoration,  
9. Activities for residents, 
10.  Bathroom. 
 
The main criteria for requirements and recommendations followed a very similar pattern to 
negative statements in the reports (Redmayne 1996),which were obviously made to 
support the prescriptions. It is not surprising that fire safety and health and safety are the 
two most frequently cited requirements, as at the time of the Redmayne study they were 
supported by much stronger legislative backing than other areas (Redmayne 1996).  
 
The top recommendation concerning care plans also features prominently on the 
requirements list, at number seven; suggesting that requirements or recommendations may 
depend on whether the inspector is making good practice suggestions or more serious, 
legally enforceable suggestions. An example of this could be when an inspector would like 
to see more detail in the care plan, as a matter of good practice, rather than as a result of 
legally enforceable regulations. Redmayne (1996) identifies instances where it is difficult 
to see why certain recommendations are not given as requirements. The author gives a 
particular example of case records of individual residents. According to schedule 2(4) of 
the Regulations the home is required to keep a record for each resident that includes: 
details of any special needs, any medical treatment required, and other information 
important to their welfare and health. However, some inspectorates were only making 
issues concerning care plans recommendations, when in fact they are covered by statutory 
guidelines and therefore should be issued as requirements (Redmayne 1996). This 
reinforces both an ambiguity in standards and inconsistency in how these standards are 
implemented. 
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The second (water temperature) and third (lift) items on the list of recommendations chart 
highly partly because one authority placed two standard recommendations on all of their 
reports, which severely biased the outcomes. Instances such as this further demonstrates 
the inconsistency of local inspection, and shows the impact that one local policy or 
guideline can have. It may have been that other homes in the study had deficiencies with 
their lift, or did not have one installed, but because of the priorities of the local inspection 
agency this problem did not induce a requirement as it did in one particular inspectorate 
office. Almost half of the requirements concern physical and structural matters, but the 
study highlights the fact that this is because structural issues are easier to inspect than 
quality of life issues and methods to assess quality of life outcomes had not been 
developed in 1994 (Redmayne  1996). 
 
Focus of inspection on structure and process 
The evidence from the study shows that in 1994 inspection was still focused on structural 
and process issues, with only number 7 on the requirements list, care plans, having any 
relation to assessing outcomes for service users – and that is only if the information in the 
plans is compared to outcomes as assessed through consultation with the service user or 
observation of care. Redmayne speculates that the reports tended to focus on structural and 
process issues for two main reasons. First, structural issues, such as fire regulations, size of 
rooms, were specified in legislation and there were clear guidelines on how these 
regulations should be met. Second, according to Redmayne it appeared that inspection 
would focus on physical and structural standards in the belief that a good quality of life for 
residents would automatically flow from these being met (Redmayne 1996). This finding 
ties in with the findings of Day et al (1995), who found that reports from different 
inspectorates were very different and prioritised different aspects of care. The findings of 
Sinclair and Gibbs (1992a and 1992b), Day et al (1995), and Redmayne et al (1996) 
suggest there are very different inspection practices occur across the country if inspection 
is left to local authorities. 
 
Redmayne, in agreement with Gibbs and Sinclair (1992a and 1992b), is critical of this 
focus on structure and process and advocates a move towards focus on outcomes in the 
inspection process. Subsequent legislation and standards since 1996 have shifted regulation 
in this direction and wide consultation with service users and professionals (see 
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Department of Health 2005; Department of Health 2006) has shown that this improves the 
quality of care in residential care homes and improves the lives of those who use the 
service.  
 
Theme 3: Reports try to highlight positives 
Sharon Redmayne (1996) found there were 1735 positive comments in the 200 reports she 
examined, compared with 744 negative comments. The vast majority of these positive 
comments (49.6 %) were on quality of life issues. The rest were structural and building 
issues (26.2 %), level and quality of facilities (5.2 %), staffing (13.3 %) and administration 
of home (5.7 %). In comparison there were 744 negative comments, most on structural 
issues (38.2 %). The rest were on administration of the home (27.2 %), quality of life (15.5 
%), staffing (10.6 %) and facilities (8.6 %). These results firmly reflect the focus of 
inspection in 1994, on process issues rather than outcomes for residents. This data shows 
that although quality of life issues were not prevalent in legislation and therefore not 
stipulated in many of the requirements for improvement, they were the focus of many 
positive comments on the home, which shows that where good practice was being 
observed it was being done so based on the quality of the life the residents were able to 
lead. This demonstrates that although progress had not been made in terms of bringing 
quality of life measures into standards and legislation, that gap was being filled by the 
professional judgement of inspectors and their desire to ensure quality of life was being 
reflected in regulation. 
 
Redmayne also found there was at least one positive comment in the report for each of the 
200 services; and almost three quarters of the reports had six or more positive remarks. 
Exactly one quarter had no negative comments. This could be part of a strategy to 
encourage rather then discourage providers, by giving constructive criticism, but also 
highlighting what the service is doing well. The study also found that negative comments 
seem to be concentrated around a small number of homes, which are obviously performing 
poorly across the board: 10% of the reports contained 42.1% of the negative comments. 
These suggest that most of the homes are deemed to be providing a reasonable or good 
level of care; it is the minority who attract the bulk of negative comments. 
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Theme 4: Conflict of purpose for inspection reports 
Day et al (1996) found there are potentially multiple users of an inspection report (home 
owners and managers, customer, social service purchasers, relatives of current users, 
inspection unit). This leads to a conflict in terms of what information the report should 
contain and whether reports should cater for all potential users. The Day et al (1996) study 
did not provide a solution to this question, but posited the problem as something policy 
makers and practitioners should consider when developing their reports. 
 
Access to reports and advice to public 
There are conflicting feelings about how public availability of reports should be 
administered. According to the Day et al study (1996) 79 % of respondents believed that 
reports should be made public, although only following current guidelines. But a vast 
majority of managers still believe that the reports should be confined to inspection units 
(95 %), Social services (86 %), and the home (88 %). In contrast, when asked about reports 
being available in public places less managers were favourable. Only 56 % thought they 
should be available in public libraries, and 42 % in General Practitioner (GP) surgeries. 
The data suggests that a high proportion of managers are cautious about advocating free 
availability of inspection reports, most likely because they realise that negative reports 
could have a far more damaging impact if they are available more widely. This form self-
preservation obviously negates the potential for positive impact (on numbers applying to 
stay at the home, and reputation) if a home receives a good report, suggesting managers are 
more concerned with self-preservation than potential kudos. 
 
Theme 5: The ideal report  
From the data she collected Redmayne (1994) attempted to develop criteria for the ‘ideal’ 
inspection report. She concluded that the onus should be on the inspector to continually 
update the picture of the home, rather than force potential residents to piece info together 
themselves. The research showed that although there was a large amount of announced 
(untargeted overview of entire home) and unannounced reports (targeted to specific 
problem areas) in 1994 there was no collation of that information for prospective service 
users.  She also found that unannounced reports were regarded as of greater importance by 
user groups, for the same reasons that user groups felt unannounced inspection were of 
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greater use: because they catch services in situ, off guard and therefore represent a truer 
picture of the day-to-day working of the service.  
 
Redmayne’s (1994) consultation concluded that reports should include: a general 
description of the home, the rooms and facilities should be provided; a description of daily 
life and whether their needs are being met under HALFI themes may also be beneficial. 
There should be information on staff qualifications and training and an indication of when 
visitors are welcome (including both family and friends and also hairdressers, religious 
groups, volunteer groups etc). Redmayne (1994) also concluded that there should be staff 
turnover figures, with reasons if turnover is high; details of incidents and accidents in the 
home, including a description of events; and details of complaints and how the were 
resolved. Conclusions such as these represent a theoretical shift in social care towards a 
position of empowerment for the service user, as opposed to central distribution of service 
by government (central or local). By giving them access to as much information as 
possible, the inspectorate is providing the optimum information for them to make an 
informed choice about the service(s) they use. 
 
However, as the Counsel and Care (1995) study shows, of the twenty residents 
interviewed, none used information from inspection units when choosing the home. So 
even if a report was produced similar in content and style to the ideal described by 
Redmayne (1996) then there is no guarantee that it will be widely consulted or used. 
Reports today include many of the criteria recommended by Redmayne (1996), but as this 
review demonstrates there is no research to provide evidence for effectiveness or 
usefulness of these reports. There is also no evidence showing whether a better organised 
and more user-friendly report is used more widely and if this is the case whether it is 
because it is more appropriate and accessible for service users. 
 
Theme 6: Shift of focus: process to outcomes 
Day et al (1995), in their one year study that involved interviewing local authority 
inspection staff, home providers, and users in England and which also made use of existing 
data (from the SSI) to examine the performance of inspectorates against government 
targets, found that the focus of inspection was moving from a focus on inputs to, quality of 
care as measured by outcomes. This study follows on from the Redmayne study (1994) 
 85 
published a year earlier and shows the cumulative development of both knowledge of 
regulation. The studies demonstrate that regulation policy and standards in the 1990s 
shifted in response to consultation and evidence (both informal / anecdotal and research). 
However, they also found that there was still a need to develop ‘alarm bells’ to identify 
things that ought not to be happening, pre-empting problems rather than waiting for 
unsuitable outcomes to materialize (Day et al 1995). This finding reflects the subsequent 
shift in inspection policy over the ten years since 1996 and provides evidence that formed 
part of the knowledge base which brought about a change in ethos in older persons 
inspection, towards a more outcomes focused approach. 
 
The Day et al (1996) study highlights possible problems with an outcomes-focused 
approach. They find that looking at outcomes should not be a substitute for other methods 
because ‘homes tend to shape the expectations of their residents’ (Day, et al. 1996: v) and 
there is the possibility of institutional conditioning, whereby residents, especially those 
who have been in the institution for a long period of time, lower their expectations because 
they have accepted their marginalized position and lack of empowerment to do anything. 
 
Theme 7: Support for national care standards 
The Day et al (1996) research also found there was considerable support amongst 
inspectors, providers and relatives for a move towards national standards of care. 
Subsequent legislation in 2000 (Care Standards Act) put national standards in place, which 
demonstrates that the research findings were similar to the prevailing thinking of 
government and that policy on the issue was enacted with some evidence (in the form of 
research) of support from key stakeholders in the inspection process. The study did not 
resolve the questions regarding whether national standards would require a national 
regulation body, or should be administrated and applied regionally (as was the position in 
1996). It was hypothesized that the local model would offer greater flexibility, but the 
national model would provide greater uniformity and consistency. These views were only 
speculation and there was no evidence from the study to be sure either way. 
 
In contrast to Day et al’s (1996) study, Counsel and Care (1995) found that ‘two-thirds’ of 
the inspectors (no percentage reported) thought that inspection should remain under local 
authority control. Although these conflicting results show an inconsistency in the evidence 
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base, because of the narrow focus of the studies (Counsel and Care only researched the 
Greater London Area and Day et al only eleven local authorities – although these were 
purposively selected to be as representative as possible) this is not too surprising. There are 
a number of reasons why Counsel and Care may have found opposition to a national body. 
First, there is a tendency for individuals to want to ‘maintain the status quo’, change is 
uncertain by nature and therefore people have a tendency to avoid it where possible. 
Second, it is likely that inspectors would have been worried about their jobs, if a national 
inspectorate was set up local authority inspectors would naturally be sceptical as to how 
would fit in and be accommodated by the changes. 
 
Theme 8: Public availability of inspection reports 
The Day et al (1996) study concluded that public availability of reports on individual 
homes could be an important new regulatory sanction. They would provide a mechanism 
that forced providers to not only be accountable to the inspectorate, but also to the service 
users. If reports were made public then the user could make an informed choice about 
whether or not they wanted to live in the home, based on the assessment of the inspection 
report. However, respondents were adamant that they needed to be more uniform.  
 
As with the discussion on national standards, the public availability of reports has now 
been implemented into public policy. The advent of publicly available reports on a national 
scale tied in with the creation of national standards, which meant that reports also became 
uniform in presentation.  Day et al (1996) found no evidence on how many people use 
reports when they were available. 
 
Theme 9: Stakeholder belief in self assessment 
Day et al (1996) also showed that at the time of their study key stakeholders in the 
inspection process believe that self-assessment could provide a useful addition to the 
existing regulation system. The research shows support amongst stakeholders for an 
additional internal regulatory strategy to work in conjunction with the arms length 
regulation. They also concluded that local authorities as purchasers could provide an 
inspection function, linking their purchasing to the outcomes of their own inspection 
activity. This once again demonstrates the prevailing feeling of the time (in 1994), and 
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subsequent adoption of self-assessment by the current national inspectorate (CSCI), shows 
that action has been taken in response to stakeholder consensus (as demonstrated by the 
use of consultation papers by the government to ask key stakeholders what they wanted 
from inspection, see Department of Health 1998; 2005; 2006). 
 
Theme 10: Regulation is very difficult to cost 
Day et al (1996) determined that regulation as it existed at the time of their report was 
impossible to cost, especially in relation to any cost-effectiveness calculation, because it 
was too inconsistent across the country. To do this, they concluded, requires the 
generalisation of best practice, which did not exist at the time. Although there is now a 
generalization of best practice, in the form of standardised training and standards, there is 
still no research on the cost-effectiveness of inspection 
 
However, Day et al (1996) did conclude that cost-effectiveness is a useful calculation 
because standards need to be costed and weighed against other improvements in care that 
might be forgone as a result of certain standards (such as minimum room size). The 
authors concluded that the cost of regulation needs to be considered in the light of benefits 
to residents, regulations should be seen to have a positive benefit in relation to the cost to 
adhere and implement them. They concluded that calculations which do this were 
impossible at the time of their study (1996) because there are 107 different regulatory 
regimes in the UK, each of which have varying responsibilities and which, as Sinclair and 
Gibbs (1992 a and 1992b) and Redmayne (1996) have shown, implement regulations in 
different, inconsistent ways. 
 
Theme 11: Impact of regulation on Managers 
Positive view of inspection 
The survey suggests that managers see inspection as positive and believe that it drives up 
the standard of care, 50 % think inspections can ‘very much’ positively affect standards of 
service; 36 % think inspections can affect standards ‘a little’; 13 % said ‘not at all’; and 1 
% said inspection had a ‘negative’ impact. In a similar vein when asked whether inspection 
encourages them to do a good job 74 % thought it did, 20 % thought inspection had no 
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significant impact and 6 % said it hinders the work in the home. In terms of their view of 
the inspectors, of the 100 managers interviewed 90 % said their inspector was 
approachable; 55 % said they were challenging; 84 % said well-informed: 94 % said 
thorough; 77 % consistent; 80 % supportive. Inspection was viewed by the Counsel and 
Care sample as a positive intervention that can help the care homes improve their service. 
 
Managers also felt that regulation had improved over recent years (up to 1996), 56% of 
respondents thought the inspection process was now more helpful as a result of changes in 
recent years, 23% felt it had stayed the same, 14% thought it was now less helpful and 7% 
made no comment. This demonstrates that the evolution in regulation was, at least 
according to the Counsel and Care (1995) sample, progressing in a positive direction. 
 
Process and structural issues should complement the focus on outcomes 
Gibbs and Sinclair (1992b) found when discussing their findings with inspectors that they 
thought measures of quality outlined in their paper that focused on outcomes need to be 
complemented with more traditional measures, such as fire regulations. Managers were 
wary that a shift to focus outcomes, away from measurement of processes, might shift 
standards away from some important safety issues, a move that they thought unacceptable 
 
Inspection should be a mechanism for advice and support 
When asked which aspect of the inspection process is most useful 58 % of managers said 
that discussing issues with the inspector was most important; 17 % thought getting advice; 
10 % thought the follow-up report; 7 % the scrutiny of systems; 6 % a tour of the home; 2 
% the inspection form. In relation to this, when asked to answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’, 99% of 
inspectors said they would like to have more advice from inspectors; 83 % said they would 
like more training; 94 % said more support; and 100 % more information.  
 
Counsel and Care (1995) present a clear picture of care home managers looking to 
inspectors for positive help. When asked what issues they would like advice on (yes or no 
question): 94 % said yes to advice on national policy changes, local policy changes (99 %), 
how to meet standards (96 %), good care practices (84 %) and legal issues (81 %) all 
featured very highly. They would clearly like to see the inspection role as one of support 
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and advice, as opposed to simply regulating. The vast majority (94 %) also feel this 
advisory role should extend to helping residents make choices about which care service to 
choose. However, how this should be operationalised was not a focus of the Counsel and 
Care report. The managers asked for advice from inspectors, but whether they would have 
accepted advice in the form of supporting (general) information and guidance produced by 
the regulator, rather than (specific) advice from individual inspectors is not made clear in 
the research. 
 
Manager’s use of reports 
When asked about their use of the report 59 % of managers claim to refer to it regularly, 85 
% discussed it with owners or management committee, 91 % discussed it with care staff, 
92 % with senior staff. However, only 53 % of managers discuss the report with residents 
and 47 % with relatives. This suggests managers see reports as providing evidence of the 
need for change and are accepting of the role of external regulators as a ‘check and 
balance’ against complacency in the service they offer. They also use the report as an 
incentive to enact change and to provide leverage to staff by discussing the issues within 
the report and using it to improve working practices where necessary. There were still a 
large number of managers who do not consult with their residents and / or relatives about 
the report or discuss how changes can be made in response to the reports findings. 
Considering that the service is provided for the residents this figure is surprising. 
 
The negative aspects of inspection 
70 % of managers found inspection time consuming and 75 % found it over 
beaureaucratic, but only 26 % found the inspection process negative. A key criticism was 
that ‘rules change constantly’. 40 % of managers surveyed thought that the inspection unit 
not was independent of the social service unit. It was not thought to be at ‘arms length’, 
especially because at the time of this study many services were both run and inspected by 
the same local authority. This finding from Counsel and Care (1995) is similar to Gibbs 
and Sinclair (1992a and b), who could not provide a reliable measure of quality for local 
authority homes, when their tool was found to be reliable to measure quality in privately 
run services. 
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Theme 12: Impact of regulation on residents and relatives 
Residents’ awareness of inspection process 
When Counsel and Care (1995) interviewed service managers 53 % said they discuss the 
inspection report with residents. However, most residents had no idea what an inspection 
unit was; when asked if they knew who checks standards in homes 11 of the 20 looked 
blank. However, two knew the name of their inspector (because they had been visited two 
days before) and the other seven had some notion that an ‘authority’ comes around to 
inspect the home. Only four residents claimed not to ever have been aware of inspection, 
but the others were aware either from staff telling them or noticing activity within the 
home, only two had had (or could remember having) direct contact with the inspector. 
 
When relatives were questioned only one relative had read an inspection report and most 
expressed the need of relatives to be vigilant in maintaining standards; one relative said 
that relatives have a responsibility to their family members in care, they should not just 
“dump them and leave them”. Of the thirteen relatives interviewed eleven had direct 
involvement in selecting the home. In the two other cases either another family member 
made the decision or social services had to place the resident in an emergency and this 
situation gave the resident or family no choice. In terms of information used to choose the 
home: four relatives received information from Social Services, although for two of these 
the information was not wholly appropriate (one case info given was for homes which did 
not meet the needs of the client, in the other the fees were higher than the clients income), 
four used GPs or a hospital social worker, two used Counsel and Care’s Homes Suggestion 
Service, two used local knowledge and two responded to direct advertising. This suggests, 
even from such a small sample, that information on homes from inspection is rarely 
reaching those needing help to choose a home. 
 
Evidence from Counsel and Care (1995) suggests that relatives wish to take an element of 
responsibility for the service their family member receives and suggests that they would be 
proactive if something was wrong (either complaining or moving their relative). However, 
the evidence shows that only one relative had read an inspection report; it is likely that 
because they know little about inspection, relatives feel more comfortable in taking the 
responsibility for their family member’s care because they feel uncomfortable relying on a 
service of which they have little knowledge. It also appears that relatives are more 
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comfortable to take advice from ‘familiar professionals’, those whom they know and / or 
trust because of their professional position. It appears from the Counsel and Care (1995) 
data that inspectors and the regulatory service is not held in this level of esteem. This is 
further supported by the fact that only half of the interviewed residents (ten) would like to 
view an inspection report; six did not want to and four did not mind either way. None of 
the twenty knew that the public were able to read the reports. 
 
This need for more resident and relative involvement is supported by the way in which 
relatives responded to Counsel and Care (1995) questions on how they thought inspections 
should be carried out. One relative commented that they should have a more active role in 
inspection, because they are in a unique position to be able to comment on the report and 
pick up on any inaccuracies. 
 
Residents can be wary of consequences of speaking to inspector 
One resident admitted that some other residents were afraid to speak to inspectors because 
they felt ‘they could get a bad time’ (Counsel and Care 1995). Only one resident would 
consider making a complaint to an inspector but only after speaking to the manager, 
thirteen said they would speak to the manager of the home rather than speaking to an 
inspector. Others were quite adamant about not going to an inspector. Two residents felt 
that no one could help them if they had a complaint and if that situation arose they would 
look for another home.  
 
Targeting inspections on poor services 
Counsel and Care (1995) also found that residents believed inspectors should visit homes 
with low standards more often, and a few explicitly claimed unannounced inspection was 
the best method. The majority of respondents felt that unannounced inspection was the 
only way to improve the service – ‘How else can they be improved’ (Counsel and Care 
1995: 27) said one. Another said ‘preparations can be made with things covered up… so 
surprise is very good’ (Counsel and Care 1995: 34) 
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Theme 13: Regulation can improve urinary incontinence 
Fleishman, R. Heilburn, G. et al. (1999) in their study ‘Improving the quality of 
institutional care of urinary incontinence among the elderly: a challenge for government 
regulation’ set out to investigate whether the Regulation, Assessment, Follow-up (RAF) 
method of surveillance on older persons hospital and residential care homes had an impact 
on improving urinary incontinence (UI) in Israel. The method was designed by the JDC-
Brookdale Institute, it is based on a tracer approach (see Kessner and Kalik 1973) and on 
the principles of quality assurance as set out  by Donadedian (1991). This method was 
adopted by both the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the Ministry of Health and 
the new system, which covers both licensing and surveillance, manages a database of 
25000 individuals and 350 long term care institutions (e.g. residential care homes, 
hospitals).  
 
Caveat for including research paper 
Although this paper examined both residential care and hospital care the results were 
reported separately, so it was possible to pick out only the residential care home data for 
the purpose of this review. The residential care sector in Israel, according to Fleisham et al 
(1999), had approximately 7 % of residents who required nursing care but are in residential 
care because of other extraneous circumstances, such as being close to a spouse. This 
finding fits in with my initial protocol criteria which stated that no less than 85% of the 
population of care homes used in studies must be under 65 or receiving any other form of 
care apart from personal care. 
 
Influences on the prevalence of urinary incontinence (UI) in residential homes for older 
people: multiple regression 
The study used multiple regression to explain the rate of deficiencies in the UI care 
process, using ‘average rate of deficiencies in the UI care process’ as the dependent 
variable and the following as independent variables:  
1. prevalence of UI,  
2. rate of nurses,  
3. rate of physicians,  
4. rate of nursing aides,  
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5. size of institution,  
6. ownership of institution 
7. devices for washing and disinfecting bedpans. 
 
The model explained 31 per cent (R2 = 0.31, F = 8.887, Sig. F = 0.000, number of homes 
in the regression = 160) of the variance in care homes, with four independent variables 
explaining the average percentage of deficiencies:  
1. per-bed rate of RNs,  
2. per bed rate of physicians  
3. ownership  
4. Institution size. 
 
The first three variables showed a positive relationship with the dependent variable, the 
fourth showed a negative relationship (the larger the residential home the lower the 
percentage of deficiencies). 
 
The multiple regression model showed that homes which were large and publicly owned 
and had higher per bed rates of nurses, generally showed better awareness of UI, 
conducted better examinations of UI, had better guidance for coping with UI, and had 
better provision for getting people to the toilet on time (Fleishman, et al. 1999).   
 
According to Fleishman et al (1999) the multiple regression analysis shows a relationship 
between three groups of variables:  
1. basic institutional variables (size of home, ownership, understanding of regulatory 
method) and structural variable (e.g. per bed rates of nurses and physicians) which 
then influence;  
2. the process variable (e.g. examination of individuals, guidance on continence, 
treatment of UI) which in turn then influence;  
3. outcome variables, i.e. improvement in UI 
 
The study comes to the conclusion that on average the larger homes, owned publicly with a 
good understanding of regulation, will have a greater number of nurses and physicians per 
bed; the home will, by virtue of these structural variables, be more organised and therefore 
have the best management of UI and provide the highest chance of improvement in UI. 
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The impact of regulation 
In relation to the effect regulation has at improving the treatment of UI the study shows 
that two main areas that have an impact on the prevalence of UI in residential homes: 
structure and process and that improvement in these areas should result in outcomes 
beneficial to the resident. The following sections show how effective regulation is at 
improving these areas, which then, as the regression above shows, will then help to 
improve the management and treatment of UI.  
 
Structural issues 
In relation to the impact of regulation on structural deficiencies that if improved would 
improve the treatment of urinary continence only the per bed rate of RNs improved from 
59 % of institutions during the first cycle (1987-1988) to 44 % during the fourth cycle 
(1994-1996). For the remaining structural items involved in UI there were very high 
proportions of residential homes with deficiencies that did not improve over time.  
 
Process issues 
With respect to the process items in the study, the regulatory system showed major 
improvement over time in residential care. Awareness of patient incontinence improved 
from deficiencies in 86 % of cases during the first cycle of inspection to only 5% at the 
fourth cycle. Improvements were also seen in medical examination of incontinence (from 
deficiencies at 92 % of the homes to only 33 % by the fourth cycle), in assistance to reach 
the toilet in time (from 25 % of homes with deficiencies to 20 %) and guidance for coping 
with incontinence from 56 % to 36 %). 
 
Fleishman et al’s (1999) analysis shows that once they are picked up by regulation, process 
issues appear much easier to fix than structural problems. The authors speculate that this is 
likely to be to do with costs because many process problems can be resolved through 
organisational changes or changes in staff behaviour, which often cost little money. In 
relation to outcomes 34 % of elderly in residential homes who were incontinent during the 
first assessment were continent two years later. The study assumes that this is due to 
proper treatment being called for by the Service for Aged regulatory system, which then 
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influences structural (less so) and process changes to decrease deficiencies in urinary 
incontinence care. 
 
DISCUSSION 
This chapter shows there is no existing evidence on the effectiveness of inspection. There 
is a lack of UK-relevant, good quality evaluations (either controlled or not) for residential 
care for older people. The study by Gibbs and Sinclair (1992a and 1992b), represented in 
this review by two papers, did attempt to look at the consistency of inspection, but was 
deemed of insufficient quality (according to the review protocol) to provide evidence of 
effectiveness. It was included in analysis of the impact of inspection. Their study does 
show that there needs to be more consistency in the application of standards and 
implementation of overall judgements about the quality of a service. A second study 
included in this review by Redmayne (1996) looked at inspection reports, and she found 
that as with the inspection procedure these were also inconsistent, both in the style and 
focus. 
 
There are also very few studies that measure the impact of inspection, and all evidence 
found during the search was published in the 1990s and is now out of date. There needs to 
be further investment in research that will examine the impact of inspection as it is today. 
The included studies, especially the Day et al (1996) and the Counsel and Care (1995), do 
give evidence as to what the key stakeholders in older persons’ residential care (residents, 
staff, managers) think about the process of regulation and what perceived impacts it has, 
either on the quality of care or the running of the service. However these studies were 
conducted in the mid-1990s and regulation has evolved considerably since the publication 
of the studies included in this review and they are now not relevant today. They do provide 
some evidence to assess whether inspection and regulation evolved as the evidence based 
suggested it should. Obviously, it is impossible to claim for certain that changes to 
legislation and regulation practice occurred as a direct result of the evidence available, but 
they followed the same direction as the established evidence base, even if it is not possible 
to categorically say that the studies were used to influence change. 
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A dearth of studies  
One of the biggest difficulties in finding studies which solely focused on residential 
personal care for older people, as opposed to nursing care, is that in the United States of 
America, and those countries with systems based on the US model (e.g. Israel, South 
Korea), the term ‘long-term care’ can signify either nursing or personal care provision, and 
there is often little distinction made between the two. It also became apparent during 
assessment of research which reached the ‘full text’ stage that the same is often true of UK 
based research; research into ‘care services’ or ‘social care’ tend to encompass both 
nursing and personal care. Therefore searches come up with a large amount of nursing care 
articles, or articles that examine nursing and personal care as a homogenous service. The 
protocol of this SR focused solely on residential personal care for older people, with a 
specific decision to exclude nursing care. The rationale behind this decision was to avoid 
crossing the boundary into medical research. A decision made for two main reasons: First, 
regulation of the medical model can involve complex medical procedures, which I 
hypothesised, because of the volume of medical research, would take over the study and 
draw me into a field in which I have no knowledge or expertise. Secondly, this SR is also 
acting as an antecedent to the primary research of my doctoral thesis, which focuses on 
personal residential care, rather than nursing care.  
 
Articles on the effectiveness or impact of the regulation of nursing care are far more 
common than those on the regulation of residential personal care (see Appendix 1). This 
reflects a burgeoning of research in nursing care in comparison to residential care, 
particularly in the US, where nursing provision is more come than residential provision as 
it is funded through the Medicare insurance system. 
 
One of the reasons for this appears to be to do with the funding of the two types of care. 
This SR demonstrates that most of the research into regulation of older persons’ nursing 
home care appears to come from the US. Board and care facilities are the US equivalent of 
residential care homes in UK, but they are not funded by health insurance. This means that 
board and care facilities in the US are funded through private payments by residents and as 
a result there are no stakeholders with a large enough interest to fund research. They are 
still regulated (licensed and monitored) by state or local authorities. Much of the US 
research found during this SR focuses on nursing or skilled nursing facilities (SNF) 
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because they are eligible to receive insurance payments, which makes them a much more 
attractive option to fund research into because the state insurers can make savings if 
research pinpoints improvements.  
 
A second reason could reflect the similarity between the majority of aspects involved in 
both nursing and non-nursing care provision. Within residential care issues around choice, 
food, well-being, respect, dignity and the other areas protected by government standards 
are similar in both nursing and personal care; nursing care simply has an extra, health 
orientated dimension. Thus it is possible to conduct the same research in nursing services 
(without focusing on the health issues) as in personal care services; to not do so would 
eliminate a key population from the sample. However, it was not appropriate to include 
this sample in my SR, because although it would widen the scope of the study to include 
articles which looked at aspects important to both personal and nursing residential care 
homes, it would also widen the scope to the extent that I had to include research into the 
effectiveness and process of inspection and regulation on the medical aspects of nursing 
care, a field I wanted to avoid. 
 
This SR highlights the lack of ‘scientific’ studies carried out on residential social care 
inspection for older people (and I extrapolate this reflects the whole of the social care 
field). There are a number of reasons for this. The first reflects a widely cited criticism of 
social work research; that it is reluctant to adopt and embrace evidence-based 
methodology. A failing which can be attributed to a number of causes: the lack of a 
quantitative skills base in social work, and the social sciences more generally; concerns 
about the appropriateness of applying a methodology rooted in the natural sciences to a 
social setting that is heavily influenced by the social interactions within it, and the ensuing 
problems with measuring these interactions; lack of funds channelled into financing multi-
site, researcher laden projects.  
 
Aside from the practical barriers to effectiveness studies in the social sciences, there are 
also substantive considerations, the most defining being the problem of subjecting a social 
care setting to a wide scale intervention over a sustained period of time. To do this can 
have both practical and ethical implications. On the practical side, the invasiveness of a 
study which measures effectiveness means that it is a daunting prospect to undertake and 
will encounter numerous problems with gaining and sustaining participants. There are also 
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complex ethical considerations regarding the allocation of interventions and the problems 
associated with negatively or positively affecting a certain population in contrast to the 
rest. However, these considerations are also apparent in the trial of clinical interventions 
and in the context of devising research I agree with the old, but wise adage that problems 
should never be dismissed simply because they are too difficult. 
 
Recommendations for further research 
There is a lot of money being spent on regulation (CSCI’s annual resources in 2005-2006 
were £151 million (CSCI 2007a: 61)) and it can be quite a burden for services, so evidence 
that inspection actually works to improve outcomes is long overdue. There is a great need 
for further (well-funded) research into older persons’ residential care, at the moment there 
is no evidence to demonstrate whether inspection and regulation actually works to improve 
outcomes for any of the key stakeholders (residents, staff, managers). Nor is there any 
detailed research into whether inspection is a cost-effective process. Netten, Forder and 
Knight (1999) conducted a study for the Personal Social Services Research Unit (PSSRU) 
that looked at the costs of regulation in 1999, prior to the inception of either the NCSC or 
CSCI, but this was not included in the review because it looked at care homes for all 
adults, not just older people.  
 
Now that regulation is administered nationally, by a central organisation it should be 
possible to conduct a large-scale study into the effectiveness of inspection and regulation, 
both in terms of cost effectiveness and effectiveness at improving outcomes for service 
users. This would be a large, costly study that would require more than one researcher and 
have to involve assessment of outcomes for the service user, with direct consultation of 
those service users. As inspection must occur at least once every year (see CSCI 2006d) in 
the most poorly performing services, with regular follow-up inspections to monitor 
improvement, it would be difficult to do a wide ranging Randomised Control Trial (RCT), 
but it would certainly be possible to develop a method to judge effectiveness. 
 
This SR also highlights the perceived lack of relevance and dissemination of reports and 
consequently the reluctance of potential and current service users to read them. Redmayne 
(1994) made a number of recommendations for the composition of inspection reports and 
those produce by CSCI include many of the criteria recommended, but as this review 
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demonstrates there is no research to provide evidence for effectiveness or usefulness of 
these reports, or how widely they are used. There could also be further research into 
whether this better organised and more user friendly report produced by CSCI is used more 
widely, and if this is the case whether it is because it is more appropriate and accessible for 
service users. 
 
REFLECTIONS 
Definitional problems: Assisted living 
When I embarked on this review I did not fully appreciated the complexity of the older 
persons’ social care field in relation to the types of services that are available and the 
confusion that the differing terminology creates. This issue is particularly highlighted 
when searching international studies, which often focused on assisted-living facilities. 
Rather than being a service that provides institutional, residential care, assisted living 
facilities are for people who can no longer live on their own, but do not require nursing or 
round the clock personal care, much akin to domiciliary care in the UK. In this semi-
institutional setting people live in self-contained flats, but with the provision of personal 
care services available to them on site. These studies were not included in the review. It 
also appeared common, especially in the USA and countries that use similar frameworks 
and policies for care (e.g. Israel), that there was not often a distinction between nursing and 
residential care and these two terms were used interchangeably, even when the type of care 
being provided may have been solely personal, with no medical treatment offered. It also 
appears that registered nurses tend to be in charge of running residential care 
establishments in the US, and associated countries, if not providing the bulk of the care, 
even if this care is solely personal, non-medical. 
 
A rigid protocol 
When I began my SR, I was heavily influenced by the guidelines of the Cochrane 
Collaboration and the necessity to develop a protocol with methodological inclusion 
criteria that adhered to a stringent scientific evidence base (see Appendix 1 for protocol). 
As it transpired this inclusion criteria was very narrow and did not generate any 
effectiveness studies on the regulation of older pe
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months of demoralising database searching. I acknowledge that a negative result, i.e. one 
that comes up with nothing, is valuable in its own right, but developing an inclusion 
criteria that is very narrow, based on a set of values that I argue better fit (although not 
exclusively) the natural sciences, was naïve for a research student. What was more 
appropriate, and became an added dimension when I re-worked the SR was to widen the 
methodological inclusion criteria. The two parts of the protocol were divided and this is 
reflected accordingly in the weight with which the evidence is presented in the final report. 
I split the question in two to look at effectiveness, using a hierarchy of evidence, and 
process, using a quality criteria developed by Kavanagh, Harden et al (2005) in an SR they 
completed for the Evidence for Policy and Practice Information and Co-ordinating Centre 
(EPPI-Centre). These criteria centred on a suitable description of methods used and 
whether these were appropriately justified in the context of the research question(s) of the 
study. This led to a small number of studies meeting the inclusion criteria of the process 
question, but the narrow focus of the question still meant that quite a few studies were 
excluded simply because they focused on wider residential care (including nursing and / or 
those under 65), rather than residential care for older people. 
 
The eventual lack of studies included in the review led me to question the 
appropriateness of the question and whether it was too narrow, even once I had divided 
the review into process and effectiveness questions. It is imperative to have a question that 
is not only clearly thought through but also worded extremely carefully. The structure of 
the question ultimately determines the inclusion criteria and search terms of the protocol 
because it defines exactly what you want to examine. The question therefore needs to be 
succinct and well constructed to reflect search aims and form a foundation for the review, 
because from this you will develop a search strategy. I think the question was worded well 
and allowed me to answer both the effectiveness and process questions. Although there 
were very few studies, a negative result is not bad and shows a lack of research in the area. 
To have widened the focus of the review would have made the project too large to manage 
single-handed. I would have had to include and examine studies that focused on health and 
nursing issues, which as well as widening the whole scope of the SR (to proportions 
impossible to cope with during my PhD) it would have taken me into territory that I have 
little knowledge or expertise in. 
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Limitations 
Scope of search 
Once the question has been defined and search terms finalised there had to be 
consideration of the scope of search, this was especially important because I did not have 
the resources to conduct a full SR. Decisions had to be made about; 
1. Focus: International or national? 
a. Publications in native language only? 
b. Translation – if so, how? Cost? 
2. Types of databases 
a. Only ones that the University of York or my sponsor the CSCI carry?  
b. Pay for subscription to relevant databases that affiliated institution(s) do not 
carry? 
3. Financial limitations 
4. Time-scale (especially with one researcher) 
 
In keeping with an initial adherence to a traditional protocol I opted to look internationally, 
but decided not to included research that was not written in English because I did not have 
the resources to pay for translation. This obviously puts a limit on the scope of my SR and 
I can only say that my findings are true to the extent that they ignore research in other 
languages, a severe limitation. 
 
I decided that without anything but a very small expenses budget I would only be able to 
search databases that were either free to access, or the University of York, or my sponsor 
CSCI had access.  Doing this restricted my scope and meant that I could not access some 
of the search database I would have done had I had more resources. Databases I failed to 
access included Ageinfo, Social Sciences Citation Index, Bibliography of Asian Studies, 
Social Work Abstracts. 
 
Inter-rater reliability 
The average SR in healthcare costs around £80000 (as estimated by Petticrew and Roberts 
(2006) using a median calculation of funding from information on the UK Health 
Technology  Assessment Agency website)  and involves a minimum of two researchers 
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(often with additional search specialists) who can discuss inclusion decisions and come to 
agreed conclusions about whether the particular piece of research should be included as 
defined by the parameters of the protocol. Inter-rater reliability was a problem because a 
PhD is essentially a very solitary endeavour and I had no resources to pay a second person 
to help examine the search output. This meant I had to make inclusion decisions on my 
own, without the use of inter-rater reliability to boost rigour. 
 
Databases 
Once title, search terms and inclusion criteria have been developed and before I embarked 
on any data collection it was pertinent to explore each of the databases that are going to be 
used for the search. I only did this for two of the databases I used, CSA illumnia and 
OVID, and this led to problems when I came to searching the others. I found that I often 
had to tweak my planned strategy to fit with the idiosyncrasies of the particular database, 
which led to a great deal of frustration and also became very time consuming. For example 
the advanced search option on Social Care Online involves a complex combination of 
‘field tags’ (e.g. author, title) that you have to copy and paste into a window and combine 
as required (see http://www.scie-socialcareonline.org.uk/AdvancedSearch.asp). 
 
A number of databases also crashed on me during my search of the outputs: for example 
social Care Online (21/04/06). These problems occurred because for some of the databases 
I naively attempted to examine the output in situ, on screen rather than exporting the 
output to a relevant reference-managing programme, or even to a text file. Valuable time 
was lost on these errors and in future I will ensure that I can save and or export my search 
output before I begin applying my inclusion criteria. 
 
Searching and saving 
I also had a problem dealing with duplicate ‘hits’ in the search output. Once again this was 
mainly due my naivety of the method and my lack of fastidiousness in exporting outputs 
appropriately. It was painstaking to eliminate these duplicates manually, especially when I 
got into the position of doing it in situ as I was making inclusion decisions. Therefore, if I 
were to conduct another SR I would ensure I had a method of eliminating duplicates before 
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I began making inclusion decision. This would be achieved by saving my search outputs 
appropriately before I begin the sifting of studies. 
 
The final writing for the review took place quite some time after the search, which meant 
that it was necessary to be fastidious in organising search outputs, something which I did 
not do as well as I could have done.  Using an appropriate data management programme 
and ensuring that I saved full searches properly would have greatly improved my 
organisation. 
 
Analysis 
I realised it was important to make detailed notes on output that may have met the 
inclusion criteria, which I put onto a data extraction form (see Appendix 1). I then used 
this at the analysis stage, often without the need to refer back to the study, because the 
detail of the extraction form was comprehensive. This was helpful and certainly made 
writing up more efficient and straightforward. 
 
Conducting a Systematic Review (SR) for a PhD 
I argue that the key to conducting a SR for a PhD and making decisions about how to 
develop an appropriate protocol is to always to maintain the maxim: is what I’m doing fit 
for purpose? While it will not be possible to follow every criteria of a traditional SR, in 
order to retain the essence of the technique and distinguish what you are doing from a 
simple narrative literature review there are certain facets that I argue must be retained: 
1. Refined research question 
2. Transparent methodology 
3. Stringent and clearly defined inclusion criteria based on your research question 
4. Stringent and clearly defined methodological criteria – not necessarily based on a 
hierarchy of evidence, but ensuring there are clear lines drawn between what is and 
what is not an acceptable methodological standard (which may be as simple as a 
clearly defined and justified methodology) 
5. A clear procedure for analysis 
6. Locate relevant databases to search and relevant organisations and individuals to 
contact asking if they are aware of any existing research o your topic area 
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All of these issues need to be clearly discussed in a detailed research protocol, defined 
prior to any of the review taking place. However, there appear to be one or two key facets 
of the more comprehensive SR that, as I have discussed, are particularly difficult for a PhD 
researcher to build into their protocol. 
 
A SR can be a very useful research tool, either as a literature review for your thesis (at a 
time when systematic searching is being increasingly advocated in more traditional 
literature reviews), or a as a thesis in its own right. However, it is important, as with the 
methods that might be employed when developing inclusion and quality criteria within a 
protocol, to ensure that this is fit for purpose. By which I mean developed within the 
confines of research circumstances. This is even more important for degree level 
researchers who have to deal with limitations that a fully funded research project will not. 
 
However, while these issues have to be taken into account it is necessary to avoid the 
stretching of the concept on an SR to the extent where the essential principles are lost. A 
SR should exhibit certain characteristics and where corners have to be cut these must be 
explained and justified and can only be done so in the confines of the method providing the 
essence of the SR is retained. 
 
Informing Phase Two of the Thesis 
The systematic review represents a self-contained piece of research and was written to 
stand alone in it’s own right. It was written in response to a direct request from the CSCI 
and as such was led by their requirements. In this sense it is phase 1 of the research and it 
informs the more extensive phase 2. In light of the Systematic Review findings the third 
part of this study investigates the impact inspection has on service provision, focusing on: 
the reaction to inspection findings of stakeholders, the extent to which it leads to 
improvements over the case study period and the barriers to implementing service 
improvement. 
 
CSCI figures suggest the changes to inspection implemented since 2004 have produced a 
more effective inspection. Services are now meeting 23 % more standards than in 2003, 
with the average percentage of standards now being met by older peoples’ cares homes at 
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82 % (CSCI 2009). The systematic review in this thesis suggests there has been no 
research to explore the process of inspection and understand how and why inspection is 
working and if the official figures tell the whole story.  The aim of phase 2 has therefore 
been to understand this process and the rationale that underpins it. This has been achieved 
through the observation of four separate inspection visits and subsequent discussions with 
the inspectors and other relevant stakeholders. The emphasis has been on exploring themes 
across the four inspections and understanding the consequences of inspection.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter sets out how I carried out my research. Rather than just being a simple 
account of what I did it chronicles my thinking from the development of the study and 
considerations of appropriate methodologies, to how this thinking draws on literature about 
research methods. I also include a reflexive strand throughout this chapter, tracing the 
evolution of my thinking and reflecting on the inevitable design changes that occurred 
throughout the research process. 
 
PLANNING 
Aims of research 
At the inception of this study there were two aims, first to determine the consequences and 
impacts inspection had on stakeholders involved in residential care for older people. The 
second incorporated an evaluative element to the design, as it was also part of the CSCI’s 
wish that I should explore the extent to which inspection would lead to improvements in 
care. 
 
Elements of research and evaluation 
These aims posed an initial methodological question about the differences between 
research and evaluation. I had the ambitious aim at the start of this study to address both 
practical and theoretical problems in relation to the inspection of residential care homes 
and produce findings that would culminate in both description but also policy and practice 
recommendations. This posed an interesting methodological conundrum because some 
literature seems to suggest that there is a distinction between the two (see Guba and 
Lincoln 1989), but others, such as Campbell and later Shaw suggest they are inclusive of 
one another. Shaw (1999) suggests that in asking whether evaluation and research are 
different we are making judgements about theoretical, empirical and normative positions. 
 
1. Can research and evaluation be similar / different? 
2. Is research different from evaluation? 
3. Should research and evaluation be different?  (Shaw 1999: 8) 
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Others who have written on these issues, such as Guba and Lincoln and Ernest House 
argue that a dichotomy is appropriate because the two types of research have different 
purposes (understanding versus technical assessment) and different audiences 
(heterogeneous evaluation audience versus homogenous research audience) (Guba and 
Lincoln 1989). Certainly, public sector organisations and ethics committees make 
distinctions between the two (see for example Eckstein 2003).  
 
The approach I take in this thesis takes much from the work of Weiss and her 
conceptualisation of evaluation as encompassing enlightenment, ‘whereby there is a 
diffuse and indirect infiltration of research ideas into… understanding of the world’ (Shaw 
1999: 73). In this context Shaw believes a method can be developed to incorporate both 
research and evaluation into a single research design by avoiding the tendency to separate 
the terms because at first glance it appears appropriate to do so;  
 
‘to talk of ‘evaluation research’… does make good sense, and involves no 
confusion of categories’ (Shaw 1999: 11).  
 
Although the decision to include evaluation in my study was an epistemological one and 
decided as part of my research design, it was partly influenced by the requirements of co-
funder CSCI, which meant there was initially outside pressure to incorporate an evaluative 
element to the research design. The CSCI had to be assured that they were to get 
something from the money they have invested in the research and although they were 
interested in the findings of the applied research, because of the nature of the organisation 
and the types of knowledge they are interested in, they were mainly interested in policy or 
practice outcomes. 
 
Qualitative or quantitative method? 
Form the initial stages of thinking about this research I always thought it likely that the 
primary research would involve mainly qualitative data. In chapter 3 I report a systematic 
review of international literature on the effectiveness of inspection, which I had hoped 
would have provided evidence as to whether inspection was effective at producing better 
outcomes for older people living in residential care. The plan was then to understand, in 
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detail, how the inspection process works, the positives and negatives of the intervention, 
and how it impacts on the stakeholders (residents, their family, staff, and manager). 
Although the systematic review unearthed no data on the effectiveness of inspection of 
older people’s residential care, the primary research was still designed to focus on the ways 
in which inspection impacts on each case study site and discover the ways in which 
residents, staff, relatives and the care home management view as good quality care, if these 
views are similar and if they are the same as those the CSCI use to develop National 
Minimum Standards (NMS) for care homes (Department of Health 2001c). 
 
Qualitative approaches can provide an understanding of causes and outcomes that 
sometimes may better answer the research question than conventional quantitative, 
comparison designed research. What is important is that the methods and research design 
are ‘fit for purpose’, and justified within this context (Shaw and Norton 2007). Shaw 
argues that qualitative research is important for facilitating the ‘valuation of outcomes as 
opposed to the technicalisation of outcome research’ (Shaw 2003: 72). By this he means 
that conventional views of outcome research tend to see outcomes as value-neutral and 
rational, for example in terms of health gain, when actually there are a range of political 
and social values that need to be considered (Shaw 2003). This is particularly relevant to 
the study of a regulator that measures outcomes for service users and tries to understand 
these outcomes in the context of their personal values. 
 
In my case, the purpose is to try and understand and evaluate the impact of inspection and 
how this influences the quality of service and well-being of the residents. Qualitative 
methods appeared best suited to my design because I not only wanted to gain an 
understanding of the process but also wanted to understand the causal relationships of 
inspection and understand what factors influence the development of better quality care for 
older people in residential homes. In this sense I wanted my research to ‘…identify 
(causal) mechanisms, going beyond sheer association’ (Miles and Huberman 1994: 147), to 
understand as well as identify causation. 
 
Theoretical influences 
Part of this research focuses on the perspectives of key stakeholders involved in the 
inspection of residential care for older people. A constructionist approach is sometimes 
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based on the concept of ontological relativity, which suggests that people’s statements 
about reality and the world they live in are a local contingency of their worldview. While I 
support the idea that social processes are central to everyday life and that historical and 
cultural change influences people’s value positions, I also agree that there is a need to 
ground critique and to understand continuity as well as variability. This position has led 
some theorists such as Campbell, House, Cook and Stake, to propose a realist ontology for 
social constructivism. Constructionism is not incompatible with realism: 
 
‘The essence of this position is that, although the real world, driven by real natural 
causes, exists, it is impossible for humans truly to perceive it with their imperfect 
sensory and intellective mechanism’ (Cook and Campbell 1979: 29) 
 
A range of views exist within this critical realist position. Following this logic each of the 
stakeholders interviewed in my study will have different experiences and perceptions of 
inspection and what constitutes quality in the service they receive.  
 
My theoretical approach is also influenced by the concept of ‘symbolic interactionism’ 
(Blumer 1969b) in the sense that perceptions of the stakeholders interviewed in this study 
may change as a result of interaction with inspection as it reformulates their world view 
and associations with what they see as ‘quality’ or ‘good inspection’. Problems occur 
where there are imbalances of power and these multiple voices do not have an opportunity 
to be heard. This has particular salience for the evaluative part of my research because 
social care services and their regulation function on the premise of social justice and 
empowerment. A constructionist approach has influenced my thinking around this power 
relationship and in particular whether CSCI’s inspection does actually reflect the 
experiences and perceptions of the people it is serving. 
 
As Guba and Lincoln (1989) outline the researcher influenced by this approach must 
accept the existence of multiple realities and that knowledge is created by both the 
researcher and the researched (Guba and Lincoln 1989). In this sense it is important to be 
reflexive and acknowledge how one’s own experiences influence the act of inquiry (Patton 
2002). This was important in the analysis stage and in the following chapters I reflect on 
the influence of my experiences and theoretical thinking in relation to the data. 
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Credibility of qualitative research 
Although qualitative research focuses on different methods of developing knowledge, 
which do not necessarily marry with techniques used to evaluate the quality of quantitative 
methods, I believe it is necessary to ensure as far as possible that the data collection and 
analysis of qualitative research is as robust and rigorous as possible. Patton (2002: 461) 
provides a useful set of checks that, if followed help to ensure research is credible. He 
defines credibility in qualitative research in terms of three distinct but related elements:  
• Rigorous techniques and methods for gathering high quality data that is 
carefully analysed, with attention to issues of validity, reliability, and 
triangulation; 
• The credibility of the researcher, which is dependent upon training, 
experience, track record, status, and presentation of self;  
• Philosophical belief in the phenomenological paradigm, that is, a 
fundamental appreciation of naturalistic inquiry, qualitative methods, 
inductive analysis, and holistic thinking. 
 
Throughout the design, data collection and data analysis stages of this work, I have 
attempted to address all three elements. Based on McCormick & James’ (1988) 
suggestions for enhancing validity I have tried to incorporate the following measures at 
appropriate points:  
Construct validity 
• Using multiple sources of evidence in the data collection phase 
(interviews with inspectors, interviews with care home managers, interviews 
with care home residents, interviews with resident’s friends and family, 
interviews with care home staff, observation with the care homes, analysis of 
inspection reports) 
• Building uncertainty about inspection into the research design by testing 
individual’s knowledge of the process before asking questions about it 
• Using information from consultation with staff in CSCI and data from 
their records as key informants to enhance sampling validity  
Internal validity 
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• Searching out cases that appeared at first glance to be contrary to my 
thinking or the consensus from other cases 
• Being rigorous in the application of well defined data analysis techniques 
• Pursuing alternative or rival explanations in the analysis of all data 
• Using triangulation – of data collection sources and of theories in the data 
interpretation phases 
External validity 
• Collecting data from a variety of care home services in different areas of 
the country 
 
Longitudinal approach 
Although interest in this area is growing, there was only limited precedent for the 
longitudinal method in qualitative research at the time I commenced this study (Henwood 
and Lang 2003). Historically there has been considerable resistance in the quantitative 
research community to the value of longitudinal qualitative research, but Holland, 
Thomson et al (2006) found in their review for the ESRC that: 
 
‘…some funders, government research managers and archivists suggest that there is 
in fact considerable support, and a clear scientific rationale for qualitative led or 
purely qualitative longitudinal research’ (Holland, Thomson et al 2006: 4) 
 
The strength of the method in relation to the aims of my study is it allows me to document 
changes over time and evaluate the impact of inspection. The changes required or 
recommended after the inspection can only be implemented over a period of time and I 
wanted to examine both the process of implementing change, whether all changes in the 
period of study could be directly attributed to inspection, and how these changes (if they 
occurred) impacted on the stakeholders. 
 
The case study method 
The Case Study as a social science method is neither discreet nor defined. It is in essence 
the study of a ‘bound system’ – with the researcher looking for endogenous conclusions. 
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Platt (1981) traces the roots back to the social worker’s ‘case history’ or ‘case work’, 
noting that social work case records were used in early studies that have since been 
heralded as classics of the method (e.g. Thomas and Znaniecki 1996). However, the use of 
the term is varied and often confused. Within academic research it is subject to ‘conceptual 
stretching’ and is often conflated with other methods such as ethnography, participant 
observation and qualitative research. It is also used in other areas such as law, medicine 
and social work in differing contexts. This multitude of uses means that as a method there 
is no universal set of criteria for its use and, as Hakim (2000) argues, case studies typically 
span a variety of methods and evidence. 
 
To begin with I have to determine whether the area I am studying counts as a case. In order 
to be defined as a method of inquiry the case study must be defined, although as I have 
discussed others might use the term differently (e.g. a barrister might have a different 
interpretation to a social worker). Gomm, Hammersley and Foster (2000) identify two key 
dimensions crucial to any case study: first the number of cases being investigated, and 
second the amount of detailed information being collected. These two dimensions are 
relational because it is often the case that the fewer cases being investigated the more 
information can be collected in each case. A Case Study typically collects a large amount 
of data from each case, which spans a number of dimensions and different methods of 
collection. The unique strength of a case study is its ability to include a wide variety of 
evidence – documents, artefacts, interviews, surveys, observations – to build up a whole 
picture of the area being studied (Yin 2003). The cases I wanted to study were implicitly 
thought of as cases by the CSCI, who had an inspection record or ‘case file’ on each care 
home in England.  
 
My case studies comprise a mixture of unstructured observation and semi-structured 
interviews, which leads to qualitative analysis of the data. Rather than aiming for 
generalisations I have instead aimed to understand the cases and make comparisons 
between them, although this provides insight into the impact of inspection in social care it 
does not provide any data that can be generalised to the rest of the residential care home 
population in England.  
 
Although I will not be making generalisations, I agree with Robert Stake (Stake 1995) that 
case studies while not generalisable in a statistical sense can be used to make general 
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statements and provide insight beyond the cases themselves. I think this is particularly true 
of a case where a particular intervention is being studied. In this respect some of my 
findings will hopefully be transferable to other inspection situations and be illustrative, if 
not fully demonstrative, of inspection. Thus, results from this thesis will be generalisable 
to theoretical presuppositions and not a population as a whole. The goal of this thesis is to 
expand theories, not to identify frequencies. As Lipset, Trow and Coleman claim, ‘the goal 
is to do a generalising and not a particularising analysis’ (Lipset, et al. 1956: 419-420).  
 
The implications for the findings of case studies depend on the type of study carried out. 
They can be restricted to description and explanation resulting in an in-depth 
understanding of the case or cases, or they can engage in some form of evaluation. The 
study I conducted looks at the ‘intervention’ of an inspection of four residential care homes 
for older people that were deemed previously by the regulator, CSCI, to be either 
performing poorly or adequately. The study examines how this intervention impacted on in 
the four homes, how and why it had this impact and how helpful it was in improving the 
performance of the home against the regulators standards, the study also examines whether 
the standards and indicators of quality used by the regulator match the opinions of 
particularly the residents in the homes, but also their relatives, the staff, and the care home 
management.  
 
There was also a question over whether to consider individual or multiple cases. Multiple-
case designs are preferred over single-case designs because, even with only a minimum of 
two cases there is a possibility of direct replication; analytical conclusions that are 
demonstrated as independently arising from two cases are obviously more powerful than 
those from a single case alone. It is also likely that two separate case-studies will have 
differing contexts and under these circumstances there is an immeasurably expanded 
possibility for external generalisation of the common findings, compared to a single case 
alone (Yin 2003). 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
In conjunction with CSCI I began the detailed planning of my research. 
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Purposive sampling  
Developing the sampling and selection strategy is a very important strategic element of 
qualitative research. A sampling strategy provides the principles and procedures used to 
identify, choose and gain access to relevant units of study for data generation (Mason, 
1996). To make sampling decisions that are ‘fit for purpose’ and reflect the theoretical 
underpinning of the study an appropriate relationship has been established between the 
selected sample and the exogenous world to which it is related. Therefore it is crucial to 
ensure that a sample of people is generated which consists of characteristics that are 
relevant to a combination of both the wider population (as representative of them as 
possible) and to the research questions. As previously discussed it is rare in qualitative 
research to use samples that are statistically representative of the population being studied. 
Rather it is appropriate to purposefully select a sample that is justified theoretically and 
best suits the aims of the study. 
  
The sampling strategy that reflects this aim is known as purposive or theoretical sampling, 
which contrasts with statistical sampling that is used to generate empirically representative 
samples. It was felt that purposive rather than representative samples would be more 
appropriate for this study as the aim was not to be able to make wider generalisations but 
to deepen my understanding of a process of inspection, make a broad evaluation of each 
case, and provide insight into the process and outcomes of inspection. Using this purposive 
approach the emphasis is not on selecting a sample representative of the total empirical 
population, but on designing a sample that encapsulates a relevant range cases and 
experiences in relation to the wider universe (Mason, 1996). This enables the researcher to 
identify fundamental differences and similarities in conditions and provide an insight into 
the situations under which concepts and their properties vary. 
 
Observation 
The first stage of my data collection was observation of the inspection or ‘event’. The 
inspection comprised a planning stage and site visit. The inspection was conducted in two 
stages: the planning and analysis of preliminary data and the site visit. In order to 
understand the planning stage I a had meeting with the inspectors the day prior to the 
respective inspections where they talked me through the planning of the inspection, 
explaining what they had done in preparation for the visit and how they used data received 
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prior to the visit to both influence their judgements and guide the site visit the following 
day. Observation of the site visit began when I met the inspectors at the case study service 
and followed the site visit. I was conscious of the ‘Hawthorne effect’ on both the inspector 
and the stakeholders in the service, but had to accept that this was an unavoidable 
limitation of the study. I was also conscious of my association with the inspector, 
particularly in the eyes of residents, but decided in the planning of this project that this 
organisational or insider status was similarly unavoidable and I used the first interview to 
clearly delineate my role and position as an independent researcher. I discuss my 
negotiation of the ‘insider’ / ‘outsider’ tightrope later in this chapter. I used observation 
throughout the case studies to supplement the interview data. 
 
This was not a ethnographic study in the sense that observation was only one aspect of my 
data collection and I was guided by a pre-determined structure (Denzin 1970). The aim of 
this work is to find out about the consequences of inspection and then find out how and 
why inspection creates these outcomes. However, I was guided by many of the principles 
of ethnography in that I wanted to understand the viewpoint of stakeholders and the 
characteristics of interaction in relation to care services and inspection. 
 
The aim of my observation was to gather first-hand information about social process in a 
‘naturally occurring’ context, to identify primarily what the inspectors did when 
conducting the inspection and the ways that other stakeholders reacted to the inspection. In 
the words of Agar (1986) I was aiming to ‘learn about a world… by encountering it 
firsthand and making some sense out of it’ (Agar 1986: 12). The observational element of 
this research design allows me to examine the series of events that make up the process of 
inspection. It allows me to describe this process in detail and to help understand what is 
going on. When combined with data from interviews this provides clues to the impact the 
process has on stakeholders and provides useful data on ‘what works’ in the inspection 
process. Of course my observation would not be of a completely ‘naturally occurring’ 
context because my presence serves to change the dynamics of the inspection. I was 
interacting with the inspectors throughout the study and was asked my opinion on a 
number of occasions, which I always declined to give. The research was clearly influenced 
by my presence and my interaction with social processes. I recorded my observations both 
during the inspections and during my time spent in the services at the three data collection 
points. 
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Semi-structured interview  
Following my observation of the inspection I conducted interviews at three separate data 
collection points. These were directly after the inspection, approximately eight weeks after 
inspection and then nine months after the inspection. The interviews were anywhere 
between 20 minutes and 90 minutes long and recorded on a digital recording device. Notes 
were also taken during the session. The use of a flexible interview schedule developed 
based on theoretical propositions developed from my planning, but with the flexibility to 
explore areas that were deemed interesting by the participants was the ideal way to answer 
my research questions. 
 
Hammersley and Atkinson point out the distinction between reflexive (or semi structured 
interview) and standardised interviews (Hammersley and Atkinson 1983), the latter which 
only uses a standard set of questions which the interview does not deviate from and the 
former which is more flexible and allows probing and follow-up questions. I felt that a 
semi-structured interview incorporated the strengths of both interview strategies; allowing 
a degree of flexibility, while utilising the guiding influence that non-standardisation of 
questions bring to focus on inspection and the care home. Without a semi-structured 
schedule it is likely the respondents, especially the residents would have gone off on 
tangents. This tended to happen even with a semi-structured schedule. However, I also 
wanted to allow the participants’ viewpoints to be expressed and give the respondents 
more freedom to elaborate on areas of the question he/she believed to be important. A 
semi-structured interview, while allowing me to address the questions developed during 
the research design, allows greater scope for the interviewee to express their own 
experiences and opinions, rather than being constrained by fixed standardised questions, 
which by virtue of their construction, constrain the participant’s responses (Flick 2002).  
 
Although I wanted to give the participants the opportunity to elaborate on their responses, 
as Schuman and Kalton identify ‘a small change in the wording of a question can have a 
large effect on answers’ (Schuman and Kalton 1998). Therefore, the questions and probes I 
used to address my initial theoretical presuppositions followed a standard wording, but 
presented the respondents with the opportunity to elaborate on their experiences and 
beliefs and respond to the question from their own perspective. By standardising the 
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wording all participants have the same stimuli from which to respond and their answers 
cannot be attributed to differences in questioning. I was also cautious of asking ‘leading 
questions’. I am aware that there can be differing interpretations of the same question 
depending on the interviewees’ background and the context of the interview. This was 
particularly pertinent as some interviews were with older people who were 50 to 60 years 
older than me. As such I adopted a process of ‘meaning clarification’ (Kvale 1996: 83) to 
provide a disambiguation of the statements made and during my analysis I was aware of 
the influence social context could have on answers to questions.  
 
I employed a set of main questions in the interviews that were ‘non-directive’ (Rubin and 
Rubin 1995), to encourage maximum level of response from the interviewees. I wanted to 
allow them to elaborate on their expectations and attitudes to living in the care home, and 
inspection and explain their own interpretation of what factors they believed informed their 
opinions and thoughts on the case. I then followed these up with request for clarification or 
further elaboration, using unscripted questions to pursue answers already given.  
 
These questions were ‘probes’ designed to stimulate further elaboration on issues that had 
already been brought up by the respondent. They were not used to refocus the data or 
influence the individual’s answers in any way (Patton 1990). The purpose of deep probing 
of experiences, beliefs and attitudes in an interview situation is necessarily constructionist; 
the purpose is to elicit interpretations, not fact. It forces the participant to evaluate the 
interview process and could highlight events, circumstances and feelings the respondent 
had not considered before. In this situation, the interview itself is playing a role in the 
construction of the data by forcing a deeper consideration than has been required or 
attempted before. This ‘active interview’ situation has a role in making meaning and forces 
my reflection on my role as interviewer and acknowledgment that I play a role in the 
generation, rather than collection of the data (Mason 1996). Methodological literature 
places a great deal of emphasis on understanding the varied and often distinct perspectives 
of both the interviewer and respondent and these ideas will be discussed as I present my 
findings (Holstein and Gubrium 1995).  
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Interview themes  
Based on my theoretical thinking stemming from my systematic review and further 
literature review, the themes I wanted to discuss in the interviews were as follows: 
Residents 
• Circumstance for being in care 
• Choosing the service 
• What constitutes well-being 
• Feelings about being in care 
• Quality of service – staff, food, environment, activities 
• Daily activity and community involvement  
• Views of inspection 
• Questions developed specifically for each case study based on analysis of past 
reports 
 
Managers and staff 
• Views on their job 
• Quality of service and management 
• Time spent with residents 
• Self-assessment 
• Views on inspection 
• Direct questions about the performance of the service and problems inspection 
might find 
• Questions developed specifically for each case study based on analysis of past 
reports 
 
Inspector 
• Role 
• Inspection process 
• Performance of service 
• Ambiguity-conflict matrix in their work (personalisation versus professionalisation) 
• Routinisation 
• Questions developed specifically for each case study based on analysis of past 
reports 
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The nature of the study meant I proposed to conduct 108 interviews over four case study 
sites. This posed a technical and theoretical problem in my approach to the interviews, 
which was particularly prominent for the interviews with residents. I was aware that 
residents might not have either the technical knowledge of the system, or the inclination to 
fully engage with direct questions about quality of care and inspection. In light of this I 
want to use questions about lived experience to create a picture of the residents’ 
experiences and views about care. Although I tried to do this the interviews were 
necessarily more limited in scope than might have been possible using a more detailed 
approach that focused on residents. However, I believe my data provides insight into lived 
experiences from which I could reflect upon and draw conclusions about the impact of 
inspection (Van Manen 1992). 
 
Documents 
Documents provide a useful complement to the interview data and help triangulate the 
findings. They can be analysed quantitatively by, for example, looking at number of 
requirements, or they can be analysed qualitatively by looking at the content of the reports. 
I used the following documents and looked at their overall written assessment of the home:  
• The three inspection reports published prior to the inspection I observed – to gain a 
history of the home and develop questions specific to the service and improvements 
CSCI would look at during the inspection I observed  
• The inspection report published as a result of the inspection I observed 
 
The reports were used in two stages. The first was as part of the study design process. I 
examined the three reports published prior to data collection to provide me with a 
background to the home and help me to develop specific questions for each service. These 
questions were specifically around improvements that had been made over the time prior to 
the data collection and to check that any outstanding improvements required or 
recommended in past reports had been carried out.  
 
The second stage came during analysis. The reports gave me another way of understanding 
the perspective of the inspectors and discovering if their professional opinion, influenced 
by the organisational constraints and rules of writing the report, was similar to the one they 
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gave to me at the time of the inspection. In this sense I was aware that documents cannot 
be simply taken on ‘face value’ and read only for their content, it is necessary to 
understand how and why they are produced and the rules surrounding their production and 
use (Prior 2004). This was particularly relevant to my interviews with inspectors because I 
was able to examine the tensions between the official documentation and the views of the 
inspectors, contextualising their construction and purpose. 
 
Choosing the case studies 
Narrowing down the regions 
I decided that for both practical and theoretical reasons I would use a purposive sample in 
my research. To determine this sample I discussed the suitability with members of CSCI’s 
Methodology and Policy team and decided that in order for my study to develop broad and 
illuminating examples I should refrain from limiting my sample to one council area or 
even one regional area (Hakim 2000). Contacts at the CSCI thought there were still a lot of 
local differences between inspection teams and even inspection regions so it would be best 
to sample at least two different regions. Restricting my sample to one region, even if I 
opted for diversity within that region would be unnecessarily restrictive, therefore I opted 
for two regions, one in the south and one in the north, in order to reflect north-south 
variation. It was decided, after consultation with Information and Knowledge Management 
at CSCI, that the North East and Eastern regions were suitable candidates. They cover the 
range of types and quality of homes. From a practical perspective both regions although 
heterogeneous are reasonably small geographically, which means that it will be relatively 
easy to access a diverse sample (as opposed to, for example, the sparse South West, which 
would provide difficulties in travelling around). 
 
Choosing how to collect the data 
This is a longitudinal study over nine months, during which time I interviewed nine 
participants on three occasions and the inspector of each case study service. I interviewed 
the following people in each study: 
• 3 residents at each case study site 
• 1 member of each of the 3 resident’s family/ friend 
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• The registered manager at each case-study site 
• 2 staff members in each home 
• The inspector of the home (this will only take place once, after the initial 
inspection) 
 
I also used the following data to supplement the interviews:  
• 3 inspection reports published prior to the inspection I am observing – to gain a 
history of the home and develop questions specific to the service and improvements 
CSCI will be looking during the inspection I am observing  
• the inspection report published as a result of the inspection I am observing 
• my notes based on observation of the inspection I followed 
• observation conducted during my time spent in the home at the three points in time 
 
Having initially planned to study six case studies at three points in time I decided to reduce 
this to four after calculating the amount of data I would collect if I stuck to six. Bearing in 
mind this was only the first (although larger) part of the study I decided that six sites would 
be unmanageable in-terms of both collecting and analysing the data. 
 
Table 5: Potential number versus actual number of interviews 
 
 No. of interviews with 6 sites 
at three separate points in time 
No. of interviews with 4 sites 
at three separate points in time 
3 residents 3 x 3 = 9 (x 6 sites) = 51 3 x 3 = 9 (x 4 sites) = 36 
3 F&F 3 x 3 = 9 (x 6 sites) = 51 3 x 3 = 9 (x 4 sites) = 36 
2 staff 2 x 3 = 6 (x 6 sites) = 36 2 x 3 = 6 (x 4 sites) = 24 
1 manager 1 x 3 = 3 (x 6 sites) = 18 1 x 3 = 3 (x 4 sites) = 12 
1 inspector             1 (x 6 sites) =   6             1 (x 4 sites) =   4 
Total 162 112 
 
As the table above shows even conducting four case studies longitudinally over 3 points 
time led to 112 interviews and to have conducted the study over six sites would have 
meant an unmanageable 162 interviews. 
 
Deciding to conduct only four rather than six case studies posed a problem for my research 
design, as I had planned to study two cases at each of the three internal rating levels the 
CSCI had at the time of my data collection. Before the current star rating system, 
introduced in January 2008, CSCI had internal ratings for each service, based on their 
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inspection and report. I had planned to use these ratings and study two poor, two adequate 
and two good services, as judged by CSCI after the previous inspection (which would have 
been a maximum of one year prior to the inspection I was shadowing) of each service. 
Having decided that four case studies were appropriate I then concluded that in terms of 
the aims of my study it would be best to focus on services at the poorer end of the internal 
ratings spectrum. This is because the various inspectors I spoke with during the 
development stage of the study hypothesised that inspection would have more impact on 
these cases and they would therefore be more appropriate to discover how the intervention 
affects the home. 
 
Number of interviews: the impact of attrition 
The levels of dependency and unwillingness of one or two residents to be involved in the 
study meant that in the first case study (CH1) only two residents were interviewed directly 
and one daughter provided interviews on behalf of her mother. In case study three (CH 3) 
it proved difficult to get relatives to agree to participate, which meant I only managed to 
interview one relative on all three occasions and a second during the second and third data 
collection points. In both the second (CH 2) and fourth case (CH 4) studies a resident died 
in the six-month gap in-between the second and third points of data collection and so final 
interviews them and their relatives could not be conducted. 
 
Recruiting participants and gaining consent 
Gaining permission from relevant case study homes 
The participant homes were identified in conjunction with the Commission for Social Care 
Inspection (CSCI). I liaised with an inspector in each of four local offices across two 
regions. The CSCI divides England into nine administrative regions and in consultation 
with CSCI I decided that a purposive sample of two of these regions would be most 
appropriate. Having decide to narrow down my sample from six to four sites I decided to 
sampled two services judged as level 1 (i.e. failing against a number of NMS) and two as 
level 2 (narrowly failing to meet a number of NMS), one of each level in the two regions, 
omitting the level 3 homes all together.  
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Two prospective homes were identified, a first and second choice. Initial contact was made 
by letter, or where agreed with the relevant inspector an informal phone call from the 
inspector to gain preliminary permission (after which a letter from me was sent). The letter 
was then followed by a phone call approximately two weeks after posting, to get initial 
reaction and arrange a meeting to explain the project further, answer any questions and 
gain permission. If permission was declined I would then have contacted the second home 
(and subsequent homes if necessary) using the same process. However, because this study 
is part sponsored by the CSCI and I had contact with the inspectors of each service, they 
were all happy to take part.  
 
I was very careful to explain that this research was independent from the CSCI and that I 
was in no way influenced by their actions or judgement. I also was very explicit with each 
manager about his or her right to refuse to be part of the study, and that this decision would 
have no bearing on the outcome of the CSCI inspection. I made this explicit in my initial 
contact letter and when I met the manager for the first time I ensured I pointed this out; 
giving them the option to refuse to take part. Having taken pains to make this one or two of 
the managers were still conscious of my working relationship with the CSCI and were 
swayed by my perceived ‘insider’ status within the organisation. Although this perception 
was initially useful in terms of recruiting my sample, I wanted to shake this tag before the 
first part of my data collection, to ensure the participants would be open and honest with 
me without thinking I would pass  things on to the inspector, or pass judgement on the 
home myself. To assert my independence from CSCI I conducted a second meeting with 
each service to further explain my research to the manager. 
 
Informed consent by participants 
I only interviewed individuals once consent had been given, as required by both the 
University of York Ethics Committee and the Association of Directors of Social Services 
(ADASS) approval board. I agree that consent is a necessary feature of research, especially 
where gaining it will not compromise the fundamental design of the study. Allmark (2002) 
suggests that informed consent should adhere to the following criteria: 
 
• The consent should be given by someone competent to do so; 
• The person giving consent should be adequately informed; 
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• The consent is given voluntarily.   (Allmark 2002) 
 
Following these criteria I decided that consent could be given in one of two ways; either by 
reading and signing a letter of participation, or giving consent on the recording. Giving 
consent onto the recording gave individuals who were wary of putting their name to 
official documentation the chance to consent anonymously; in this case they were only 
identified on the recording by their interview number. The option to consent in this manner 
also gave frail residents who could not write the chance to consent.  
 
I ensured participants were satisfied they knew enough about the purpose of my research 
by giving them a brief information sheet about the project and answering any initial 
questions. This was a requirement of the ethics committee and although I wanted to ensure 
the participants knew that they were taking part in a research project and that it was in 
relation to a government regulator I wanted to avoid giving the respondents too much 
information that might influence or bias their responses to my questions. As I did not 
interview any participants with dementia there were no concerns about participants being 
too vulnerable to give informed consent. 
 
Participants were free to end their participation in the research at any time, at which point I 
would have either cease the interview, or if they data has already been collected, cease 
using it and remove any reference to this data from any reporting. None of my participants 
requested this option, either during the data collection or subsequently. 
 
Negotiating the ‘insider’ / ‘outsider’ tightrope 
This research presented me with an interesting dilemma regarding my ‘insider’ / ‘outsider’ 
status because it was necessary to juggle this conundrum across two organisations – the 
CSCI and the service I was studying. Adler and Adler talk of social groups as frequently 
having ‘two sets of realities about their activities: one presented to outsiders and the other 
reserved for insiders’ (Alder and Alder 1987: 21). The aim of my research was to get 
beyond the exterior presentation and understand both inspection and the functioning of the 
home from the insider. As I discuss above, regarding perceptions of managers, there were 
some aspects of attempting to be an ‘insider’ across two conflicting organisations that were 
problematic. My strategy was to gradually move from being a simple ‘visitor’ to the home 
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and relying solely on my research questions, to becoming, as far as possible, an ‘initiate’ 
(Flick 2006). To do this I had to persuade the care home staff and residents that I was not 
an inspector, as some initially thought when I arrived with the inspector to shadow their 
inspection. To achieve this I spent my first day in each service, after I had shadowed the 
inspection the previous day, chatting with people informally to assure them of my role as a 
researcher independent from the CSCI. It also helped me to begin to understand the staffs’ 
viewpoints and the organisational principles of the groups. I was not conducting an 
ethnographic study and only spent five days in each service, three times in a nine month 
period. So I cannot claim to have developed a true ‘initiate’ position, but this informal 
conversation and observation, supported by field notes, did provide an extra dimension of 
insight into the cases I was studying. 
 
I was also aware of what Adler and Adler term ‘the two sets of realities’ that exist in 
research – the reality presented to you as a researcher and the reality kept hidden, even if 
you become fully integrated into the field (Adler and Adler 1987) . These are areas that 
will only be accessible if researchers conceal from the field their role a researchers, an 
option that was not ethically or practically viable in this research. This point was especially 
pertinent during my research because the majority of participants first saw me with the 
inspector carrying out an inspection. This inevitably increased the perception of some that 
I could pass on information that could result in negative consequences, no matter how 
much I emphasised my independence (Flick 2006). I reflect on this within my research 
findings.  
 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
See Appendix 5. 
 
ANALYSIS 
Analytical framework 
I looked at the causes and consequences of inspection, with emphasis on not only ‘what’ 
works, but ‘how’ and ‘why’ it works. To do this I will used my notes from observation 
during the day of the inspection, observation in the home at the subsequent data collection 
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points and interviews with all stakeholders. With these broad aims I also examined the 
interplay between individual change and change within institutions and social structures. 
 
Analytical technique 
‘Qualitative analysis transforms data into findings. No formula exists for that 
transformation’ (Patton 2002: 432) 
 
As Patton succinctly claims in the above quote there are numerous different ways to 
analyse qualitative data, each with often only subtle differences from the last. Because 
there are no commonly agreed rules the ‘skill, knowledge, creativity and diligence’ (Patton 
2002: 432) of the analyst is extremely important. The aims of my research – to explore 
both the impact of inspection and evaluate the process - suggest that both coding of themes 
or concepts and analysis of narrative are useful analytical techniques. I developed a 
theoretical framework through which I analysed my data: 
 
Understanding the process focused on gaining an insight into the function of inspection. 
This involved examine the technical aspects of the process and the rationale for approaches 
used. It also focused on any tensions that might exist at the professional level between 
organisational direction and professional discretion / judgement. 
 
Individual change focused on individual contact with inspection and how it is experienced. 
Analysis explored: whether their understanding of inspection develops over time; the 
development of their personal life and lived experience over the 3 data collection points 
(including health issues); the development of residents’ relationship with staff; the 
development of relationships between staff; the development of relationships between staff 
and the management. 
 
Service change focused on changes in the delivery process. This involved understanding 
how the service was reviewed and changed and whether these changes, if any, can be 
attributed to inspection, or indeed other factors. The specific focus of analysis was on: 
• The dynamic of the service – whether this has changed and how 
• What works in terms of inspection 
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• How this service change, if it occurred, impact on service users (using cross 
referencing between themes) 
 
Policy domain and structural changes to inspection – Due to the evolving nature of the 
inspection regime I was conscious of any changes in policy and practice of inspection 
during the nine month study and see if any changes occurred and if so what impact these 
changes had. I did this by reviewing CSCI and government literature and cross-referencing 
any changes with evidence of their impact on the sample care homes. 
 
As I have explained I found it appropriate in the context of this research that there should 
be a strong analytical foundation based on theoretical propositions developed during the 
research design and literature review period; it seems sensible to ensure that when 
developing materials and interview schedules for data collection that these should be based 
on a strongly developed theoretical question and situated within the findings of others who 
have worked in the same field. It think this holds even more true for research that includes 
an evaluative element and used both techniques during analysis.  
 
Transcription 
Transcription was conducted both onto a computer file and by hand. The fact that some 
transcription was conducted by hand meant a Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analysis 
Software (CAQDAS) programme was not used for analysis. I choose to utilise a technique 
of colour coding using highlighters and post-it notes as I found this to be a more tactile 
technique than the technical constraints of a CAQDAS programme. In taking this decision 
I took inspiration from Coffey and Atkinson who claim: ‘the important analytical work lies 
in establishing and thinking about the linkages, not the mundane process of coding’ 
(Coffey and Atkinson 1996: 27) 
 
Coding  
Miles and Huberman (1996) describe codes as tags attached to chunks of data. They are 
essentially labels to describe what the data means or to represent meanings inferred to the 
data by researchers. In this sense codes can either be used to manage data, by simplifying 
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them into segments, or to expand and interpret the data by inferring context and meaning 
to the codes (Denzin and Lincoln 1998).  
 
Coffey and Atkinson (1996) argue that codes can be either created before the data 
collection begins, based on the theoretical framework that influences your research design 
or they can be developed inductively from the data (Coffey and Atkinson 1996). I agree 
with Strauss (1987) that coding is more than just a procedural process for indexing and 
sorting data, that it is about conceptualising the data, or to put it into his words ‘breaking it 
apart’ (Strauss 1987: 292). Coding is a way of relating data to the researchers’ ideas about 
those data; it provides a system of links between specific parts of the data and concepts or 
ideas. However, as Coffey and Atkinson caution ‘one should not confuse coding itself with 
the analytical work of developing conceptual schemes’ (Coffey and Atkinson 1996: 27). 
Coding is organisational in one sense, in that it allows the researcher to distinguish 
between and combine data, but it is also involves conceptualising the data by developing 
concepts and themes and incorporating reflections. 
 
I designed my research based on a set of objectives, which were subsequently developed as 
a result of my literature review and systematic review. Propositions stated at the beginning 
of the research are incorporated into the design of the study to focus the analysis on certain 
data relating to aims and research questions; however they can often cause bias by 
focusing the researcher on certain parts of the data. In order to properly test the 
propositions it is necessary to also examine the possibility of rival explanations: that 
observed outcomes were the result of some other influence besides the intervention 
(inspection by CSCI). It is important to search for these rival explanations and collect as 
much evidence as possible about other influences. Robert Yin states that in order to ensure 
analysis is not biased by theoretical propositions it is important to go further than simply 
looking for rival explanations, he feels it is necessary to have ‘…pursued your data 
collection about them vigorously – as if you were in fact trying to prove the salience of the 
other influence’ (Yin 2003: 112). Therefore my approach was to analyse the data with my 
pre-existing questions and themes in mind but also remain perceptive to new ones. 
 
To achieve a balance between pre-existing and new themes I conducted a combination 
coding process, with two strands: 
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1. Understanding the individual cases and comparing them to one another to find both 
intra case and inter case themes and patterns, e.g. in what ways did inspection 
improve well-being for residents 
2. Gaining insight into wider issues, such as whether inspection actually works to 
improve services both in terms of the inspectorates own evaluation of performance 
but also the opinions of the other stakeholders, and discover whether these opinions 
tally. 
 
A combination analysis like this one allowed the flexibility and knowledge development 
properties of open coding to complement and develop the theoretical propositions made 
prior to the data collection.  
 
By combining the theoretical propositions and themes developed through open coding will 
hopefully provide and insight into other cases and inspection in general, allowing me to 
understand and evaluate the cases I am studying, as well as gain an insight into issues 
about the impact of inspection on stakeholders. 
 
Analysing narratives: A thematic approach 
In order to avoid being hoist by my own petard and losing sight of the totality of 
individual’s stories by segmenting my analysis into codes, I also used narrative analysis to 
understand the sense of identity, and participant’s conceptualisation of the issues being 
studied, such as their opinion on what constitutes good quality care and inspection. Rather 
than conducting full narrative analysis my focus was on the content of the interview and 
the participants ‘suppositions about what can be taken as expected, what the norms are, 
and what common or special belief systems can be used to establish coherence’ (Linde 
1993: 3). I have been influenced by the work of Riessman, who has incorporated thematic 
analysis into the narrative method. Narrative analysis of this type focuses on the 
participants’ reports of events and experiences, rather than how they tell the story. As 
Riessman explains: 
 
‘This means there is minimal focus on how narrative is spoken, on structures of 
speech a narrator selects, audience (real and imagined), the local context that 
generated the narrative, or complexities of transcription’ (Riessman 2008: 54). 
 130 
 
Focusing on narratives within interviewees speech help me understand how they were 
conceptualising the issues I was identifying and studying. 
 
Using this hybrid method allowed me to bridge the gap between two often distinct methods 
and take the best from both: coding, which facilitates systematic focus and organisation, 
but which inevitably cuts the data into ‘chunks’ and analysing the whole narrative of the 
interview to understand the issues under study. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has described the development of my research methodology. I conducted a 
qualitative study based on the analysis of four cases studies, each examined longitudinally 
over a nine month data collection period. I have examined the impact of inspection from 
the perspective of the inspectors themselves and the other key stakeholders within older 
peoples’ residential care: the residents, relatives, the care home manager and the care home 
staff. The proceeding analytical chapters will not only detail the themes drawn from my 
analysis of the data but will also include my reflections on the methodological process and 
discuss some of the issues raised in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4: ‘THE EVENT’ 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter focuses on a description of the ‘event’ of inspection and aims to give the 
reader a picture of the process. The chapter draws on data from my observations of each 
case study, as well as interviews with the inspector, manager of the service, residents, 
relatives and staff. The interview data comes mainly from the section of the interviews 
where I discussed experiences of inspection. It also draws on CSCI documents to develop a 
picture of the organisational framework, which guides the inspection process and compares 
this to the experiences of the stakeholders involved in each case study. 
 
The chapter includes some discussion of issues raised around the impact of inspection on 
quality of service that will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters, where 
links will be made. 
 
Any form of inspection that focuses on outcomes and standards that cannot be measured 
through the collection of quantitative data must tread a tightrope between organisational 
procedures (developed in order to achieve consistency of judgement), and the use of 
professional judgement by the inspectors. This relationship between the standardisation of 
inspection procedure, developed and implemented through training and organisational 
prescription (in the form of guidelines), and the individual workings of the individual 
inspector developed through years of professional, tacit experience forms the key to 
understanding the inspection process. By examining the day-to-day working of each 
inspector, how they encounter and solve problems and how they respond to new 
organisational initiatives, I hope to develop a clearer picture of the purpose and 
achievements of inspection.  
 
THE CASE STUDY SITES 
Before I discuss the main findings it is necessary to describe the case study sites in which 
the inspections took place. In this section I present analysis of the NMS scores from the 
three reports previous to the inspection I observed. I do this to provide context to my case 
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studies and to examine the previous impact inspection has had on the home as judged 
against the CSCI’s NMS. Looking at past impact has a substantive analytical value in that 
it gives an idea of the historical effectiveness of inspection as judged against the CSCI’s 
own metrics. It also provides context for my analysis of the case studies by showing how 
the services previously reacted to inspection. These data offer context in the form of 
inspectors’ prior ‘knowledge’ of the services – i.e. as an element in understanding the 
background of the service. This then feeds into the way they conduct the observed 
inspection. 
 
Case study 1: Inspection April 2007 
Care Home 1 (CH 1) is a medium-size (10 to 30 bed) service in a small village situated just 
outside a medium sized city in the south of England. It is an independent family owned and 
run home. 
 
A single inspector conducted the inspection over two days. A second day was required 
because the manager was absent on the first day and the majority of the paperwork was 
locked away. 
 
I interviewed the inspector directly following the inspection and then the following 
stakeholders at 3 points during the eight-month case study: 
 
Table 6: Interviews conducted during Case Study 1 (CH 1) 
 
 Interview 
point 
 Interview 
point 
 Interview 
point 
 Interview 
point 
  1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3 
Manager x x x Resident 
1 (m) 
x x x Relative 
1 (f) 
x x x Staff 1 
(f) 
x x x 
Co-
owner 
x x x Resident 
2 (f) 
x x x Relative 
2 (f) 
x x x Staff 2* 
(f) 
x  x 
    Resident 
3 (f) 
   Relative 
3 (f) 
x x x Staff 3 
(f) 
x x x 
* Staff 2 was absent during second interview 
 
Although this service was, like the other 3 sites, registered as a Care Home only with no 
dementia beds, the dependency levels of residents in this service appeared to be greater 
than residents in the other 3 services. Residents with very high levels of dependency - who 
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needed hoists to be moved, or who, to an untrained observer, have communication 
difficulties - appeared to be in the majority at this site, in comparison to the minority at the 
other sites. 
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Table 7:  NMS scores CH 1 
Highlighted column represent the NMS scores and report outcomes from the inspection I 
observed. 
N
M
S
 Report: 
01/ 
2006 
Report: 
05/ 
2006 
Report: 
12/ 
2006 
Report: 
04/ 
2007 
Outcome 
ratings from 
case-study 
inspection 
Overall score 
from case-
study 
inspection 
1     
2 3    
3 1 3 3 3 
4     
5     
6 1 3 3  
Choice of 
home (1-6): 
 
Good 
 
7 2 2 2 2 
8 2 3 3 3 
9 3  1 2 
10 3  3 1 
11     
Health and 
personal care 
(7-11): 
 
Adequate 
12 3  1 1 
13 3  3 3 
14 3  3 3 
15 3  2 2 
Daily life and 
social activities 
(12-15): 
Poor 
16 3  2 2 
17     
18 1 2 2 3 
Complaints 
and protection 
(16-18): 
Adequate 
19  3 3 3 
20 4    
21     
22     
23     
24     
25     
26 3  3 3 
Environment 
(19-26): 
 
Good 
27 3  2 2 
28 1 2 1 2 
29 1 2 1 2 
30  2 2 2 
Staffing (27-
30: 
 
Poor 
31 1 1 1 2 
32   2 2 
33  1 2 2 
34     
35  3   
36 1 1 2 2 
37     
38 1 2 3 3 
Management 
and 
administration 
(31-38): 
 
Poor 
  
P
o
o
r
 
Scoring: 4 = Standard Exceeded (Commendable) 3 = Standard Met (No Shortfalls)  
2 = Standard Almost Met (Minor Shortfalls) 1 = Standard Not Met  (Major Shortfalls) 
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The NMS scores for CH 1 (Table 7) show that inspection has induced small quality 
improvements since January 2006, especially in outcome areas rated as ‘poor’, where there 
was a stepwise increase from major shortfalls against particular standards to minor 
shortfalls. However, despite these small improvements the service has historically 
performed poorly against the key outcome areas of ‘Management and Administration’, 
‘Daily Life and Social Activities’ and ‘Staffing’. The slow progress is problematic because 
despite slight improvements the management appears unable to raise the performance of 
the service to meet all of the standards. The lack of improvement demonstrates the CSCI 
have failed to implement an effective strategy to induce improvement and clearly the 
punitive sanction of issuing a poor report is not working. 
 
Case study 2: Inspection April 2007 
Care Home 2  (CH 2) is a mid-size home in a medium sized city in the south of England. It 
is part of a larger organisation and the manager has support from / is accountable to an area 
manager (or equivalent). 
 
The inspection was conducted by three inspectors during a single morning.  The inspectors 
comprised: the primary inspector of the home, the Regulation Manager (RM), and a 
pharmacist inspector.  
 
The RM is the person responsible for planning and overseeing the inspection of all services 
that fall within the boundaries of their office. In this case study the RM had a policy that 
she would try to accompany inspectors on visits to level 1 services, where possible. She 
explained a two-fold reason for this: 
 
‘It’s to both drive home the fact that they need to improve and if they don’t things 
could get serious and also to support the inspector, because often the level 1 
services can be a very time consuming inspection with lots of niggly bits… as it 
happens this one had improved quite a bit and it wasn’t so bad.’ (RM, CH 1) 
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The pharmacist inspector was asked to come along because there was a serious failing in 
medication procedure at the time of the last inspection and the inspector and RM wanted to 
ensure this was properly checked. 
 
I interviewed the inspector and Regulation Manager (RM) directly following the inspection 
and then the following stakeholders at 3 points during the eight-month case study: 
 
Table 8: Interviews conducted during Case Study 2 (CH 2) 
 
 Interview 
point 
 Interview 
point 
 Interview 
point 
 Interview 
point 
  1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3 
Manager x x * Resident 
1 (f) 
x x x Relative 
1 (m) 
x x x Staff 1 
(f) 
x x x 
Manager’s 
Line 
Manager 
x x x Resident 
2 (f) 
x x + Relative 
2 (m) 
x x  Staff 2 
(f) 
x x x 
    Resident 
3 (m) 
x x x Relative 
3 (f) 
x x x Staff 3 
(f) 
x x ~ 
* Manager on long-term absence so her Line Manager (who was responsible of 6    homes 
in the region) had took over management duties. 
+ Resident died 
~ Staff member had left the home
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Table 9:  NMS scores CH 2 
Highlighted column represent the NMS scores and report outcomes from the inspection I 
observed. 
N
M
S
 
Report: 
02/ 
2006 
Report: 
07/ 
2006 
Report: 
11/ 
2006 
Report: 
4/ 
2007 
Outcome ratings 
from case-study 
inspection 
Overall 
score from 
case-study 
inspection 
1  3 3 3 
2 3  3 3 
3 3 3 3 3 
4 3  1 3 
5 3 3   
6     
Choice of home 
(1-6): 
 
Good 
 
7 2 2 2 2 
8 3 3 1 3 
9 2 2 1 2 
10 3 3 1 4 
11     
Health and 
personal care 
(7-11): 
 
Adequate 
 
12 3 2 1 3 
13 3 3 3 3 
14 3 3 3 3 
15 3 3 2 3 
Daily life and 
social activities 
(12-15): 
Good 
16 3 3 3 3 
17     
18 3 3 3 3 
Complaints and 
protection (16-
18): Good 
19 3 3 3 3 
20 3 3   
21 3    
22 3 3  3 
23 3 3   
24 3   3 
25 3 3   
26 3 2 2 3 
Environment 
(19-26): 
 
Good 
27 3 2 2 3 
28  3 3 3 
29 3 3 3 3 
30 3 3 2 3 
Staffing (27-30: 
 
Good 
31 3 3 2 3 
32  3   
33 3 3 2 3 
34     
35 3 3 3 3 
36 3 1  3 
37     
38 2 3 1 2 
Management 
and 
administration 
(31-38): 
 
Adequate 
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Scoring: 4 = Standard Exceeded (Commendable) 3 = Standard Met (No Shortfalls)  
2 = Standard Almost Met (Minor Shortfalls) 1 = Standard Not Met  (Major Shortfalls) 
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From the inspection in November 2006 to the one I observed in April 2007 CH 2 showed 
improvement in all seven CSCI outcome areas. There was improvement across most of the 
standards inspected and no decreases in score against any of the standards. The table shows 
that scoring against the NMS returned to a slightly higher, but similar, level to the July 
2006 inspection, supporting the manager’s assertion that the November 2006 inspection 
was a ‘blip’ that occurred as a result of a combination of the manager being on long term 
sick leave and a number of agency staff being on duty because of staff sickness. 
 
Case study 3: Inspection May 2007 
Care Home 3 (CH 3) is medium-size service in a small town in the north of England. It is 
and independent family owned and run home. 
 
A single inspector conducted the inspection in one day. 
 
I interviewed the inspector directly following the inspection and then the following 
stakeholders at 3 points during the eight-month case study: 
 
Table 10: Interviews conducted during Case Study 3 (CH 3) 
 
 Interview 
point 
 Interview 
point 
 Interview 
point 
 Interview 
point 
  1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3 
Manager x x x Resident 
1 (f) 
x x x Relative 
1 (m) 
x x x Staff 1 
(f) 
x x x 
    Resident 
2 (f) 
x x x Relative 
2 (m) 
* x x Staff 2 
(f) 
x x x 
    Resident 
3 (f) 
x x x Relative 
3 + 
   Staff 3 
(f) 
x x x 
* Relative not available during first data collection point 
+ Could not get third relative to participate 
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Table: 11  NMS scores CH 3 
Highlighted column represent the NMS scores and report outcomes from the inspection I 
observed. 
N
M
S
 Report: 
04/ 
2005 
Report: 
11/ 
2005 
Report: 
05/ 
2006 
Report: 
05/ 
2007 
Outcome ratings 
from case-study 
inspection 
Overall 
score from 
case-study 
inspection 
1 3  3  
2 2 3 3  
3 3  2 3 
4     
5     
6     
Choice of home 
(1-6): 
 
Good 
 
7 1 3 2 3 
8 2  3 3 
9 1 3 2 3 
10 3  3 3 
11     
Health and 
personal care 
(7-11): 
 
Good 
 
12 2 2 2 2 
13 3  3 3 
14 3  3 3 
15 2 3 3 3 
Daily life and 
social activities 
(12-15): 
Good 
16  3 2 2 
17     
18 1 2 2 3 
Complaints and 
protection (16-
18): Good 
19 2 3 2 2 
20 3 3   
21 1 3   
22 2 3   
23 3 3   
24 3 3   
25 1 3   
26 3  2 3 
Environment 
(19-26): 
 
Adequate 
27 1 3 2 3 
28  3 3 3 
29 1 2 2 3 
30 2  3 2 
Staffing (27-30: 
 
Good 
31  2 2 2 
32     
33 2 2 2 3 
34 2 2   
35  3 3 3 
36     
37     
38  2 2 3 
Management 
and 
administration 
(31-38): 
 
Adequate 
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Scoring:  
4 = Standard Exceeded (Commendable) 3 = Standard Met (No Shortfalls)  
2 = Standard Almost Met (Minor Shortfalls) 1 = Standard Not Met  (Major Shortfalls) 
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The NMS scores from the inspection of CH 3 in May 2007, show some improvement from 
the previous inspection with only standard 30 being scored lower than previously and the 
rest either showing no change or a shift from level 2 (standard almost met) to level 3 
(standard met). Of the seven outcome areas the report is broken down into only two were 
judged to be adequate, while five were rated as good, yet the service was still only given an 
internal overall rating of adequate.  
 
Case study 4: Inspection May 2007 
Care Home 4 (CH 4) is a large service (over 30 beds) in a medium size city in the north of 
England. It is part of a larger organisation and the manager has support from / is 
accountable to an area manager (or equivalent). 
 
A single inspector conducted the inspection in one day. 
 
I interviewed the inspector directly following the inspection and then the following 
stakeholders at 3 points during the eight-month case study: 
 
Table 12: Interviews conducted during Case Study 4 (CH4) 
 
 Interview 
point 
 Interview 
point 
 Interview 
point 
 Interview 
point 
  1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3  1 2 3 
Manager x x x Resident 
1 (f) 
x x x Relative 
1 (m) 
x x x Staff 1 
(f) 
x x x 
    Resident 
2 (f) 
x x * Relative 
2 (m) 
x x  Staff 2 
(f) 
x x x 
    Resident 
3 (m) 
x x x Relative 
3 (f) 
x x x Staff 3 
(f) 
x x x 
* Resident died 
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Table 13:  NMS scores CH 4 
Highlighted column represent the NMS scores and report outcomes from the inspection I 
observed. 
N
M
S
 Report: 
05/ 
2005 
Report: 
10/ 
2005 
Report: 
05/ 
2006 
Report: 
05/ 
2007 
Outcome 
ratings from 
case-study 
inspection 
Overall score 
from case-
study 
inspection 
1 3 3   
2 3  2 2 
3 2 2 3 3 
4 2 2 3  
5  3   
6     
Choice of 
home (1-6): 
 
Good 
 
7 2 2 2 3 
8 2 2 3 3 
9 1 3 2 3 
10 3  3 3 
11 3    
Health and 
personal care 
(7-11): 
 
Good 
 
12  3 1 3 
13  3 3 3 
14  3 2 3 
15  2 3 3 
Daily life and 
social activities 
(12-15): 
Good 
16 2 3 3 3 
17   3  
18 2 2 3 3 
Complaints 
and protection 
(16-18): Good 
19 2 2 2 3 
20 2 2   
21   2 3 
22     
23     
24 2 2 2 3 
25     
26 3 3 3 3 
Environment 
(19-26): 
 
 
Good 
27  3 3 3 
28  3 3 3 
29 2 3 3 3 
30 2 2 3 3 
Staffing (27-
30: 
 
Good 
31 2  3 3 
32     
33 3 2 2 2 
34     
35 3  3 3 
36 2 2 3  
37     
38 2 1 2 2 
Management 
and 
administration 
(31-38): 
 
Adequate 
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Scoring:  
4 = Standard Exceeded (Commendable) 3 = Standard Met (No Shortfalls)  
2 = Standard Almost Met (Minor Shortfalls) 1 = Standard Not Met  (Major Shortfalls) 
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The NMS scores for CH 1 show that inspection has induced small quality improvements 
since May 2005, particularly in outcome areas where there has been a stepwise increase 
from scores of 2 to 3. The home had performed relatively poorly in the inspection previous 
to the one I observed especially against Standard 12. There were also a number of 
Standards (7, 9, 14, 33) where the service has maintained or dropped back to an adequate 
score without showing much improvement between inspections. In general the home has 
improved from an adequate to a good service and is only being let down by standards 2 
and 38.  
 
Limitations of system based on inspection against NMS 
The NMS scores do not tell the whole story of inspection or the performance of the 
service. Simple analysis of the NMS only shows where an improvement has been achieved 
to the extent that a step improvement in scoring is warranted, from say 1 to 2, but fails to 
show if any incremental improvements within each scoring level have been made. These 
incremental improvements may not warrant a change in score but show progress towards 
the next level. To determine if any changes had been made incrementally during the case 
studies I used the follow-up data collection points at six weeks and nine months. 
 
Questions concerning the value and usefulness of the NMS as indicators of quality have 
been a central theme of this thesis and will be addressed later in the chapter and in Chapter 
7. Simple analysis of NMS scores has to be placed in the context of the value of these 
scores and whether they represent quality as viewed by residents or whether they represent 
a linear quantitative assessment that is convenient for the regulator but misses the 
subtleties of the care provided. This question relates to a question about whether the CSCI 
have got the inspection process right. 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF A KEY INSPECTION (KI) 
This study was based on observation of the annual Key Inspection (KI) of four homes in 
England. At the time of my study every home in England received an annual KI; since the 
conclusion of data collection this has now changed so that the best performing services 
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(those rated as ‘excellent’) now get a minimum of one inspection every three years, but 
poor services still receive one each year. 
 
The Department of Health developed a set of 38 standards which every service is checked 
against. The 18 most important are checked at every Key Inspection (KI) (Department of 
Health 2001c: 82). The other 20 do not have to be checked at every inspection but must be 
checked at regular intervals. These standards are not legally enforceable but rather 
operationalise the Care Home Regulations (2001), which provide legal minimum care 
requirements.  
 
The KI is the primary evaluation of a service and determines what the regulator thinks 
about the quality of a particular service. If there are acute problems or overall poor 
performance in any one of the seven outcomes areas then this is enough to cause a poor 
overall rating for a service, which, at the time of this study, the CSCI noted internally only. 
There may be other random or thematic (for explanations of these two inspection processes 
please see Care Quality Commission 2009) inspections during the inspection cycle to 
follow up areas of poor performance, but the quality rating comes from the KI alone. It is 
important that the KI is done efficiently and correctly because from a provider’s 
perspective it provides a quality rating for the service that lasts for at least a year. This 
rating has the potential to exert a large influence because it can affect whether local 
councils choose to purchase beds with the service, or whether individuals decide to live in 
a particular home. From the CSCI perspective the KI is at the core of the regulatory 
process and it is important it functions to improve quality in services judged adequate or 
poor and maintain quality in services providing a good or excellent quality of care. 
 
The CSCI (2008b) states that all Key Inspections (KI) must include the following stages: 
• Stage 1: Planning and mapping of evidence 
• Stage 2: The involvement of people who use services 
• Stage 3: Fieldwork activity (including a site visit) 
• Stage 4: Consolidation of evidence 
• Stage 5: Making judgements on outcomes 
• Stage 6: Awarding a quality rating 
• Stage 7: Reporting and closing down 
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Each inspection is given three days of resources, which conventionally equates to a day to 
plan the inspection, a day for the site visit and a day to collate the data and write the report 
(CSCI 2008b). Two inspectors expressed their reservations about always managing to 
collate data and write the report each in a single day, but the CSCI claim that advances in 
tools to aid the recording and writing process, which will be discussed in this chapter, 
should make this almost universally possible.  
 
PLANNING THE INSPECTION 
 
On the day prior to each inspection I had a meeting with the inspector to discuss their 
planning for the following day. The discussion covered their methods of preparation and 
my analysis highlights both similarities and differences in the approaches of each 
inspector. 
 
Inspectors use various types of information to prepare for the inspection: 
1. Previous reports 
2. Complaints to CSCI (although latterly through the study these were dealt with in-
house by services, without being reported to the CSCI, or referred to the council) 
3. Questionnaires sent out prior to the inspection 
4. Accident reports 
5. Any information the CSCI might have from the local council (this is very 
dependent on the CSCI relationship with the council) 
 
Together these individual sources of information allow the inspector to build a picture of 
the service prior to the site visit. They serve to show problem areas already apparent prior 
to inspection and also show where problems might be occurring and need to be checked. 
The use of these sources not only highlights problems but also builds an initial picture of 
the service and helps flag changes since the last inspection.  
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Previous Reports 
At the planning stage each inspector went through at least the previous two inspection 
reports and in two cases (CH 1 and CH 3) through more. In case studies 1 and 3 the 
inspectors decided to go beyond the previous two reports because there were outstanding 
issues that stretched back beyond the previous two visits. In these cases the inspector 
wanted to be up-to-date with all previous documentation on the issues, as well as the 
timescale involved. 
 
To the inspectors the use of previous reports had two main purposes, which reflected the 
two core principles of the CSCI: to ensure minimum standards and foster constant 
improvement (see 2006d). In terms of ensuring NMS are met previous reports were used as 
a preparation tool by inspectors. They showed the inspector what outstanding issues they 
needed to review during the site visit. Secondly, they helped to establish background 
context prior to the inspection. Inspection is a cumulative process and the inspectors were 
looking for constant improvement and development over and above correcting any poor 
performance, even in services rated ‘Excellent’.  
 
Use of questionnaires 
In each of the case studies the inspectors used the questionnaires to highlight any praise, 
problems or grievances made by the stakeholders in response to an annual consultation. In 
addition to previous reports these provided the particular, case-by-case, areas of focus or 
concern for the inspector, offering an additional level of information to augment data 
collected during the site visit. If they were available inspectors particularly valued 
questionnaire data because it documented the direct views of service users or their 
families. 
 
The value of these questionnaires to inspectors was dependent on the type of response 
service users gave. Each of the inspectors used the responses from the questionnaires to 
focus their inspection and direct them towards issues important to key stakeholders, and in 
particular the residents. Those submissions that carried clear opinions and useful responses 
formed a key tool of the inspection process as they facilitated focus on service user 
outcomes. As inspector of CH 3 claims: 
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‘Questionnaires are great if we get meaningful responses… we can use them to 
focus on the areas the residents see as important and can check all is good for 
them… its just unusual to get much of a response, and this home is particularly 
bad’ (Inspector CH 3) 
 
However, there was also great frustration voiced by all inspectors that the questionnaires 
were not fit for purpose and this was reflected in the low response rates found across the 
cases4. The questionnaire was composed of a series of tick box questions followed by a 
short space at the bottom in which the respondent can write their own unstructured 
comment. As the inspector of CH 1 explained the questionnaire design was not conducive 
to detailed, critical responses, or appropriate for what was often a frail target group: 
 
‘They’re far too short and the front is only a tick box, once you done that you have 
to be pretty bothered about something to write on the little line at the bottom… and 
you also have to remember that some old people aren’t able to do so’ (Inspector CH 
1) 
 
The same inspector also had reservations about the usefulness of the questionnaires in light 
of the seemingly prevalent fear amongst residents that their response might get fed back to 
the service, either formally or by accident: 
 
‘You see they are often scared we’ll tell the manager and it will affect their care. 
They think they will be victimised if we say they are complaining’ (Inspector CH 
1) 
 
The questionnaires were used by all of the inspectors but were only of limited value 
because there had been little improvement in the document. There was frustration at 
perceived organisational neglect on behalf of the CSCI, especially considering the focus of 
inspection is supposed to be on service user outcomes. Each inspector thought that they 
should be redeveloped and tested in order to become more usable for the service user and 
thus more useful to the inspector. 
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Accident Reports 
In a sign that the CSCI felt progress had been made in base-line quality of services, 
accident reports were only a minor feature during inspectors planning for a site visit. There 
had been a shift in the significance of accident reports for inspectors because protocol had 
shifted accountability onto the management of the services. Inspectors only got involved if 
internal processes did not deal with the complaint and the issues were left unresolved. The 
inspector of CH 1 helpfully described the shift in significance: 
 
‘Accident reports really produce a line of accountability, the process of making 
homes report accidents means they have to deal with them properly and that’s good 
in the sense that they know they’ve got to act properly, but short of checking 
they’ve dealt appropriately with the accident and the necessary risk assessments are 
in place when we visit they don’t really inform the rest of our visit…. I guess it just 
means we don’t have to spend so long looking over the records during the visit’ 
(Inspector CH 1) 
 
The CSCI stance on these reports represented a shift in the accountability from the 
regulator to the provider; with the CSCI checking the accountability process was in place 
rather than the details of complaints. As the inspector of CH 4 described: 
 
‘Well if they’ve got a process to deal with complaints in place we don’t need to 
look at everyone ‘cos they should be following it up’ (Inspector CH 4) 
 
Official view 
In this section I have reported the ‘official view’ of information and tools in the sense that I 
report how the inspectors used and valued each aspect. It was obvious from discussions 
with other stakeholders that this information was used for different purposes, for example 
managers spoke of using reports as a guide to improve or persuade their superiors that they 
needed more resources. These issues are discussed in the later findings chapters. 
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Organising the inspection: The Inspection Record (IR) 
The IR was introduced in early 2007 to provide a template document on which inspectors 
were expected to record inspection data. It was designed to support the inspector by 
simplifying the recording process during the inspection and making it easier to transfer 
data onto the final report. It also provides a permanent record on file for inspectors to use 
during the planning stages of subsequent inspections. The main purpose of introducing the 
IR was standardisation of the recording procedure to align judgments and eliminate 
inconsistencies.  
 
Despite training and guidelines its introduction led to continuing diversity of inspectors’ 
approaches. Each of the four inspectors used the IR differently. In fact three out of the four 
devised their own methods to transform the record into a usable document, with only one 
inspector (CH 4) using it in the format it was designed to be used.  
 
One inspector refused to use the record at all and instead used his own system. As he 
explained: 
 
‘I mean it just doesn’t work as it should at the moment, it’s more of a hindrance 
than a help. They say they’ve done consultation over it but, I don’t know. I mean 
hopefully it’ll be developed more… so no I don’t use it’ (Inspector CH 1) 
 
The inspector of CH 2 used the record during the planning stage and typed his pre-planned 
questions within the relevant outcome section, but during the site visit he made notes on to 
a notepad instead of the record itself. Here the IR was used as a tool to guide and focus the 
inspection, but not as the integrated tool that the CSCI intended.  
 
The inspector of CH 3 used the record to make her inspection notes, but reorganised it to 
fit a preferred layout, with the pages for recording inspection data matched to the NMS 
guidance.  
 
The inspectors felt marginalised by the CSCI’s process of developing and introducing the 
record, they expressed frustration at the perceived lack of consultation over its 
development and consequently felt it did not function in a way relevant to their needs. 
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Despite the CSCI developing tools in conjunction with inspectors it got it wrong at the 
organisational level and this failure has had a negative impact, in terms of frustration and 
time consuming extra work to modify the record.  
 
However, it has also produced an interesting consequence in that systems developed to 
increase standardisation actually made three of the four inspectors use their discretion to 
improve usability of the IR. Paradoxically the recent introduction of an IR has caused 
consequences antithetical to its aims by leading to a diversity of approaches by inspectors. 
Bell et al (2008) have also reported this phenomenon in the context of social workers use 
of the new Integrated Children’s System (ICS). 
 
Negotiating a time to start the site visit 
The final decision of the planning process was to determine what time the inspection 
should begin. It transpired that the inspectors’ choice of start time gave an interesting 
insight into their overall approach to inspection. Each inspector had slightly different 
reasons for the time they choose.  
 
The inspector of CH 2 had a clear opinion of the start time. They wanted to arrive at 
breakfast time in order to observe that particular part of the day. Breakfast time is one of 
the busiest periods in a care service’s day and the inspector saw it as an ideal time to see 
both the home during a busy period, when they reasoned any underlying problems would 
surface, and to catch them off-guard when all members of staff would be busy and not able 
to react to the inspectors’ arrival. It was this surprise element that seemed particularly 
important to the inspector. They argued that there was only a short period after arrival 
when the staff and manager of the service are off-guard and therefore unprepared to be 
observed, and the inspector of CH 2 wanted to use this period to: 
 
‘…get a chance to see the home in as real a situation as possible’ (Inspector CH 2) 
 
In contrast the other inspectors decided they wanted to arrive after breakfast. I asked all 
three about this decision and the common answer was ‘because we don’t want to disrupt 
the home at the busiest period’ (Inspector CH 4). They were less concerned with the need 
to ‘catch the home off guard: 
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‘I think we’ll find the problem anyway, its not like I’m going to see anything extra 
by going at breakfast’ (Inspector CH 4) 
 
The phenomenon of conflicting inspection styles was also found to exist between local 
authority nursing home inspectorates during the mid-1980s in research by Day and Klein 
(1987) and between individual environmental inspectors by Hawkins (1984).  
 
THE INSPECTORS’ APPROACH TO INSPECTION 
 
The trend amongst the inspectors was flexibility towards designing inspections based on 
individual services. Rather than have a standard plan of action they would structure the day 
based on evidence synthesised during the planning stage. The inspector of CH 3 was keen 
to point out that she would attend the inspection with a plan of action, but this was not 
concrete especially if she felt the service would try to cover things up when they saw the 
inspector arrive: 
 
‘I mean I make a plan the day before, like… and yeah its usually pretty similar in 
terms of what I do, but if things change then it’s flexible… you know, like if 
they’re all running round taking stoppers away from doors then I might do a tour of 
the premise first’ (Inspector CH 4) 
 
Pragmatism: balancing organisational directives and professional judgement 
There was a concerted view that where possible the inspectors would use every tool in 
their armoury to collect the best possible data on the service. The inspectors all 
acknowledged usefulness of a compliance-based approach (Braithwaite, et al. 2007) and 
unsurprisingly found it easy to improve quality if the service, and the manager in 
particular, was prepared to cooperate: 
 
‘Well obviously it’s best if we can get the manager to understand why we’re 
making the requirements and things, then they tend to get it sorted’ (Inspector CH 
4) 
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The CSCI began with a remit of toughening up the inspection procedure by raising 
minimum standards and my case studies suggest that this stance has resulted in inspection 
procedure developing under a deterrent-based ethos (Braithwaite, et al. 2007), in which 
inspectors issued threats if the service failed to improve rather than helping it to do so. 
Interviews with inspectors and care home managers suggest that where compliance-based 
approaches have had an impact in improving quality of services the inspectors have had to 
implement this at a local level using their discretion.  
 
At its inception the CSCI took on a joint remit with two main strands: a policing or 
enforcement strand, where they are tasked with ensuring minimum levels of care by 
‘stamping out bad practice’ (CSCI 2008a: 17); and a capacity building strand, through 
which they focus on ‘improving standards’ (CSCI 2008a: 17) across the board.  
 
Inspection tended to focus on the ‘stamping out bad practice’ strand, a stance symbolised 
by the insistence that the inspector not give any direct advice or assistance to a particular 
service. However, managers and inspectors invariably saw the deterrent toolkit of CSCI as 
ineffective. The managers felt that a bad report was not in itself a necessary deterrent, 
because in the words of the manager of CH 1: 
 
‘I mean as far as I’m aware none of our residents here looked at reports before 
moving in. We’ve certainly had no one asking why we’ve got a poor report at the 
moment’ (Manager CH 1, interview 2) 
 
A second reason for the lack of effective deterrents is that enforcement procedure is 
incredibly laborious. The regulation manager of CH 2 explained that it can often take over 
12 months to bring a legal enforcement order, and the process is very time consuming for 
the commission, as she explained: 
 
‘It is a lot easier for us (the regulator) if we can persuade a service to make the 
changes rather than have to take action against it, and we don’t want to do that 
anyway, I mean it’s peoples’ livelihoods for a start’ (RM CH 2) 
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That is not to say that the regulator is not prepared to take action, and indeed issued 1205 
requirement notices, 493 statutory notices, 11 urgent cancellations and 1 prosecution 
during 2007-08 (CSCI 2009). But this stance might reflect the fact that the CSCI does not 
have immediate enforcement powers; it cannot close a service without going through a 
long legal procedure (CSCI 2008).  
 
The services were aware of this fact, even if they were not expert in the procedures of the 
CSCI, because for the services in my study all had carried outstanding requirements from 
previous reports and failed to receive any punitive action for doing so. When coupled with 
the fact that many private residents do not read reports the deterrent aspect of CSCI is 
relatively weak. 
 
The Inspector’s dilemma: giving advice 
The inspectors in the case studies argued that advice was not about providing a 
consultancy service, but about devising the best way to induce improvements. The 
inspector of CH 4 summed up the position: 
 
‘I just think that with some of them you need to look at other ways of making them 
change, and often it’s about persuading them it’s the right thing for them’ 
(Inspector CH 4)  
 
All of the inspectors I studied had worked in regulation prior to the nationalisation of the 
social care inspectorate, and they all vented frustration at the CSCI’s lack of willingness to 
allow inspectors to advise services. There are strict guidelines against giving advice, but 
they would sometimes slightly moderate this deterrent-based stance: 
 
‘We’re not allowed to give the homes any help really no, I mean I do sometimes 
say ‘look at this website’ or this might help… it can be frustrating at times yeah, 
but I guess that’s not our role’ (Inspector CH 1) 
 
This opinion conflicted with the CSCI leadership. The Commission justify their stance 
through the registration procedure and other capacity building initiatives, such as working 
with the General Social Care Council (GSCC) to develop good practice frameworks and 
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training requirements. Both owners and managers must be registered with the commission 
and during this registration process they have to demonstrate that they are sufficiently 
qualified to do the job (see Department of Health 2000a). The CSCI argue that these 
measures ensure managers should have the technical and managerial competency to 
address any failings the Commission finds and they should not need any advice from 
inspectors. The RM interviewed in case study two admitted that the inspectors she 
managed had difficulties in accepting this position: 
 
‘Inspectors have to get their head round the fact that we’re not there to manage the 
service, that’s for the home to do’ (RM CH 2) 
  
Aside from the resource drain on inspectors’ time, the danger of offering advice was neatly 
summed up by the RM in case study 2: 
 
‘I mean you can see why they don’t want inspectors offering advice, I mean at the 
extreme we could get blamed if they do something an inspector says and something 
goes wrong, or in the least it gets criticised next time… we could be making a rod 
for our own back’ (RM CH 2) 
 
This dilemma was a key theme throughout the case studies and will be discussed with 
specific reference to the impact of inspection in the remaining data chapters. 
 
THE SITE VISIT 
Having examined the planning of inspections and the individual inspectors approaches, I 
now move onto discussion of the visits to the services. 
 
Collecting the evidence 
The evidence and data an inspector must collect is tightly governed by CSCI protocols and 
every part of the process must have an outcomes focus with judgements made based on 
Key Lines of Regulatory Assessment (KLORA) (CSCI 2007c). These guidelines give a 
description of the type of evidence each home is required to have in place in order to meet 
the conditions at each scoring level.  However, the inspectors have the professional 
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freedom to organise the process of the day as they see fit, which means the inspectors 
organise their site visits differently. As I have already described they had different 
opinions about when to commence the visit, which sheds light onto their respective 
theoretical underpinnings and approaches to inspection, and this was also true of the 
schedule for the rest of the day.  
The table below outlines a brief structure of each of the inspections I observed.
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Table 14: Timetable of the day for each inspection 
 
 CH 1 CH 2 CH 3 CH 4 
Step 1 Arrival (Day 1) Arrival Arrival Arrival 
Inspector 1 Inspector 2 Inspector 3 Step 2 Interview with senior staff 
while waiting for manager in 
his office. It became apparent 
the manager not present and 
most of required paperwork is 
locked away. 
Observe 
breakfast 
and talk 
with 
residents 
Tour of 
premises 
Observe 
medication 
dispensing 
during 
breakfast 
Brief chat with manager 
to explain the plan for the 
day 
Brief chat with manager to 
explain the plan for the day 
Step 3 Interview with senior 
supervisor – mainly questions 
about whether things have been 
improved since last inspection 
(specifically related to 
requirements and 
recommendations from last 
report) 
Interview 
with 
residents 
and staff 
who were 
serving 
breakfast 
Speak to 
residents in 
their rooms 
Tour of 
meds 
facilities 
and storage 
Brief tour of downstairs 
plus and informal chat 
with groups of residents 
in the two lounges 
Tour of premises 
(accompanied by manager) 
Step 4 Chat with co-owner (not 
manager) 
Examination 
of 
paperwork 
Interview 
with 
assistant 
manager 
 Examination of 
paperwork 
Examination of paperwork 
Step 5 Tour of premises Interview 
with staff 
(x3) 
  Interview with staff (x2) Talking through some of 
the paperwork with 
manager (for clarifications) 
Step 6 Interview with residents (x3) Interview 
with relative 
(x1) 
  Tour of premises Interview with residents 
(x2) 
Step 7 Interview with staff (x2) Conference between 3 inspectors Interview with residents Interview with staff (x2) 
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(x3) 
Step 8 Interview with relatives (x2) Talk with 
manager 
and 
feedback 
  Talk with manager and 
feedback 
n.b. no relatives visited 
home during the 
inspection 
Brief interview with 
relative (x1) 
  
    Talk with manager and 
feedback 
 Day 2      
Step 1 Arrival      
Step 2 Interview with manager and 
examination of paperwork, 
including examine the files of 
the particular residents spoken 
to during the previous visit 
     
Step 3 Inspection feedback      
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Table 14 shows that each inspector covered all the component parts stipulated in the CSCI 
inspection framework; what differed was the order in which these areas were examined. 
This was determined by a mixture of personal preference, decisions based on evidence at 
the planning stage, and a reaction to the circumstances of inspection. This section 
examines the strands of inspection and analyses the inspectors’ differing approaches to the 
inspection process. 
 
Duration of Inspection 
Although the duration of each inspection in this study varied quite considerably, from three 
hours to two days, there was a remarkable similarity between the actual hours devoted to 
each inspection. The CSCI state that ‘the site visit will usually last one day, but may be 
more depending on the size and nature of the service and the issues arising’ (CSCI 2008f: 
1) and this seemed to be true of all of my case studies. 
 
Table 15:  Time taken by each inspector on the site visit 
 
Case study Real-time duration Man-hours 
1  Day 1: 9.30 – 12.30 
Day 2: 9.30 – 14.00 
3h + 4h 30 minutes = 7h 30 minutes 
 
2  08.30 – 11.15 2h 45 x 3 inspectors = 8 h 15 minutes 
3  09.30 – 17.15 7 h 45 minutes 
4  10.30 – 18.00  7  h 30 minutes 
 
 
In Case Study 2 the inspection was carried out by three different inspectors 
simultaneously: the primary inspector; a pharmacy inspector who was there to focus on 
standards for medication; and the Regulation Manager (RM). In this instance although the 
inspection only lasted for less than 3 hours, there was actually over eight hours of 
inspection time during that period, because each of the three inspectors worked 
simultaneously. 
 
In Case Study 1 the inspection was conducted over two days, which on face value appears 
to be a much longer visit. However on this occasion the manager was not available on the 
day of the first inspection visit and a number of the documents the inspector needed to see 
were locked away. Although the inspection spanned two days there was little difference 
between the duration of this inspection and the other three because the inspector finished 
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earlier on the first day once they reached the stage where they needed to examine records 
that were not accessible without the manager and went back for another half-day two days 
later. 
 
It is interesting that the inspections appeared to take a similar amount of time across the 
case studies and indicates that there is a reasonable consistency between both individual 
inspectors and the different CSCI regional offices. As this study only examined services 
performing ‘adequately’ or ‘poorly’ against the NMS it would be interesting to examine 
whether there is also an inter-level similarity in duration between the lower level services 
and the ‘good’ and ‘excellent’ homes, or whether less time is spent examining these 
services. 
 
Structure of the day: what to do first paperwork or interviews? 
After initial introductions had taken place the inspectors began the main stage of the 
inspections. As with the timing of the inspection the structure of the day appeared to be 
significant in terms of the inspectors approach. The two core parts of the day, in terms of 
both time and significance, were the examination of paperwork and interviews with 
stakeholders.  
 
The order in which inspectors choose to inspect these areas offered further insight into 
each inspector’s approach. Two inspectors choose to examine the paperwork first, before 
speaking to any staff or residents, reasoning that this would provide evidence of potential 
problems with care, which they could then ask the residents about. A third (of CH 1) 
inspector spoke to residents and took a tour of the building before looking at any 
paperwork. However, in this case the managers absence forced the inspector to conduct 
their inspection in this way. I asked the inspector what approach he took on a ‘normal’ 
inspection and he claimed he would: 
 
‘…tend to examine the paperwork first before speaking to residents and staff… cos 
it has the potential to flag up issues I might want to ask the residents about’ 
(Inspector CH1). 
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The inspector of CH2 chose the opposite approach to the other three and opted to speak 
with residents before examining paperwork. His reasoning was entirely dichotomous to the 
other inspectors in that he wanted to see if conversations with residents flagged up any 
issues he should then follow up while examining the paperwork. When I asked him about 
this he reasoned that the records could not represent what service users thought about how 
they were being treated and so this needed to be questioned. He did not want to be 
influenced by paperwork fearing that this could influence the questions he asked: 
 
‘I don’t want to be guided by clever documentation, I like to hear it from the 
horse’s mouth first, so to speak’ (Manager CH 2). 
  
The inspection of paperwork 
Table 16 shows that the majority of the inspectors’ visits were taken up by paperwork. 
 
Table 16: Time spent on paperwork (rounded to nearest 5 minute interval) 
 
Case 
Study 
Time in minutes spent on paperwork Percentage of visit 
1 190 mins paperwork out of total 450 mins with 
service  
42 % 
2 Approx. 290 mins (Inspector = 85 mins, Pharmacist 
= 105 approx, RM = 100 mins)5 out of a total of 495 
mins with service 
59 % 
3 210 mins paperwork out of total 465 mins with 
service  
45 % 
4 195 mins paperwork out of a total of 450mins with 
service  
43 % 
N.B. time spent checking medication records is counted as paperwork 
 
Although I did not make a note of the time spent on other aspects of the inspection no one 
other aspect came even close. The inspectors of CH 1, 3 and 4 all spent roughly the same 
time on paperwork, with the inspector of Ch 2 taking about 15 % more time. However, 
there were three different inspectors at the visit to CH 2 and there was a certain amount of 
overlapping between the inspector and the RM. The pharmacy inspector’s presence also 
skewed the result because much of his time was spent going through medication records in 
great detail, after initially watching medication being dispensed. Such an intense 
examination would not usually happen during a routine inspection. 
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Styles of examining paperwork 
Although the inspectors spent a similar amount of time looking through paperwork the 
manner in which inspectors collected data was one of the areas that varied quite distinctly 
between two approaches. 
 
The first approach, exhibited by inspectors of CH 3 and 4 was to check through the 
paperwork evidence thoroughly and methodically, picking up on any problems as they 
went through and relating these to the NMS retrospectively. This was a holistic approach, 
with the inspectors trying to understand the whole picture of the home rather than just 
checking for evidence of individual standards. It requires an in-depth working knowledge 
of the standards and guidelines because the inspector must be able to determine where 
things are missing without specifically focusing on a particular standard.   
 
The inspectors of CH 1 and 2 approached paperwork differently using the NMS and 
KLORA guidelines to sift through the paperwork for evidence of each particular standard, 
letting the standards guide the data collection. This appeared to be a more efficient but less 
holistic approach, which could potentially miss wider overarching failings and meant the 
inspectors gained a less holistic picture of the service.  
 
Questioning the paperwork 
It was necessary for all inspectors to talk through the paperwork with the manager at some 
point for both practical and substantive reasons. The manager had to signpost inspectors to 
the appropriate documentation and there were always points of clarification that inspectors 
wanted to question. In this context the inspectors structured their time looking at 
paperwork in two different ways: two (CH 1 and CH 4) choose to sit in the office with the 
respective managers and go through the paperwork with them available to answer 
questions. In these instances the manager sat and worked and stopped to answer points of 
clarification or discuss any issues the inspector brought to their attention. The other two 
inspectors (CH 2 and CH 3) preferred to have the managers direct them to all of the 
paperwork, look over it first and then question the manager on any anomalies or missing 
pieces of information retrospectively. The two inspectors who choose to examine the 
paperwork away from the manager sacrificed expediency for independence; they wanted to 
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avoid interference or intervention from the manager, in the form of them making excuses, 
that might have influenced their appraisal.  
 
Case tracking 
Inspecting for Batter Lives (IBL) was introduced in 2005 and mapped the changes the 
CSCI wanted to make to improve inspection over a three year period. As part of the 
changes introduced in IBL all inspectors are expected to case track during every inspection 
(CSCI 2005a). The aim of this was to follow the ‘cases’ of two or three residents through 
all aspects of the inspection process, to generate an overall picture of the service they 
receive and determined whether their desired personal outcomes have been first identified 
and then met by the service. 
 
The inspectors all valued case-tracking and saw it as a key facet of the inspection process 
that facilitated triangulation of evidence and determined whether systems described in the 
paperwork were being implemented in practice. As the inspector of CH 4 pointed out: 
 
‘To really focus on one or two individuals and follow-up the paperwork with 
confirmation for the residents, on a range of things from activities to number of 
staff makes me much happier about deciding on the rating for a home than just 
taking the paperwork for granted or asking residents questions without first 
knowing what the home is claiming to be doing’ (Inspector CH 4) 
 
The benefits of case-tracking are in both the level of detail that can be examined and the 
way in which the findings can be applied to the rest of the service population. It is 
unacceptable for the service to be failing one resident so any areas of service that are 
deficient in one person’s care can be extrapolated to the rest of the service population. It 
allows the inspector to build a picture of the whole system of care, rather than just 
individual processes or outcome areas.  
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Consulting service users  
Interview schedule 
All of the inspectors had some form of interview schedule which they used to structure 
their conversation with the residents. These schedules varied quite considerably as it was 
one of the few areas where the CSCI had not prescribed guidelines. In light of findings that 
suggest inspection is becoming increasingly prescribed it first appeared strange that there 
were no guidelines or standard question templates, but after observing the planning and 
site visit a lack of prescription made sense. First, the inspectors needed to be able to tailor 
their questions to evidence from previous inspections and any new information that may 
have come to light, this made every site visit unique. Secondly, the inspectors needed 
flexibility to ask questions specific to residents’ lives and care. In this context any form of 
protocol or standardised questionnaire would be counterproductive.  
 
The lack of standardisation inevitably resulted in different approaches from each inspector. 
The inspectors of services 2, 3 and 4 were very organised and all had some form of pre-
prepared written schedule based around the seven outcomes areas with questions to 
address each section. The inspector of CH 2 developed these during the planning stage 
based on analysis of previous reports and other available information, which meant he 
targeted questions based on shortcomings from previous inspections. The other two 
inspectors developed a basic set of general questions around the seven outcome areas as 
well as specific question related to previous failings. They also added additional notes / 
questions during their examination of the paperwork, based on missing data or areas that 
they decided required corroboration. 
 
The inspector of CH 1 spoke to residents without any formal preparation of questions, but 
instead guided himself through the seven outcome areas using his copy of the NMS and his 
inspection record. When I asked whether this was his usual method of interviewing 
residents he claimed: 
 
‘… I don’t usually like a schedule no, but I would usually have some notes from 
my examination of the paperwork, it’s just unfortunately this time I had to speak to 
the residents first so I wasn’t that prepared to be honest. Usually I’d have a bit of 
time after looking at the paperwork, over lunch or in the office, where I could make 
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sure I knew what I wanted to ask and also who I specifically wanted to talk to 
based on having looked at their care plans… this time I had to do it the other way 
round, which I’ve done before but it’s certainly not my usual way of inspecting’ 
(Inspector CH 1) 
 
The fact that the inspector of CH1 had no schedule and was conducting the inspection in 
an unusual (although not unique) order meant that his style of questioning and 
conversation with the residents was disorganised. Despite this disorganisation the inspector 
had a lengthy conversation with one resident and briefer conversations with another two, in 
which he managed to touch on all seven outcome areas, from opinions on staffing levels to 
the most important aspect for the resident: their health and personal care and daily life and 
social activities. 
 
The value of interviews with residents 
Policy emphasis on personalisation of service and achieving successful outcomes for 
service users means that a key aspect of the inspection process is speaking with residents. 
Even if all of the paperwork appears to be in place and up-to-date, if residents express 
serious concerns with their care then the inspector must ensure these are explored and 
resolved. This means the time spent talking to residents was seen as the most valuable part 
of the inspection by all inspectors:  
 
‘The purpose of our job is the residents. I want to see that they are happy not only 
in general but also that they feel the care they are receiving is up to standard, and 
you can’t determine that through the paperwork, I’ve known homes to look great 
on paper, but the minute you speak to residents it becomes a different story’ 
(Inspector CH 1) 
 
Paradoxically, as we have seen, this was not the area that inspectors are generally able to 
spend most of their time on, which was a cause of great frustration. As the inspector of CH 
3 explained: 
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‘You see we should be spending ninety percent of our time out in the home talking 
with residents and observing practice, but we just don’t have the time’ (Inspector 
CH 3) 
 
Interviews with residents focused on outcomes, which essentially mean the impact the 
service has on the people using it. They check whether the processes put in place by the 
service and documented by the paperwork were actually having intended outcomes for 
residents, rather than just subjecting them to generic outputs. In addition these interviews 
also determined whether the care delivered by the home had been devised in consultation 
with the service user. The NMS set out desired outcomes for each standard and were 
devised with intensive user consultation (see Department of Health 2000a) to ensure the 
home will be delivering a personalised service if staff are doing their job properly. 
 
Interviews with residents typically lasted between 10 and 20 minutes, with two exceptions 
across the studies were residents were very keen to talk. Across all of the cases it was often 
difficult for the inspectors to keep the residents engaged with questions concerning 
inspection, and there was a tendency for residents to deviate from the questions being 
asked. In these cases the inspectors were acutely aware of the time constraints they were 
under and tried to steer the conversation back towards inspection. 
 
Residents’ reluctance to give full disclosure 
Older people move into residential care because they can no longer look after themselves 
without intensive support. Residents are often vulnerable and rely on the care home to 
meet their needs. This reliance meant residents were hesitant about giving a full and frank 
assessment of the service they receive. Many were scared that any criticisms they divulged 
to the inspector would be reported to the manager of the service and they would be ignored 
or marginalised because of their disclosure. Data from the case studies reflected this, the 
majority of resident I spoke to across the sites claimed they would be reluctant to be 
completely honest with the inspector because as one resident described: 
 
‘I’m not going to say anything just now because I don’t want to make trouble for 
myself… no… maybe in a year or so… haha’ (Resident CH 4, interview 1).  
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In order to marginalise this phenomenon as much as possible when talking to residents the 
inspectors had to be sensitive to these concerns, while at the same time getting the 
residents to give an honest appraisal of their care. All of the inspectors were sensitive to 
the potential worries of the residents and were careful to make assurances that anything 
they said they did so in confidence, unless it was a specific issue that the resident wanted 
the inspector to raise on their behalf (which happened with one resident during case study 
3). 
 
Consulting staff 
Inspectors’ preparation for conversations with staff working at the case study sites was 
very similar to the preparation for resident interviews: the three inspectors who prepared a 
question schedule for resident interviews did the same for their conversations with staff 
and the inspector who had no interview schedule for the residents had no schedule for his 
conversations with staff. Questions to staff were obviously different to those asked to 
residents, they tended to be more technical and focused on the systems and processes that 
are required to be in place to ensure favourable outcomes (as defined by NMS) for each 
resident.  
 
Some staff were similarly hesitant to divulge to an inspector, one in CH 4 admitted she did 
not tell the inspector her real appraisal of the service performance for fear of repercussions. 
However, most with whom  I spoke insisted they were open and honest with the inspector. 
 
Consulting relatives 
Talking to relatives can be problematic during an unannounced inspection because there is 
no guarantee any will be present during the visit. Inspections typically last a full day so it 
is unusual for there to be no relatives present at some point, but it is not uncommon. This 
was proven during the inspection of CH 3, when no relatives visited at any point during the 
day. The inspectors at the other three sites all spoke to relatives, and all managed to speak 
to a relative of at least one resident with whom they also spoke. Where possible the 
inspectors were keen to speak to a relative of at least one of the residents they were case-
tracking because the views of this relative provided an additional piece of evidence with 
which to build the case and make the best possible judgement of outcomes for that 
particular individual, and by extrapolation the service as a whole. 
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Concluding the visit: Feedback 
At the end of the inspection the inspectors are required by CSCI guidelines to give initial 
feedback to the care homes. As they have not had time to synthesise and analyse all of the 
data, the feedback was informal and the inspectors were sure to emphasise that none of 
their judgements were final until the report had been published. 
 
The inspectors were all relatively brief with their feedback, emphasising that they could 
not give a true appraisal and judgement until they had time to consider all of the evidence. 
All were reluctant to give scores for the individual outcomes areas but did give a 
provisional overall judgement. However, it transpired after the publication of the report 
that their initial feedback of findings was remarkably similar to the outcomes of the report. 
This suggests the majority of judgements are made in stiu, in the mode of what Schön 
(1983) terms reflecting in practice rather than based on analysis and on practice reflection 
after the event.  
 
All four inspectors explained their findings by going through the seven outcomes areas and 
giving both areas of strengths and areas that needed to be improved. The inspector of CH 4 
felt it was important to give positive feedback where possible, especially because of the 
service’s previously poor rating: 
 
‘I think with these types of services it’s important to stress what has been 
improved, if it has, and I think this service has made some good improvements…’ 
 
Giving advice on how to improve 
Despite appeals from managers the inspectors were unable to give advice about how to 
make specific improvements. The CSCI had a clear policy on this, outlined in the IBL 
document that defines the role of the CSCI as a regulator and not a consultancy or 
troubleshooting service. When asked about why they no longer maintained this supportive 
practice all four inspectors cited the organisational constraint of CSCI policy: 
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‘It was a lot more of a supportive role before… we had an announced and 
unannounced, where as now its an overall review, we’re not their to advise and 
support’ (Inspector CH 4) 
 
Two (CH 2 and 3) specifically mentioned the fact that the manager is supposed to be 
qualified and competent to conduct all aspects of the job and it is not up to the inspector to 
do their job for them.  
 
However, despite their acceptance of the CSCI position three of the inspectors were 
frustrated by it and thought their services would improve faster if they had been allowed to 
give more constructive advice. All of the inspectors had worked for previous local council 
run inspection organisations and were used to giving advice at the point of feeding back to 
the service, especially to the small, less sophisticated providers: 
 
‘I remember back in the local inspection days I’d be happy to help, especially to 
homes like this who have no other support… I’d take phone calls to give a hand… 
but we can’t do it now’ (Inspector CH 3) 
 
Catalytic feedback 
Although they were not prepared to offer specific advice two of the inspectors did offer 
what Braithwaite et al (2007) call ‘catalytic feedback’ at the end of the inspection. This 
specific type of feedback works by encouraging a positive response to criticisms, and 
inspectors tried to do this rather than give specific advice. The feedback worked by trying 
to encourage the manager to build on existing strengths within the service and by working 
incrementally the larger problems could be overcome. For example the inspector of CH 3 
declined to give specific advice to the manager about improvements required to the staff 
induction training, but she did comment on the ongoing improvements that had been made 
so far and stressed that these seemed to have occurred because the manager had brought in 
an external consultant from another service to help her for a day. The inspector commented 
that the manager should use this consultant again and that they were heading in the right 
direction. The inspector of CH 4 also gave similar feedback, encouraging the manager to 
use his / her own organisational strengths to develop better communication and teamwork 
across her staff. 
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AFTER THE VISIT 
The Report 
After the inspection the inspectors collated the evidence and wrote the reports. A draft 
report is sent to the home approximately four weeks after the inspection with an invitation 
for the manager (and owner if applicable) to comment on the findings. The CSCI will only 
amend factual changes, not disputes over any findings. Comments and disputes will be 
kept on record by the CSCI but they are not published as part of the report. The report is 
then published eight to ten weeks after the inspection. 
 
All reports follow a set format, written onto a template and they have to follow guidelines 
on the use of plain English. The report is broken down into seven sections based on the 
seven outcome areas, with a brief summary of the report findings at the front. A summary 
of ‘what the home does well’ is placed at the beginning of the report and any requirements 
and recommendations are printed at the back of the report after the individual scores for 
each of the thirty-eight NMS that were inspected. The judgements have to be based on the 
KLORA guidelines (CSCI 2007c) and the report must contain evidence to support the 
judgements. The guidelines also stipulate how to structure each section, from layout, to the 
number of lines that should be written for each section, and what type of evidence should 
be used.  
 
The reports for each of the four case studies show this uniform structure and all contained 
similar types of evidence to support judgements. The typical evidence used to support 
judgements for each outcome area are shown in Appendix 6. 
 
All of the reports were of similar length ranging from 26 to 29 pages, with the majority of 
the extra length being attributable to a longer list of requirements tabulated at the end of 
the document. 
 
In line with CSCI best practice guidance three of the inspectors used quotes from 
stakeholders in every section of the report to evidence whether or not outcomes were being 
achieved. According to the inspector of CH 3 the CSCI had only recently sent a 
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memorandum to regional offices to encourage a greater use of direct quotes in the writing 
of reports. This directive had obviously not filtered through to the inspector of CH 1 who 
failed to use quotes in any of the seven sections, but did use two within the summary 
section on ‘what the home does well’.  
 
There is a clear reason for the uniformity of reports. This has roots in the desire for the 
individual resident, or prospective resident, to be able to take responsibility for the 
decisions they make. The ability of the public to do this is dependent on the government 
producing consistent and accessible information. The CSCI want reports to be comparable 
to enable prospective residents to examine a number of reports and make fair and accurate 
comparisons about the quality of each service. 
 
After each individual outcome section has been discussed in the body of the report the 
score for each of the 38 NMS are presented in a table form, under the heading ‘Scoring of 
outcomes’. This table gives the score for each of the NMS that were inspected. Not every 
standard is examined at every KI, so only those standards that were inspected are scored. 
 
Requirements and Recommendations 
Following the ‘scoring of outcomes’ a table of requirements and a table of 
recommendations are listed at the end of the report. The first table lists ‘Requirements’, 
which are actions that must be taken to ensure the service meets the requirements of the 
Care Standards Act (CSA) 2000.  If the requirement is statutory the enforceable 
regulations from the CSA 2000 are listed next to the NMS to show the legal justification 
for the stipulation. There is usually a timescale attached to the requirement that gives a 
timescale for the service to resolve the issue. Failure to adhere to this timescale can result 
in enforcement action being taken. 
 
However, in the four case studies I conducted all services failed to meet timescales for at 
least one previous requirement and no enforcement action had been taken. Indeed CH 1 
had failed to act on agreed timescales for five requirements from the previous inspection 
and received no subsequent enforcement action after this had been discovered during the 
case study inspection. This inaction reflects the difficultly the CSCI have in bringing 
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enforcement action against services. It is a cumbersome, long process which will be 
discussed further in Chapter 7. 
 
The second table lists ‘Recommendations’ that relate to NMS and are seen as good 
practice for the Registered Provider (owner of the service) to consider carrying out. They 
are not enforceable against the regulations of the CSA 2000 and as such can be ignored. 
The managers seemed to neglect the significance of this section of the report as none 
discussed it in the context of using these to develop their provision of service. They were 
viewed as ‘ideals’, changes that could be made if the service had unlimited resources but 
which were often ignored in the face of requirements.  
 
The recommendations given at the end of the report build upon the catalytic feedback 
given during the verbal feedback provided at the end of the site visit. They provide a list of 
areas that can be developed or improved and which if acted upon at this stage will improve 
the performance of the service.  They usually discuss minor areas of the service which if 
developed will have significant cumulative value, both in terms of improving the 
individual area and providing incremental improvement which when combined will have a 
positive effect on the service as a whole. This section of the report provides a type of 
advice and gives the service a chance to improve areas before they become problematic, or 
simply to build on existing strengths. In keeping with the non-consultancy policy of the 
CSCI the section does not provide advice about how to achieve improvements, but usually 
they suggest actions that are straightforward and often, when achieved, combine in their 
constituent parts to develop the more complex practice pathways. There was a paradox 
between managers wanting advice from inspectors but generally ignoring the 
recommendations, when it is these pieces of advice that can provide a catalyst to larger 
improvements. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The inspections all followed a reasonably similar trajectory guided by the NMS and system 
guidelines (e.g. KLORA). In many ways inspection appears to be dominated by 
standardisation, with changes perceived by inspectors to be eroding their professional 
judgement. This standardisation spaned the focus of inspection and the technical 
judgements inspectors have to make, but has less influence over the process.  
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However, despite increasing of standardisation being implemented by organisational 
decision-makers inspectors’ use of discretion was evident, often in quite innovative ways 
that resulted from rebellion against the process of standardisation. For example, in the 
unique ways in which inspectors reorganised the IR to make it usable and in the two 
distinct ways the inspectors conducted their inspection of paperwork: 
1. Holistic  - examining the paperwork thoroughly and methodically, picking out 
problems as they went through and relating them to the NMS retrospectively 
2. Targeted – using NMS and KLORA to find evidence of each particular standard 
 
Although there was scope for discretion the inspectors expressed frustration at the level of 
prescription by the CSCI, which they felt was slowly eroding their professional role and 
replacing the need for reflective skills with the de-skilled ability to simply routinely collect 
data and match it against a checklist. This de-skilling mirrors Braverman’s critique of 
scientific management, elements of the concept can be seen in the evolution of the 
inspection process (Braverman 1975). However, there were areas where inspectors were 
able to exert their professional autonomy in the ways they structured the day and crucially 
in their interviews with stakeholders. There was also scope for some inspector discretion 
that fell within the guidelines of the CSCI if the inspector was prepared to be a little 
inventive and to bend the rules slightly, as in the case of the inspector of CH 3 who 
allowed the service to fax a fire certificate 2 days after the inspection. These findings echo 
the work of (Evans and Harris 2004) who demonstrate that discretion is not a phenomenon 
that is either present or absent it is used in specific instances.  
 
The parallel working of both strengths-based and deterrence-based philosophies is a 
particularly interesting feature of the inspection regime. This philosophical tightrope is 
traversed both at the top-level of the CSCI, in the development of organisational 
frameworks and protocols, and at a street-level by inspectors on the ground. The deterrence 
philosophy is the dominant feature of the CSCI and strengthening this aspect of inspection 
was a clear founding principle when it began in 2004. While the focus of regulation since 
the Care Standards Act 2000 appears to be on deterrence-based approaches, these were 
also complimented with certain strengths-based aspects to foster compliance. For example, 
the emphasis on ‘what the home does well’ at the beginning of the report and the use of 
recommendations at the end of the report to suggest areas where improvements can be 
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made and current strengths can be built upon. However, the strengths-based aspect of 
regulation was described as minor in relation to the deterrence-based aspects by both 
inspectors and care home managers, who certainly felt the deterrence aspects of the system 
far outweigh the compliance.  
 
Two of the care home managers (of CH 1 and 3) complained specifically about the lack of 
positives in the reports, and it appeared during my observation of inspection that most the 
strengths-based initiatives came predominantly from informal actions by inspectors, such 
as the use of ‘catalytic feedback’. The balance between these two seemingly opposing 
philosophies is explored further in Chapter 8. 
 
There was clear evidence of both a perceived and a real shift from inspecting to auditing, 
with the CSCI orientating more focus towards auditing quality assurance systems as 
opposed to directly checking the quality during the inspection. This was evident from the 
inspectors claims about increased emphasis on paperwork and the amount of time they 
spent looking at paperwork in comparison to other aspects of inspection, particularly 
talking directly with residents. Further evidence such as the CSCI only auditing the 
services complaints system rather than assessing the actual complaints and the adoption of 
self-reporting in the form of the Annual Quality Assurance Assessment (AQAA) 
(introduced in 2007) has further emphasised this shift towards auditing. The inspectors’ 
views on this bureaucratic shift was negative and reflected their concerns about the remit 
of their jobs, which they felt were both being eroded by efficiency savings and 
bureaucracy.  
 
In this chapter I have taken the inspectors accounts as a straightforward realist account of 
inspection and used them to supplement my observations. In subsequent chapters I 
examine the views of other stakeholders in more detail and explore contrasting 
interpretations of the inspection process as well as the consequences for the service 
function and residents well-being.  
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CHAPTER 5: IMPACT ON SERVICES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
After exploring the process of inspection in the previous chapter I now move on to looking 
at the impact inspection had on service provision. Impact can be measured in terms of 
direct impact on the service during the process of inspection itself, through the outcomes of 
the inspectors’ reports, and exploring whether the process induces change in service 
provision. I am also interested in the consequences of inspection and determining how and 
why the manager and staff within the service reacted to inspection.  
 
To examine these issues analysis in this chapter is split into two parts. The first, examines 
of the impact of the site visit, how it affected the service on the day and how the prospect 
of unannounced inspection visits impact on the service in terms of obtrusiveness and 
disruption.  
 
The second part looks at longitudinal impact to explore whether CSCI actually induces 
changes and whether these changes improve the performance of the service and quality of 
care. In Chapter 4 I briefly analysed the three previous National Minimum Standards 
(NMS) scores for each service to look at the progress the services had historically made 
against the standards. That data provides context to the case studies and shows that where 
progress was made it has previously been limited. 
 
IMPACT OF INSPECTION SITE VISIT ON MANAGERS AND STAFF 
In this section I explore how the services reacted to inspection in terms of service change. 
None of the staff I interviewed had read the report and those who know about the findings 
only knew what they had been told by their manager. In the case of CH 2 and 4 the 
managers had discussed the report with staff in a staff meeting by the third data collection 
point. This was only a brief overview of the requirements and a value judgement by the 
manager. In CH 1 and 3 the managers had not discussed the report with staff. 
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All of the managers and staff reacted pleasantly to the inspectors and accepted that external 
inspection was a necessity for services that look after vulnerable adults. Impact was 
manifest in two ways: disruption to the service and emotional stress. 
 
Disruption to the service 
The presence of an inspector during the site visit obviously had an impact on staff and all 
staff I spoke with talked unanimously about ‘being on guard’ and ‘taking that extra bit of 
care’ that day. Many were keen to point out that this caution was not because they felt they 
were doing their job poorly at other times but simply a result of the added tension and 
pressure created by the situation. My observations during the inspections suggested that the 
staff tried to get on with their jobs while the inspector was observing them or touring the 
home. The tendency was for staff to avoid the inspector if possible. In only one instance 
did a member of staff approach an inspector to have a conversation. A staff member in CH 
2 explained why she wanted to avoid the inspector: 
 
‘I’m not going to try and speak to him, I don’t want to say the wrong thing or bring 
attention onto me… if he asks me anything I’ll try to answer it to my ability, ‘cos I 
know the job…’ (Staff 2 CH 3, interview 1) 
 
The impact on staff performance was demonstrated by the Assistant Manager of CH 2 who 
made a mistake during the dispensing of medication that led the service to receive an 
immediate requirement from the inspector. I missed the incident as I was observing the 
lead inspector rather than the pharmacy inspector, but she left medication open and 
unattended and blamed the lapse on the presence of the inspector: 
 
‘I give out the meds all the time. It was a mistake I admit that, but I really think it 
was because he was there, it does throw you off you know’ (Staff 2 CH 2, 
interview 2) 
 
Emotional stress 
Every member of staff I interviewed at each case study site admitted to being nervous 
about working while the inspector was observing and many were wary of speaking openly 
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because they feared the potential consequences. Those with little or no experience of 
previous inspections were more cautious when answering their questions during the day. 
Staff in CH 3 had experienced a large number of random inspections over the previous two 
years because the home was failing to comply with regulations. This meant that many of 
the staff were familiar with both the process of inspection and the inspectors themselves. 
This familiarity led to less apprehension and more open dialogue between the inspector 
and staff. As a member of staff describes the relationship: 
 
‘Yeah we feel like we know (the inspector) now and I know I might as well just be 
honest and answer what she asks me, we’ve got nothing to hide’ (Staff member 
CH3) 
 
The stress of inspection was always in the mind of the manager. This pressure was 
accepted as ‘being part of the job’ and managers certainly did not show resentment to the 
process, in fact they were favourable to a system that provided a regular check and 
hopefully affirm of the good job they do. The manager of CH 4 even spoke of looking 
forward to an inspection because she would hopefully get a ‘pat on the back’ from her 
employees. Similarly staff admitted that the fear of an unannounced visit at anytime is a 
motivator for good practice. In the words of one member of staff from CH 3:  
 
‘It keeps me on my toes’ (Staff 1 CH 3, interview 3). 
 
Frustration at inspection 
When I returned to the service at the second data collection point I asked the managers 
about their initial reaction to the report and inspection. They tended to describe the 
judgements in the report as ‘fair’ in the sense that they were evidenced and related to the 
standards: 
 
‘Yeah I mean the report is what I expected, it’s fair, I haven’t got my NVQ yet and 
I’m not able to do all the supervisions they want so yeah it’s fair’ (Manager CH 1, 
interview 2) 
 
176 
 
Despite accepting the report he was hostile to the regulations and the process of inspection. 
He described regulation as dictatorial and felt it was interfering in his business, which he 
should be free to run according to market principles. He felt the system was favourable to 
large homes who could afford to do more because of economies of scale:  
 
‘I find the dictating part of the inspection offensive. It’s my business. I should be 
able to say “look, it might not meet all of your standards but residents have a choice 
and they can have a nice family service in (name of village) that gives good basic 
care in a lovely setting or go to a big 50 bed home and get a care plan like the 
inspector) thinks we should have”… If they gave us advice we would be more than 
happy to take it onboard… They don’t help us improve the service no, I mean they 
won’t give us any advice, it’s like we’ve got the manual and he ensures we’re 
doing that… they keep us on our toes… they never say ‘Have you tried doing 
this?’, or ‘This would help’ (Manager CH 1, interview 2) 
 
The manager saw inspection as adversarial and fealt that it would achieve its goal of 
inducing improvement if it was more constructive in its criticism. Another criticism was 
that the balance of the report unfairly highlighted the negative conclusions: 
 
‘I don’t like the fact there was a very short passage of what the home does well and 
then twelve pages of negatives, there should be some balance… with the format it 
would be much better if they gave the positives and the negatives at the same time, 
to say well here’s what they do well, but here’s what needs to be better’ (Manager 
CH 1, interview 2) 
 
Inspection outcomes 
Despite the report presenting scores against each standard inspected and an overall score 
for each of the seven outcomes areas within the report, the services focused their attention 
predominantly on the requirements listed in the back of the report. These requirements 
were treated as ‘action points’. There was no critical analysis of scores or analysis of 
particular low scoring areas with a view to improvement. The requirements were 
interpreted to be a definitive, exhaustive illustration of what needed to be changed in the 
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service, rather than urgent errors that required attention because they contravened the Care 
Home Regulations 2001. As the Stand-in Manager of CH 2 explained: 
 
‘Well we’ve looked at addressing the requirements, that’s what we have to do’ 
(Stand-in Manager CH 2, interview 2) 
 
The previous chapter touched upon the modernisation agenda of the CSCI and 
demonstrates a shift towards audit principles. As the CSCI continues along this direction of 
travel it relies more heavily on managers to independently evaluate and act upon the 
inspection findings. CH 2 and 4 did quickly submit a plan of improvement to the CSCI but 
this only set out how they would address the requirements. CH 1 and 3 failed to submit this 
document until very late in the study period more than 6 months after the inspection. 
 
IMPACT: CHANGE OVER TIME  
The study was designed with a longitudinal aspect in order to explore consequences of 
inspection over a nine-month period. As requirements represented the focus of services 
reaction it is necessary to understand how each service reacted to these.  
 
To analyse this I first looked at the number of requirements issued to each service and 
analysed how the services acted upon them. The second data collection point was 
approximately one week after the report was issued and only 4 – 6 weeks after the 
inspection. Services had not usually had time to make any changes by that point, except 
where they were very minor or simple to rectify and had been fed back to the service 
during the informal feedback process.  
 
The data were analysed through a conceptual lens influenced by micro-level organisational 
theory (Garside 1998). Analysis takes account of the influence of both structure and 
agency in the services reactions to requirements and examines how these two factors 
interact. In considering this interaction I was also influenced by Giddens’ concept of 
‘duality of structure’ (Giddens 1986: 25) within the care home setting. Using Giddens’ 
conceptualisation of Structuration (Giddens 1986) structure interacts with agency in 
determining a manager’s leadership. Human agency and social structure are related to one 
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another, and it is the repetition of the acts of individual agents that reproduces the 
structure. 
 
Appendix 7 shows a table of the requirements issued to each of the four care homes and 
tracks the progress services made at addressing failings flagged in the reports. Table 17 
below summarises the larger table, showing the number of requirements made in each of 
the four reports and whether they were acted upon by the service.  
 
Table 17: Number of requirements made in report which were ‘actioned’ by the service 
Report Number of requirements 
issued in report by theme 
Number of 
requirements 
‘actioned’¹ 
by end of 
study 
Number of 
requirements 
not 
‘actioned’ by 
end of study 
Number of 
requirements 
partially 
‘actioned’ by 
end of study 
CH 1 8 4 3 1 
CH 2 6 5 1 0 
CH 3 5 0 5 0 
CH 4 5 4 0 1 
¹ The term ‘actioned’ signifies the fact that I could only determine if the home had made 
changes and was satisfied it had rectified the problem. I was not in a position to determine 
if they had met the requirements as judged by the inspector. 
 
Table 17 shows that by the end of the study period of the 24 requirements issued over the 
four inspections eleven had not been ‘actioned’ by the services. CH 3 did not take action 
on any of the requirements issued in the report. CH 1 had only taken action on four of eight 
requirements and made partial progress on a fifth. Comparatively CH 2 and CH 4 had 
made much better progress with CH 4 acting upon all five of the requirements and CH 2 
only failing to act on one. 
 
The rest of the chapter explores the reasons behind the services either acting upon or not 
acting upon requirements. 
 
Themes of requirements 
The requirements focused on six thematic areas, with a number of sub-themes (which are 
labelled in the tables in Appendix 7). The six thematic, and the respective sub areas were: 
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Table 18: Requirements ‘actioned’ grouped into themes 
Themes of requirements Number of 
requirements 
across case studies 
Number of 
requirements 
‘actioned’ 
1. Care planning 4 0 
a. Personalisation          2 0 
b. Activities and 
stimulation 
         2 0 
2. Management 4 0 
a. Qualifications          2 0 
b. Supervision of staff          2 0 
3. Staff 5 4 
a. Training          3 2 
b. Recruitment          1 1 
c. Numbers on duty          1 1 
4. Medication 4 2 
a. Policies and procedure          3 1 
b. Safe storage          1 1 
5. Documentation 5 5 
a. Safety certificates / 
insurance 
         3 3 
b. Working documents          2 2 
6. Environment 2 0 
a. Safety          1 0 
b. Refurbishment          1 0 
 
Of the requirements, those pertaining to documentation were most likely to be acted upon. 
This was mainly as a result of CH 4 which had four requirements that stipulated the need 
for the service to hold necessary documentation on site. The documents were held at the 
head office of the parent company and were quickly retrieved by the manager after the 
inspection. 
 
Care planning was criticised in CH 1 and 3 and neither home had managed to make 
successful progress on this by the end of the case study period. The managers of CH 1 and 
3 had both failed to achieve their NVQ qualification in management and in the case of CH 
2 this meant the manager had still not passed the CSCI fit persons test and was not the 
registered manager of the service (the manager of CH 3 was already registered because she 
had been in position prior to the Care Standards Act 2000). Neither manager had achieved 
their qualification by the end of the case studies. 
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Changes not related to inspection 
Aside from the inevitable change in residents due to death there were relatively few 
changes not related to inspection during the case study period. 
 
The biggest non-inspection related change was that, following national legislation, the 
smoking ban had come into effect and this was having a considerable impact on services. 
As the manager of CH 4 explains it had induced considerable stress: 
 
‘The smoking ban has been a nightmare, that’s the big thing at the moment. I’ve 
got staff having to go off the premises, and they don’t like that. I’ve got residents 
complaining they’re not allowed to smoke in their rooms, and they’re being 
shunted into a small room with no one else…’ (Manager CH 4, interview 3) 
 
Changes made as a result of the smoking ban were often the first issue on residents and 
staff lips when I asked about changes and this had more impact on their consciousness than 
any of the changes that resulted from inspection. 
 
All four homes had had changes in staff personnel and this reflects the transient nature of 
the care home workforce, which is discussed later in this chapter. 
 
The compliant and the non-complaint service: a simple typology 
The data in table 18 above and data from my observations and interviews suggest that there 
were two types of approach to dealing with the outcomes of inspection. CH 2 and 4 were 
broadly complaint with the requirements in the report by the end of the case studies, with 
both services ‘actioning’ all but one of the requirements they were issued with. In contrast 
CH 1 and 3 were less complaint, especially CH 3 which had not made any progress 
towards addressing any of the requirements issued in the report. CH 1 had addressed four 
of the eight requirements but had been slow in addressing the other four. The attitude and 
approach of the manager in CH 1, who was overtly defiant of the CSCI at the beginning of 
the research, was an additional factor in the characterising of the service as non-compliant: 
 
‘We’re a small, intimate home… we have nice garden… there’s no smell and 
they’re safe, what more do they want. I don’t think it’s right. Take supervision, I’m 
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not doing that, some staff have been here for years, why do they need supervision?’ 
(Manager CH 1, interview 2) 
 
The simple dichotomy between the two types of service does not tell the whole story. 
Appendix 7 and Table 18 show that in general the requirements that were acted upon were 
those that were relatively straightforward to complete. They also generally involved the 
least resources in terms of time and money to fulfil. For example the four requirements that 
CH 1 had fulfilled were: 
1. Updating staff documentation – by getting references from all staff that were not in 
place previously. 
2. Providing training in food hygiene for kitchen staff – all staff who worked in the 
kitchen had been on a day training course. 
3. Staff training to dispense medication – the manager had limited the staff who give 
out medication to the supervisors and only one of the three needed training and she 
had been on the relevant course. 
4. The home had added an extra member of staff to the afternoon shift and part of 
their responsibility was to arrange daily activities. 
 
In contrast the requirements that had not been acted upon involved a reworking of current 
organisational methods within the service, which the manager seemed unable to carry out. 
The requirements around improved care planning and staff supervision had not been 
carried out. Neither had the manager gained his NVQ qualification nor applied to be 
registered with the CSCI (which he could not do until he was qualified). 
 
CH 4 acted on all but one of the requirements it was issued, yet the four it acted upon 
pertained to documents that were held off site and were immediately retrieved from head 
office. The fifth requirement to stop wedging doors open was being rectified through the 
fitting of magnetic doorstops, but this renovation was only partly complete. Similarly the 
only requirement CH 2 had not rectified focused on a review of care planning. 
 
Therefore a more sensitive analysis of the data suggests that dividing the services as 
compliant and non-complaint based on the completion rate against requirements is 
simplistic. Instead there seems to be a thematic division based on the type of change 
required in the report. Those changes that required large-scale organisational change of 
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operational processes and staff behaviour, such as care planning or staff supervision were 
left uncompleted. Changes that were relatively straightforward and could be executed 
without the need for organisational change were rectified. Figure 1 shows this thematic 
division: 
 
Figure 1 Thematic map of incomplete and completed requirements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Manager claimed he constantly reviewed staffing and had decided current levels were 
appropriate. He therefore made no change 
 
The analysis is slightly skewed by CH 3 which failed to act on any of the requirements, 
including the relatively straightforward task of refurbishment. However, Figure 1 shows a 
clear differentiation between care planning, management qualification, and staff 
development, which all require some form of organisational change to complete and the 
more straightforward tasks of completing documentation, refining medication procedure 
(which is highly prescribed), and adding extra staff. Apart from the care planning 
requirement in CH 2, which was not acted upon, all of CH 2 and 4’s requirements did not 
require organisational change and therefore were completed relatively quickly. The 
outstanding requirement for CH 4 was in the process of being completed; it was being 
delayed by the firm being employed to fit the new doorstops. 
 
Care planning (CH 1, 2, 3) 
 
Management qualification 
(CH 1, 3) 
 
Staff (supervision) (CH 1, 3), 
 
Staff (training –meds) (CH 3) 
 
Environment (CH 3, 4) 
 
Documentation (CH 1, 2, 4) 
 
Medication procedure (CH 2 
 
Medication storage (CH 2) 
 
Staff numbers (CH 2)* 
Incomplete requirements Completed requirements 
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Common responses to inspection 
This next section explores the reasons behind the services actions in response to the 
requirements issued. The focus is on the areas of change that were incomplete and explores 
the reasons for the lack of change.  
A lack of urgency 
Initially it appeared there was lack of urgency displayed by all but CH 4 in reacting to the 
inspection requirements. Previous timescales had been missed by all four services and in 
the case of CH 1 a timescale on a requirement for formal staff supervision went back to 
June 2005. The problem was systemic across the studies and related to a set of interacting 
issues that include a lack of perceived threat and the time and resources to implement 
complex change. 
 
The manager of CH 2 explained why there was often a lack of urgency in an admission 
that the consequences of inaction were perceived as minimal: 
 
‘I mean it doesn’t really change anything here. Life still goes on… we still have 
new residents wanting to move in, I had a call yesterday, but we’re full at the 
moment… I’ve never once had a resident or their family ask for a copy of a report 
and no one has questioned me about a report ever’ (Manager CH 2, interview 1) 
 
The timescales are supposed to be legally enforceable through the Care Home Regulations 
2001 but evidence from previous reports shows that timescales are rarely enforced. The 
RM of CH 2 explained this position: 
 
‘… we only take enforcement action if we really have to because it takes so long’ 
(RM CH 2) 
 
The lack of urgency was also attributed to the time and resources it takes to implement 
organisational changes, especially where changes were large and involved considerable 
bureaucracy: 
 
‘It takes a long time to develop new care plans you know, they’ve got to be 
designed and of course CSCI don’t help you with that, then we’ve got to train the 
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staff in them, and that’s not easy especially when it means more paperwork for 
them’ (Manager CH 1, interview 3) 
 
When change involves a shift in working practices in terms of the behaviour and attitudes 
of staff, the changes can take a long time. Time has been shown to be a barrier to 
organisational change (Lee 2008). 
 
Management acting as a barrier 
As the leader of the service the manager is the single most important factor in improving 
the service’s quality rating: they have the capacity to foster staff development and dismiss 
those who are not performing appropriately; they can introduce new policies and practices 
to improve the quality of service; and crucially in relation to inspection, oversee the 
implementation of any requirements and recommendations made by the inspector.  
 
Capacity for service change therefore primarily lies in the manager’s desire and ability to 
achieve change and these factors in turn relate to their understanding and acceptance of the 
need for change. The inspectors were very clear in their opinion that the manager was the 
key factor in creating change. As the inspector of CH 3 explained: 
 
‘Oh the manager is crucial they are the single most important factor in whether a 
home fails the inspection, er, they drive the service and are responsible for its 
success’ (Inspector CH 3)  
 
All four managers were critical of some of the changes the CSCI require, which when 
coupled with the perception that defying the CSCI had little consequence meant there was 
a reluctance to act on requirements. The criticism was based on a perception that changes 
were for the benefit of the CSCI not residents, as the manager of CH 4 claimed: 
 
‘I mean you do have to question whether everything they ask from us is necessary 
and not just for the inspectors, I know they’ve got a job to do but it seems too 
much, you know’ (Manager CH 4, interview 3) 
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The managers of CH 1, 3 and 4 were frank and open about their reluctance to make some 
of the changes, feeling they were sometimes too demanding: 
 
‘I’m not going to ask busy district nurses and doctors to give me their opinion on 
the service here, they’ve got more important things to do than spend five minutes 
filling in a card’ (Manager CH 1, interview 2) 
 
‘Sometimes I think things can be, how can I put it? Unnecessary, like I mean I 
know I didn’t have the certificates on site but they’re at head office and they 
could’ve just faxed them to (the inspector) that afternoon if (the inspector) had 
wanted’ (Manager CH 4, interview 2) 
 
Capacity for change 
I purposefully selected my case studies from the pool of services that had previously been 
rated either poor or adequate by the CSCI, as I reasoned that these would be where I would 
see the most impact. However, focusing on these homes also vividly demonstrated an 
interesting tension that exists between the ongoing tightening of assessment and control 
systems by the regulator and the capacity of local leadership for change (Newman, et al. 
2008). This tension appears to be even more acute because homes, at the ‘poor’ or 
‘adequate’ end of the quality ratings spectrum, are by definition struggling with adhering 
to the NMS and accompanying regulations. 
 
In CH 1 the inspector thought the manager’s perceived stubbornness and unwillingness to 
admit his failings coupled with a lack of knowledge about some aspects of care provision, 
were holding the service back: 
 
‘It’s his autocratic style of management you see, it’s not a style that gets the best 
out of people, and you could see that by the way his staff spoke about him’ 
(Inspector CH 1) 
 
The inspector of CH 3 had similar complaints about the manager’s lack of knowledge: 
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‘I think she’s a bit stuck in her ways and not willing to learn about the new way of 
doing things, I must admit it must hard after doing it one way for 20 years’ 
(Inspector CH 3) 
 
They identified this as the key barrier to improvement and in his opinion the key motivator 
for improvement was education. Both managers’ knowledge of care needed to improve and 
the inspectors felt this would come with the appropriate qualifications. They felt that the 
required training would help persuade the manager of current prevailing values of choice 
and control in care. 
 
Structural barriers 
When explaining the lack of progress over time managers argued there were ingrained 
structural barriers that prevented changes. For example the Manager of CH 3 argued that 
she did not have enough time to make the changes herself: 
 
‘…to be honest I know the supervision and training isn’t enough for (the inspector) 
but I just don’t have the time, you know and I honestly don’t think the staff could 
do it, or benefit from it that much’ (Manager CH 3, interview 2) 
 
Managers were increasingly finding it difficult to allocate already scarce resources towards 
achieving the modernisation the CSCI required. As the manager of CH 2 explained: 
 
‘… I mean they say you’ve got to do activities but there’s no money to do them… 
It’s frustrating that they demand so much yet give no help with how we’re 
supposed to stretch our resources’ (Manager CH 2, interview 1) 
 
For the owner-manager of CH 1 the resource issue was resolved through an outdated 
conception of good quality care provision, justified through resource limitations: 
 
‘Do you know the cost of property here Matthew? We provide these grounds and a 
well maintained service and it doesn’t cost a fortune, I know other homes that 
charge two hundred pounds more a week than us, but we don’t because we want to 
serve the community… for that they get good basic care and my staff chat and 
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interact, if you like, with the residents, but we just don’t have the capacity to put on 
lots of activities, and I tell you when we have done in the past not many here have 
wanted to take part to be honest… families should take more responsibility, why 
can’t they come in the evenings or at least during weekends and take them out, 
walk them round the garden? I mean some do, there are one or two who are great, 
but others just don’t bother’ (Manager CH 1, interview 2) 
 
He focused on the environment and argued the home provided good basic care, in a well-
maintained home, in a pleasant village setting. He admitted they focused less on activities 
and stimulation. He justified this by claiming residents got what they paid for and argued 
that their families should take responsibility for providing additional contact and 
stimulation. The manager of CH 3 also voiced this sentiment and felt that her residents 
were content with the service she offered and the increased demands around 
personalisation and care planning were unnecessary, certainly in the context of a lack of 
resources. 
 
Although she too complained about a lack of resources the manager of CH 4 put a positive 
spin on the role of inspection. Even though CSCI requirements required extra resources 
she could also use the report as a negotiating tool to attract more resources from the parent 
company: 
 
‘well it’s good in way because I can say look I need more money for activities or 
whatever, and its down here (in the report) in black and white so they can’t argue’ 
(Manager CH 4, interview 2) 
 
Using Giddens’ (1986) theory of Structuration as a framework for analysis there is a social 
structure within services - traditions, moral codes, and established ways of doing things. 
These can be changed when people start to ignore them, replace them, or reproduce them 
differently. Managers in these case studies were functioning within an organisational 
culture premised on ageist concepts of decay and dependency (Wilken 1990). This was 
affecting the behaviours of managers, staff and, as I will discuss in Chapter 6, residents. 
This dominant structure is demonstrated in the routinisation I observed in all four services. 
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Each service showed varying degrees of routinisation. For example all four had routine 
times for getting residents up and dressed, bringing morning and afternoon tea, lunch and 
dinner. There is a practical need for routinisation within institutional settings; however, the 
routinisation in all four homes was excessive, particularly in the context of increasing 
focus on personalisation. CH 1 had the most rigid routine: 
 
‘The support we get here isn’t good, we’re just expected to get on with giving the 
care, keeping them entertained and doing the paperwork.,. I mean we barely get 
time to get them up, give them breakfast and medication before its time for 
toileting, and then lunch, then toileting again, you know, we never stop… activities 
pah, we hardly get time’ (Staff 2 CH 2, interview 1) 
 
The routine was not enforced, the resident who refused was not compelled to go to the 
toilet, but it was ingrained in the running of the service and therefore de facto enforced. 
 
This type of practice, where residents are treated as part of a routine, rather than as 
individuals had supposedly been eliminated as a result of the new modes of care developed 
since the Care Standards Act 2000. However, pressures of time created by a shortage of 
staff and the burden of inspection meant staff had developed a routine to ease the burden 
on them, rather than provide optimum care for residents. 
Staff resistant to change: the influence of prevailing culture 
Across the case studies staff were unhappy about the changes that had already been 
implemented since the Care Home regulations 2001. Progress in the case study services 
was slow there had been limited progress against the NMS. Staff referred directly to the 
impact of CSCI:  
 
 ‘I’m sick of it at the moment to be honest Matthew, it’s getting to the stage where 
its not worth it for me… this job used to be fun, I’d chat to the relatives have a 
laugh, now since CSCI have come along there’s too many hoops to jump through’ 
(Staff 1, CH 4, interview 2) 
 
As with managers staff were constrained by their experience of, and buy-in to, an outdated 
culture of service, and were finding it difficult to shift their behaviour as prevailing policy 
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thinking had changed. Their resistance was partly the result of objection to an increased 
workload, which they felt was unfair especially without any change to their remuneration: 
 
‘… these changes have given us a lot extra to do now, I often have to stay behind 
after a shift to finish me care plans, it’s the only chance I have to get them done… 
on top of the work I do for me NVQ on me days off’ (Staff 1 CH 3, interview 2) 
 
As well as the extra personal workload staff were also concerned that the extra amount of 
paperwork negatively impacted on their caring role. To many of the staff I interviewed this 
seemed to be antithetical to the aims of social care: 
 
‘I can’t understand it, how they think that all of this extra care plans and things are 
helping when they actually mean we have less time to spend with the clients’ (Staff 
2 CH 3, interview 3) 
 
Caring was conceptualised specifically as direct support and assistance for residents. In 
this context the care planning and record keeping were viewed as a hindrance to caring, 
rather than a process through which care is improved through accountability and 
personalisation. Other studies suggest time claims like this are endemic across the social 
services setting (Bell, et al. 2008). Observations from my field log do show that staff did 
spend a considerable amount of time on paperwork, especially at the end of their shift, but 
I had no point of reference to compare these claims against so can only take their claims on 
face value as evidence. 
 
From the sample of staff I interviewed across the studies the willingness to change and 
embrace new techniques was related to each staff members own experience and perceived 
career path. Staff who had been in the job for a long period of time or who were reaching 
the end of their working life were less happy to embrace changes, such as detailed care 
planning, which required extra training and work. Others who wanted to remain in the 
profession were more willing to adapt to change. 
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Services focus on outputs rather than outcomes 
All four homes saw success in terms of service outputs rather than outcomes for residents. 
Outputs are service products and differ from outcomes, which refer to the impact the 
service has on the welfare of service users. A quote from the Line Manager of CH 2 neatly 
sums up this output focus: 
 
‘For example not one person has had a bed sore they didn’t come in with and things 
like that I think are more important than one person’s view, which they often use to 
make a judgement’ (Line Manager CH 2, interview 2) 
 
The commonality of focus on outputs without the justification for these in terms of 
outcomes for residents was important in understanding the underlying reasons for services 
performing poorly against the NMS. Focusing on outputs allows service staff and 
managers to affirm their own role and the current function of the home, rather than 
question the service they were providing in terms of outcomes for residents and  therefore 
have to make changes in response to these.  For example none of the four services had 
residents’ meetings to consult over service provision. Managers were often frustrated at the 
lack of attendance at some of the activities they put on. However, my interviews with 
residents found that lack of enthusiasm was often because they were the wrong activities: 
 
 MN: ‘so you don’t do any of the activities?’ 
 
 Oh no, I don’t like bingo’ 
 
 MN: ‘Is there anything you would like?’ 
 
 ‘Well we used to play indoor bowls at me old place, I loved that’ 
 
 MN: ‘But they don’t play that here?’ 
 
 ‘No’ 
 
 MN: ‘And have they ever asked you what you might like to play?’ 
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 ‘No I don’t think so’   (Resident 2 CH 4, interview 2) 
 
Activities tended to be the obvious care home activities, like sing-a-longs or bingo, but 
residents wanted more varied things, such as the above example of indoor bowls. 
 
To claim that manager and staff did not consider outcomes for residents is erroneous, more 
specifically they produced outputs based on their own assumptions of outcomes, which 
stemmed from their cultural perspective and resulted in a service which was often tailored 
to organisational needs and behaviour rather than the residents. 
 
For the managers of the three privately run services there is an intersection of structures 
based on a profit driven mode of production and a social justice driven mode of 
production; the managers had to align these two conflicting influences. In the cases of CH 
1 and 3 this pressure created a focus on limited outputs rather than holistic outcomes, 
because they could ally their notions of social justice with a narrow set of outputs. If they 
were forced to consider a wider plethora of outcomes it was apparent that the profit driven 
mode of production would be compromised because the two would be incompatible. They 
were essentially claiming their services only offer a resource limited level of care, which 
was appropriate to the cost of the service.  
 
Factors that induced change 
Despite complaints from all four service managers about the demands of inspection all but 
CH 3 had made progress against the requirements by the end of the study period. In the 
case of CH 2 and 4 only one requirement had not been acted upon. I have discussed the 
influence of the types of requirements services had to address and the technical ability and 
capacity of the service personnel to achieve change. This section now explores the reasons 
services began to comply with the inspection outcomes and discusses how services initially 
resistant to change were persuaded to begin to make improvements against the NMS. 
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Accepting the principle of CSCI 
Although she thought some elements of inspection were unnecessary the manager of CH 4 
was sanguine about inspection and happy to comply with the rules even if she did not 
agree with every standard and process for gathering evidence: 
 
‘Er, I think we need the Commission and it’s a good thing, so you just have to get 
on with it… I like the feedback at the end, that helps… So you just have to knuckle 
down and get on with it’ (Manager CH 4, interview 2) 
 
The manager of CH 2 was less sanguine but equally as pragmatic: 
 
‘Well it happens and I can’t change it so we’ve just got to get on with it, listen to 
what they say and try to get it right for next time’ (Manager CH 2, interview 2) 
 
Punitive sanctions finally getting through 
The manager of CH 1 had steadfastly refused to accept the value of change during the first 
two data collection points. A couple of weeks before my third data collection point the 
service had received a random inspection, which is shorter than the Key Inspection (KI) 
and used to follow-up requirements to ensure they have been implemented (I was not made 
aware of the inspection so did not attend). Because there had been little progress over a 
long period of time there was a real threat of legal action from the CSCI. After a number of 
years of resisting change and ignoring the CSCI’s threats the manager seemed to realise 
that a critical mass of pressure had built up from the CSCI. He talked about the need to 
improve because the CSCI would begin legal proceedings if he failed to make progress 
with the key outstanding issues by the next KI: 
 
‘I’ve had a kick up the arse to be honest. After a couple of conversations with (the 
inspector) I realise that I might loose the business if I don’t get things sorted. He’s 
talking about legal proceedings and I don’t want to loose my business… I guess 
before now I’ve thought I could get away with having a home that’s not got a great 
CSCI rating because, well, residents were still coming in. But now its more serious 
now they could close me down potentially and I don’t want that’ (Manager CH 1, 
interview 3) 
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The fact that it seems to have taken the manager over three years to perceive that sanctions 
from the CSCI were real and could have an impact, beyond the publications of bad reports, 
shows that the threat of sanctions has not been backed by action from the CCSI. The 
manager acknowledged that CH 1 had reached the stage where only the threat of draconian 
measures were having an impact. It had taken the CSCI three years to reach this point 
where the inspector felt he had exhausted all of his patience to the point where only very 
real threats of punitive sanctions would work in this case:  
 
‘To be honest there’s been no real improvement over the last couple of years and 
I’m beginning to wonder what I can do now, I do wonder if I need to bring another 
inspector in to give a fresh look and fresh ideas’  (Inspector CH 1) 
 
By the end of the data collection period the manager had enrolled on his NVQ and made 
progress with care plans. Although he would not admit it explicitly he gave the impression 
that the task of reviewing and revising the care plans was daunting, both in terms of the 
scale of the task and the knowledge required to develop the new plans. By the third 
interview he had managed to delegate the tasks and a new supervisor had been employed 
whom the manager felt was capable of developing the care plans. He also informed me that 
he was in the process of hiring a consultant to come in a do ‘a few trouble shooting 
sessions with us’ (Manager CH 1, interview 3), admitting he had been struggling with the 
management of the service. Rather than improve his own skills and knowledge base he 
chose to delegate responsibility to a new member of staff and a consultant, but he was 
beginning to accept the CSCI’s model of quality care, even if seemingly rather reluctantly 
through threat of sanctions. 
 
In respect to his attitude there was evidence of some improvement by the third data 
collection point. Relatives and staff all claimed there had been an improvement in his 
communication and willingness to listen, and they thought this was beginning to translate 
into an improvement in service: 
 
‘He’s better now he’ll at least listen to what we have to say and he does do things 
when I ask him, like when they lost mum’s jumper in the wash and he made sure it 
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was found, whereas before he would’ve just dismissed that request’ (Relative 1 CH 
1, interview 3) 
 
‘…well at least there is better attitude from (manager) now he’ll listen to my 
suggestions a bit more and treats us with a bit more respect, whereas before we 
were just ignored’ (Staff 1 CH 1, interview 3) 
 
It had taken the inspector and CSCI three years to make the threat of legal action real. This 
demonstrates the hesitancy inspectors have to use this method and supports the comments 
of the RM of CH 3 about the difficulty in pursuing legal action. 
 
UNDERSTANDING WHY IMPROVEMENT WAS LIMITED 
Burden of regulatory regime 
Regulation places a huge burden on services in terms of ongoing adherence to the 
standards on a daily basis and the impact of the vast amount of paperwork. In terms an 
ongoing adherence to standards managers felt the burden of regulation was too high, they 
felt there was a large imbalance between the output or benefits of adhering to regulatory 
standards and the input in terms of time and resources required to achieve them. They 
questioned whether some of the standards and inspection activity were simply there to 
justify the CSCI’s own institutional position, rather than improve services: 
 
‘…I’ve actually had residents complain about the changes we’ve made in response 
to the report, and I want to see what (the inspector) says when I tell him this next 
time, I mean I thought inspection was for the residents, so if they don’t like the 
changes what’s the point in them Matthew?’ (Manager CH 1, interview 3) 
 
The manager of CH 2 thought the same thing: 
 
‘I think they sometimes focus on stuff that wasn’t important to the lives of residents 
and won’t make a difference to them at all’ (Manager CH 2, interview 1) 
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Inspecting for Better Lives (IBL) (2005) shows the CSCI’s intention to lower the burden of 
inspection. The document claims the CSCI’s ‘(a)im (is) to reduce the administrative 
burden of inspections, particularly by reducing the amount of information we ask for.’ 
(CSCI 2005a: 1). However, at the beginning of my fieldwork in 2007 the managers did not 
feel as though the burden had been reduced. In fact with the introduction of the Annual 
Quality Assurance Assessment (AQAA), a complex self-assessment document, they felt 
like the burden was being increased. As the manager of CH 4 explained: 
 
‘This new AQAA is a pain, we don’t even have the internet here, so I’m not sure 
how I can do it online, its going to be even more work… and we’re not even getting 
less inspection’ (Manager CH 4, interview 1) 
 
In reducing the burden on itself, by shifting towards a more cost effective risk-based 
regulatory regime, the CSCI had increased the burden on the service it inspects.  
 
There was also criticism that homes were being forced to focus on paperwork and meeting 
the NMS at the expense of caring for the service users: 
 
‘I mean I really think we’re getting to the stage now where I’m questioning whether 
we’re actually running this home for the service users or the inspectors’ (Manager 
CH 3, interview 3) 
 
Similar criticisms have been made of performance management regimes in public service 
organisations (see Walker 1998) and other regulators, notably Ofsted, who have been 
criticised in the past for their focus on quantifiable targets, which were used as an 
automatic indicator of quality despite other forms of evidence suggesting that meeting 
these targets was not always improving education (see for example Cullingford 1999a).  
 
The impact of technology 
The impact of technology on inspection cannot be underestimated, especially in relation to 
the increase in rationality that comes with the information society (Lash 2002). Woolgar 
(2002) argues that Information and Communication Technology (ICT) configure the user 
by setting rules as to how users can act. Parton (2008) argues that in relation to social work 
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this has had an impact on forms of knowledge in the form of a shift from narrative to a 
database way of thinking; social work has moved from the ‘social’ to the ‘informational’. 
These arguments are clearly borne out in the case of inspection and the impact of 
technology has had a considerable effect on the construction of the current regime. 
Technology has facilitated the ‘modernisation’ of the inspectorate under the principles of 
new managerialism by focusing on a linear collection of informational indicators. This 
technology driven process is evolving contrary to the CSCI’s stated aims of focusing on 
user experience and this tension will be explored further in Chapter 7. 
 
Shifting the goal posts 
There was a common perception that the CSCI was constantly raising the bar and requiring 
more evidence to meet standards. Managers also felt that there was a lack of adequate 
notice or information about the changes. This led to frustration for managers and left them 
feeling unable to keep up with constant changes, which resulted in an almost defeatist 
attitude: 
 
‘It is sometimes difficult to keep up with all of the changes they bring in… er… I 
mean… you feel as though you’re just getting to grips with one set of rules and 
they change things again and that means new paperwork’ (Manager CH 1, 
interview 1) 
 
The changes were not made to the Care Home Regulations (2001) or NMS, they were 
made by the CSCI in the pursuit of ‘a constant improvement of standards’ (CSCI 2006d: 
1). They do this by tightening the guidelines under which the inspector judges each 
standard. They are able exert this influence through the ‘administrator’s prerogative’ 
(Croley 1998). In the pursuit of progress the homes struggling to adhere to the current level 
of standards were being further left behind. The CSCI created a problem for itself because 
as the goal-posts shifted services already performing poorly were falling further behind 
acceptable levels of care, in the case of CH 3 the manager felt might eventually close them 
down: 
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‘I mean I’m not sure how long we can keep this up, it feels as though the inspectors 
are trying to push us out of the market, they don’t seem to realise the problems of 
small independent homes’ (Manager CH 3, interview 3) 
 
In response to accusations about a lack of assistance with constantly changing regulations 
the inspector of CH 3 explained to the manager that the information was in the public 
domain. The inspector suggested the CSCI website held all relevant information, and the 
Skills for Care website had advice on how to meet the changes. However, despite 
maintaining the official position to the managers, during my interviews all of the 
inspectors expressed some sympathy about the pace of change and the accessibility of 
information required to make changes: 
 
‘I mean I do understand the problems the manager has in achieving all these, 
especially for a small independent home like this one where money is clearly a big 
issue’ (Inspector CH 1) 
 
‘There has been a huge change in inspection and the pace has been horrendous and 
I personally think there should be more time for managers to assimilate that 
change’ (Inspector CH 3) 
 
The regulatory burden:  pushing smaller providers from the market? 
The two managers of the small, independent homes were particularly aggrieved at the 
introduction of yet more administrative burden. As both Hood et al (1999b) and Power 
(1999) found as the scope of regulation expands so does the compliance costs for 
regulatees. The frustration at an increasing burden of regulation and the associated costs 
was coupled with a restriction from local councils on how much they would pay a home 
for each resident it funded. Managers have no control over this and have to abide by prices 
derived by the council based on a Fair Price for Care valuation calculated based on the 
Unit Cost of Health and Social Care produced annually by the Personal Social Services 
Research Unit (Curtis 2007). Managers can only then raise prices by the amount the 
council calculates each year. There was a concern that through a combination of quasi-
market forces and regulatory burden the government and public sector were trying to push 
independent providers out of the care home market: 
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‘Everyone is entitled to the same care despite economic background, but the 
councils and government don’t see it like that… if we don’t get enough money 
coming in how can we be expected to provide the same level of care as a home that 
is completely private and charges £200 a week more than us?... especially when 
they’re (the CSCI) not prepared to help’ (Manager CH 1, interview 2) 
 
The managers of both CH 1 and 3 were worried that they might be forced out of business 
by the continual raising of standards alongside increasingly restricted resources paid. The 
restriction of charges for council funded residents also restricted the charges they could 
make to private funders, whom they could not justify charging considerably more as they 
and their relatives would not accept subsidising the council funded residents. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Inspection caused disruption to the services and emotional stress to the staff and managers. 
In the main this was accepted as part of the inevitable process of inspection but all four 
managers complained that it took up a lot of their time during the visit.  
 
The outcomes of inspection were reduced by managers to the requirements issued at the 
end of the report and the managers saw these as a task list. They thought requirements 
negated the need for further critical analysis of the report in order to target improvements 
based on strengthening the NMS that they failed to meet. This meant in order to look at the 
consequences of impact I had to structure analysis around the requirements in the 
inspection report. 
 
Thirteen of the twenty-four requirements were acted upon by the services. Analysis of the 
requirements suggests they fell into six thematic areas:  
1. Care planning 
2. Medication 
3. Staff 
4. Documentation 
5. Management 
6. Environment 
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The requirements around documentation, environment and medication were more likely to 
be acted upon than those around care planning, management and staffing. This was 
because the latter themes all involved some kind of organisational change within the 
service. In this respect, although CH 3 acted on none of its requirements and CH 1 on only 
50 %, a typology of the non-compliant versus complaint home was inappropriate. Rather 
the lack of change was the result of a complex interaction between agency and structure. 
 
The managers and staff all exhibited some resistance to change, which was dependent on 
their knowledge and capacity for change. The lack of change can be seen in terms of 
Giddens’ theory of Structuration where structure and agency interact in a model of service 
provision (Giddens 1986). In all four services the model of provision was influenced, to 
some extent, by an outdated conception of care resulting from a culture of ageism. This 
was most prominent in CH 1 and 3 and least in CH 2 and 4. The organisational culture was 
self-perpetuating and enhanced in the privately run homes (CH 1, 3 and 4) by an 
incompatible interaction between a profit driven and social justice driven modes of 
production. This culture of ageism was both reaffirmed and justified by a focus on outputs 
without adequate consultation with residents regarding outcomes. 
 
The burden of the regulatory regime and a constant tightening of the criteria to meet the 
standards has created frustration for service that were already struggling to comply with 
standards. This has served to increase resistance to complying with the NMS. 
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CHAPTER 6: IMPACT ON RESIDENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A central aim of this study was to examine residents’ views of quality residential care 
provision: what they value, what they deem to be unsatisfactory, what changes they would 
like to see. This chapter uses data from interviews with residents and their relatives to 
discuss these questions and in doing so analyse the impact of inspection on those whom the 
services are aimed. This part of the study aimed to: 
 
• describe the way residents and their relatives view the principle of inspection and 
the function of the CSCI;  
• describe the extent to which inspection improves the quality of service as 
experienced by residents; 
• determine whether inspection focuses on outcomes important to residents. 
 
IMMEDIATE IMPACT OF SITE VISIT 
Residents impassive to inspection 
Residents were generally impassive towards the inspector and on the whole only residents 
who spoke with the inspector were aware of what they were doing. Staff in two of the 
homes (CH 2 and 4) reported one or two residents asking them ‘why we were there’, often 
commenting on the fact that we were wearing suits so must be ‘important’. In contrast 
according to the staff in CH 1 not one resident with whom the inspector did not speak 
asked why we were there. This lack of awareness of inspection was confirmed during 
interviews after the inspection. When I asked residents if they knew there was an 
inspection the previous day only those who spoke with the inspector were aware it had 
taken place. In CH 3 the inspector’s presence did arouse more interest and quite a few 
residents stopped the inspector to ask what they were doing. This seemed to be due to the 
fact that the inspector in this case study spoke to a number of residents while they were 
sitting in the communal area with other residents, the other inspectors tended to either visit 
residents in their rooms or take them to a empty room or quieter place.  
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No knowledge of CSCI 
The limited direct impact on residents is further demonstrated by the fact that none of the 
residents I interviewed across the four case studies knew what the CSCI was or what it did. 
The residents who had been interviewed by the inspector on the day of the visit heard the 
name from the inspector and knew about the inspection from the limited amount the 
inspector told them during their interview: 
 
‘I know she came round yesterday to chat to me about the home, like and whether 
they were treating me proper’ (Resident 2 CH 3, interview 2) 
 
Those who had spoken to the inspector knew that inspection was conducted and that it had 
a protective function, to ensure they were not being mistreated, but were not aware of the 
organisation that conducted the inspection or the remit to which it inspects.  
 
Obfuscated by complexity 
Residents were clear that the principle of inspection was a good thing: 
 
‘It gets everything out in the open, makes sure the staff here are doing what they 
supposed to be doing, which they are as far as I’m concerned’ (Resident 1 CH 2, 
interview 1) 
 
‘Yeah I mean someone should check the home is treating us properly, you know, 
that there’s no problems’ (Resident 1 CH 4) 
 
However, when I asked them directly about their views on good quality inspection 
residents found it difficult to give a general view on the facets of good inspection, instead 
acknowledging the complexity of the process and the need for expert knowledge. They 
established that inspection per se was a good thing but the complexity of the process was 
seen as a barrier to any real or meaningful engagement, as a resident from CH 3 claimed: 
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‘I don’t know about things like how they (inspectors) should do their job, I mean 
all I can do is say whether I’m happy I don’t know what they do’ (Resident 1 CH 3, 
interview 2) 
 
Residents seemed afraid to expand on their views of good quality inspection for fear that 
their understanding might be questioned and their normative position contended: 
 
‘Oh I don’t know how they should do it best, that’s for the government to decide, 
they know how to do it. All I know is it’s a good thing if it stops the home stepping 
out of line… you know in terms of abuses and things’ (Resident 2 CH 4, interview 
1) 
 
In this context they were not motivated to engage collaboratively with inspectors and 
involve themselves in the complexities of the process, nor did they believe they had the 
appropriate expert knowledge to do so. In light of the complexity of the process residents 
felt they would rather leave it to the inspectors, whom they saw as professionals with 
expert knowledge. However, they did acknowledge that their experiences were important 
and that the inspector should consult their knowledge to find out about service 
performance: 
 
‘Oh yes they should ask us about the care here, they do all this for us so they should 
definitely ask us what we think’ (Resident 2 CH 1, interview 2) 
 
It appeared as though a lack of empowerment was the key reason for residents’ apathy 
towards the process of inspection. There was certainly no evidence that notions of service 
user control or partnership in their care were acknowledged as favourable concepts. 
 
No engagement with inspection outcomes 
A key tool of inspection is to provide information on outcomes of inspection to people that 
use the service. The data from these case studies show that information was not reaching 
residents in these particular services. There seemed to be three interrelated reasons for this. 
First, the CSCI were not actively disseminating information to residents directly. Second, 
there was no compulsion or motivation for the services to actively disseminate the report to 
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residents. Thirdly, residents were not engaged with either the purpose or outcomes of 
inspection so were did not actively request the report. 
 
All of the services held a copy of the report, but in three cases this was kept in the 
manager’s office and in the case of CH 4 pinned to a notice board in the entrance to the 
service. None of the services had any form of residents’ meeting to discuss the report with 
their service users and the outcomes were not actively disseminated. None of the reports 
painted a picture of an excellent service, which may have had some impact on the lack of 
publicity by the managers of the homes. When I asked them about disseminating outcomes 
to residents the managers excused their role in this by portraying resident apathy, as the 
manager of CH 4’s response demonstrates: 
 
‘I don’t think they’d be bothered to be honest, it’s not something they seem to be 
concerned with and none have ever asked to have a look’ (Manager CH 4, 
interview 3) 
 
For their part residents and their relatives were as impassive to the outcomes of the 
inspection as they were to the inspection itself. Only one resident across the four cases 
studies had viewed the report by the end of my data collection, and this was at the request 
of her son. I also interviewed her son and it appeared the Hawthorne effect (Landsberger 
1958) had an influence on his request from the manager to view the report: 
 
‘Yeah he came and asked me for it, he said he’d like to have a look, I think he 
knew you were coming back’ (Manager CH 2, interview 2) 
 
Other residents were indifferent to the findings because they either felt it was irrelevant to 
them:  
 
‘Oh I don’t know about that (the report), I just get on with it, I’m ok that’s what 
that I worry about’ (Resident 1 CH 3, interview 2), 
 
or they were concerned it would be too technical for them to understand and engage with:  
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‘Oh I don’t worry about that, that’s for them to worry about. They know what 
they’re looking for, let them get on with it’ (Resident 3 CH 3, interview 1). 
 
These opinions suggest a prevailing notion of dependency and lack of empowerment, 
which mirrors the findings of the previous chapter. Residents were neither actively 
encouraged to engage with inspection outcomes nor empowered to do so. The lack of 
engagement with both the inspection process and outcomes is a failure of the CSCI as 
much as the service provider or resident. Studies in other fields, such as mental health, 
have shown that an understanding of processes creates concordance with processes rather 
than compliance (Gray, et al. 2002). Concordance is important because it realigns the 
power balance and empowers residents to actively engage with and control the outcomes 
they receive from services. In this study residents clearly showed compliance with both the 
service and inspection.   
 
There was a common theme amongst the residents of devolving decision-making to their 
families, which further compounded a belief in dependency. This passivity extended to 
ensuring the quality of their care: 
 
‘Oh me son worries about that, he looks after me you know, pays the fees and sees 
it’s all alright’ (Resident 3 CH 4, interview 1) 
 
However, aside from one relative in CH 2 no other relatives viewed the inspection report 
over the nine month study period. This lack of engagement was particularly surprising 
considering I was questioning them about inspection and whether they had viewed the 
report. A lack of time was offered as a reason by most relatives and inaction was usually 
justified by contentment at the quality of service, as the son of a resident in CH 4 
explained: 
 
‘I don’t think I need to look at the report, I know that my mum is happy and that 
the care here is good. If I have a problem with something I go and see the manager 
and get it sorted out, but aside from one or two little things like a missing blouse, 
which, lets face it Matthew is going to happen in a big home like this, I’ve had no 
cause for complaint’ (Relative 2 CH 4, interview 3) 
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Surprisingly in CH 1 where two relatives had concerns about care and had been frustrated 
by a lack of progress in improving the service, neither had viewed the report. Relative 2 
had a problem with access because she did not use the Internet and the service were not 
forthcoming with a copy: 
 
‘well I did ask (the manager) for a copy, he sort of brushed me off, said yes, but 
then hasn’t been forthcoming with it. (The inspector) told me I could get it online, 
but I don’t use the Internet’ (Relative 2 CH 1, interview 1) 
 
Relative 3 had concerns about the care but she did not look at the report because of time 
constraints: 
 
‘Oh I haven’t got round to it you know, I guess I know what the issues are anyway’ 
(Resident 3 CH 1, interview 3) 
 
There was a clear lack of engagement with inspection; reports are designed with service 
users in mind but are not being accessed by those who use the service or their relatives.  
 
IMPACT OF INSPECTION OVER TIME 
Satisfaction with service 
During discussions about their experiences of care residents invariably inferred to their 
satisfaction with the service in terms of a concept of happiness. A typical response to 
discussions about their experiences of life in the home resulted in residents professing their 
happiness with the service: 
 
‘Oh I’m happy here they look after me, make sure I’m ok’ (Resident 2 CH 3, 
interview 1) 
 
In the simplest interpretations of the concept happiness infers a persons short-lived state, 
however residents’ used the term to describe it in a sense of life satisfaction and 
satisfaction with service (Donovan. and Halpern 2002). When discussing happiness 
residents focused on the support they received, no matter how limited, and the good things 
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in their life. They tended to dismiss or marginalise the aspects, with which they were less 
happy because they saw these as circumstances of their situation. For example, one 
resident explained: 
 
‘Oh I’m happy, I mean I can’t walk anymore, but I have the DVDs and telly and I 
can’t get out much, cos of me legs but there’s nowt anyone can do about that so I 
can’t worry about it’  (Resident 1 CH 1, interview 2) 
 
Another resident of CH 3 exhibited similar sentiment: 
 
‘Oh I can watch the cars go by here and chat so I’m happy, I mean I cannae walk 
without the frame so I have to be happy with what I can do’ (Resident 3 CH 3, 
interview 1) 
 
In this sense residents’ descriptions of their happiness were always described in the context 
of decay associated with the ageing process. The focus was primarily on physical decay, 
but also in a number of cases residents focused on issues of mental decay, such as loss of 
memory or increased confusion. This data mirrors the findings of previous studies on life 
in care homes (see for example Shaw 1984). 
 
There was very little change in life satisfaction during the longitudinal study period. 
Resident 3 in CH 3 spoke in exactly the same way about her happiness on my third visit, as 
she did during the first: 
 
‘Oh I’m happy, ay, just being here and looked after, with everyone to have a chat 
with. I cannae walk see, so I can’t really go out. Occasionally the staffs take me in 
a wheelchair like, but only when they have time… not very often’ (Resident 3 CH 
3, interview 3) 
 
Inspection had no direct positive influence on residents’ satisfaction during the case studies 
and this is not surprising considering the lack of both direct change to service delivery and 
change in general discussed in Chapter 5. 
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Negative impact of inspection on life satisfaction 
The only reaction to inspection that had a direct effect on residents’ happiness was the 
negative influence of a particular requirement in CH 4. The report required that the service 
stopped allowing residents to have their doors propped open because this practice 
represented a fire risk. This had a negative impact on all three residents I spoke with as 
they felt it created isolation, as Resident 2 explained when I asked about any changes to the 
service: 
 
‘Oh the door has to be shut, that’s the big problem now. I hate being shut in my 
room, I like to see people go by, they stop and chat. See I mean some I know in 
here are on frames and they’re frightened now to stand behind the door case they 
get hit’ (Resident 2, CH 4, interview 2) 
 
The lack of an open door was causing loneliness and exposing a lack of contact with staff, 
as Resident 2’s daughter explained: 
 
‘I mean they don’t even come round to check on them, at least when the door was 
open mum could see people, now she feels like she’s in jail’ (Relative 2 CH 4, 
interview 2) 
 
Although this change had a negative impact on residents the problem could have been 
rectified relatively simply by the service. In order to adhere to fire regulations they were 
required to fix magnets to the bedroom doors that would release if the fire alarm activated. 
However, despite the relatively simple solution the problem had not been addressed for 
this resident by my final visit. The manager explained that the process to install the 
magnets had taken a long time, due to hesitation from the parent company and delays from 
the building company. However, the service had returned to propping Resident 1’s door 
open while they were waiting for installation, risking the prospect of being caught by an 
unannounced inspection6. The service could have used this process to demonstrate 
personalisation by prioritising those residents who liked to keep their doors propped open. 
On my final visit plenty of residents had magnets on their doors, yet they preferred to keep 
them closed. 
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Satisfaction and criticism of service 
It was very obvious that personal satisfaction and criticism co-existed for residents. 
Criticisms were often only implicit in the interviews, and where residents explicitly raised 
problems they had little effect on their satisfaction of the service. Problems were usually 
seen as a foible that they had to accept, often in the context of lower expectations: 
 
‘I have to wait quite a bit for the staff… but, they’re good here and when you get to 
my age and you can’t do things like you used what else can I expect’ (Resident 1 
CH 4) 
 
Judgements about standard of service did not always correlate with satisfaction because of 
varying expectations and aspirations. This finding is similar to that of Rees and Wallace’s 
conclusions when discussing social work: 
 
‘Client evaluations are not simply related to the receiving or not receiving of… 
help… They are related to context, to knowledge of services available, to 
expectations…’ (Rees and Wallace 1982: 72) 
 
The residents provided positive evaluations of the service that were apparently influenced 
by frames of reference. When asked if they were happy with the service they received and 
their life in the home most answered in the affirmative, but when I asked where they would 
like to live all would have preferred to live in their own homes or with family. These 
discrepancies reflect residents’ perceptions of what is possible and what is ideal. The 
reluctance of residents to evaluate the service received can therefore be seen in the context 
of personal norms and expectations. 
 
Residents focus on outputs rather than outcomes  
In the previous chapter I discussed the influence of organisational structure in perpetuating 
ageist culture in services. This was both reified and justified by a focus on outputs rather 
than outcomes for residents. Analysis of interviews with residents suggests residents 
shared the staff focus. During both interviews with the inspector during the site visit and in 
the more in-depth interviews I conducted with residents it became apparent that residents 
tended to focus their evaluation of service performance on outputs rather than outcomes. 
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For example all four services offered a limited amount of activities, typically bingo and 
sing-a-longs, and these were not tailored to residents through consultation, but residents 
did not link these service outputs to outcomes: 
 
‘Well I don’t do a lot, they have bingo and things, but I don’t enjoy that I don’t do 
any of the activities, like. I sort myself out I read and watch the telly… my son 
brings me books from the library’ (Resident 2 CH 4, interview 1) 
 
Similarly residents spoke about a lack of staff and how this related to them having to wait 
to be assisted. But they did not link these directly to outcomes, which were interpreted as 
being the responsibility of the individual, rather than a collective responsibility of the 
service – managers, staff, residents and relatives. Residents focused on contact with friends 
and family to achieve outcomes such as social interaction: 
 
‘(Her son) comes every Wednesday and I look forward to that we have a good chat 
and he helps out here you know. He makes a cup of tea and chats with the staff. He 
sometimes takes me out’ 
 
MN: ‘And what do you like to do during the rest of the week?’ 
 
‘Oh not a lot’ (Resident 1 CH 2, interview 2) 
 
This led to a measurement problem for inspectors because strictly speaking outcomes 
should be measured subjectively based on whether residents feel their needs have been met 
and are ultimately satisfied. 
 
It was often the aspects of their care that residents purposefully marginalised in the 
interviews that gave a sign of areas where the service could improve the lives of residents. 
Seemingly in the context of their feelings of decay and passivity were very reluctant to 
explicitly request or demand action in these areas. I focus on these issues in the next 
section of this chapter to try to determine if there were any changes to the care experienced 
by residents over the case study period. 
 
Prevailing notions of deficit and deficiency 
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Limited expectations meant most resident’s conceptualisation of care was very narrow, 
based on notions of deficit and deficiency in old age. This perception was unanimous 
across the residents interviewed. When I asked about outcomes they thought good quality 
social care should provide they focused almost solely on provision for their physical needs:  
 
‘They have to help me get dressed and with my bath… what else can I expect… if I 
can have my book to read and my friends come in I’m happy’ (Resident 2 CH 4, 
interview 1) 
 
This impression was reflected in the criteria they focused on when discussing well-being 
and satisfaction. Residents emphasised qualities they though society deemed desirable in a 
care home: the environment and processes of physical care, issues that have historically 
been the focus of residential social care, and focused less on mental and emotional well-
being because they were perceived as subjective and individual: 
 
‘Oh well I’ve got a lovely big room, it was originally meant for two people you 
know’ (Resident 1 CH 1, interview 1) 
 
None of the residents spoke of wanting a greater involvement in their care, and when I 
asked directly about this the subject it often was dismissed as unnecessary. Responses from 
residents of CH 2 and 4 represent the passive response to my questioning about further 
involvement in their care: 
 
‘Oh no, I leave that up to them, I wouldn’t like to get involved, they’re the experts 
and know what’s best, no I’m happy with the care they give me’ 
 
‘No they know what they’re doing, they have a hard job, with a lot of residents to 
see and get up in the morning, I have no complaints’ 
 
Services provided within a political lens of new managerialism were supposed to change 
the problem of state-led service provision, which was characterised by public 
bureaucracies that created bureau-professional power over service users and marginalised 
choice and control (Mintzburg 1983). It is clear from data discussed in this chapter and the 
previous chapter that the concept of empowerment has yet to permeate all services and that 
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the technicalisation of the system of provision actually leads to similar types of bureau-
professional hegemony over services that were characteristic of previous public service 
bureaucracies. 
 
The influence of ‘culture of ageism’ on residents  
In devising this research I choose to focus on services that were rated as either ‘poor’ or 
‘adequate’ by the CSCI at the beginning of my case study. The rationale for this was that 
these services are starting from a standard of care that is failing to meet a number of NMS 
and so I hypothesised would receive the greatest impact from inspection and have the 
greatest scope for improvement. 
 
Residents’ views of good quality social care suggest an endemic culture of ageing across 
all four case studies with residents subscribing to ageist attitudes that suggest they are frail 
and dependent. Conversations with residents always touched on frustration at having to 
wait for assistance, but this was tempered by their belief that their dependence was an 
inevitable consequence of their ageing and as such they had to accept the level of service 
they received rather than complain if they felt it was poor: 
 
‘I wish I could just get it myself you see, but I can’t walk anymore, so I have to 
wait for them to help me’ (Resident CH 2, interview 1) 
 
This opinion was ubiquitous across the four cases, where all residents I interviewed felt as 
though they had to make certain compromises and accept that they were in decay, as an 
interviewee in CH 4 describes: 
 
‘well I can’t walk now, me legs have gone, so I have to accept I can’t go out 
much… not in the winter, me daughter will take me into the garden in the summer’ 
(Resident 1 CH 4, interview 1) 
 
The feeling of dependence further compounded residents’ willingness to accept bad 
practice or treatment because they were afraid to complain, either in case it made things 
worse or for fear of upsetting staff on whom they relied.  
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This situation was typified by the residents in CH 1 and 4 whom did not like aspects of the 
way staff treated them but were prepared to accept the treatment because they did not want 
to ‘rock the boat’ and risk upsetting those on whom they felt they were dependent. For 
example, one resident in CH 1 was called ‘Granddad’ by ‘one or two of the staff’ (Resident 
1 CH 1, interview 1) and although he did not particularly like it he put up with it because 
he did not want to ‘rock the boat’, so did not complain. His hesitancy seemed to be the 
result of a lack of empowerment compounded by a negative conception of ageing that had 
resulted in him acquiescing to the very staff who were paid to care for him. 
 
These findings echo Goffman’s concept of the total institution where: 
 
‘… all aspects of life are conducted in the same place and under the same 
authority… each phase of the member’s daily activity is carried out in the 
immediate company of a large batch of others all of whom are treated alike…’ 
(Goffman 1991: 17) 
 
The findings suggest that despite ongoing improvements inspection has failed, both 
practically through system changes and ideologically through new managerial discourse, to 
have sufficient impact on some services to completely eliminate the institutionalisation of 
residents. 
 
A self-perpetuating model of care provision 
As described in the previous chapter this outdated conception of care stemmed from a 
poor, ill informed, service and was self-perpetuating. Residents, and relatives, had low 
expectations because they had not experienced a better model of care. None of the case 
studies exhibited an innovative model of empowerment for residents. Only one resident 
across all four cases had seen her care plan, let alone discussed a plan of care. This was 
telling when considering residents’ responses to my questions about outcomes delivered by 
care services. As residents were not exposed to processes of empowerment they were 
largely unaware of the existence of methods to co-produce their care, so consequently did 
not expect to be empowered.  
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CHANGES RESIDENTS WANTED TO SEE TO THEIR CARE: 
INDICATORS OF IMPACT  
 
During interviews with residents I tried to determine, both through direct questions and 
analysis of their experiences of living in the care home, any changes they would like to see 
to the service. I then followed up the issues raised to see if the service had made the 
changes, and if so if it was possible to determine the reasons for the change.  
 
There were common changes residents wanted to see across the four case studies, so they 
are presented here in themes. There were a number of specific issues or complaints from 
residents that, while different in detail, fall under the same crosscutting theme. In order to 
examine the impact of inspection I describe any case specific changes over time, within the 
thematic analysis. Appendix 8 shows a tabulated service-by-service breakdown of changes 
residents wanted to see and tracks whether these were addressed over the case study 
period. 
 
As residents tended to focus on service outputs in the interviews their focus for change was 
also on outputs. In the interviews I tried to explore how the outputs affected outcomes for 
residents and in this analysis I make these links. 
 
I ensured that at least two of the three the residents I interviewed in each case study also 
spoke with the inspector during the site visit in order to determine if the inspectors had any 
direct influence on individual service users care.  
 
Lack of staff 
Almost all of the residents interviewed during the four case studies felt there was a lack of 
staff. Staff were seen in both a technical sense, as aides to support the physical 
practicalities of daily living, and a point of human contact. Residents’ mainly attributed a 
lack of maintenance and support as the consequence of staff shortages, but it became 
clearer that this issue had wider ramifications in terms of personalisation and associated 
outcomes older people have identified as important: feeling valued, having a say in service 
delivery, control over routine (Glendinning, et al. 2006). 
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The tendency was to speak of the need for an increased number of staff, rather than 
criticising the current staff for not being efficient enough: 
 
‘Oh I think they need more staff, the ones here do such a good job, but they’re run 
off their feet’ (Resident 1 CH 2, interview 1)  
 
‘Oh the staff here are great, they work so hard, I just wish there was more of 
them… it’s for them really, they never sit still you know’ (Resident 2 CH 3, 
interview 1) 
 
The balance between the expectations of residents and resource limitations of the service is 
difficult to judge, as the Line Manager of CH 2 claimed: 
 
‘Residents are always going to want more staff until they have one to one care, 
that’s natural and in an ideal world we’d all like to be able to offer one to one care, 
but the reality is that we can’t, unless you are prepared to pay for it… we do the 
best we can and we do an assessment every 6 months based on Skills for Care 
guidelines’ (Line Manager CH 2, interview 3) 
 
Despite his claim to do regular assessment of staffing levels CH 2 was the only service 
issued with a requirement to re-examine their staff numbers and skills mix. As discussed in 
the previous chapter the Line Manager did not change this because he claimed he regularly 
conducted an assessment of staffing based on Skills for Care guidelines (which were 
endorsed by the CSCI): 
 
‘It’s the agency staff you see, and I accept they don’t always know the residents, 
but what can I do if someone calls in sick? When we have our regular staff on we 
are fine, but I can’t wave a magic wand if one of my staff calls in sick half an hour 
before their shift’ (Line Manager CH 2, interview 3) 
 
This method, which is non-prescriptive, inevitably leads to tensions between inspectors’ 
judgements, managers’ judgements and service users’ views.  
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The two residents in CH 2 spoke of a lack of staff causing long waiting periods for 
assistance during my first visit. This was still a problem by the third data collection point 
and was still clearly having a negative impact on their well-being, mainly in terms of long 
waits for physical assistance: 
 
‘It’s been a bit up and down, there has been quite a shortage of staff and that does 
alter things because they’re late with everything, especially get up in the mornings’ 
(Resident 1 CH 2, interview 3) 
 
‘we have to wait for everything and the agency staff don’t know you or what you 
want or anything so it’s not pleasant at times’ (Resident 2 CH 2, interview 3)  
 
Residents in CH 3 also suggested a lack of staff was leading to lengthy waits for assistance 
to complete necessary daily tasks: 
 
‘Oh I often have to wait a while to get up of a morning it sometimes takes an hour 
from getting up to being ready and down here, there’s not enough staff to do it on a 
morning’ (Resident 1 CH 3, interview 1) 
 
‘Sometimes when I need the toilet they make me wait, I’ve had accidents before 
you know’ (Resident 3 CH 3, interview 1) 
 
These were clearly related to the technical aspect of care rather than providing social 
contact, which in CH 3 residents perceived as being good: 
 
‘I have fun with the carers, a chat you know, I liked to take the micky…if I stayed 
at home I’d be on my own watching traffic… the staffs have always got time for a 
natter, and they often bring in the bairns, which is good like’ (Resident 1 CH 3, 
interview 1) 
 
The inspector of CH 3 did not require a review of staffing levels and there was no change 
during the study period despite residents concerns about the time they had to wait for 
assistance, which, in the example of a resident having to wait so long for the toilet that she 
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wet herself, resulted in unacceptable lapses in the quality of care, which the inspection 
process failed to uncover. 
 
In CH 4 two of the residents I interviewed felt there were lengthy waits for assistance 
when they rang the call alarm, as Resident 3 explained: 
 
‘I do have to wait a long time, they often come in and say, ‘I’ll be with you in a 
minute (Resident’s name)’ and then they don’t come back for over half an hour. I 
often have to ring the bell again’ 
 
MN: ‘Doesn’t it just keep ringing?’ 
 
‘No they come in and switch it off when they check on us’ (Resident 3 CH 4, 
interview 1) 
 
Once again there was no change to staffing levels over the study period. The inspector 
judged the service to have an adequate number of staff with an appropriate skills mix so 
did not require a review of staffing. Unsurprisingly according to the residents the waiting 
times had not changed and they were still regularly waiting quite long periods for the call 
alarm. 
 
In CH 1 where the inspector did not issue a requirement for the staffing levels to be re-
assessed an additional member of staff had been added to the afternoon shift. Two of the 
relatives thought this had made a small difference to the quality of their care: 
 
‘you see they’ve got an extra member of staff on in the afternoon and I think that 
has made things improve slightly… I arrive to her being wet quite a bit less than I 
used to, although it’s still far from perfect, but small steps ey’ (Relative 2 CH 1, 
interview 3) 
 
‘They seem to have a bit more time now. I don’t think they’re as stretched as they 
were but they still don’t have a lot of time to spend with mum, which is to be 
expected I guess there are a lot of residents with a lot of problems here’ (Relative 3 
CH 1, interview 3) 
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Relative 2 had seen small improvement in her mother’s hygiene, which see directly 
attributed to there being more staff in the afternoon. As the inspector made no reference to 
staffing levels the change cannot be attributed to inspection. Relative 2 and 3 felt the 
change had come about because of complaints they had made to the manager. The staff in 
CH1 also felt they had an impact on the change: 
 
‘we’ve got an extra member of staff now… its taken a while. A lot of fighting from 
me and (another staff member). We’ve finally made him (manager) see sense. I 
think some of the relatives have also been working on (the manager), I know 
(Relative 2) has been asking for another one on in the afternoons for a while’ (Staff 
2, interview 3) 
 
However, interviews with staff suggest that the new member of staff simply facilitated a 
continuation of basic levels of care, rather than enhancing the service: 
 
 ‘We’ve finally got an extra member of staff on in the afternoons’ 
 
MN: ‘And that’s made a difference to the service you provide?’ 
 
‘Well it means we can cope, we can toilet them all now whereas it was becoming 
difficult to even do that before’ (Staff 1 CH 1, interview 3) 
 
The evidence from staff was also supported by resident 1’s (CH 1) experience. At the 
beginning of the study he complained that: 
 
‘(I) hardly ever see a member of staff except when they bath me or bring me my 
food’ (Resident 1 CH 1, interview 1) 
 
After nine months he felt this had not really changed despite the additional afternoon staff 
member: 
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‘I still have days when I might only see them when they come to do things for me, 
you know they never just come to say hello or for a chat…’ (Resident 1 CH 1, 
interview 3) 
 
The data suggests the extra member of staff had eased the burden of care, but had failed to 
increase the amount of social contact staff had with residents.  
 
The findings suggest questions about the appropriateness of CSCI guidelines on staffing 
levels and whether there is enough investigation into the ability of staffing levels to fulfil 
the demands of the service users. The levels of waiting described in all services was often 
lengthy and clearly a cause of distress to residents. Despite this fact only one service was 
issued with a requirement to review staffing levels, which the manager ignored as he felt 
he was already doing so. 
 
Poor personalisation 
Residents did not talk directly about the planning of their care but a number of their direct 
grievances were the result of lack of personalisation and planning. This theme spanned the 
four case studies and was represented by a number of different issues. 
 
Lack of consultation 
In a clear sign of poor personalisation and care planning in CH 1 Resident 1 felt he had to 
drink a cup of tea everyday: 
 
‘Sometimes I don’t really want a tea but I don’t like to say no, cos once or twice I 
have and they haven’t brought me another one for a while’ (Resident 1 CH 1, 
interview 1) 
 
Rather surprisingly the same problem was experienced by Resident 1 of CH 4, as we 
discussed during the first interview: 
 
 MN: Shall we stop talking for a while so you can drink your tea? 
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 ‘Aye I suppose we should, I don’t really want it like, but I’d better drink it’ 
 
 MN: ‘why not just leave it?’ 
 
 ‘Nor cos then they’ll think I don’t want it and stop bringing it’ 
 
 MN: ‘Has that happened before?
 
 
‘Oh aye and then it took me ages to catch a carer at the right time to tell her I 
wanted one at 10 o’clock’   (Resident 1 CH 4, interview 1) 
 
Neither issue had been resolved by the end of the study – both residents were still stoically 
drinking their tea every morning. There was no evidence of improved care planning in 
either case. The inspection report for CH 4 did not contain a requirement for improved care 
planning, so no change was required by the inspector and the manager claimed there had 
been no changes made to care plans during the study period. However, the inspector of CH 
1 did issue a requirement that care plans were improved, but the resident did not notice any 
change in service: 
 
 ‘Oh no they never ask me if I want a tea, they just bring it’ 
 
 MN: ‘And is that ok?’ 
 
‘Well I sometimes don’t want it but I drink it anyway cos when I’ve said no in the 
past they have stopped bring it for a while, and most days I do want a cup’ 
(Resident 1 CH 1, interview 3) 
 
Residents’ experiences mirror findings in the previous chapter which show that there had 
been no changes to care plans during the study period, although the manager of CH 1 
claimed to be in the process of hiring someone to help re-develop them during my last visit 
to the service. A simple change like asking residents if they wanted a cup of tea each day 
rather than assuming could be made very easily, but despite requiring care plans to be 
reviewed there was no change to residents’ experience of service. The impact of the report 
was not sufficient to induce changes to working practices to improve personalisation. 
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In a further example of poor personalisation Resident 1 of CH 4 also wanted the 
opportunity to take part in some of the activities the service offered. She had developed a 
reputation for preferring to stay in her room during the day because she did not want to sit 
with the other residents or play bingo. However, occasionally the home hosted a sing-a-
long, which she was often not even told about because staff presumed she would not want 
to attend: 
 
 ‘… well they occasionally have a sing-a-long, but they never tell me about it’ 
 
 MN: ‘Would you like to go to that?’ 
 
 ‘Well I would aye, but they never tell me’ (Resident 1 CH 4, interview 1) 
 
As with the lack of personalised planning for her mid-morning drink this issue had not 
been resolved by the end of the study and she was still not attending any of the activities 
the home put on. There was a clear clash of regime cultures in the way homes addressed 
these issues through an organisational routine - a notice or mass announcement – but the 
residents respond as individuals and expected to be notified personally.  
 
A lack of personalisation was also experienced by Resident 1 of CH 2, who felt she had to 
fit in with the routine of the service and go to bed at eight o’clock every night. She was 
never asked by staff if she was ready to go to bed, but simply taken to her room as part of 
the bedtime routine: 
 
 ‘I have to go to bed at eight you see’ 
 
MN: ‘And would you prefer to stay up later?’ 
 
‘Well maybe sometimes 
 
There was no change to this routine over the study period. The resident had made a 
decision to go along with the routine rather than request to stay up later on occasion: 
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 ‘Oh I’m sure I could ask to stay up later, but I don’t want to cause a problem you 
see, they’re busy enough as it is’ (resident 1 CH 2, interview 3) 
 
As well as a lack of personalisation in care planning by the home there was also a clear 
lack of empowerment of residents across the four services. The services were still 
exhibiting a rigidity of routine and process of block treatment that Goffman found in the 
1950s (Goffman, 1991). Further evidence of institutionalisation is demonstrated by the fact 
that not one resident in any of the four case studies was prepared to make a direct 
complaint to the service about an issue of personalisation. However, both insisted they 
would speak up if there was a more ‘serious’ issue,  such as physical mistreatment, but not 
on a matter of personalisation. As the Resident 2 in CH 4 explained: 
 
‘well I’m not going to rock the boat, its not that important. I’ll just keep quiet about 
it haha, its only a cup of tea…’ 
 
MN: ‘So you don’t complain if you have problem with the service?’ 
 
‘Oh if they shouted at me or treated me bad like, I’d tell the manager yeah’  
(Resident 2 CH 4, interview 1) 
 
The residents showed a clear hierarchy in their perception of care services, with support for 
keeping alert and active regarded as less important than assistance with physical care or 
safety. The other services, like being brought a cup of tea were regarded as ‘extras’, 
provided generously by busy staff, but not a right. 
 
Lack of choice of food 
Previous research by Cass et al (2006) and the CSCI (2006a) have shown how much 
importance older people place on mealtimes, and according to a report by the CSCI they 
are often ‘the highlight of the day’ (CSCI 2006a: 3). A choice of food is one of the ways in 
which CSCI judge if service users are being offered choice and control. 
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In support of this evidence where there was a lack of choice offered in CH 1 and CH 3 
residents wanted to see improvement because they valued meal times highly. In CH 1 the 
lack of choice particularly upset Resident 1: 
 
‘It’s always bloody sandwiches for tea, I get sick of sandwiches. It’s never anything 
hot… I get (his daughter) to bring me food in the evenings sometimes cos I get so 
sick of sandwiches’ (Resident 1 CH 1, interview 1) 
 
A lack of choice and control about her food was also an issue for Resident 2, but as a series 
of extracts from the three interviews show, she exhibited resilience by finding a way to 
cope with the problem: 
 
Interview 1 
 ‘I never had a banana this morning’ 
 
 MN: ‘Oh really and you usually do?’ 
 
‘We have a cup of tea, bread and butter and a banana. I’ve got it all in me little 
book, me diary. It’s all what I had for me meals you see’ 
 
 MN: ‘Oh so do they ask you what you would like?’ 
 
 ‘No I just go back a week, its nearly always the same, but no banana today’ 
 
Interview 2 
 MN: ‘So do you still keep a food diary?’ 
 
 ‘Oh yes’ 
 
 MN: ‘And is it still more or less the same every week?’ 
 
 ‘Yeah, usually’ 
 
 MN: And nobody comes to ask you what you would like? 
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 ‘No, I just check in me diary’ 
 
Interview 3 
MN: ‘So do you still keep a food diary?’ 
 
‘Yeah I do’ 
 
MN: ‘And is it still more or less the same every week?’ 
 
 ‘Yeah, I like to be able to check you see, so I know what I’m having’ 
 
 MN: Do you ever wish it would change? 
 
‘Well sometimes, but I like to know what I’m getting see. I can just look in me 
diary’       (Resident 2 CH 1) 
 
The resident clearly would have liked to have been told about her food menu for the day, 
and as the extract from the third interview shows she would have liked to have a choice, 
but the repetitiveness of the weekly menu meant she was able to develop a coping method 
to find out what her food was likely to be that day. In the final interview she admitted she 
would like more choice. The fact that she also kept a diary suggests the service was failing 
to keep her informed and certainly failed to offer her any choice over the food she 
received. The tendency to find coping solutions in response to poor outcomes around 
personalisation was a feature in the case studies and one which inspections failed to have 
any impact on improving. 
  
CH 3 also offered a lack of flexibility in food provision specifically in relation to Resident 
2’s diabetes: 
 
‘You know just occasionally I’d like a cream cake for desert like the others, but 
they say I’m not allowed cos of me diabetes. Well I’ve had it for twenty five year 
(sic) and I know I can have a cream cake sometimes… I’m the one who the nurse 
comes to see to check me blood sugar’ 
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This paternalistic control was incredibly frustrating for the resident, who felt she could 
manage her diabetes herself given her long experience of living with the condition. This 
had not changed by the end of the case study period, as she still felt as though she was 
being denied an occasional treat: 
 
‘Oh no I’m still not allowed me cakes, they say they’re no good for me but I’d like 
the occasional one’ (Resident 2 CH 3, interview 3) 
 
Lack of activities / stimulation 
Residents across the cases complained about having a lack of things to do: 
 
‘Oh I’d like to be able to do more, get out and go to the shops or have a walk, but 
it’s these things see (points to legs). I can’t walk very far and I need this (pointing 
to walking frame)’ (Resident 1 CH 4, interview 1) 
 
or getting bored 
 
‘Oh I get bored quite a lot, we have a telly there but I don’t really watch it, I’m 
partially sighted you see…’ (Resident 2 CH 2, interview 1) 
 
Academic studies show boredom is a key facet of care home life because residents are 
usually restricted in their mobility, which often limits the amount they can do for 
themselves (Hoe, et al. 2006). This is why the CSCI places an emphasis on the service 
providing activities and stimulation. Of all the residents interviewed across the case studies 
only one resident from CH 3 (Resident 3) did not claim to get bored or express the desire 
for more activities to be provided by the service. 
 
These complaints were not explicitly directed at service failings, but rather once again 
focused on perceived and real notions of disability and decay in older age: 
 
‘... I can’t do much you see so I just sit here and talk to people, when they come in’ 
(Resident 2 CH2, interview 1) 
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This depression and resignation associated with her old age also frustrated her son: 
 
‘we’d love for he to come home for a visit but she won’t, on the basis it will upset 
her… I can’t fault the staff I mean they try, but there is a limited amount they can 
do’ (Relative 2 CH 2, interview 1) 
 
MN: ‘Do you think they do enough?’ 
 
‘I’m not sure what else they could do if mum is unwilling’ 
 
However, the resident admitted she might have joined in with some of the activities had 
the service been more proactive at including her. She spent her days in a small communal 
room that was not used for activities: 
 
‘I’m not bothered about the bingo and sing-a-longs. I don’t see them so I’m not 
bothered’ 
 
 MN: ‘But what about if they did them in this room?’ 
 
‘Oh well I might do them, but I’m not bothered really’ (Resident 2 CH 2, interview 
2) 
 
The resident had settled for this situation and because she was frustrated at the physical 
decay of her body and felt it was something that she should endure. The service had made 
limited attempts to include her further but had not managed to find an innovative way to 
encourage her inclusion. Despite this the inspector of CH 2 judged the provision of 
activities to be good and there was no improvement over the case study period. 
 
Resident 2 in CH 3 had a specific complaint that she was not being included in activities 
because she was partially sighted and therefore could not play dominos or bingo. The 
inspector made a requirement for there to be more done for partially sighted residents, but 
Resident 2 felt nothing had changed since the inspection: 
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‘Oh nah, they’re not doing anything for me like, they still play bingo and I’d like to 
join in, but how can I when I can’t see the card?’ (Resident 2 CH 3, interview 3) 
 
Resident 1 of CH 4 were also left frustrated by the unimaginative activities that did not 
appeal to her and consequently meant she spent a lot of time in her room: 
 
‘Nah, they bore me all the things they do, I’d prefer to stay here and read or watch 
the telly… oh I used to do a lot in my last place (a supported living facility), darts, 
carpet bowls, I used to love carpet bowls, but they don’t do it here’ 
 
MN: ‘Have they ever asked you what you might like to play?’ 
 
‘Nah I just let them get on with it, others like what they do’ 
 
And this did not change over the case study period: 
 
‘Oh nah we haven’t played anything like that, I like to just sit and read, or watch 
the telly’ (Resident 1 CH 4, interview 3) 
 
As with CH 2 the inspector judged the provision of activities to be good in CH 4, so there 
was no requirement to improve this aspect of care from the CSCI. 
 
There were some signs of improvement in activities and stimulation in CH 1, where the 
inspector issued a requirement that activities were reviewed. In the first round of 
interviews Relative 2 thought her mother, who could no longer verbally communicate after 
a stroke, was neither mentally nor physically stimulated: 
 
‘I don’t think they do enough to keep mum ticking over, you know, rather than just 
letting her sit there. It would be nice if they had a bit more time to talk to her or do 
something with her’ (Relative 2 CH 1, interview 1) 
 
As a result of the requirement an activities co-ordinator had been appointed on a part-time 
basis and there were noticeable, but limited improvements: 
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‘Well there does seem to be a bit more going on now, things like catch ball. Its 
quite limited but it’s a start and mum joins in which is good’ (Relative 1 CH 1, 
interview 3) 
 
‘This new activities person does try to spend some time with residents, especially 
those who can’t do a lot like mum’ (Relative 2 CH 1, interview 3) 
 
Instances where residents attribute changes to inspection: Inspectors 
intervening directly in specific cases 
Over the course of the four case studies there were only two instances where an individual 
resident identified inspection as having a direct impact on their care. These were both 
instances where the inspector intervened directly on a specific issue of poor care.  
 
The first occurred in CH 3 when the inspector spoke to the manager about a direct 
complaint a resident made about a particular member of staff whom she felt did not treat 
her with enough respect. This was dealt with by the manager and the resident was happy 
the staff member had improved by the third point of my data collection.  
 
The second direct intervention came in CH 1 where the service was neglecting to replace a 
resident’s asthma medication despite the residents persistent questioning. The inspector 
spoke to the manager about this during the inspection and it was resolved quickly, although 
the residents’ daughter also spoke to the manager about the issue. As it was a medication 
issue I asked the inspector why this failing had not resulted in a direct requirement issued 
in the report. The inspector claimed that because the resident’s asthma medication was 
self-administered he would only speak to the manager and ask him to resolve the problem, 
if it had been part of the medication the service was responsible for dispensing he would 
have issued an immediate requirement to the home. 
 
Frustration at lack of change from relatives 
In CH 1, where there had been a history of missed requirements over a number of 
inspections, relatives were disillusioned with inspection and it’s lack of power to enforce: 
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‘I just don’t think they make sure that what he says should be done has got to be 
done… (the inspector) is very good but I suppose his hands are tied… the 
government should have more weight’ (Relative 2 CH 1, interview 1) 
 
‘I’ve told the inspector before about my problems and nothing changes, they 
(inspectors) don’t seem to do anything’ (Relative 3 CH 1, interview 1) 
 
Relatives in CH 1 had a number of issues regarding the number of staff on duty, the 
attitude of the manager and his ability to make improvements and although they had not 
viewed inspection reports, as far as they were concerned there had been no impact from 
previous inspections. By the end of the study small changes were beginning to occur in 
terms of improved communication but these had only been small. They clearly attributed 
this to a lack of enforcement ‘power’ to force change. 
 
A paucity of impact on residents 
Analysis of the data suggests there are four ways in which inspection can induce change: 
1. Indirect influence on outcomes, through changes to the ‘culture of practice’ 
2. Indirect influence on outcomes, through inducing changes to paperwork and 
changes in process. 
3. Direct intervention to improve outcome(s) for all residents as the result of a 
particular general failing, e.g. medication. 
4. Direct intervention to improve outcome(s) as a result of an individual’s complaint 
at time of inspection or bad practice uncovered by the inspector. 
 
As I have described through this chapter the impact of inspection in each case study was 
relatively limited. At first this seemed surprising considering the homes were rated as 
either ‘poor’ or ‘adequate’ by the CSCI and therefore were identified as in need of 
immediate improvement. There appeared to be a number for reasons for this paucity.  
 
First, most of the requirements to improve issued by inspectors fell under ‘indirect 
influence on outcomes’ and therefore had a limited direct effect on residents. They were 
related to the process of running a care home: paperwork or environment issues. Changes 
in these areas needed time to produce direct changes visible to service users. An example 
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was the change in attitude of the manager of CH 1 by the third data point. This had no 
discernable immediate effect on residents’ care. However, there was an indirect effect in 
terms of improved listening and consultation by the manager of CH 1, and this change was 
noticed and appreciated by residents and relatives. The staff I spoke with at the third point 
of data collection thought that small improvements in communication had improved the 
atmosphere in the home which had in turn meant staff were happier and working better as 
a team: 
 
‘…yeah… I mean it’s been small and there’s… he’s still got a long way to go with 
how he talks to us, but it’s definitely got better, he’s now listening to us about 
things… and for example we now have an extra member of staff on in the 
afternoon, when before there only sometimes used to be one for two hours between 
2pm and 4pm there is now two and sometimes three’ (Staff 1 CH 1, interview 3) 
 
This method of indirect change is increasingly the predominant method of improvement 
for the CSCI, as it evolves into a system with a greater emphasis on audit – checking the 
systems are in place on the premise that with the right systems services will provide high 
quality care. This rationale is clearly not working as the CSCI would like because, 
certainly in services performing poorly against the standards, it is not fostering the level of 
improvement care home residents would like.  
 
Secondly, the inspection process had a limited impact on the culture of practice within the 
services. It appeared that without this embedding of good practice through persuasion and 
education the services were failing improve the process of care. As discussed in the 
previous chapter services were resistant to change because the management either 
disagreed with the judgement of the inspector, did not have the knowledge to carry out the 
changes, or did not have (or would not spend) the resources to make the change. Without 
the embedding of prevailing notions of good practice more direct changes were resisted by 
the services because they were seen as unnecessary.  
 
Thirdly, the changes residents wanted to see did not always tally with inspector’s 
judgements. This was particularly the case with residents concerns about the lack of staff. 
The issue of staffing was far from clear-cut and represented an aspect of inspection where 
inspectors would not directly intervene, but instead ask the service to review their current 
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plans. In the case of CH 2, where this requirement was issued, the manager simply chose to 
ignore the requirement because he felt they were already reviewing staffing levels 
appropriately. As there was no direct judgement on the acceptability of the current level 
the manager felt able to simply ignore the requirement and that at the next inspection he 
would argue that the service had regular staff reviews.  
 
Fourth, the inspector failed to uncover service user complaints. This was particularly the 
case with some of the issues of personalisation and was related to residents’ hesitancy to be 
open with the inspector and the relatively short amount of time inspectors have to speak 
with residents. 
 
CONCLUSION 
It was clear that service users and relatives knew very little and in most cases nothing at all 
about the CSCI. This finding alone poses an immediate difficulty for one of the central 
policy platforms of the CSCI, underpinned by a concept of active citizenship: that it should 
enhance service users’ involvement in the social care process, and should make decision-
making about quality more transparent. Neither of these aspirations has been delivered thus 
far by the CSCI. Indeed, there is some evidence that, ironically, it may have led to some 
loss of user engagement and involvement. This may be due partly to the fact that service 
users view the CSCI as complex and time consuming, and feel marginalised by outdated 
concepts of ageing that suggest they should be grateful and passive recipients of care rather 
than empowered to effect decisions about the provision they receive. It is also partly that 
inspection appears to have relatively little direct impact on service users; either not 
focusing on the outcomes they see as important or making very little difference to their 
experience of care home life.  
 
There is a body of literature, including research done by the CSCI itself (CSCI, et al. 
2006), that suggests ageism still exists within many older peoples services, despite work by 
the government, national regulator and workforce regulator (General Social Care Council). 
The findings in this study suggest that inspection by the CSCI, as the national regulator, 
has failed to induce improvements in the organisational culture of the service providers. 
Despite an ideological political shift in recent decades towards provision built on new 
managerial foundations that emphasise choice and control through service user 
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empowerment has yet to filter through to real service user control or empowerment in 
these case study services.  
 
The implementation of these policy and cultural changes to provision might affect changes 
in the expectations of residents living within the care homes by exposing them to 
opportunities to exert choice and control as stakeholders able to contribute to the 
community rather than being passively resigned to decay and dependency in old age, but 
this cannot be judged using data from these case studies. 
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CHAPTER 7: THE CHARACTERISTICS GOOD QUALITY 
INSPECTION? 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter follows on from the conclusions of the systematic review, and examines the 
facets of good quality inspection through the synthesis of themes from the previous two 
chapters and additional analysis of interview data from across the stakeholder groups.  
 
Hood et al (1999b) developed Green and Welsh’s (1988) cybernetic theory to analyse 
organisational control processes into a theoretical framework to test the usefulness of 
inspection of public service agencies. They divide inspection into three distinct elements: 
the director, which sets the standards and protocols; the detector, which gathers the 
information; and the effector, which modifies behaviour. This model provides a useful way 
to frame the data to determine stakeholder views on good quality inspection, how it could 
be improved and identify any tensions that exist within the system. 
 
DIRECTION: ORGANISATIONAL INFLUENCE 
The role of the CSCI as the ‘director’ of regulatory policy, working in conjunction with the 
Department of Health has been explored in the literature review of this thesis. This director 
influence in terms of internal CSCI policy development was a key source of tension during 
the interviews because the modernising policies of Inspecting for Better Lives (IBL) (CSCI 
2005a) were being introduced during the early part of my case studies (April 2007). 
Documents such as the Inspection Record (IR), and the Key Lines of Regulatory 
Assessment (KLORA) guidelines, which prescribe the way judgements should be made 
against the national standards, and the new Annual Quality Assurance Assessment 
(AQAA) had all recently been implemented. This led to criticism about technical aspects 
of inspection and questions about the implications this modernising agenda had for the 
goals and purpose of the regulator. 
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The role of inspection 
Data from this study, in agreement with other literature (see for example Hudson 2006), 
has already established that the broad goals of inspection are correct. Questions regarding 
the function of the CSCI led me to ask whether the various stakeholders thought the 
government should have a role in holding services accountable and ensuring they operate 
for the safety and well-being of their residents. The answer was obviously ‘yes’, with none 
of the stakeholders I interviewed believing inspection was unnecessary. In fact all four 
managers were keen that inspection should continue despite their grievances with both the 
process and outcomes. They felt it legitimised their service in the eyes of the public and 
provided a safety net to protect against bad care. The CSCI serves to give the public 
confidence in the system of care, despite evidence from this study that suggests they do not 
read reports or other CSCI publications. This point was highlighted by the regulation 
manager of CH 1: 
 
‘Of course they want us to keep inspecting, it legitimises what they do and keeps 
the public thinking things are safe’ (RM CH 2) 
 
The role of the regulator in the reassurance of the public was proven by the responses of 
residents and relatives in the study, who when asked about the need for inspection, tended 
to say:  
 
‘I think there should definitely be inspection ‘cos who’s going to know if 
everything’s right unless they come and look’ (Resident 3 CH 3, interview 1) 
 
Justification of its role 
The priorities of an inspectorate are partly self-fulfilling, driven by its own goals and 
interests and those of the policy makers it serves. They also inevitably have to justify the 
belief that inspection is a worthwhile exercise. The CSCI had to justify its worthiness and 
progress to parliament each year (CSCI 2009) by making claims of improvement amongst 
the services it regulated. This point was raised as a complaint by managers and staff across 
the case studies who felt that some of the paperwork was only necessary to satisfy the 
CSCI rather than have any positive effect on the service: 
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‘I mean I really think we’re getting to the stage now where I’m questioning whether 
we’re actually running this home for the service users or the inspectors’ (Manager 
CH 3, interview 3) 
 
‘…I’ve actually had residents complain about the changes we’ve made in response 
to the report, and I want to see what (the inspector) says when I tell him this next 
time. I mean I thought inspection was for the residents, so if they don’t like the 
changes what’s the point in them Matthew?’ (Manager CH 1, interview 3) 
 
A similar complaint has been levelled at other public service inspectorates, notably Ofsted, 
the schools and children’s services inspectorate, who have been accused of inspecting and 
enforcing standards around managerial targets that are clearly to the detriment of learning 
(Lupton 2005). It was clear from interviews with inspectors, managers and staff that some 
standards were to the detriment of residents’ care, for example the increased amount of 
paperwork clearly reduced the time staff could spend engaging with and caring for 
residents. There is a clear case for documented audit trail to ensure accountability and 
safety. However, the evidence from these case studies suggests this has reached an extent 
where it is becoming detrimental to care. 
 
From inspection to audit: The shift to risk based inspection in the name of modernisation 
The CSCI has been working towards a model of regulation based on risk assessment since 
its inception. The idea is that inspections are targeted based on a record of performance 
and not all services are at equal risk of performance failure. As the Regulation Manager of 
CH 2 explains: 
 
‘I mean it makes sense to target the services that have a poor record and are 
therefore quite rightly thought of as a higher risk… in a world where we have less 
resources targeting comes into play’ (RM, CH 2) 
 
This lighter-touch approach is led by the data from previous reports and reviewing regular 
management and quality assurance data, which is provided in the form of a new self-
assessment AQAA that was introduced just as I began my case studies in April 2007 
(which meant it had not been used by the inspectorate at that point). The inspectors are 
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tasked with examining this data and looking out for any warning signs or ‘triggers’, which 
might signal the need for an inspection. In the case of services rated ‘good’ or ‘excellent’ 
an inspection might only be every third year unless data from the AQAA, or complaints 
flags the need for an earlier site visit. 
 
This risk-based system was only introduced in 2007, rather than at inception, because the 
CSCI needed a period of ‘bedding in’ to understand the field and create a baseline for 
services. Only once there was a history of inspection and an accurate quality rating in place 
that can be traced over a number of years could the risk-based inspection be introduced: 
 
‘We couldn’t have done it (self-assessment) any sooner or we’d have no decent 
data on which to base the risk assessment calculations’ (Inspector CH 2) 
 
All of the inspectors expressed a concern about what they saw as a gradual shift towards 
auditing rather than inspecting. They saw the increasing amount of time they had to spend 
looking at paperwork during and inspection as indicative of this shift: 
 
‘I mean with the new changes we’re moving from an inspection, where we spend 
time looking at the service to an audit where all we do is look at paperwork, and 
that’s the way its going to go further with the AQAA and new link inspector 
system’ (Inspector CH3) 
 
By ‘auditing’ the inspectors were inferring a streamlined process that focused on 
examining and checking the accuracy of records, rather than an examination of the whole 
service, which they saw as the purpose of ‘inspection’.  
 
The inspectors had three main concerns about the shift towards a system of regulation with 
a greater emphasis on audit. The first came from a position of self-preservation, in that 
they feared that scaling back of inspections might lead to job losses within the units and at 
the time of my data collection this was a real concern amongst inspectors: 
 
‘We’re just not sure that it (shift to inspection every 3 years for best services) will 
happen... erm… but there is a real worry that there might be scaling back’ 
(Inspector CH 1) 
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The fears latterly transpired to be untrue (with losses being the result of retirement or staff 
leaving) but were a real concern during the early part of the case studies. This was a real 
and current anxiety for inspectors, which had an influence over their criticisms of the 
process. 
 
The second concern was one of a decrease in the quality of service as a result of a change 
in the system of inspection. The inspectors were afraid that a shift to regulation with an 
increased audit element, at the expense of site visits, would compromise the quality of 
services, which the inspectors felt they had been making great strides to improve. 
Inspectors of CH 3 and 4 talked negatively of the differences between what they saw as 
‘assessing’ and ‘inspecting’: 
 
‘Assessing isn’t enough; we need to be out there with the people who matter. They 
need to know we’re out there and we need to know we can make them improve. I 
think we’ve taken a step back, especially now we don’t handle complaints’ 
(Inspector CH 3) 
 
Inspectors felt these changes represented a further step away from compliance-based 
approaches and with it any chance of working with services to help them improve: 
 
‘I mean my tendency has always been to talk with the services and give them 
advice, that’s what we used to do in the old days, but things have changed now and 
were not allowed to do that’ (Inspector CH 4) 
 
The changes clearly made inspectors feel their skills and professionalism was undervalued: 
 
‘Its changed an awful lot in the last 12 months… currently I inspect, but whether 
that will remain my role I don’t know. I think I will be assessing data rather than 
inspecting in the near future’ (Inspector CH 1) 
 
There was a clear shift from inspection focusing predominantly on site visits to being 
based at a desk assessing paperwork. The prospect of assessing provoked thoughts of 
Braverman’s (1975) concept ‘de-skilling’, especially when coupled with the prescription 
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over judgements introduced by KLORA. This prospect was anathema to the inspectors in 
all four case studies and the inspector of CH 1 even suggested he would leave his job: 
 
‘A lot of our role has been taken away now in terms of registration, not attending 
adult protections. My role is a lot more boring now… I’m not sure I’ll stick it out if 
it changes as much as it looks like it will’ (Inspector CH 1) 
 
Concerns voiced by the inspectors reflect the wider debate about the role of the regulator 
and whether it should be a universal inspector, annually visiting each service irrespective 
of previous quality rating, or whether it should shift towards a more risk-based approach 
that uses past data, self-assessment (AQAA) and other statistical tools to identify risks and 
act appropriately.  
 
The consensus of opinion was frustration at a shift towards what Power (1999) terms 
‘ritualistic verification’, where the pattern of inspection is legitimised through standardised 
processes that produce consistent performance measures. In creating this functioning 
inspectors felt that the CSCI was losing sight of the goals of inspection. As Power (1999) 
explains: 
 
‘Even though audit files are created, checklists get completed and performance is 
measured and monitored in even more elaborate detail, audit concerns itself with 
auditable form rather than substance’ (Power 1999: 96) 
 
The inspectors believed money to the primary reason for the shift, before any notion of 
more efficient or effective working. As the inspector of CH 4 rhetorically answered to a 
question about the changes: 
 
‘Well its all about money isn’t it? At the moment I am frightened by the way it is 
going… KLORA is directing our judgements so we will always have to choose 
from a written judgement and I want to retain mine, not choose from judgements 
written by other people’ (Inspector CH 4) 
 
Inspectors’ views are supported by analysis of CSCI budgetary data. Under a directive 
from the Department of Health the CSCI adopted a three-year financial strategy in 
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conjunction with IBL, resulting in £7351000 of budgetary cuts in 2006-2007 and the 
number of inspections dropping from 41599 to 23351, leading to £12527000 of savings in 
2007 - 08, with a reduction in the number of inspectors from 1994 to 1844 between 2007 
and 20087. 
 
Inspectors all spoke of being drawn to their previous work as social workers or nurses 
because of the relational and caring aspects of the work and they used this same rationale 
to justify their role as inspectors. This has been found in other recent studies of social work 
practitioners (see Carey 2003). Inspectors, like social workers, have to meet organisational 
demands, which have only increased with modernisation and commercialisation of these 
services. These demands have led to a decrease in the relational aspects of their work, 
certainly in terms of working in partnership with service providers and put their 
professional ethos at odds with the modernisation agenda of the CSCI. This situation had 
clearly created dilemmas for inspectors as they have a tendency to want to help and assist 
services based on their tacit knowledge and experience, but are constrained by the 
bureaucratic and hierarchical settings within the CSCI. While the modernisation agenda of 
the CSCI has clearly forced change and specific instances of deprofessionalisation there is 
also an element of the inspectors’ reactions to changes that are similar to complaints in 
other bureaucratic professions across the private and public sectors (Bell, et al. 2008), 
which suggests most bureaucratic change is met with unease by staff. 
 
Consistency at the expense of professional expertise? 
Historically social care inspectorates have exhibited huge inconsistency across England 
(see data synthesis in SR, Chapter 2). In response to this one of the key goals of the Care 
Standards Act 2000 was to ensure all services were checked against the same standards 
and were asked to achieve the same quality of care. There is an inevitable tension between 
‘levelling up’ of services nationally to a set of universal standards and the need to take into 
account local diversity. The director element of the CSCI has invested heavily in training 
and manuals in an attempt to standardise both the process (methods) of inspection and 
judgements of outcomes. This high level of standardisation aims to minimise variable 
judgements and competencies. My interviews with inspectors suggest that this investment 
has had the desired effect and the inspectors were conscious of ensuring they were being as 
consistent as possible: 
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‘… the issue with us now is being consistent, and that’s across England not just in 
our office… (and) I think that’s right I mean each home service should have to 
work to the same rules (Inspector CH 3, interview 2) 
 
Inspectors had, in the main, accepted (although not agreed with) the idea that consistency 
should supersede any calls for leniency or exceptions as the result of local issues. The 
inspector of CH 3 did offer leniency to the service she was inspecting, but only around the 
minor issue of allowing them to find a safety certificate, which they had misplaced. She 
reasoned to me, without prompting, that this is one of the few areas she would be lenient. 
In contrast the inspector of CH 4 would not allow the manager to retrieve certificates from 
the Head Office of the parent company. These decisions are marginal judgements, made at 
the edge of what is prescribed or acceptable. Inevitably these decision will therefore 
involve some human agency no matter how standardised the process becomes. 
 
Although they accepted the need for consistency there were still tensions in the eyes of all 
four inspectors between a high level of standardisation and the fact that this was often ill-
suited to the complexity of real-life situations. If it is going to be consistent across the 
board, inspection will inevitably be unreasonable sometimes in the face of unique local 
conditions. This situation was particularly prevalent in case studies 1 and 3 where the 
manager / owners felt there was a lack of understanding regarding the financial and 
organisational constraints of their independent status. 
 
In seeking consistency the CSCI inevitably have to be prescriptive in their judgement 
guidelines and in their protocols that govern inspectors’ actions and remit. Under previous 
inspection regimes problem solving occurred at the local level, either by an inspector 
independently, or a group of inspectors discussing a particular course of action. This 
‘street-level bureaucracy’ (LIpskey 1983) was a feature of old local inspection regimes and 
the inspector of CH 4 looked back on it as being effective, especially in terms of fostering 
compliance through a sense of partnership and encouragement: 
 
‘You see before we would give them a bit of advice like, it was a more helpful role, 
and personally I think that was better… er we got them to do more you see’ 
(Inspector CH 4, interview 1) 
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Accepting the erosion of local-level autonomy was difficult for all four inspectors, who 
had all worked in previous local inspection regimes and thought that the flexibility of 
making local-level judgements was valuable. 
 
This move towards constancy inevitably meant that some of the benefits of local inspection 
systems were lost, the main one being the ability of the inspector to work constructively 
with a service locally and being able to use their judgement to give leeway or make 
allowances in the hope that the service will improve without support. It appears that the 
main problem for the inspectors was that the CSCI had stopped them from working with 
the home to build on strengths. Instead it only allowed them limited punitive sanctions 
with which to force improvement, rather than using the notions of partnership and 
assistance that they valued as local inspectors.  
 
Director control over judgements: KLORA guidelines 
KLORA guidelines have standardised the criteria under which inspectors make their 
judgements against the NMS. They have made comparing judgements across England 
more consistent, which is one of the key aims of the regulatory project (CSCI 2009). The 
NMS have allowed the CSCI to demonstrate improvements in quality across services, as 
the manager of CH 3 pointed out: 
 
‘The stats will tell you it’s improved things, I mean there are less poor homes now’ 
(Inspector CH 3) 
 
There is some contention over whether the MNS and KLORA guidelines simply serve to 
reify the CSCI and inspection by showing improvement against the standards but not 
necessarily improving care in services. The RM from case study 2 believed that KLORA 
was helping the CSCI to improve standards on the ground by specifiying decision-making 
about quality levels: 
 
‘Last year it was a bit of a guessing game about what was a level 1, 2 or 3, whereas 
now we’ve got the rules it’s a bit more consistent across the country’ (RM CH 2) 
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As I have discussed in previous chapters there was clear discontent with the regulatory 
process, but these did not completely negate stakeholders views of the benefits, nor the 
opinion that the principle of inspection is a good one. 
 
However, according to the inspector of CH 2 the level of consistency required had still not 
quite been achieved, and this accounted from some of the problems and reservations: 
 
‘I think within the Commission we know where we are going, but we’re not quite 
there, so there are some differences in approach’ (Inspector CH 2) 
 
To inspectors the KLORA represented another standardisation tool (along with the IR) that 
eroded their autonomy and ability to reflect on quality during inspection. As the inspector 
of CH explained: 
 
‘…do I find them helpful? I find them restricting and they take away professional 
judgement… this is shown when the rules conflict with what we think, e.g. some 
homes I think are good actually by KLORA guidelines only come out as adequate’ 
(Inspector CH 3) 
 
There were operational problems with KLORA. The inspectors were not totally 
comfortable with the KLORA guidelines or how to implement them and there were 
differences in opinion regarding how far they should be followed. The inspector of CH 4 
felt she had to follow them to the letter and actually go against her own overall judgement: 
 
‘If we didn’t have KLORA I’d probably have made that section an adequate but 
given the home an overall judgement of good, but with the current rules making 
that section adequate will mark the whole home down’ (Inspector CH 4) 
 
The inspector had assessed the evidence and decided that overall the home was good, but 
there were two maintenance certificates missing which meant the section on Environment 
(NMS 24 – 30) had to be marked as adequate even though every other section was good, 
this pulled the overall quality rating down to adequate. 
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However, elsewhere the KLORA were not followed to the letter. There was an interesting 
use of informal ratings in Case Study 2. The inspection unit was internally sub-
categorising within the level 1 category based on the local knowledge of the inspectors and 
their managers: 
 
 ‘I call the less bad ones pinky level 1s’ (RM CH 2) 
 
This demonstrates the use of local flexibility and knowledge to develop a further level of 
specificity for the homes under their jurisdiction. The RM in Case Study 2 spoke of 
pressures from the CSCI hierarchy to lower the number of level 1 or ‘poor’ services they 
have on their books. In response to this pressure the ‘pinky’ homes were those which are 
close to moving out of the level 1 category, and provide targets for the inspection team to 
push improvements and lower the number of level 1 services they have. 
 
The negotiation between the prescriptive guidelines laid out by the KLORA and the 
influence of the inspectors own knowledge and experience was central to the inspection 
process and implementation of the standards. The tension lies in achieving an acceptable 
level of consistency while also allowing for some flexibility and giving inspectors the 
ability to react to the situation: 
 
‘You see I know that I use a lot of my own personal stuff, outside of the standards, 
whether someone could come in without that and cover everything, I don’t know’ 
(inspector CH 4) 
 
Balancing judgements between residents views and professional opinion 
A frequent dilemma for the inspectors was how to balance the value of service users’ 
views and opinions about the quality of a service with other evidence. This was 
particularly difficult if there was a large amount of evidence suggesting a service was 
performing poorly against KLORA indicators, but residents seemed happy and content 
with their lives. The issue forms part of a wider debate in social care about the right of 
professional individuals or organisations, working on behalf of the state, to use objective 
evidence to overrule the wishes of individuals. The question of balance was superfluous 
for inspectors if the problem had a direct negative impact on their safety or welfare. 
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In these instances there was no debate: the judgement of the professional, supported by 
documented evidence should supersede residents views: 
 
‘I mean sometimes there’s no debate, for example if there is a problem with 
medication like there was in the inspection you saw’ (Inspector CH 2) 
 
The debate was more subtle in terms of outcomes that determine quality of life. There was 
a feeling amongst the inspectors that older people have a tendency to ‘accept their lot’ 
(Inspector CH 1) put up with certain things they do not like because they see no other 
choice: 
 
‘They often seem prepared to accept things we wouldn’t and I don’t think we 
should let that happen. It’s a kind of accepting of their lot if you like and we’re here 
to prevent services taking advantage of that by saying look there are standards you 
must meet’ (Inspector CH 1) 
 
‘well some service users can be accepting of an environment, they are accepting of 
a poor home because they feel they have no choice… I think families might choose 
but choices are taken away from them (the residents), it’s a balance between the 
NMS and speaking to people which forms a picture at the end’ (Inspector CH 4) 
 
This view is supported by my data on residents views of good quality care across the case 
studies. They were influenced by a social construct that sees ageing as representing decline 
and decay, both biologically and psychologically, they tended to accept uncritically the 
‘culture of care’ within services.   
 
Much focus is now placed on the value of a person’s wellbeing and it is right that they 
should be able to define this themselves, but if there is evidence that the service is unsafe 
or exhibiting a poor service then the inspector’s were adamant that they had a duty to 
protect and prevent residents from accepting poor service because of their outdated 
conceptualisation of the ageing process.  
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Validity of standards 
Data from my interviews with staff and managers shows that the CSCI had generally done 
a good job of communicating the purpose of the standards and demonstrating to services 
that they were justified in the context of better care. It was interesting that past problems 
and incidents of abuse reported in the media seemed to have considerable impact on their 
acceptance of the CSCI. This was much more prominent than accepting a system of 
provision and regulation that has developed through an ideology of new managerialism. 
Both managers and staff referred to these issues when asked about the validity of the 
current standards: 
 
‘Well we can’t have it like it used to be can we, when people were getting away 
with all kinds of horrible abuse and things’ (Staff 1 CH 1, interview 2) 
 
‘… I mean I we wouldn’t want it to be like it was in the 80s with news about abuse 
all the time… no I think this is a good thing’ (Manager CH 2, interview 2)’ 
 
As the inspector of CH 2 explains the CSCI had made an explicit shift direction towards 
focusing on the service user by demanding an increase in use of their comments in the 
report: 
 
‘We (CSCI) have been told we’re not using enough resident comments in our 
reports, so now we have to make sure we do more’ (Inspector CH2) 
 
But this was seen as a paradoxical problem, when on one hand CSCI were expecting a 
more user focused report by including more of their comments, but at the same time 
creating a barrier to this by requiring a greater audit trail:  
 
‘I don’t think we have enough time to focus on outcomes, we’re assessing data 
rather than inspecting’ (Inspector CH3) 
 
This finding fits with another criticism of new managerialist service provision that 
suggests an increase in technicalisation actually prevents achievement of original 
organisational goals and outcomes (Munro 2004). The inspectors questioned the validity of 
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scoring and felt that sometimes the overall quality score determined by the NMS was 
unfair and went against the overall picture as judged by the inspector. 
 
The shift away from support: A top-down policy 
The shift from consultation and advice being part of the regulatory process, at least 
informally, to inspectors no longer offering any assistance has been a stark and sudden and 
according to the RM in Case Study 2 and this has hit some providers quite hard: 
 
‘Gone are the times when we have cosy little chats with providers, give them 
friendly advice, you know. We don’t do that anymore, I mean you may get them… 
I know many providers who find it difficult now I mean before we used to get them 
in at registration, discuss their plans, talk it through, there’s none of that anymore. 
Now they need to know what the law is and get on with it’ (RM CH 2) 
 
The inspectors’ discussion of interaction confirmed data from my field log which shows 
that despite efforts from managers to engage inspectors in informal ‘chats’ concerning 
strategies to address criticism, inspectors were very careful to avoid getting into lengthy 
conversations on these topics. Instead they referred managers to the website run by the 
GSCC. The inspector of CH 1 explicitly told the manager it was his job as manager to have 
the knowledge to manage the service successful and be able to cope with the technical 
requirements of the audit trail. 
 
Their comments to service personnel during the visit contradicted what all four managers 
said in their interviews after the inspection, in which they were all sympathetic with the 
managers’ predicament. Sympathy seemed particularly strong from the inspectors of the 
two independently run services, because of the financial constraints smaller providers 
faced. 
 
The inspectors exhibited a clear distinction between their beliefs and actions during the 
inspections. They were constrained by organisational directive to follow procedure but 
they felt it reduced their power to induce change: 
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‘I think our authority is lessening, especially in terms of what I can put on as 
requirements, they have to be considered more now, and they have to be legally 
enforceable. I guess before we had more flexibility about what we could put in as a 
requirement’ (Inspector CH 4) 
  
THE DETECTOR 
The detector role involves a complex system of checks that include analysis of documents 
and data, site visits and increasingly self assessment. Inspectors provide the detection role 
in the regulatory process, using a variety of methods to test that the systems of delivery are 
in place to produce a high quality service. The focus of inspection and methods of 
detection are described in Chapter 4 so will not be elaborated on here. This section uses 
data from my field diary and interviews with all stakeholders to examine the qualities 
required to be a good inspector.  
 
Inspector qualities  
As described in Chapter 4 the system of inspection involves a range of tools and methods 
of detection, and the process can be broken into two main phases:  
1. Analysis of documents and information prior to the inspection. 
2. The site visit. 
 
The benefits of inspection are dependent on the ability of inspectors to operationalise the 
inspection framework and use their own experience and judgement to apply the standards 
effectively: 
 
‘Skilled and credible inspectors are the single most important feature of a 
successful inspection service… credibility will derive from the inspectors’ 
experience and knowledge, as well as the way that they conduct themselves in 
doing their job’ (Audit Commission 2000: 9) 
 
The ‘director’, in this case CSCI, can develop a well regarded framework but it will be 
inconsequential, if it is not applied properly. In order to build a picture of a good quality 
inspector I asked all stakeholders for their opinions and used these to supplement my 
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observations. Data from the case study interviews suggests the following qualities are 
important: 
1. Experience / Skills / background 
2. Understanding of home (but not too much to induce regulatory capture) 
3. Fairness 
4. Friendliness 
5. Respect – the ability to both able command and give respect 
 
The five qualities listed above together provide the tacit knowledge that inspectors’ 
themselves so valued. Analysis of data concerning the qualities required to be a good 
inspector led me to consider the types of knowledge required to make inspection decisions 
and judgements. This discussion is interwoven to the following analysis of the facets of a 
good inspector. 
 
Experience and skills: Adding-value 
A key skill described by all stakeholders was that the inspector must use their experience 
and knowledge to ‘add value’ to local services: 
 
‘well they should be making it better for us’ (Resident 2 CH 4, interview 1) 
 
In this respect they must be able to spot errors, instances of poor practice or areas where 
practice is acceptable but could be improved. To residents and relatives the key skills 
important for an inspector were the experience and knowledge to be able to judge a home. 
Residents wanted inspectors who were experts in the field of social care and had sufficient 
experience and skills to spot deficiencies and assist in making corrections. Residents did 
not make the distinction between inspection and support, in the sense that they thought part 
of the role of an inspector was to help the home correct any faults they found.  
 
Understanding of home 
Both inspectors and managers thought that some familiarity with the service was 
beneficial. In particular managers thought that inspection was more effective if they knew 
the inspector and how they worked. This meant they had to spend less time with the 
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inspector and could get on with their job, lessening the impact. Staff also thought that 
having an inspector who they knew was mutually beneficial in the sense that they felt less 
intimidated and the inspector was therefore likely to get a more honest answer and see the 
normal workings of the home, less affected by a nervous staff. 
 
During my data collection the CSCI was in the process of shifting from a case load system 
(where inspectors were responsible for administrating and inspecting a certain number of 
homes) to a key worker system (where inspectors would be responsible for the 
administration of the home but would not necessarily inspect the home). The inspectors 
were afraid this would mean they will be less familiar with the services for which they are 
responsible, as in theory they could never have actually visited the service: 
 
‘Well I just worry that I could get services to go and inspect for which I have no 
prior knowledge and I could end up looking after ones that I’ve never been to, I 
don’t like that idea’ (Inspector CH 4, interview 1) 
 
As this system had not been put into action during my data collection further work with 
what has now become the Care Quality Commission (CQC) would be required to see if the 
inspector fears have been realised in practice.  
 
For the inspectors the main benefit of familiarity with the service was the cumulative 
knowledge they developed. They felt there working knowledge was far better if they had 
the experience of visiting the service on prior occasions, rather than simply using previous 
inspectors notes and self-assessment data as was being proposed in IBL. 
 
Residents’ and staffs’ comments that suggested inspectors should ‘get a feel’ for the home 
raised questions about the types of knowledge required to inspection. I agree with work of 
Schön (1983) on reflecting in practice that a key value of inspection lies in an inspector’s 
ability to use their tacit understanding of the individual home, the nature and aims of social 
care and the goals of the inspectorate. This puts them in a unique place to make 
judgements about quality of service provision. When this is marginalised both inspectors 
and the services being inspected loose a valuable resource of effecting change. 
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Fairness 
Stakeholder opinion of fairness varied depending on their relationship with the inspection 
process, which in turn was shaped by their prior knowledge of regulation. Residents who 
across the case studies admitted very little prior knowledge of inspection saw fairness as 
meaning the inspector gets a true picture of the service through residents’ experiences: 
 
‘I think they should speak to us to find out about the place. We know best as it’s 
here for us’ (Resident 1 CH 1, interview 1) 
 
Relatives framed fairness in a similar way focusing on the outcomes rather than the 
processes required to achieve them. There was also a feeling amongst relatives across the 
case studies that inspection should focus more on the bigger outcomes and less on the 
detail. One relative in CH 2, who was visiting the home on the day of the inspection, 
thought the inspector was ‘nit-picking’ and ‘missing the bigger picture’ in favour of small 
issues that in his opinion, while necessary to point out, should not effect the overall tone of 
the report, or judgement: 
 
‘I think they’re a bit unfair when they nit-pick, for example they should be 
concentrating on the atmosphere of the place, rather than saying mum hasn’t got 
her footpads (on her wheelchair) on today’ (Relative 1 CH 2, interview 2) 
 
These opinions demonstrate that relatives’ concerns focused primarily on wider issues such 
as happiness and the atmosphere of the home. These types of service qualities cannot be 
measured using indicators and standardised judgements such as KLORA. They require a 
different type of knowledge based on reflection, experience and a tacit understanding of 
service provision (both in general and specific to the service) – qualities inspectors have. 
Relatives failed to sometimes see process issues, which if neglected could lead on to bigger 
outcomes failures, as important. 
 
When managers spoke about fairness they really meant empathy, for example the manager 
of CH 1 was completely preoccupied with the home’s finances and the impact this had on 
his ability to develop the quality of service. He wanted the inspector to empathise with this 
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issue and in turn give the home leeway on some of the criticisms found, especially those, 
like training, that involved a large capital outlay: 
 
‘… tell me how I’m supposed to afford to spend that (to rectify all of the 
requirements) Matthew? We charge over two hundred quid less then some places 
round here, how can they expect me to compete with those places’ (Manager CH 1, 
interview 2) 
 
I have already discussed the inspectors’ sympathy for the amount of compliance required 
to meet all of the NMS. However, there was a limit and particularly in the case of CH 1, 
which had made little progress over the previous CSCI inspection, the inspector was losing 
any sympathy: 
 
‘I know it can be tough sometimes for the smaller homes but I think it’s excuses to 
be honest - they seem more concerned with the environment and not the care, (the 
manager) needs to re think his priorities’ (Inspector CH 1) 
 
Friendliness and respect 
As discussed in Chapter 4 inspectors voiced caution about their relationship with the home 
manager. There was a conscious effort to remain professional but at the same time 
friendly. The manager of CH 4 pointed out that inspectors tended to get the best results 
when the service feels as though they are being constructive and helpful, building on the 
strengths of services, rather than being authoritarian and simply criticising: 
 
‘I think when the inspector says nice things or talks about where we can improve 
rather than just what’s wrong, then that’s when I think inspection is best’ (Manager 
CH 4, interview 2) 
 
The managers advocated a friendly approach, they felt they were more likely to action the 
changes if they respected the advice and judgement of the inspector, rather than feared 
punishment of the organisation: 
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‘I mean the last inspector was terrible in my opinion he just came in and said 
what’s what. At least (inspector) comes in and tries to be a bit more helpful’ 
 
Inspector Inconsistency 
Despite the centralisation of inspection since the Care Standards Act 2000 and the 
introduction of NMS and KLORA guidelines to standardise inspectors’ judgements, 
managers still complained about instances of inconsistency. This inconsistency 
understandably led to frustrations for managers, as the Line Manager of CH 2 pointed out: 
 
‘well, a new inspector has come in to one of our other homes I run and for years 
another inspector has said the toilet situation was ok, because the staff were taking 
residents to another set of toilets further from their rooms, but a new inspector has 
come in and said it’s not ok… They’ve shifted things seemingly just because a new 
inspector has come in’ (Line Manager CH 2, interview 3) 
 
All four managers talked about inspector inconsistency as a key frustration. While others 
could not cite specific examples the Line Manager of CH 2 and the manager of CH 4, who 
both liaise with other care homes, saw inconsistencies between inspectors both across 
inspection offices (in the case of CH 4, who felt her service was subject to slightly 
different inspections than other homes in the company inspected by inspectors from other 
CSCI offices), and within the same inspection office but by different inspectors (in the case 
of CH 2). Both managers expressed exasperation at the differences in expectations across 
services, and thought it was inspector inconsistency that was causing the problem: 
 
‘See I’ve got one home where the inspector isn’t happy with the care plans, yet 
every other home seems to get an ok, so I’m in the process of redesigning them all 
to fit what this inspector wants… You see I can’t have different plans across my 
homes, so I’m changing for one inspector’ (Line Manager CH 2, interview 2) 
 
‘I’m in (region) here and the other homes are in (region) and we have different 
inspectors and my inspector might say ‘that’s acceptable’ but an inspector in 
(region) will say ‘no it’s not’. So we’re looking at our care plans and trying to 
collaborate’ (Manager CH 4, interview 2) 
252 
 
 
It is clear that no matter how prescriptive judgement guidelines like KLORA are there is 
always going to be some scope for interpretation, which inevitably leads to different 
decisions. There is a distinction between decision-making at the margins of the regulations 
and clearly breaking the rules. As professionals inspectors are also going to make some 
decisions which bend the guidelines, as in the actions of the inspector of CH 3 who gave 
leeway for a certificate to be faxed to the inspection office two days after the inspection. 
 
Difficulty for inspector to get a true picture of the service 
As described in Chapter 4 inspection only lasts for the equivalent of two working days, one 
to prepare and analyse pre-inspection data and the second to conduct the site visit. This 
means inspection only offers a snapshot of the service in which the inspector only has a 
limited time to construct a true picture of the service. The Line Manager of CH 2 
highlighted this issue with reference to the possibility of one vocal resident skewing the 
overall picture: 
 
‘I mean it’s obviously difficult to get a good understanding from such a snapshot 
because it’s difficult to get the balance correct… the last report seemed like in each 
section he had only spoken to one man and his views became the views of the 
whole population’ (Line Manager CH 2, interview 1) 
 
The issue of the ‘snapshot’ nature of inspection was also a cause of frustration to the 
inspectors, who despite accepting that the audit paperwork was necessary felt it led to 
further marginalisation of the views of service users: 
 
‘I don’t think we have enough time to focus on outcomes, we’re assessing data 
rather than inspecting and we only have chance to get limited number of service 
user views’ (Inspector CH 3) 
 
The issue also highlights the paradoxical nature of the focus of inspection: 
 
‘We (CSCI) have been told we’re not using enough resident comments in our 
reports, so now we have to make sure we do more’  
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MN: ‘How does this sit with the time pressures?’ 
 
‘Well I guess we have to use more of what we hear, and try to speak to more 
residents, but I’m not sure how we are going to do that’ (Inspector CH2). 
 
The CSCI is professing to do one thing, but the system of inspection that is in place forces 
inspectors to marginalise the focus on user outcomes the CSCI claim to be so important. 
 
Working with Councils: Regulatory fragmentation 
The issue of multiple inspection visits was mentioned by almost all staff and managers in 
their interviews. Although the CSCI is the national regulator regulation is a complex 
patchwork of different bodies, and this leads to duplication and an increased burden on 
services. As the manager of CH 4 explained: 
 
‘I can’t see why there can’t be more cooperation, I mean we had a meeting 
yesterday about codes of conduct and you’ve got one from the CSCI that you work 
to, one from the council, and you’ve also got the general council structure and it’s 
all the same thing basically… why they can’t all incorporate I don’t know’ 
(Manager CH 4, interview 2) 
 
An important effect of the duplication was that it led to confusion and sometimes conflict 
between requirements: 
 
‘I’ve had the CSCI tell me to move the toilet so it is closer to more residents, but 
the councils say it is fine… oh it’s very frustrating’ (Line Manager CH 2, interview 
3) 
 
Although the main duplication came from overlap between the CSCI and local councils; 
managers also spoke of visits from fire inspectors, building inspectors and inspectors of the 
call alarm system. 
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The inspectors felt that the lack of communication between themselves and councils was 
problematic and weakened the process of regulation. As the above quote shows managers 
were sometimes left confused about whom to follow. 
 
Enforcement was also a problem because in light of the slowness of its own enforcement 
procedure the CSCI was increasingly relying on councils to enforce improvement through 
threats to stop contracting with services, and making quality assurance part of contractual 
agreements. However, the inspectors across the four case studies all felt direct 
communication with council quality assurance teams was poor: 
 
‘… er I mean I guess in theory we work together but I very rarely hear from anyone 
in the council… I mean we get notified of complaints but I never really speak to 
anyone’ (Inspector CH 4) 
 
THE EFFECTOR: INDUCING CHANGE 
A successful inspection system needs an effective way of changing the behaviour of 
service providers and improving performance. Without this successful director and 
detector systems will be of little value. The regulator needs to either convince providers to 
pursue the actions and objectives they prescribe or provide real and feared punitive 
measures that will force providers to comply. The question over what constitutes a strong 
effector is debatable and there appears to be some tensions within the CSCI’s approach to 
effecting change. 
 
Boyne et al (2001) identify two main ways of effecting change, the first of which I have 
split into two separate mechanisms: 
1. Advice 
a. Informal advice  
b. Formal reports by inspectors that include requirements which the home 
must act upon and recommendations to improve practice but which are not 
legally binding.  
2. The powers available to central government that may be triggered by the findings 
of the inspectorate.  
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I would also add a third mechanism to Boyne et al’s (2001) methods: 
3. Standard setting and promoting cultural change 
 
Advice 
Analysis of my observations during the inspections and interviews with stakeholders 
shows that advice was broken down into two categories: Informal and formal.  
Informal 
The CSCI has all but eliminated the use of informal advice by inspectors and as described 
in Chapter 4 this directive was adhered to in all four of my case studies and street-level 
support has been all but eliminated. What was evident from observation of the case studies 
was that despite the tough stance from the CSCI the inspectors instinctively veered towards 
persuasion, helping services to comply with regulations rather than punishing them. This 
finding was similar to that of Day and Klein (1997) who found that in the face of a tough 
stance of the regulatory body, the inspectors used a more understanding approach aimed at 
raising standards and fostering compliance. This also fits with Harlow’s (2004) argument 
that social workers have a tendency towards social justice and caring that leads them into 
the profession, but then often find that the system in place restricts this tendency. This was 
the case with the inspections I observed where the organisations tough regulatory stance 
with a policing element was complemented by inspectors trying to encourage compliance 
through emphasising strengths and the merit of improvement, but without going as far as 
giving direct advice.  
 
Formal 
As we have seen in previous chapters the inspectors were restricted in the amount of 
assistance they could give the services. They were restricted to pointing managers in the 
direction of the GSCC, Skills for Care and other support organisations for help and the 
limited ‘catalytic feedback’ (Braithwaite et al 2007)  they could give in the report. 
However, this feedback in the report is indirect in the sense that the managers have to 
dissect the report and extract constructive feedback from the text. Recommendations do 
provide some assistance in the sense that they often flag small problems that, if acted upon, 
can cumulatively improve practice, but this type of advice was less valued by managers. 
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Punitive powers 
The main method of effecting change used by the CSCI is to make requirements in the 
report and then follow these up to check if the changes have been made within an agreed 
timescale. The requirements follow a punitive course and are ultimately underpinned by 
the power of government to close a service if it is performing poorly. 
 
Inefficiency of ultimate sanction 
Ayres and Bratihwaite (1992) argue that in order for regulation to be effective it must be 
underpinned by the ‘ultimate sanction’, which in the case of the CSCI is the ability to close 
a home down:  
 
‘Regulatory agencies will be able to speak more softly when they are perceived as 
carrying big sticks’ (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992: 6). 
 
Data from the case studies shows that the possibility of the CSCI actually taking punitive 
measures except where safety is compromised is very low, and as such shows the deterrent 
aspect of regulation is often ignored. Between the four case studies there were nine 
previous requirements (i.e. issues which legally must be addressed) uncompleted beyond 
the initial timescales agreed. Four of these the timescales set out in the reports had been 
ignored on more than one previous occasion. This gives two key insights into the workings 
of the CSCI: first, there is a lack of effective punitive power and secondly, in practice 
inspectors have to work hard in the face of limited options to coerce services into 
requirements, because the threat of force is somewhat hollow. 
 
The evidence regarding lack of punitive power was highlighted in my conversations with 
the RM of CH 2. She talked about the lengthy cumbersome process of closing a service: 
 
‘It’s a slowish process as you have to first send out a letter, then they have 28 days 
to write back, and then their case has to be heard by a director, that director has to 
then write a notice through the commission (CSCI) to the home’ (RM CH 2) 
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Inspectors of the other three case studies spoke of frustration at the paucity of action in the 
homes and highlighted the contradiction between the CSCI aims and the difficulty in 
pursuing punitive action, which can take over a year. As the inspector of CH 1 commented, 
they frequently felt ineffective: 
 
‘… it does get frustrating though when you feel like you’re just banging your head 
against a wall ‘cos nothing happens’ (Inspector CH 1) 
 
Data from earlier studies on nursing homes also shows how punitive sanctions have 
historically been slow to deliver. For example Day and Klein’s (1987) study on nursing 
homes in the UK shows only six were deregistered in a two year period in the mid-1980s.  
 
Discretionary sanctions 
In an acknowledgement of the problems with the punitive powers at the disposal of the 
CSCI the RM of CH 2 talked about using informal agreements with councils to stop them 
placing any more council funded residents in a problem service and even informal 
agreements with services themselves, who agreed to stop moving residents in until the 
serious concerns of the CSCI had been addressed: 
 
‘I have on occasion just come to an agreement with a provider not to move people 
in, erm… it’s much better than going down the legal track’ (RM CH 2) 
 
This stance led to instances where judgement could sometimes override the prescriptions 
of the standards. In these instances the inspectors were instructed to gage their overall 
impression of the service, and if that was good, but there was one area where there were 
severe shortcomings they would push up the overall score but follow the issue up using an 
intensive course of random inspections to force improvement: 
 
‘… normally it would be a level 1 because of the immediate requirement, but the 
general the picture is good and it is not a level 1, but they have a major shortfall in 
one major area, so I will make it an adequate and then follow it up’ (RM, CH 2) 
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These instances of upgrading prior to improvement by the service reflect a national 
pressure on the regional inspection units to push as many services out of the level 1 (poor) 
category and show the lengths to which inspectors and their managers will go to achieve 
this progress. The inspector was clear to point out that he would only do this if all other 
areas of the inspection were above level 1 and he could see a real commitment to quickly 
improve the problem area form the service. 
 
This was achieved by discounting the score for the area that would only score 1, marking 
up the home based on the other scores and then using random visits to ensure the service 
had corrected the problem.  The RM and Inspector of in case study 2 did stress that they 
would only do this- if the home was getting higher scores for most of the other standards 
and it was only problems with one or two Key Standards that were causing the home to be 
scored at level 1. 
 
This action resulted from the pressure the CSCI to push as many level 1s up into the next 
bracket during the 2006/2007 year that I followed. This impetus appears to stem partly 
from financial pressures within the CSCI: 
 
‘The number of randoms are supposed to been going down this year because we’re 
looking at head counts and we just wouldn’t have the numbers to go around, to do 
all the ones we did last year… I guess it’s all about modernising regulation’ (RM 
CH 2) 
 
With year on year budgetary cut backs the CSCI can no longer afford to carry out the 
number of inspections it could in previous years. This means that although there is obvious 
altruistic, ‘quality of service’ reasons for forcing improvement in the services, there are 
also egoistic, self-preserving reasons: the higher the CSCI rating the less inspections the 
CSCI needs to conduct each year. The CSCI is being forced to scale back its operations, 
while still maintaining ensuring services maintain standards.  The RM of CH 2 believed 
that this led to different local level solutions to the drive to decrease inspections, which 
caused inconsistency: 
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‘yeah… what percentage of Eastern region homes might be level 1, say 20 % I 
can’t remember, I’ve only got 2 %, so yeah. There cannot be services that are so 
much better in one part of the country, not that big a difference’ (RM CH 2) 
 
The fact that inspectors are using informal persuasion demonstrates both the impotency of 
CSCI punitive power and the creative ways inspectors are using their professional 
experience to compensate for organisational deficiencies. Once again discretion was used 
to create effective local level solutions. 
 
The contrast in reaction to requirements between case study 2 and the other three shows 
the inspection office in case study 2 had managed to develop a more effective local level 
system of compliance than others. They achieved this through making the threat real by 
instigating the most enforcement actions in their region and showing services that they are 
prepared to take enforcement action where necessary. This organisational ethos influenced 
the way in which the inspectors approached inspection and they were confident that their 
requirements would be supported by enforcement action if not complied.  
 
Services realise they can get away without acting on requirements and this jeopardises the 
efficacy of the inspection process. The CSCI cannot claim to be driving up standards and 
punishing poor providers if its actions are simply being ignored. 
 
Cutting back on issuing requirements and regulations 
The issuing of requirements and recommendations was handled differently across the case 
studies in terms of enforcing the timescales in which they had to be carried out. Inspectors 
were all aware that requirements were only supposed to be issued if they were prepared to 
take punitive action against the service. The regional office responsible for inspecting CH 
2 had taken the tough line of the CSCI in ensuring that timescales were met while other 
offices were clearly letting services flout regulations: 
 
‘We don’t make requirements anymore unless we’re prepared to go further, so if 
it’s not done next time we take enforcement action… we’ve done more 
enforcement action than any other office (in their region)’ (RM CH 2)  
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‘we’ve lost the smallest number of level 1s in the region, so we are forcing 
improvement… we’ve been really focusing on the level 1s’ (RM CH 2) 
 
Standard setting and promoting cultural change 
The CSCI has an educational and policy-guiding role, and in this sense it aims to shape 
service provision. Their role in educating services comes through inspection but also the 
standards themselves.  
 
However, as we have seen the nature and complexity of both the process of inspection and 
complying with the NMS has hindered progress of services in this case study. I have 
argued that a stifling of progress results from the conceptualisation of service provision as 
a set of operations that can be reduced to measurement by indicators. By adopting this 
approach the CSCI emphasises its function as a service-shaper, underpinned by the 
premise that it sets standards and managers are expected to have the skills to analyse the 
report, determine the need for change and then effect that change, all while continuing to 
run the service. This role and its effects in terms of the marginalisation and slow progress 
of some services were increasing as the CSCI shifted further to a standard prescribing 
approach through the implementation of prescribed judgements, rather than supportive 
inspection based on the reflexive judgements of professional inspectors. 
 
CONCLUSION 
I have analysed the data on good quality inspection through three-part framework: 
Director, Detector and Effector. 
 
The director element focuses on the leadership and managerial structure of the CSCI. Data 
from interviews and my field log suggested that inspection was partly self-serving in terms 
of collecting data that justified its own role. For example, the inspectors are forced by 
procedure to spend the majority of time during the site visit inspecting paperwork even 
though the CSCI has asked for a greater focus in the reports on service user outcomes and 
a documentation of their comments to evidence this focus.  
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Consistency has taken primacy over inspectors’ professional expertise in the modus 
operandi of the CSCI. The introduction of the KLORA through the modernisation project 
of IBL has increased the marginalisation of inspectors’ autonomy. However, as others have 
shown elsewhere within the bureau-professions (see Evans and Harris 2004), a tightening 
of standards led to discretion, both from inspectors themselves and managers at the local 
level. The RM in case study 3 had begun to categorise ‘poor’ homes as either red – i.e. 
those with multiple or fundamental failings and ‘pinky’ – i.e. those which are nearly 
adequate and often only ‘poor’ because the increasing tightening of standards has shifted 
the line to the extent that they fall back into the ‘poor’ category. 
 
Stakeholders identified five key qualities that inspectors need to carry out their Detector 
work: 
1. Experience / Skills / background 
2. Understanding of home (but not too much to induce regulatory capture) 
3. Fairness 
4. Friendliness 
5. Respect – the ability to both able command and give respect 
 
These qualities suggested implicitly that most of the stakeholders believe that inspection is 
about more than just an inventory of standards but also requires a focus on qualities that 
cannot be easily reduced to standard judgements, such as the atmosphere of a service. This 
requires a different type of knowledge that comes from inspectors experience and tacit 
understanding of the care process. 
 
Analysis in previous chapters has shown the limited scope inspectors now have to provide 
advice or work in partnership with services. The main method of inducing change was 
through the threat of punitive sanctions, but these were slow to implement and not often 
used by inspectors. Instead services have got savvy to the lack of punitive options available 
to inspectors so changes are often slow to materialise. In conjunction with the constraint on 
any form of partnership working with services to improve, inspectors were frustrated that 
progress was often slow for ‘poor’ services. However, at a regional level some CSCI 
offices had developed discretionary solutions to this problem. 
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The CSCI appears to predominantly rely on its role as a leading voice in social care and 
position as standard bearers of purveying notions of good quality care. This narrows the 
role of the CSCI and presents it as auditor in the neo-liberal, new managerialist sense of 
checking on standards but devolving responsibility for improvement to managers and 
service providers. This is clearly the trajectory of the CSCI but is leading to discontent 
within the workforce and marginalisation of inspectors. It is also clearly not forcing 
improvement because services require support. Inspection appears to have taken a 
retrospective step when considered through the conceptual lens upon which social care 
provision was built: social justice. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the final chapter of this thesis I draw together the findings from the systematic review in 
Chapter 3 and the thematic analysis presented in Chapters 4 – 7. The findings focus on a 
series of aims that together build a picture of inspection in an attempt to examine how it 
serves to influence service quality, as well as touching on the question of ‘what is good 
quality care?’ In conducting this research I had a unique insight into inspection and the 
decision-making process involved, which other researchers have often had trouble gaining 
access to (see Travers 2007). 
 
At the beginning of the study questions about effectiveness were very prominent. This led 
me to conduct a systematic review to determine whether there had been any previous 
research into the effectiveness of inspection on residential care for older people.  
 
Having found a dearth of evidence of both gold standard effectiveness data and data on 
impact I focused my case studies on the processes and consequences of inspection and 
discussed any pitfalls that existed. In this way the thematic analysis has given some 
answers to the remaining aims of the study; namely, to add to the evidence on what makes 
for good residential care inspection and the most effective ways of maximizing quality of 
older peoples’ residential care. Thematic analysis has focused on issues such as the process 
and impact of inspection; looking at ‘how’ an inspection is carried out, asking the relevant 
stakeholders about their experiences of inspection and looking at the impact over time. In 
writing about these themes I have been pursuing the most general aim of the study, namely 
to understand more about the dynamics of the relationships between inspection and good 
quality care.  
 
In the final part of this chapter I use my findings to offer guidance to the new inspection 
body that replaced the CSCI in April 2009, the Care Quality Commission (CQC). The 
CQC was enacted under the Care Standards Act 2008 and given new powers of 
enforcement. However, it has continued with the CSCI inspection regime during 2009 – 
2010 but plans to continue the evolution began by the CSCI and change its methodology in 
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2010 – 2011.  
 
NO RESEARCH ON EFFECTIVENESS 
My systematic review showed there have been no studies into the effectiveness of 
inspection on older peoples’ social care and very little research into its impact. The lack of 
research reflects the fact that is it very difficult to conduct any kind of control-based study 
of services that are universally regulated: it would be both unethical and illegal to select a 
control group of residential care homes that would not receive an inspection. 
 
Therefore the debate has not been well informed through empirical evidence and robust 
academic research into the methods, costs and impacts of regulation in social care 
(Sutherland and Leatherman 2006). Since its inception in 2004 the only real evaluation of 
its function has been by the CSCI itself. There have been studies into the regulation in 
many other settings from financial institutions and markets (see for example Grouta and 
Zalewska 2006), to environmental regulation (Gunningham, et al. 1998) and healthcare 
(Walshe and Shortell 2004). There is also a considerable body of literature on the theory 
and practice of regulation, some of which draws on comparative research to offer 
theoretical tools and frameworks (see Braithwaite, et al. 2007). Examining regulation from 
an economic perspective Boyne and Day (2002) developed a framework that breaks 
regulation down into costs and benefits, with benefits including improvement of service 
standards, providing a safety-net and an assurance of minimum standards. However, as the 
systematic review in this study demonstrates, this framework has never been used to 
determine a cost-effectiveness calculation of inspection.  
 
THE PROCESS OF INSPECTION 
The CSCI: practising what it preaches? 
It is helpful to draw out the policy aims of inspection by the CSCI: 
• Government-driven: although I argue the CSCI has policy influence through the 
administrators’ prerogative, it is primarily government driven. 
• Provide a publicly available quality rating for each service (not yet ‘live’ during my 
data collection, but was very soon after). 
• Increase accountability and transparency through making findings publicly available. 
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• Delivering better management. The CSCI inspection focused on ensuring managers 
were responsible for delivering good quality services through an emphasis on training 
and skills. 
• Standardszing good practice. The NMS provide national, standardised guidelines on 
practice. 
• Promote needs-led, person-focused services.  
 
The principle of government led inspection was supported by most stakeholders and even 
though there were many criticisms of its function there was almost unanimous agreement 
amongst the interviewees of the principle of inspection. They also broadly praised the 
consistency of standards and the inspection process across England. There was criticism 
that this standardisation was too pervasive and frequently enforced at the expense of local-
level decision-making. Managers felt that inspectors should have discretionary control over 
issues in which there were clear local-level influences over areas of practice. Inspectors 
were also of the opinion that if local-level contexts meant a particular service’s adherence 
to a National Minimum Standard (NMS) would have had a negative impact it should be 
possible to ‘trouble shoot’ an appropriate solution. 
CSCI as a priority setter not a motivator 
The data in this thesis show that, although they might not agree with all of the NMS, the 
stakeholders interviewed all agreed that the CSCI had set a clearly defined set of indictors. 
When talking about the quality of health care provided in general care practices 
Rhydderch, Elwyn et al. (2004) claim that:  
 
‘Indicators should provide meaningful information which makes it possible to set 
priorities. Finally the indicators should motivate practices to induce change’ 
(Rhydderch, Elwyn et al. 2004: 214). 
 
The stakeholders agreed that the NMS indicators make it possible to set priorities to 
comply with the regulatory agent. The list of requirements at the back of the report clearly 
sets out the problems and gives timescales, which should be agreed with the service 
manager. However, the current inspection process fails to successfully motivate change, 
certainly for homes that are performing poorly. Two homes (CH 1 and 3) in this study 
failed to make any significant improvements on the requirements issued by inspectors. 
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Managers and staff in these services were aware of what they had to do to comply with the 
NMS but did not carry these changes out. This was because although inspection clearly 
tells services what changes are required it provides only distant reasons why the service 
should make changes and no assistance as to how the service should achieve them.  
 
This represents a two-fold problem. First, the rationale for the CSCI’s vision of quality 
care and good practice is very distant from service providers. Without proactive searching 
and synthesising of research evidence and policy arguments by managers the arguments 
for user-focused, personalised services failed to reach the target audience. This was clearly 
the case in the two independently owned services that had no support or extra capacity to 
actively engage with the data and policy. Secondly, if managers found it difficult to 
understand why they needed to change, they certainly did not have the resources to know 
how to make changes. 
 
The biggest barrier to change appeared to be motivation, with managers either not 
believing they needed to change and simply ignoring the requirements or finding other 
excuses to justify their inaction. With no clear leadership for change this lack of motivation 
was often spread to staff, and indeed in the case of CH 1 there was no binding mechanism 
so the staff felt marginalised by the manager and were not prepared to work harder, or stay 
behind after their shift to complete the necessary paperwork (logs and care plans). 
 
In organisational literature social worlds theory suggests that change emerges as a function 
of negotiation and renegotiation between two or more social worlds (Tovey and Adams 
2001). The theory emphasises the importance of considering who is using indicators and 
for what purpose. In the inspections I observed there was a clear tension between the 
practices and activities required by CSCI to meet their quality improvement targets and 
practices and activities that services believe lead to improvement for residents. The 
manager of CH 1 summed up this feeling: 
 
‘You see they want me to do things that residents are complaining about… now if 
(the inspector) comes back and there are the same complaints then I’m going to tell 
him and showing that what he wants is having a detrimental effect on my residents’ 
(Manager CH 1, interview 2) 
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This tension was also apparent in CH 4 where residents wanted to prop their doors open 
because they liked to ‘see the world go by’ (Resident 2 CH 2, interview 2), but the 
regulations would not let them do this. The service could put in specialist equipment in the 
form of doors that automatically close in the event of fire, but these were expensive, as the 
manager explained: 
 
‘See the doors issue is now a big one… we’re having to tell the residents that they 
must keep their bedroom doors closed, and some of them, understandably hate that. 
Now, I know we can get those automatic things in, but they cost a lot… er, we’ve 
even talked about staff ensuring doors are closed in the case of an emergency, but 
it’s not allowed… and the residents hate it’ (Manager CH 2, interview 2). 
 
The complex relationship between inspectors (detector) and the CSCI 
(director) 
As I have discussed in the findings chapters there is a tension between the prescriptive 
guidelines developed by the ‘director’ element of the CSCI and the implementation of 
judgement by inspectors. Inspectors in the case studies were increasingly demoralised and 
unhappy in their role; one inspector (of CH 1) even threatened to leave the profession if 
changes continued. Managers, staff and inspectors all thought their ability to induce 
change and improvements had been diminished by increasing perspiration and restriction  
which they felt influenced the lack of change over the case study period. This phenomenon 
is not unique to inspectors in this study, other studies of different professions have shown 
that frustration at perceived professional marginalisation is a frequent complaint of staff 
within the bureau professions and represents an ongoing tension within services (see for 
example Bell, et al. 2008).  
 
This distinction was not clear-cut; the use of reflective judgement had not been wholly 
eliminated. Inspectors in the study tried to moderate the punitive approach of the CSCI by 
using judgement and discretion where possible. As a plethora of sociology literature argues 
even the most rigid scientific experiments still rely on argument and interpretation of 
results (see for example Latour and Woolgar 1986). No matter how prescriptive guidelines 
become there is still a need for professional judgement in implementing the protocol. A 
fact demonstrated by specific instances (for example the leeway the inspector of CH 3 
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allowed for faxing of a fire certificate) and during the process of inspection where 
inspectors changed the IR to suit their own preferences. 
 
My data is consistent with the conclusion of Evans and Harris (2004), who when talking 
about a different bureau-profession argued that the distinction between judgement and 
standardised processes are not clear-cut: 
 
‘…existence of rules is not inevitably the death-knell of discretion. Rather, by 
creating rules organizations create discretion’ (Evans and Harris, 2004: 883). 
 
In response to tightening prescription over judgement inspectors muddled through, made 
do, and subtly recreated the objectives of the system. This in turn provided them with 
continuing scope for discretion. The result of this is that the application of inspection has 
become removed from the intentions of the developers within the CSCI. 
 
THE IMPACT OF INSPECTION 
 A lack of direct impact on residents 
Inspection had very little direct influence over residents in my study, in relation to:  
• the process of inspection, 
• direct changes it induced, or  
• increased awareness of CSCI information.  
 
CSCI data shows that residents received indirect benefit from regulation in the form of 
year-on-year rising standards across the country (CSCI 2007a). However, data from this 
research shows improvement against the CSCI’s criteria does not necessarily match 
residents’ expectations and certainly failed to have any influence on these expectations, 
which were markedly different to the prevailing policy and research opinion. 
 
A synthesis of the findings chapters suggests that managers still feel that service users do 
not want to be ‘burdened’ with details of their care and that the concept of empowerment 
has not permeated into practice. This finding reminded me of work on medication 
management in a mental health setting (Cushing and Metcalfe 2007). All four service 
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settings offered mechanisms of collaboration that were at best tokenistic and rooted in 
notions of compliance with institutional routine rather than concordance between residents 
and the service about provision. This was worst in CH 1 and 3, but also apparent in CH 2 
and 4.  
 
Empowerment was challenging for services in terms of knowledge, skills and resources. 
Thus paternalistic notions formed a ‘culture of ageism’ that purveyed service provision. 
Ageism is manifest where powerlessness and dependence is engendered. Although 
residents views were not treated with suspicion or marginalized completely, my data 
suggests that residents were still treated on the basis of a negative social construction of 
ageing (Wilken 1990). Paternalism spread to routines and my interviews and observations 
suggest that all four homes reflected elements of Goffman’s ‘Total Institution’ (Goffman 
1991). 
 
Impact on services 
Across the case studies, services had managed to act on thirteen of the twenty-four 
requirements and simple analysis of the three previous NMS scores for each service in 
Chapter 4 (see Tables 9, 11, 13 and 15) shows that, although not at the pace the CSCI 
would have liked, all four services had made some progress against the NMS. All had 
developed some system of individualised care planning and accountability, even if it did 
not meet the standards of the CSCI. 
 
CH 1 and CH 3 had been rated as ‘poor’ since the CSCI’s inception, but have still shown 
improvement in some areas. The inspectors admitted they were providing a better level of 
care now than they were at the date of the first CSCI inspection. The reason they were still 
rated as ‘poor’ or ‘adequate’ was that they had been unable to keep up with the pace of 
changing expectations, or ‘goal post shifting’ that occurred as the regulator developed its 
methodology. The failings of the ‘poor’ homes in the case studies were a result of not quite 
meeting standards, but it was acknowledged that the basic infrastructure was in place. 
 
In their response to the findings in the reports, service managers universally placed the 
majority of their focus on the requirements issued in the report. These were seen as a set of 
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tangible errors with which to both interpret the overall outcome of the report (based on the 
number and perceived severity) and, as discussed earlier, set priorities. 
 
Eleven of the twenty-four requirements issued across the four services had not been 
‘actioned’ by the end of the case studies. CH 2 and 4 were, on the surface, by far the most 
compliant services; both acted on all but one of their requirements. In comparison CH 1 
and 3 performed poorly. However, it became apparent that a distinction between 
compliance rates was simplistic and more detailed analysis suggested that the amount of 
time required and complexity of the change required were better indicators of compliance. 
 
The slow progress related to the format of reports and the fact that managers follow a to-do 
list of requirements rather than critically analyse the whole report. The technology driven 
scope and format of the report influences this and shows that by focusing on specific 
indicators the report is in fact potentially constraining improvement. It guides managers 
towards a linear task of requirements, which results in stepwise improvement rather than 
focusing on the wider whole picture of service and addressing fundamental issues at a 
strategic level.  This can be seen in the context of wider changes in social services from 
knowledge as being ‘social’ and by implication more holistic to being ‘informational’ with 
providers being guided from point-to-point (Parton 2008).  
 
Potential compliance is also influenced by interaction between structure and agency within 
the service. Other studies (see Newman, Glendinning et al 2008) have shown that a service 
manager’s capacity for change has a significant impact on improvement potential. The 
managers’ capacity to change was influenced by: 
• disagreement with the inspector and the need for change, 
• a lack of knowledge of how to make changes. 
 
My findings showed that a lack of capacity to change reproduced a culture of non-
compliant care within the service that guided the actions of staff and also, as I have shown, 
influences the expectations of residents. This manifests in a lack of empowerment for 
residents and routinisation that exhibited similarities to Goffman’s concept of the ‘Total 
Institution’ (Goffman 1991). The data paints a picture of services that have yet to fully 
realise that systems of provision that cumulatively develop produce good quality care. 
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An institutional focus on outputs 
The result of a culture of ageism is a focus on outputs of service without drilling down to 
see if these are achieving outcomes for residents. Chapters 5 and 6 show how this focus 
was replicated by managers’ attitudes towards service provision and the organisational 
culture of the service. Resident’s expectations were focused on outputs rather than 
outcomes, which were only discussed indirectly in the context of a particular service 
output. 
 
Residents across the studies had low expectations of care and felt their physical frailty 
should be embodied in the service provision. However, neither the service nor the 
inspectorate had an impact in terms of altering or challenging these expectations. In the 
case of the services there was clearly a motivation to maintain low expectations because it 
meant there was less pressure on provision. The low expectations also served as 
‘assurance’, helping managers to justify the lack of empowerment and choice they offered. 
In the three privately owned services there was tension between profit driven and social 
justice driven modes of production, which were incompatible without a substantial rise in 
charges. It is important to point out that the focus on outputs was not the result of cynical 
exploitation of residents or purposefully offering a poor service, rather managers were 
constrained by a lack of resources and hamstrung by an inspectorate that continuously 
shifts the goal posts of quality. 
 
Understanding a lack of service improvement 
The question of accountability was a key factor in barriers to service improvement. As 
shown in Figure 2 Bull and Shaw (1992) build on Lyman and Scott’s (1970) analysis of 
accountability, their conceptualisation is helpful for analysis of the level of service 
improvements in each of the case studies.  
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Figure 2: Conceptualising accountability 
 
  Responsibility 
Accepted 
  
 Confession  Justification  
Blame Accepted    Blame denied 
 
   
 
 Excuse  Repudiation  
  Responsibility 
denied 
  
Source: Bull and Shaw (1992: 641) 
 
The managers across the four case studies demonstrated examples of all four of these 
‘accounts’ of inaction against inspection requirements. In CH 1 the manager initially gave 
both justification and excuses, before finally resulting to confession in the final interview 
when the threat of punitive CSCI action became real. CH 3 followed the same trajectory as 
CH 1 except there was still little contrition at the end of the study and the manager was still 
either making excuses for some failings and even exhibiting repudiation for the 
requirement on her to gain her management qualification in care; she felt that her 
experience of twenty-five years should count as a proxy to the qualification. 
 
In CH 2 the manager made an excuse about the main failing, which was the mis-handling 
of medication, blaming it on an uncharacteristic mistake made by one of her senior staff. 
She thought the CSCI should have given some leeway on this issue because she argued it 
was so uncharacteristic. The CSCI could not confirm this excuse so an immediate 
requirement was issued. 
 
In CH 4 where all of the requirements regarded documentation or environmental changes 
the manager made excuses. She accepted these were faults but blamed head office for 
keeping the documents rather than accepting that she should have insisted they were kept 
in the home. 
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The function of the CSCI and its limited ability to hold services to account meant that 
managers could hide behind the forms of accountability (see Figure 2) above without being 
forced or persuaded to change.   
 
Burden of inspection 
Staff and managers rejected elements of inspection and resented the burden it placed on 
their services. There were three sets of pressures directly related to complying with 
inspection that managers and staff found frustrating: 
1. The administrative burden of complying with standards 
2. Raised costs of complying with standards, in the context of decreasing budgets 
3. Standards driving care rather than care driving standards 
 
Grievances about these issues provided extra encouragement to defy inspection as far as 
possible. Points 1 and 2 primarily related to the increased cost and resources required to 
provide care that is regulated by the CSCI. This related to the control councils had over 
fees. Point 3 reflected inspectors’ and staff opinion that they had to implement aspects of 
care provision they felt were only there to serve the metrics of the inspectorate and were 
actually having a negative impact on residents.  
 
CONCEPTUALISING THE CSCI’S APPROACH TO INSPECTION 
The influence of new managerialism 
A new managerialist ideology has shifted the bulk of social service provision to the private 
sector (Gilbert 2005). This has led to the choice of provision sitting with the citizen, or 
consumer, who in reciprocating this choice has to be responsible for the choice made. 
These choices are supported by a government that provides quality assurance via service 
agreements, contracts, detailed performance data requirements and other managerialist 
techniques (Harris and McDonald 2001; Turner and Martin 2004). Skidmore et al (2004) 
advocate this approach by steering providers towards ‘desirable regulatory outcomes, 
rather than specifying how they are to be achieved from the centre’ (Skidmore, et al. 2003: 
23) 
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Residents in this study often suggested they did not want to engage with choice and 
associated risk and instead preferred to devolve this to family or the service. This finding 
raises the question: should we be encouraging residents to take a greater responsibility 
under notions of active citizenship or should we accept that residents want paternalistic 
support from the state and their families? The evidence from both this study and others 
clearly suggests that where given the opportunity residents want to have a say in their own 
care (Department of Health 2006). It is clear that inspection could do more to support and 
encourage that process, both directly through support and partnership working with service 
provides and directly through better communication and engagement with residents. 
 
However, Ferguson argues that: 
 
 ‘…the philosophy of personalization is not one that social workers should accept 
uncritically’ (Ferguson 2007: 387) 
 
and I agree. Ferguson uses the case of social workers, but I think this can be equally 
applied to the social care profession. He argues that concepts of active citizenship and new 
managerialism are actually stigmatising ideas of dependency, social justice and 
professionalism of social workers. Reducing notions of good care to personalisation serves 
to marginalise professionals and place unfair levels of responsibility and accountability on 
service users. This study has shown that a lack of empowerment is negatively affecting 
residents, but also that empowerment itself is not the answer – residents still wanted to be 
able to rely, and in some cases depend, on services. What is required is a balance, but the 
CSCI inspection regime did not support this approach. Inspection has been so focused on 
linear, technology led accountability processes it has failed to support and facilitate this 
working. Instead the concept of personalisation forms a layer of rhetoric that residents and 
services have yet to fully understand or embrace. As Munro argues in the case of social 
work: 
 
‘the process of making human services including social work "auditable" is in 
danger of being destructive, creating a simplistic description of practice and 
focusing on achieving service outputs with little attention to user outcomes’ (Munro 
2004: 1075). 
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My findings agree with Munro (2004) and others (see for example Carey 2006) and clearly 
show that a new managerialist form of inspection leads to a diversion of resources to 
technology, software, consultants and technicians and paradoxically, as it goes against 
policy aims, constrains service user choice. The Inspection Record (IR), associated 
computer database and those processes expected of care services by the inspectorate, in 
terms of care planning and the AQAA (which was designed to be internet-based but two of 
the case study services were not connected to the internet), have served to divert focus 
from service users towards paperwork and technical aspects of providing care. Chapters 5 
and 6 clearly show this shift and the frustration it caused for managers, staff and 
inspectors. 
 
The modernisation agenda had a big impact on inspectors as it produced changes in their 
system of working: a reduction in inspections, an increase in data analysis and ‘desk 
work’, and a shift to home-based working. It was clear inspectors were not happy about 
their change in role and what they saw as marginalisation and deprofessionalisation. This 
finding is supported by a Unison (2007) study that showed inspectors had a lack of 
confidence in the CSCI leadership and the new inspection regime. They also felt alienated 
by the closing of offices and were worried about the lack of team dynamics that would be 
caused by home working: 
 
‘When we shift to working from home there’s going to be no one to check things 
with, or have a chat about, you know… ask about a certain home or how another 
inspector would deal with a certain situation, I don’t think that’s good’ (Inspector 
CH 4) 
 
Inspectors felt their job was being increasingly guided from the top-down, with little 
concern for their views. Although inspectors were consulted on changes and some were 
part of advisory panels the inspectors in the case studies felt that much of the consultation 
was tokenistic and was being imposed despite unhappiness at changes.  
 
There was clear evidence in the form of IBL, the development of KLORA guidelines and 
the AQAA, of the ‘Administrators Prerogative’ in policy making (Croley 1998). The CSCI 
leadership was slowly changing standards without formal changing of NMS or care home 
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regulations and therefore any act of parliament. They achieved this through reinterpretation 
of their inspection and judgement guidelines  
Self-governance: too much too soon? 
The shift to risk-based inspection places a greater emphasis on self-governance through 
introduction of the AQAA. The CSCI are shifting accountability to service management, 
and stepping back to provide the ‘check’, or safety-net if anything goes wrong. They 
justified this through the implementation of a stringent registration process and 
comprehensive training requirements for all care home staff. However, this system has not 
been successfully embedded everywhere. Self-governance success requires: long-term 
capacity building; effective information and meaningful participation; a co-production 
process and support to develop skills for decision-making. Each of these attributes requires 
a high level of skill and capacity and data from my studies shows that not all services and 
service managers possess the knowledge and skill to self-govern. Both managers who had 
not achieved their NVQ in care or management were finding it very difficult to implement 
changes required by the CSCI. For the problems of relying too heavily on self-reporting 
CSCI needs to look only to the US where self reporting has failed to induce significant 
improvements in nursing home care (Harrington 2001). 
 
Inspection stifling innovation and improvement 
There was a real feeling that inspection was stifling innovation. Managers were concerned 
that most of their working day was consumed with meeting standards and spoke of the 
burden of bureaucracy that inspection creates. Stifling of innovation was found in studies 
of the US healthcare system in the 1990s (Brennan and Berwick 1996; Walshe and Shortell 
2004) and the pressure on services in this study was certainly very high. It would be 
interesting to see how this pressure was channelled in services that were performing well 
against CSCI standards to see whether pressure created by inspection had led to innovative 
services, or whether the burden was simply being managed more effectively. 
 
There is a danger that extra pressure creates resistance and inertia as happened in CH 1 and 
3, which made little progress on the requirements issued after inspection. Findings from 
this study suggest that the only way to break this and ensure improvement is to adopt an 
approach with poorly performing homes that is compliance-led and works in partnership 
with services to build on strengths and support improvement. This aspect of regulation has 
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been marginalised in favour of inspection and standards-led goal setting. There is also little 
emphasis placed on the recommendations in the report, which could be more productively 
utilised as ‘catalytic feedback’ (Braithwaite, et al. 2007) if their cumulative importance is 
emphasised. The managers in the case studies largely ignored recommendations because 
they were either too preoccupied with requirements or knew they were not enforceable and 
therefore decided they were not important. As the Line Manager of CH 2 claimed during 
my second visit where he dismissed the idea on acting on any of them: 
 
‘well they’re just recommendations… I mean they suggest what we should do but 
we don’t have to do it if we don’t agree’ (Line Manager CH 2, interview 2) 
 
The existing burden of requirements and lack of compliance-led inspection created a 
situation where managers were unable to complete requirements so were certainly unable 
to focus on recommendations with a view to forward planning and step-wise improvement. 
 
A devolution of responsibility to commissioners 
Inspection is only part of a patchwork of regulation that is interlocked and interconnected 
but that often works independently. The CSCI modernisation plans have devolved further 
powers to local councils. The devolution was well underway during the cases studies and 
there was evidence of considerable fragmentation and duplication. Managers were 
particularly annoyed at the duplication between local council quality monitoring and CSCI 
inspections, there was duplication not just in terms of frequency and structure of site visits 
but also in terms of the types of submissions. The problems were exacerbated because 
there were often different forms and methods of submission, so for example, the contents 
of the CSCI’s new AQAA self-assessment could not simply be duplicated and given to the 
council, as they wanted things in a different format. This is an example of the lack of 
joined-up working between public sector organisations that promotes inefficiency and 
frustration. Similarly inspectors spoke of a lack of formal routes of communication 
between inspectors and council quality monitoring teams meaning useful information was 
not being shared and the bureaucratic burden on services was increased as a result. 
 
The launch of the World Class Commissioning (WCC) framework has de facto devolved 
some regulatory powers to local councils because they must ensure they are ‘managing 
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local health systems’ and ‘making sound financial investments’ (Department of Health 
2007c). Public Service Agreement 19 also states that local authorities must ensure better 
care for all (HM Treasury 2007). According to the inspectors and managers in this study 
local councils now have quality assurance teams and contract monitoring teams (usually 
both) to monitor quality and assure they are commissioning high quality services. There is 
no prescription from national government over quality monitoring, the CSCI provide the 
national check, but according to inspectors in this study councils tend to stick quite closely 
to the CSCI NMS, but this did not result in similar bureaucratic requirements.  
 
The relationship between the CSCI and councils was negatively affected by the dual role 
of the CSCI as an inspector of individual services and councils. The inspectors had very 
little communication with monitoring teams in councils and they believed it was because 
of this uneasy organisational relationship. 
 
Through its own evolution and the development of the roles of councils under WCC the 
CSCI appeared to be slowly devolving power to local councils, certainly in terms of 
enforcement. As CSCI punitive action against services was such a cumbersome process 
new performance assessment outcomes frameworks for councils (CQC 2008) place 
responsibility on them to deliver the following: 
• Performance management sets clear targets for delivering priorities (p 42). 
• Shape the market to improve outcomes and good value (p 43). 
 
The CSCI and its successor body have begun this process by delegating responsibilities to 
council contracts officers and adult protection co-ordinators to investigate areas of concern. 
Contracts offices are able to temporarily suspend placements to services and therefore use 
market principles to force improvements. It is clear that this method of enforcement is 
problematic not least because certain areas have a shortage of care home beds, which 
means suspending registrations can cause capacity problems (Furness 2009). 
A suitable model to induce service improvement? 
The idea of strengths-based and compliance-based models of regulation have their 
foundations in the work of Etzioni (1961) who described three types of mechanisms for 
gaining compliance from an actor: normative, coercive, and remunerative.  
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According to Etzioni’s (1961) analysis normative mechanisms induce compliance either by 
ensuring the regulator and the regulatee have mutual goals, which in the case of social care 
should be resident wellbeing, or through the legitimacy and authority of the person 
requesting action (the inspector). According to Matland (1995) who developed Etzioni’s 
model in the context of policy implementation: 
 
‘For administrative implementation, where levels of conflict are low, normative 
compliance mechanisms are generally sufficient. The orders given are perceived as 
legitimate, and there is little controversy that might lead to subversion.’ (Matland 
1995: 161) 
 
Essentially in this scenario the regulatee subscribes to the authority of the regulator and 
accepts their expert opinion. For regulation to work in a normative fashion it relies on the 
service (regulatee) to believe that the inspector, the person who is detecting, judging and 
enforcing, is an expert and has a greater knowledge of the social care process than the 
management of the service. I have shown in this research that this is often not the case and 
managers question both the expertise of the inspector and motives of inspection, which 
some saw as at least in part a self-serving exercise on behalf of the regulator.  
 
System tension between the CSCI and inspectors further undermined the authority of the 
inspectors because they were clearly frustrated by the erosion of their professional 
judgement and autonomy to exert a street-level influence. 
 
A coercive mechanism threatens sanctions for failing to comply with a request for action, 
Etzioni (1961) described this mechanism as a last resort, which could be expected to be 
effective since it is clear and easily monitored. However, as this research has shown the 
success of coercion is dependent on the efficiency of the mechanism employed to enforce 
it. The regulator can have ultimate coercive power, in the case of the CSCI the ability to 
close a service, in theory, but if in practice the process is long and cumbersome the threat 
becomes empty, and the coercive mechanisms less effective. This is clearly shown by the 
many timescales for improvement that were flouted by the four case study services. 
 
A remunerative mechanism must ‘include sufficient incentives, often additional resources, 
to make the desired course of action attractive to the agent’ (Matland 1995: 161). The only 
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remunerative action residential social care regulation offers is through an indirect influence 
over council commissioning. In reference to this the manager of CH 1 explained, he was 
operating in a vicious circle where he wanted more money from the council to make it 
possible to improve the service, in the form of a secure block contract, but the council were 
not prepared to place any more people in CH 1 until he improved the CSCI report and 
NMS scores. However, he felt that he had a sufficient number of private residents not to be 
unduly concerned. This suggests there is no cooperation between agencies to utilise this 
method of persuasion. The case of CH 1 does, however, provide an argument for the need 
for better joint working between the regulator and councils. If there could be a joint 
mechanism developed whereby improved ratings from the regulator led to an increased 
chance of funding from councils then a remunerative element of compliance could be built 
into the regulatory framework.  
 
This research has shown that the CSCI was failing to use any of these three mechanisms of 
compliance effectively. 
 
Realising that there are a plethora of incentives and disincentives within social care 
regulation Braithwaite et al (2007) examined the differences between regulation policies of 
older persons nursing care in the UK, US and Australia. They found that the US tended 
towards a deterrent, risk-based approach with coercive sanctions to effect change, but 
Australia had paradigmatically shifted its nursing home regulation towards a model based 
on continuous improvements of strengths, based on a normative set of goals. My data 
suggests that the CSCI model has struggled with conflicting pressures and evolved into a 
model that takes elements of both strengths-based and deterrent-based regulation, but 
which under its recent development and as it amalgamates with the Healthcare 
Commission and Mental health Act Commission to form the Care Quality Commission 
(CQC), has shifted further down the deterrent, risk-based route. This is evidenced by the 
change to a three-year inspection cycle, based on detailed risk-assessments from self-
reported data. Under this model it is harder to focus on continuous improvement because 
contact with services is less frequent and intense. Even services rated ‘poor’ that will still 
have yearly inspection visits are subjected to a lighter, risk-based assessment necessitated 
through financial constraints and justified as modernisation.  
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Building on the work of Braithwaite et al (2007) I have developed a typology of the 
CSCI’s ‘effector’ process (see Figure 3) which shows how the CSCI tries to use elements 
of strengths based and deterrent-based philosophies. 
 
Figure 3: Typology of the process to affect change in the regulation of older peoples’ 
social care 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Adapted from Braithwaite, et al. 2007: 319) 
 
The CSCI can be broadly categorised as deterrence-oriented, with a strong focus on 
identifying deficiencies, putting agreements in place for these to be improved and 
imposing penalties and sanctions (see Figure 3). However, in practice my research has 
shown this is not how the regulator works. The processes in the bottom two segments of 
the deterrent-based pyramid were routinely used and according to CSCI statistics are often 
enough to force services to improve. However, where the CSCI reaches the third tier, 
‘sanctions to deter’, on the deterrent-based pyramid services in the case studies either 
chose to ignore them or did not have the knowledge to remedy them. Transgressions 
frequently went unpunished often failing to meet more than one timescale for action 
because the process of ‘escalated sanctions’ was so cumbersome. This meant the local 
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offices resorted to strengths-based methods to foster improvement using informal 
encouragement, discretion to create local level solutions, and regular Random Inspections 
(RI’s) to follow up a services’ progress. 
 
The incentive of a good report is used to encourage improvements under the rationale of 
active citizenship. Residents and their families must access, critically engage and then 
make the ‘right choices’ based on the information within the report. However, this 
incentive is marginalised when considered in the context of data from this research: only 
two relatives and one resident were aware of the CSCI’s annual report and only one 
relative had actually consulted it before their parent moved into the home. Managers were 
aware of this lack of consultation and felt that negative reports were not having a 
noticeable negative impact on resident numbers. Only CH 1 expressed any negative 
outcomes as the result of receiving a negative report and that was because the council 
would not block purchase any beds, a practice which is now coming to an end anyway as a 
result of the new World Class Commissioning (WCC) framework (Department of Health 
2007d), which places the emphasis on purchasing services that are tailored to the 
individual. 
 
Support is supposed to be provided by other non-governmental organisations such as the 
GSCC and by training and qualifications that all managers and staff are supposed to 
acquire to do their respective jobs. The strengths-based elements of the pyramids are 
provided outside the direct scope of regulation, for example through commissioning bodies 
or industry awards. The problem with the system is that there is still imperfect information 
about this support and a lack of incentives for some managers to use it. 
 
The goal of the CSCI when it set out was to both improve standards within the care sector 
and catch those services that were failing to achieve minimum standards. To enhance this 
there should be a robust and explicit strengths-based agenda with the safety net provided 
by strong punitive sanctions if a service continually fails to improve. The findings from 
this thesis suggest the CSCI are failing to implement this system effectively at the moment. 
The current system has marginalised inspectors’ knowledge and experience in favour of a 
risk-based system based on data analysis, where any inspector can go to any home without 
prior knowledge of the service. In doing this the CSCI has lost many of its beneficial 
strengths-based facets, such as reliance on the professionalism of inspectors and the use of 
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professional judgement and experience to guide inspection findings and find the best 
mechanisms to induce improvement. 
 
Theorising inspection 
Writing about evaluation Weiss (1987) argues that the programmes being evaluated are 
borne out of political decisions, which means: 
 
‘They emerged from the rough and tumble of political support, opposition and 
bargaining. Attached to them are the reputations of legislative sponsors, the careers 
of administrators, the jobs of program staff and the expectations of clients’. (Weiss 
1987: 49) 
 
These considerations provide a framework to theorise inspection in the context of new 
managerialist ideology, and the technical influence of the administrator (CSCI) (Corley 
1998). I have argued that inspection and a vision of service provision both stem from 
political considerations. Claims from CSCI suggest they envisage an inspection process 
that places service users’ views at the core of assessment. However, data in this research 
shows that the function of the system is creating barriers to improvement. Rather than 
helping to change social and institutional structures within which the problems for the 
services were generated and sustained inspectors were forced to use a model of inspection 
that focuses on a set of discrete standards, measured in terms of policies and procedures in 
place, specific output responses in surveys, problems identified and improvements 
required.  
 
The CSCI vision has been obfuscated by the technicalisation of inspection and the 
momentum of the regulatory agency, which because of the size of the organisation and the 
systems in place has become difficult to change. I have built on the arguments of others to 
contend that the technicalisation of CSCI’s vision of improvement into standards has 
meant that, despite claims to the contrary, focus of inspection has been predominantly on 
‘quality as measured’ rather than ‘quality as experienced’. 
 
Where quality is viewed as measurable judging quality takes on the characteristic of what 
Stake and Schwandt (2006), when discussing of the quality of evaluands, term ‘thinking 
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criterially’ (Stake and Schwandt 2006). This means an explicit transformation of evidence 
gathered into the appropriate standard for it and ‘is more or less an experience distant 
undertaking’ (Stake and Schwandt 2006: 407). Conversely: 
 
‘Quality-as-experienced starts from the view that quality is a phenomenon that we 
personally experience and only later make technical, if need be. This view 
emphasises grasping quality in experience near understandings, that is, in the 
language and embodied action of those who are actually undergoing the 
experiencing of a program or policy.’ (Stake and Schwandt 2006: 408) 
 
The focus on inspection in terms of its technical function does not allow for this level of 
analysis. Instead it focuses on ‘experience-distant’, criteria based measurement against 
standards. 
 
As the process of regulation shifts ever further to focusing on ‘experience-distant’ criteria 
inspectors are increasingly being treated as ‘moral dopes standing mute at the margins of 
everyday responsibilities’ (Gubrium 1989: 197). Rather, they are sensitive to ‘the 
consistencies and contradictions between what they claim to know about clients and what 
they are requested to document’ (Gubrium, Buckholdt et al 1989: 197). It is this valuable 
tacit knowledge and understanding that must be better utilised to overcome the current 
barriers to improvement of inspection. 
 
There is a clear tension in inspection that results from the interaction between 
standardisation, what Gubrium, Buckholdt and Lynott (1989) call a ‘descriptive tyranny of 
forms’, and local level decision-making. However, evidence from this study suggests that 
inspection has not completely lost all narrative and contextual elements because there were 
examples of flexibility in the discretion some inspectors used.  
 
It is not enough to simply want to know the outcomes of inspection but also why those 
outcomes appear—or fail to appear. Inspection in its current form and the progression it is 
making under a ‘modernisation’ agenda is in danger of losing this enlightenment, quality 
as experienced aspect by becoming a ‘tick box’ exercise driven by forms and technology. 
The Inspector of CH 4 told of her dismay at this prospect: 
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‘I don’t want us to become like the Healthcare Commission where they go in to a 
hospital and sit in a boardroom for two days without even going into the ward’ 
(Inspector CH 4) 
 
While it is important to emphasise these discretions have not been eliminated, as the CSCI 
admits ‘there is still a big gap between vision and reality… most users still experience 
‘one-size fits all’ care’ (CSCI 2009). The encroachment of further target driven emphasis 
despite the rhetoric on outcomes is moving the CSCI in a retrogressive direction, which is 
serving to reinforce a one size fits all model of care. 
 
The CSCI as a ‘critical foe’ 
The concept of a critical friend has its foundations in educational reform of the 1970s: 
 
‘A critical friend can be defined as a trusted person who asks provocative 
questions, provides data to be examined through another lens, and offers critiques 
of a person’s work as a friend. A critical friend takes the time to fully understand 
the context of the work presented and the outcomes that the person or group is 
working toward. The friend is an advocate for the success of that work’ (Costa and 
Kallick 1993: 49). 
 
The notion of a critical friend could be applied to the act of inspection with inspectors 
providing a critique of care. However, data from the case studies suggests that rather than a 
‘friend’ the CSCI acts as a ‘foe’. The term infers opposition and this reflects the 
adversarial relationship found in the case studies. The elements that represent the notion of 
‘friend’ – ‘taking the time to fully understand the context’, being an ‘advocate for success’ 
- were noticeably constrained for inspectors both by the technical constraints of the 
inspection process (user-distant, critical measurement) and the deterrence-led approach 
that prevented inspectors working in partnership with services to offer support and be ‘an 
advocate for success’. 
 
This focus coupled with the burden of paperwork felt by services led to the perceptions 
from managers and staff that for the CSCI inspection is the purpose itself, rather than 
improvements in quality. It was clear that this led to frustrations for inspectors, who felt 
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that although the criteria are useful indicators of quality they are not necessarily good 
proxies for actual improvements and improved outcomes for residents. They would have 
liked more time to spend ascertaining the experiences and views of inspection and learning 
from experiences of a home with a view to drawing on aspects of partnership working. 
 
Unfortunately in the context of ‘modernisation’ and resource cuts this was not possible and 
inspection, although figures will show that it is raising standards against the NMS 
indicators, is actually taking a retrogressive approach to improving care because the 
technicalisation of the process of both care provision and inspection are acting as barriers 
to improvement.  
 
This thesis has taken a critical stance against the CSCI’s modernisation of social care 
inspection. While I stand by my endeavour to hold a mirror up to inspection my 
conclusions must be taken in the context of improvements created by CSCI. Statistical data 
(see CSCI 2009) shows an improvement in quality as measured against the baseline of 
NMS and data from this study show stakeholders think at least some improvements have 
resulted from the tightening of regulation. The standards are not the sole problem; they set 
out a well researched vision of social care. However, the new managerial approach to 
implementing these standards is clearly not working to improve all services.  
 
POLICY AND PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS 
These conclusions expect a revision of current government policy and CSCI practice. 
There are numerous policy pressures that influence the way inspection is formed and 
delivered. Never more so than now have economic pressures been quite so prominent and 
the argument I make for a broader more inclusive inspection process that gives inspectors 
the opportunity to spend more time with residents and work in teams if appropriate would 
likely be dismissed in policy making circles as idealist and unaffordable. 
 
In the context of the critical analysis within this thesis I now offer policy and practice 
recommendations.  
 
The first set of these are made without the constraint of current financial budgets, but I do 
not apologies for this fact as clearly part of the problem is the current chronic under-
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funding of social care (HM Government 2008), and this should be addressed politically 
alongside restructuring of the social care system. 
 
In acknowledgement of prevailing political opinion and economic constraints I also offer a 
second, more pragmatic set of recommendations, which do not offer a route to eliminating 
all of the criticisms in this thesis, but which I consider achievable in the context of 
structural constraints.  
 
In an ideal world… 
The findings in this thesis paint a reasonably negative picture of care homes. In all four 
case studies the main reason given by the managers for failings was the lack of resources. 
In the context of these findings, and HM Treasury’s estimate of the £6 billion funding 
black hole (HM Government 2008), there needs to be fundamental changes to both the care 
delivery and inspection systems.  
 
The Treasury itself states that a world-class care system would require a huge amount of 
new money (HM Government 2008). This could be achieved in two key ways: 
1. Social Insurance – people insuring against their care needs in later life, either 
through active (people compelled to invest in a state-led and/ or private-led 
insurance scheme) or passive (no compulsion but risk no or bare-minimum levels 
of care if opt-out) compulsion. 
2. An increase in (income proportional) taxes to fund an improved and universal care 
system. 
 
Accepting the principles of social justice, by far the most equitable and just means of 
achieving this is through increasing taxes to give older people a more dignified final 
chapter in their life. This would allow all services the budget to increase their staffing 
ratios, and ‘professionalise’ staff through increased training and higher salaries. By 
professionalising the workforce staff will be in a position to innovate and, because of a 
greater sense of professional responsibility, will be prepared to spend more time on record 
keeping and planning. A closer ratio of staff to residents would also allow staff to spend 
more time with residents, engaging them in activities or simply ‘having a chat’, which my 
findings suggest was valued above almost everything else by residents. More proactive and 
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meaningful engagement of residents must also include empowerment and an increased 
emphasis on residents guiding their own care. This needs to be much greater than in the 
current system that only tokenisitically attempts to engage residents with their care plans. 
Engagement should not be driven through a technical process of filling in required forms, 
which it is currently, rather it should come through a shared focus and belief by residents 
that their input will be valued and regarded as highly as the input of staff. 
 
Without these changes it seems inevitable that the institutionalism I found will continue to 
be replicated in services. A better resourced system will both improve care, but also allow 
more effective regulatory compliance because the services will be in a position to better 
deal with the regulatory burden (more staff will free other staff time to spend on 
compliance).  
 
However, the regulatory burden should also be reduced. Instances where record keeping 
was being carried out primarily to re-enforce the role of the regulator must be eliminated. 
What is required is a focus on the tacit knowledge of inspectors and their freedom to 
weigh-up complex judgements based on their own knowledge and experience as opposed 
to having to refer to a set of KLORA guidelines. They should also be able to discuss 
improvement with services. They should be given reign to offer constructive advice where 
they think it is necessary and share good practice they have observed elsewhere. This can 
only be achieved through a system built on the premise of solidarity and mutual trust, 
where providers are happy to support one-another and work together with the inspectorate 
in a spirit of collective endeavour and responsibility.  To achieve this there needs to be a 
rethink of the system of social care and a shift away from an ideology of new 
managerialism and profit driven efficiency towards a system based on social justice and 
collectivism. 
 
A more pragmatic approach to change...  
I am wary of expecting too much from policy makers. However, this thesis makes the case 
that despite saying the correct things the CSCI has developed a system of inspection that 
prevents a successful outcomes focus. The successor to the CSCI, the CQC, is re-
evaluating inspection methods in 2010 and I argue it needs a reorientation of focus away 
from technology-led audit to a more enlightenment, quality as experience based inspection 
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programme. The following recommendations take a more pragmatic view of inspection 
and accept that the whole-scale structural changes recommended above are unlikely to find 
their route into practice. However, these recommendations do represent a fundamental 
refocusing towards ‘quality as experienced’ (Stake and Schwandt 2006) by the people who 
live in care, rather than the ‘experience distant’ (Stake and Schwandt 2006) records that 
supposedly represent the quality of their care and which currently take up a 
disproportionate amount of inspectors time. 
 
There are a number of ways of improving service users experience and engagement with 
the existing inspection regime: 
1. Empowering residents and their families through better communication with the 
general public about the rights and responsibilities of service providers and the role 
of the regulator in assuring these. 
 
This could be achieved through a longer engagement process during the inspection 
facilitated through a longer inspection period.  This would allow inspectors longer 
to talk to residents and relatives, which my findings suggest is key to success. 
 
I would also advocate the reintroduction of lay inspectors, who should either have 
direct experience of care home living themselves or have had a family member or 
close friend resident in a service and therefore have knowledge of the workings of a 
service. 
 
2. Making service users voices louder and more active in inspection, which will only 
be realised if point 1 is achieved. 
 
3. Changing culture in both the inspectorate and services through a model of 
regulation that focuses more on a partnership approach, including allowing 
inspectors to build upon catalytic feedback using their tacit knowledge to discuss 
options with inspectors during the feedback process. 
 
In order to enhance the support and improvement function of the new regulator it 
should offer greater practical guidance to services in the form of best practice 
templates for care plans and other record keeping functions. Not every service 
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would have to adhere to these exact guidelines; if a service has a unique or novel 
way of planning or record keeping that fulfilled the necessary requirements then 
this would be acceptable. The best practice guidelines should evolve and inspectors 
should be encouraged to share best practice seen elsewhere with services that are 
failing to meet the standards. 
 
There is also scope to improve the inspection process and outcomes: 
• Inspectors to be not just be allowed but encouraged to reflect more in practice and 
not be so constrained by guidelines (such as KLORA) 
• Inspectors should be encouraged and supported to regularly reflect on practice and 
suggest both national and local-level initiatives and solutions. 
• Involving service users more in the development and changes to inspection practice 
when ‘shifting the goal posts’ – to prevent further distance from residents’ direct 
experiences. 
• Using their understanding of outputs to create links to outcomes – this can only be 
achieved through more in-depth interviews with residents. 
• Halting the continuing technicalisation of inspection. 
 
This could be orchestrated from a ‘top-down’ level, which would require a re-thinking of 
KLORA to create a balance between consistent standards and local-level flexibility. I have 
demonstrated that discretion was already being used at the local-level in the case studies 
despite the ongoing tightening of criteria governing judgements; so to facilitate this 
officially is not compromising current practice. 
 
Alternatively, and perhaps more realistically in the current financial and political climate, 
inspectors should reflect on ways to exert discretion. This should both build on existing 
discretion, but also develop new and innovative methods to improve inspection process 
and outcomes. In this I take heart from a previously used quote by Evans and Harris (2004) 
that suggests: 
 
‘…by creating rules organizations create discretion’ (Evans and Harris, 2004: 883) 
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It is not enough to simply want to know the outcomes of inspection are but also why those 
outcomes appear - or fail to appear. This can be achieved by marrying the concepts of audit 
and enlightenment evaluation (Shaw 1999). 
 
Better joint working with councils 
There is clear evidence that under the WCC strategy further responsibility over quality 
assurance is being devolved to councils. Without any additional funding they must now 
meet quality assurance and contract monitoring commitments under PSA 19. The CQC 
will need to work better with local councils at the level of the on the ground inspector. This 
will require a removal of barriers that existed between the CSCI and council as a result of 
the dual role of the CSCI as inspector of councils and inspector of service providers (i.e. if 
the council is purchasing services from poorly performing services it would often be 
marked down by the CSCI).  
 
This is necessary for both the successful regulation of services and to try and eliminate the 
duplication services currently face.  
 
The CQC: Talking softly while carrying a big stick? 
In some senses these recommendations are irrelevant. There is little doubt, in this current 
economic climate and with a continued emphasis on new managerialist ideology, that the 
CQC will continue down the risk-based route. For evidence of the CQC’s direction one 
need look no further than the comments of the new CQC Chairwomen Barbara Young who 
claimed the CSCI had been ‘running the finger around the toilet bowl’ (Carvel 2008b) 
without many statistical or risk-based tools to target inspections and encourage or even 
force improvements. 
 
Chairwomen Young also emphasised the deterrent-based angle the CQC will adopt, 
although she maintained it would try to also exert a strengths-based influence. She claimed 
the CQC would aim ‘to talk softly but carry a big stick’ (Carvel 2008a: 1). However, under 
the Care Standards Act 2008 the CQC has new powers to give public warnings, fine 
providers or suspend registration if they do not comply, rather than having to immediately 
reach to the ‘ultimate sanction’ of closure. The new powers in the CSA 2008 address 
inspectors’ concerns about the inability to enforce change if providers continually fail to 
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meet timescales for improvement. Under the new powers of the CQC CH 1 and CH 3 
could be warned, fined or have their licence suspended, rather than before when the only 
real enforcement action was to cancel registration and close a service. There will need to 
be further research to determine whether these new powers serve to improve compliance. 
 
Despite the strengthening of the punitive angle there is a need for a stronger supportive 
dimension, which focuses on helping services improve rather than attempting to force 
them. To do so greater emphasis should be placed on ‘strengths-based’ inspection would 
help services, especially independent providers who have no internal assistance. But 
financial and bureaucratic constraints mean that this service has been removed from 
inspectors and placed in the hands of other non-governmental organisations such as the 
GSCC. However, while there are avenues of support available it seems that information 
has not yet disseminated to some care home managers the distinction between the role of 
inspectors as assessors and support and advice provided from other third party 
organisations is not clearly mapped.  
 
REFLECTIONS 
Further research 
This research has raised a number of questions and there is scope for number of further 
research projects: 
1. It would be useful to conduct a similar qualitative study of compliant services to 
determine whether the same problems were evident. The assumption is that because 
they are compliant with standards the services will exhibit a much more user-
focused service and not be struggling to adhere to standards. However, as I have 
argued I suspect many of the problems are systemic within social care, but have 
different levels of impact. 
 
2. In light of the lack of effectiveness research it would be interesting to see further 
research into how frequently requirements are ignored and how many consecutive 
timescales can be missed before further action is taken. It would also be interesting 
to conduct a wider study of inspectors to examine the tactics they use to enforce 
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standards, and the street-level techniques they use to either complement or usurp 
prescribed protocols and guidelines. 
 
3. In adherence to the current political favour for research centred around controlled 
studies it would potentially be possible to design a study of effectiveness using a 
stepped wedge design (See MRC framework on Complex Interventions (Craig, et 
al. 2008)). A group of comparable homes would be allocated into study arms, one 
of which receives an inspection at the beginning of the trial and the other which 
receives an inspection at the end of the trial period. This would be possible because 
inspections function on a yearly cycle. I would expect the study to involve both a 
quantitative effectiveness element and a qualitative element and the design could 
use outcomes from this study as indicators. 
 
Unique access 
Travers (2007) has talked about the difficulties of accessing inspection and I was in a 
unique position of being able to observe and inspection and then interview the major 
stakeholders over a nine-month period. The findings from this study are therefore the result 
of a unique study of the CSCI.  
 
 Reflexive inquiry? 
I was surprised by the number of study respondents who asked me for advice during the 
case studies. Questions came from all groups: 
• Managers and staff asked me questions about their service and whether I thought it 
represented good practice; they also enquired about the NMS and whether I thought 
aspects of the service would meet the relevant NMS. 
• Relatives wanted to know what I thought of the service and they had questions 
concerning complaints; they often wanted my normative opinion on both good 
quality inspection and care. 
 
I was careful to decline these requests and aspired to remain neutral as a researcher. This 
line of questioning suggested that the power relationships of the interviews were not 
always as a researcher – staff member / manager as I had intended, but that I was 
occasionally seen as an ‘official’ affiliated to the CSCI. 
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APPENDIX 1: SYSTEMATIC REVIEW PROTOCOL 
Title 
‘The impact of the regulation and inspection process on residential care for older people’. 
 
Background 
Effective Inspection – Why conduct a Systematic Review? 
There is little existing evidence to suggest what constitutes effective inspection in social 
care, or whether effective inspection promotes factors which older people claim improve 
their lives. In the UK the Care Standards Act (2000) states that the regulatory body shall 
have the general duty of keeping the Secretary of State informed about the quality of 
services, and ‘shall have the general duty of encouraging improvement in the quality of 
Part II services (those that are required by law to register with the regulatory 
commission)’ (2000). It is unclear what impact inspection has on outcomes of social care 
or what outcomes designate effective inspection. There are various ways the inspection 
process could be judged to improve quality of care, including: 
• Improving care homes’ performances against a set of measurable standards 
• Improving the lives of residents as measured, for example, by an increase in 
participation, or increase in measured objective well-being. 
• Inducing an increase in staffing levels, which research in both Australia and 
the United States has shown corresponds directly with improved care 
(Braithwaite 2001; Harrington 2001).  
• Impacting on whether care is purchased from a particular home. As yet 
there is little international work on establishing links between care home 
performance and purchasing of residential care services, either by 
individuals or by government authorities (Harrington 2001).  
 
It is unclear whether inspection works in all instances, in all older persons’ care homes, or 
whether it has a greater effect on some homes’ compared to others and particular outcomes 
over others. This protocol is driven by the necessity to improve the knowledge base of 
social care inspection and inform policy making by facilitating decision-making that is 
well informed by evidence. 
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CSCI has very little information on the efficacy of the inspection process, which suggests 
there is a dearth of accessible research. This apparent lack of impact research is not just 
limited to social care inspection. There has been little policy research done in the UK on 
outcomes research per se, with the Department of Health instead focusing much of their 
work on monitoring the impact of legislation (Macdonald 1999).  The rhetoric of 
governments, built on or influenced by the third way pragmatism of ‘what counts is what 
works’ and the subsequent belief that polices should be ‘evidence based’ is left wanting 
when there is no systematic body of evidence on the benefit and costs of inspection and 
regulatory regimes (see Hood, James et al. 2000; Boyne, Day et al. 2002).  
 
A lack of existing evidence 
The apparent lack of research on effectiveness seems to represent a certain level of 
scepticism social care researchers have towards the epistemology of evidence based policy 
making and its affiliation to health based research. However, in order to be accountable 
social care regulatory bodies, as regulators of government policy (or at the very least social 
justice), need to reflect on the efficacy of their work and establish a knowledge base from 
which they can begin to assess their performance. What this review aims to achieve is to 
begin to build a map of international evidence on the efficacy of social care inspection and 
help to inform evidence based decision making in the social care sector by systematically 
searching for, and analysing all relevant studies in the field of inspection and regulation of 
older people.  
 
In conjunction there is also a need to build upon questions of efficacy and determine what 
makes inspection more or less effective. Within the UK there has been a paradigmatic shift 
to place service users, not just social care professionals, at the forefront of improving 
social care. In light of this inclusive direction and in concomitance with considering the 
impact and effect of inspection, it is necessary to examine why inspection has an effect 
(either negative or positive) on the users of social care and understand how the inspection 
process directly effects the individuals it aims to serve. 
Objectives 
The aim of this review is two-fold and it will be conducted in two separate parts: 
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C. Effectiveness question: Assess evidence for the efficacy or otherwise of the 
regulation and inspection process to improve living conditions and well-being in 
older people (over 65) living in residential care? 
 
D. Process question: In what conditions are inspection and regulation more or less 
effective? How do service users view the inspection process? 
 
In order to answer question A I will use the best available evidence from well-designed 
and explicit trials, whether randomised or not. 
 
Question A will locate studies which show what works but they will not tell us why or how 
they do therefore I propose that the second part of this review will look at process issues. 
Question B will be answered using data from qualitative research and other types of 
process evaluations which reflect key contextual and implementation issues. 
 
A descriptive systematic map of the research evidence relevant to answering questions A 
and B will be produced. Following this there will be an in-depth review and synthesis of 
the quality and findings of the studies. 
 
Criteria for considering studies in this review 
Types of studies 
Objective A 
Four types of study will be included in this section of the review. They will be (for details 
of inclusion thresholds for each design see Quality assessment section): 
1. Randomised Control Trials (RCTs) 
2. Controlled Trials using a quasi-random allocation (CTs) 
3. Controlled Before and After Study (CBA) 
4. Interrupted Time Series Design (ITS) 
 
Objective B 
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Studies which examine the conditions in which inspection is more or less effective will be 
included in the review. They will be assessed using criteria developed by Kavanagh, 
Harden et al (2005), according to whether:  
(i) The aims and objectives were clearly reported;  
(ii) There was an adequate description of the context in which the research was carried out 
(including a rationale for why the study was undertaken);  
(iii) There was an adequate description of the sample used and the methods for how the 
sample was identified and recruited;  
(iv) There was an adequate description of the methods used to collect data; and  
(v) There was adequate description of the methods used to analyse data. 
 
Timeframe of search 
The review will cover material from 1991 to the present (2007). This time period has been 
chosen because 1991 is the year of the 1st annual report by the Social Services Inspectorate 
and is the first year where the effects of the influential report on “Caring for people” were 
implemented. This period represents the point in time when the decision was made to 
‘promote decision-making processes and service provision which reflect the needs and 
wishes of users… and… aims to replace systems dominated by professionals with 
approaches based on partnership with service users’ (Department of Health Social Services 
Inspectorate 1991: 14). As the 1991 report by the SSI asserts ‘… these changes represent a 
substantial shift in the culture of the PSS (Personal Social Services)’ (Department of 
Health Social Services Inspectorate 1991)  and began the shift to the emphasis onto the 
user involvement that we have in UK care services today. This timeframe also allows for 
similar trends of transition in other countries to be reflected in research, such as the 
influence in the US of quality standards being established in law in 1987 (Harrington 
2001) and the regulatory shift towards evaluating outcomes for residents in Australia in 
1989 (Braithwaite 2001).  
 
Types of participants 
Older people over 65, whom for reasons of frailty, or other conditions which require care, 
live in a residential care home (board and care home, or assisted living facilities). For the 
purpose of this review Residential Social Care is defined as a ‘care home which is 
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providing personal care’ (CSCI 2006). There is a caveat to this definition in that there are 
occasions where care homes for older people accept residents who by virtue of their 
condition (such as the early onset of dementia), require the services that an older persons 
care home provides. I will not exclude a study in which a care home that provides a 
specific service for, and predominantly cares for (over 85%) older people but has a small 
minority of those under 65 because of their specific requirements.  
 
This review does not tense include:  
1. older persons’ nursing homes, which provide skilled medical care.  
2. residential care for children or adults where care is aimed at those people under 65, 
or people under 65 make up over 15% of the population. 
 
There will be no limitations on language and interpreters will be used where appropriate. 
Types of intervention 
The intervention being measured is inspection, which for the purposes of this review is 
defined as: 
 Independently examining an institution to assess shortcomings in relation to 
official standards and/ or stakeholder views and evaluations.  
Types of outcome measures 
Objective A (Effectiveness question) 
A range of outcome measures will be identified and analysed where appropriate. These 
may include: 
1. Improvements in measured outcomes 
• As measured against a set of independently devised standards enshrined in 
law, which may include: 
i. National Minimum Standards as legislated for by national 
government 
ii. Standards as devised by local or regional government authorities 
iii. Standards devised by an independent, non-governemtnal 
organisation who have been charged with regulating social care. 
2. Impact on residents well-being (as measured by either: objective measures such as 
the Human Development Index or subjective measures), such as: 
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• Ensuring all of an individual’s Activities for Daily Living (ADLs) are met 
• Interpersonal functioning 
i. Care home community participation and involvement 
ii. Daily activity 
iii. Peer relationships 
• Behavioural outcomes 
i. Behaviour problems as measured by carers reports and any 
(standardised) measures 
3. Improvements in the lives/ conditions of care providers’  
• Morale 
• Employment retention and measurement of employment vacancies 
4. Cost effectiveness 
• Improving cost effectiveness to increase the sustainability of caring 
• Identifying if costs are prohibitive to the extent that they discourage 
individuals from seeking care services they require 
 
Objective B (Process question) 
A range of process measures will be identified and analysed where appropriate. These may 
include: 
1. User experiences 
2. Providers’ experience 
3. Inspectors’ experience 
 
Examining for example: 
• Perception of the efficacy of inspection at improving outcomes 
• In what instances do these group(s) identify inspection as being most effective 
• What do stakeholders think about the inspection process 
Search Strategy 
Reports will be identified from the following sources: 
• Bibliographic databases 
• Hand searching of key journals 
• Reference list of key papers 
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• Direct requests to key organisations 
• Key websites 
 
Electronic searchers will be conducted across a range of bibliographic databases for 
national and international research published since 1991. Websites and requests to key 
organisations will be used to find relevant research that has not been published in peer 
review journals. 
 
Bibliographic databases that will be searched are: 
 
UK 
• Ageline via CSA Illumia 
• Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts (ASSIA)  
• CommunityWISE 
• PAIS International (Public Affairs Information Service) 
• HMIC (Health Management Information Consortium) 
• Sociological Abstracts 
• Social Services Abstracts 
• Social Work Abstracts via Ovid 
• Social Policy and Practice 
• Social Care Online 
which includes: 
• CareData 
• ELSC (Electronic Library for Social Care) 
• Zetoc 
• EPPI-Centre 
• TRIP (Turning Research Into Practice) Database  
 
International Databases 
• International Bibliography of the Social Sciences 
• PSYCinfo 
• PubMed 
• Web of Science 
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• Abstracts in Social Gerontology – via CSA Illumina 
• Econlit via Ovid 
• SOSIG: Social Welfare 
 
US 
• CINAHL (Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature) via Ovid 
Websites to search  
• ESRC 
• Centre for Evidence Based Social Services (CEBSS) 
• SOSIG: social welfare 
• HERO  
Grey Literature 
• SIGLE, European grey literature since 1980. 
• Information for Practice (NYU website on international grey literature) 
 
Hand searching of Key Journals 
Restricted to recent issues (those published up to 18 months prior to the beginning of 
review) of key journals because there may be delay in them reaching electronic databases. 
Relevant journals will be identified by using the results from my databases search to find 
the most frequently sourced journals.  
 
Reference list search of all included articles 
The reference lists of all studies included in the review will be hand searched to determine 
if anything relevant has been missed in the database search. Any titles deemed relevant 
will then be subject to examination of the full text and included if they meet the criteria. 
 
Contacting relevant support and expert organisations 
The following organisations will be contacted either via email or letter for advice on any 
research they know of which is relevant to the question or other organisations or experts 
which they think may be able to help: 
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Age Concern England 
Care Directions 
Carers UK 
Care and Health 
Community Care 
Demos 
Help the Aged 
IPPR 
Kings Fund 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
NCVO 
Prime Ministers Strategy Unit 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 
SCIE 
Social Market Foundation 
Australian Association of Social Workers 
Canadian Association of Social Workers 
International Federation of Social Workers 
National Association for Social Workers (USA) 
Search strategy 
There is much advice in the literature (see Higgins and Green 2006; Petticrew and Roberts 
2006) about how to develop a search strategy. Once I have identified the main concepts 
and terms in your question there are a few checks to which you need to subject the 
strategy. First, identify synonyms and related terms (e.g. older, aged, elderly etc) to cover 
for all possible terms that could lead to a paper relevant to your review. Second, it is 
important to take account of plurals. Third, it is always helpful to use truncation, if the 
search engine will allow. Truncation is a function that allows the shortening of a word to 
be suffixed with an asterisk (*) that signals to the search engine to also look for all other 
words that can be constructed from the first few letters of the word used (e.g. abus* gives 
abuse, abusing, abused). This is a very helpful technique because it allows the use of one 
search term instead of many variations, saving time. Forth, it is extremely helpful to 
consult a thesaurus for each key search term in order to ensure all possible variations of the 
term are included. However, it is important to consider these variations carefully because 
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they have the potential to be counter productive if they force the term to be more general 
than is appropriate; for example to use the term age on it’s own, even within a Boolean 
search would throw up so many irrelevant outputs it would be erroneous to use. Finally, 
some database will allow you to search via subject headings, which obviously localises 
your search and narrows down the possible output (e.g. from getting lots of medical papers 
when search around older persons care, if you only search under social care). However, it 
is necessary to be aware that by limiting the search to specific subject areas you may miss 
relevant papers produced in other domains. 
 
The searches of each database and journal will be conducted using the following strategy 
and technique. 
Facets of question being answered: 
 
Population:  Older people in (non-nursing) residential care 
Intervention:  Effectiveness of inspection and regulation 
  Cost effectiveness of inspection 
  Impact of inspection on all stakeholders in residential care 
Outcome: Improvement in peoples lives 
Study Design: A. RCTs, CTs, CBA, ITS 
B. Studies which examine the conditions in which inspection is more or 
less effective and fulfil inclusion criteria stipulations, will be 
included in the review 
 
In order to maximise sensitivity I will omit the study design facet from the search strategy 
because the range of study designs (for effectiveness and process questions) is too broad. 
Instead the study design will be assessed at the inclusion stage of the review as 
recommended by the Centre for Research Dissemination at the University of York (CRD 
2001).  
 
The databases will be searched using a combination of free text and keyword searchers. 
Where possible the searchers will be subject to truncation and Boolean techniques in order 
to increase efficiency and sensitivity of the searching. If these tools are not available for a 
particular database or search engine then the searching will be conducted manually to 
ensure appropriate use and combination of all search terms. 
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Keywords = (“old* people*” or old* or elder* or aged) and (resident* care or resident* or 
“assist* living” or “retir* home”) and (inspect* or regulat*) 
 
Free-text in title or abstract or full text = (old people/ older people/ elder*/ aged/ very old 
people) & (inspection/ regulation/ evaluation/ investigation/ assessment) & (resident* 
home*/ resident*/ home*/ care home/ care*/ support* living) 
 
n.b. * represents truncation command, this will be substituted for appropriate command 
symbol depending on database being searched. 
Methods used in the review 
Selection of trials (see Figure 1) 
The titles were screened as set out below: 
 
1. First stage of screening will be based on the basis of titles, where studies with an 
obviously unrelated title will be excluded. However where there is any ambiguity, 
or the title appears relevant the studies will be taken onto the second stage. 
2. Second stage based on assessment abstracts and where available, or the abstract is 
too ambiguous, on full text. 
n.b. SCIE caution that there is a tendency toward over-inclusion at the second 
stage, so a clear understanding of the review question must be enforced at all times.  
 
As this review is contributing to my PhD thesis I do not have the resources to include a 
full-time secondary reviewer.  
Quality assessment 
Objective A 
For objective A I have based the study criteria on the Cochrane Effective Practice and 
Organisation of Care Review Group guidelines (McAuley and Ramsay 2002). To be 
included in this part of the review the study has to be conducted according to one of the 
following four designs: 
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1. Randomised controlled trial (RCT) i.e. a trial in which the participants (or other 
units) were definitely assigned prospectively to one or two (or more) alternative 
forms of inspection (or no inspection) using a process of random allocation (e.g. 
random number generation, coin flips). These alternative forms may include: 
• Inspected home (of certain size, population, staff numbers) compared to 
non-inspected, control home (of similar size, population, staff numbers). 
• Care home inspected against National Minimum Standards compared to 
care home inspected based on objective well-being index of residents. 
 
2. Controlled  trial (CT) may be a trial in which participants (or other units) were: 
a) definitely assigned prospectively to one or two (or more) alternative forms 
of inspection using a quasi-random allocation method (e.g. alternation, date 
of birth, patient identifier) or; 
b) possibly assigned prospectively to one or two (or more) alternative forms of 
inspection using a process of random or quasi-random allocation.   
 
3. Controlled before and after study (CBA) i.e. involvement of intervention and 
control groups other than by random process, and inclusion of baseline period of 
assessment of main outcomes.  There are two minimum criteria for inclusion of 
CBAs: 
a) Contemporaneous data collection 
Score DONE pre and post intervention periods for study and control sites 
are the same. 
Score NOT CLEAR if it is not clear in the paper, e.g. dates of collection are 
not mentioned in the text.  (N.B. the paper should be discussed with the 
contact editor for the review before data extraction is undertaken). 
Score NOT DONE if data collection was not conducted contemporaneously 
during pre and post intervention periods for study and control sites. 
b) Appropriate choice of control site: 
 Studies using second site as controls: 
Score DONE if study and control sites are comparable with respect to 
dominant reimbursement system, level of care, setting of care and academic 
status. 
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Score NOT CLEAR if not clear from paper whether study and control sites 
are comparable.  (N.B. the paper should be discussed with the contact editor 
for the review before data extraction is undertaken). 
Score NOT DONE if study and control sites are not comparable. 
 
4. Interrupted time series (ITS) i.e. a change in trend attributable to the intervention.  
There are two minimum criteria for inclusion of ITS designs in as recommended by 
EPOC: 
a) Clearly defined point in time when the intervention occurred. 
Score DONE if reported that intervention occurred at a clearly defined point 
in time. 
Score NOT CLEAR if not reported in the paper (will be treated as NOT 
DONE if information cannot be obtained from the authors). 
Score NOT DONE if reported that intervention did not occur at a clearly 
defined point in time. 
b) At least two data points before and two after the intervention. 
Score DONE if 2 or more data points before and 2 or more data points 
recorded after the intervention. 
Score NOT CLEAR if not specified in paper e.g. number of discrete data 
points not mentioned in text or tables (will be treated as NOT DONE if 
information cannot be obtained from the authors). 
Score NOT DONE if less than 2 data points recorded before and 2 data 
points recorded after intervention. 
 
If the study is not any of the above designs, it will not be included in this review.  If the 
study scored NOT DONE for any of the above criteria within each design, the study will 
not be included.  If the reviewer is unsure of the study design, the paper will be discussed 
with the contact editor of the study before data extraction is undertaken. 
 
Objective B - Assessing quality of studies for the process question(s)  
There are currently no established methods for assessing the quality of process evaluations 
(Kavanagh, Harden et al. 2005). The Evidence for policy and Practice Information and Co-
ordinating Centre (EPPI-Centre) has published numerous reviews which assess the quality 
of process focused research. I will use criteria developed in previous EPPI-Centre reviews 
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to assess the quality of qualitative and other types of studies assessing interventions 
processes and people’s perspectives and experiences (Harden et al., 2004; Rees et al., 
2004; Thomas et al., 2003;Harden et al., 2001). Studies will be assessed using criteria 
developed by Kavanagh, Harden et al (2005), according to whether:  
 
(i) The aims and objectives were clearly reported;  
(ii) There was an adequate description of the context in which the research was carried out 
(including a rationale for why the study was undertaken);  
(iii) There was an adequate description of the sample used and the methods for how the 
sample was identified and recruited;  
(iv) There was an adequate description of the methods used to collect data; and  
(v) There was adequate description of the methods used to analyse data.  
 
A final judgement about the quality of objective B studies will relate to the appropriateness 
of the study methods for ensuring that findings reflect key contextual and process issues. 
This judgement will be informed by previous EPPI-Centre work in this area and the work 
of other groups on assessing the quality of process evaluations (cf. Arai et al., 2002; 
Harden et al., 2001). 
 
Consultation 
I will consult with both Information and Knowledge Management and the Service User 
and Public Involvement Directorate to consult CSCI on the relevance and potential use of 
this review. 
Data management, extraction and synthesis process 
Extraction of data from studies searched in this review will follow the following protocol: 
1. Databases, websites, key journals, reference lists from key papers will be 
searched and requests to organisations made to begin the inclusion process 
(see figure 1) 
2. Basic data extracted from each search will be added to a ‘list of references’ 
(see figure 2). 
3. Data extracted from those studies which were deemed relevant enough to 
obtain the full record, but were then excluded will be added to a ‘Table of 
excluded studies’ (figure 3.), which will include a reason for their omission. 
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Papers which meet the inclusion criteria will be added to an Excel spreadsheet 
(figure 4), to provide a map of included literature: 
a. A copy of the data recording and quality appraisal format will be given as 
part of the review appendix (figure 4) 
 
4. Organise studies in relation to study quality  
Once articles have been deemed to fulfil the inclusion criteria. The studies will be 
assessed for quality. Both information on, and assessment of, the study’s quality 
will be reported under one heading in order to maintain a simple and coherent 
report presentation. Assessment of the studies quality will be reported along with 
analysis to give a transparent account of the limitations of included studies. 
 
5. Analysis and synthesis  
Analysis of included studies will be presented as follows: 
• Objective A 
Analysis of studies will explore relationships and differences between the study 
findings, and the extent to which they reflect common, higher order, themes. 
Interventions will be examined to identify any patterns according to 
effectiveness. For example are there any common characteristics of inspection 
which can be judged to be effective or ineffective? 
 
• Objective B 
For the process questions I will conduct narrative syntheses of the findings 
from qualitative research and other types of process evaluations. This will help 
generate hypotheses about what conditions make inspection more or less 
effective. 
 
• Cross-study synthesis 
I will combine objectives A and B in a cross-study synthesis order to determine 
the effectiveness of inspection and make recommendations about the conditions 
in which they may be most effective. 
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Filtering of papers from searching to synthesis 
 
  
Searching 
Papers identified e.g. 
electronic database 
search 
Screening 
Abstracts and titles 
screened 
Papers excluded  - 
title/ abstract not 
relevant to question 
Potential includes  
- exclude potential 
duplicates 
Full document screened – 
to determine if meets 
inclusion criteria/ answers 
research question 
Papers excluded 
- specific criteria for 
exclusion given 
Papers included 
- if meet criteria 
Map of literature created 
- database of included 
studies 
In-depth review 
- synthesis of literature 
- relationships/ differences 
 
Letters to 
relevant 
organisations 
Hand search of 
references 
- of all included 
papers 
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APPENDIX 2: LIST OF DATABASES SEARCHED FOR SYSTEMATIC REVIEW 
 
Review Topic: Impact of Inspection on older peoples’ residential care    Searcher: M. Norton 
 
Date: 05/04/06 
 
Database Dates Covered Dates searched Titles/ abstracts Full 
Record 
Included Excluded 
CSA Illumina – 
Social Services Abstracts 
Sociological Abstracts 
ASSIA 
ERIC 
 
1991 - 2006 05/04/06 142 (key word) 
 
 
 
21 2 18 
Ovid –  
Journals@Ovid 
CINAHL 
HMIC 
IBSS 
EMBASE 
Ovid Medline 
psycINFO 
1991 - 2006 28/04/06 969 (key word) 
 
6 1 5 
Social Care Online 
Incl. AgeInfo 
 
1991 - 2006 06/04/2006 280 5 1 4 
EPPI-centre 
 
- 2006 06/04/06 0 0 0 0 
Zetoc* 
 
1993- 06/04/06 1867 18 0 18 
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EconLit via WebSPIRS 
 
1969 - 2006 07/04/06 453 2 0 2 
PAIS International via 
WebSPIRS 
1972 - 2006 07/04/06 118 6 0 6 
SIGLE via WebSPIRS 1980- 03/2005 07/04/06 203 1 0 1 
Social Policy and Practice via 
WebSPIRS 
- 2006 07/04/06 1238 10 2  8 
ESRC 
 
- 2006 10//04/06 1578 0 0 0 
HERO 
 
- 2006 10/04/06 0 0 0 0 
Social Work Alliance 
 
1999 - 2006 12/04/06 560 0 0 0 
CommunityWISE 
 
 
-2006 24/04/06 – 
25/04/06 
1350 4 0 0 
PubMed Central -2006 01/04/06 – 
02/04/06 
 
1591 2 0 0 
Research in Practice for Adults 
 
- 2006 02/04/06 62  0 0 0 
Turning Research into Practice 
(TRIP) 
 
  18 0 0 0 
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National Citizens Coalition for 
Nursing Home Reform 
(website) 
All ‘professional 
publications’ 
4/05/06 40 0 0 0 
Information for Practice 
 
      
SOSIG 
 
- 2006 5/05/06 3 0 0 0 
Web of Science 
 
1991-2006 9/05/06 188 3 0 4 
UrbaDoc - 
Acompline 
Urbaline (Greater London 
Authority Database) 
 
1991-  2006 11/05/06  1 0 1 
TOTAL   12386 78 9  
* Comprises a combination of free text searches that mirror the advanced search strategy when combined. Zetoc does not allow complex 
searches. n.b. total hits includes duplicates, which may occur between individual searches 
 
Total: 12386 articles; 78 were retrieved and the full text was examined, of these 7 were included in the analysis. 
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APPENDIX 3: LIST OF ARTICLES INCLUDED IN THE 
SYSTEMATIC REVIEW 
 
Author Title Date Published Publication Database / 
web portal 
Sinclair, I. and 
Gibbs, I. 
Consistency: a 
pre-requisite for 
inspecting old 
people’s homes? 
1992 British Journal of 
Social Work 
CSA illumnia 
Sinclair, I. and 
Gibbs, I. 
Residential Care 
for Elderly 
People: The 
correlates of 
Quality 
1992 Ageing and 
Society 
Social Policy 
and Practice 
Fleishman, R. et 
al 
Improving the 
quality of 
institutional care 
on urinary 
incontinence 
among the 
elderly: a 
challenge for 
government 
regulation 
1999 International 
Journal of Health 
Care Quality 
Assurance 
CSA illumnia 
Counsel and 
Care 
Under Inspection 1994 Counsel and 
Care report 
Ovid 
Redmayne, S. Spotlight on 
Homes for the 
Elderly: an 
analysis of 
inspection 
reports on care 
homes for the 
elderly 
1995 Bath Social 
Policy Papers 
Social Care 
Online 
Day, P. Klein, 
R. and 
Redmayne, S. 
Why Regulate? 
Regulating 
residential Care 
for elderly 
people 
1996 Policy Press and 
Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation 
Social Policy 
and Practice 
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APPENDIX 4: TABLE OF EXCLUDED STUDIES 
 
Author Title Date 
Published 
Publication Database/ 
website/ portal 
Why Excluded? 
Emslie, S Rationalising Audit, inspection 
and review 
2002 Community Care Zetoc • Focus on health care 
• Review of policy 
• Not empirical research 
Winchester, 
R. et al 
Best Value: Ahead of the Game 2002 Community Care Zetoc • Summary of Best 
Value Initiative – a 
scheme to encourage 
councils to operate in a 
more cost-effective 
manner 
• Not primary research 
Walshe, K. Improvement thorough 
inspection? 
1999 Quality in Health 
Care 
Zetoc • Focus on NHS not 
residential care 
Wing, H Older People: Paperwork and 
Inspection are necessary for the 
provision of good services 
29/ 10/  2003 Community care Zetoc • Think piece based on 
anecdotal evidence. 
• Not empirical research 
 Inspections can improve quality 04/ 07/ 2001 Community Care Zetoc • Focus on all population 
groups within 
residential care 
 Improvements needed in 
inspections 
08/ 08/ 2001 Community Care Zetoc • Magazine review of 
social services 
management policies 
• No empirical research 
Cowper, A An Inspectors call 2001 British Journal of 
Health Care 
Zetoc • Focus on health care  
• Not research 
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Management 
Nazarko, L Nursing homes 1995 Elderly Care Zetoc • Focus on nursing care 
Fujiwara, Y; 
Hoshi, T; 
Shinkai, S; 
Kita, T 
Regulatory factors of medical 
care expenditures for older 
people in Japan 
2000 Health Policy Zetoc • Research on health care 
costs 
Bennett, A Inspector nurse 1999 Elderly Care Zetoc • Focus on nursing home 
• Opinion piece from 
author 
Kerrison, S. 
H. and 
Pollock, A. 
M. 
Regulating Nursing Homes: 
Caring for older people in the 
private sector in England 
2001 British Medical 
Journal 
Zetoc • Nursing home focus 
• Review of in situ 
regulatory framework 
in UK, not 
effectiveness of 
inspection 
Various – 9 
papers 
Standards Matter: A conference 
report on regulating registered 
residential and nursing homes 
for older people 
1999 Centre for Policy 
on Ageing 
Zetoc • Conference on details 
of new regulation 
proposals and ways to 
regulate  based on these 
proposals. Not research 
on effectiveness or 
impact of regulation or 
inspection 
Edis, A. Residential Care 
The regulatory framework: Can 
It Help of Hinder Your Client? 
1998 Elderly Client 
Advisor 
Zetoc • Analysis of UK policy 
history, not of impact 
or effectiveness of 
regulation 
Rantz, M. J. 
et al 
Assessing Quality of Nursing 
Home Care: The Foundation for 
1996 Journal of Nursing 
Care Quality 
Zetoc • Assessing the quality of 
nursing homes not the 
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Improving Resident Outcomes effectiveness or impact 
of inspection 
• Only single point data 
collection 
Fleishman, 
R. 
A Regulatory Approach to 
Improving Long-Term and 
Residential Care 
1996 Quality 
Management in 
Health Care 
Zetoc • Study of provision and 
quality of care, not the 
effectiveness or impact 
of regulation 
 
Gay, E. G. et 
al 
A Comparison of the Effect of 
Regulation on Health Care for 
the Older American: A Tale of 
Two States 
1994 The Gerontologist Zetoc • Health care focus 
Bland, R. User-centred Performance 
Indicators for Inspection of 
Community  Care 
1997 Public Policy and 
Social Welfare 
Zetoc • Focus on community 
care – inspection of 
services which 
facilitate the service 
user staying in their 
own home 
Arai, Y. Quality of Care in Private 
Nursing Homes 
1993 International 
Journal of Health 
Care Quality 
Assurance 
Zetoc • Nursing  care focus 
Francis, J Raising the Quality of Home 
Care 
  CommunityWISE • Focus on home care not 
residential care 
Boyle, G Facilitating choice and control 
for older people 
  CommunityWISE • Focus on domiciliary 
care 
Francis, J. 
and Netten, 
Raising the Quality of Home 
Care: A Study of Service Users’ 
2004 Social Policy and 
Administration 
CommunityWISE • Focus on home care 
• Users’ views on quality 
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A.  Views not process or 
effectiveness of 
inspection 
Allen, I et al  Elderly People: Choice, 
participation and satisfaction 
1992 Policy Studies 
Institute report  
CommunityWISE • Study of service user 
choice in social care 
Doron, I and 
Lightman, E 
Assisted-living for older people 
in Israel: market control or 
government regulation? 
2003 Ageing and Society CSA illumnia • Discussion paper 
• Inadequate description 
of methods 
Harrington, 
C. 
Regulating nursing homes: 
Residential nursing facilities in 
the United States 
2001 British Medical 
Journal 
CSA illumnia • Nursing home focus 
• Examines care home 
performance not 
inspection performance 
Braithwaite, 
J 
Regulating nursing homes: The 
challenge of regulating care for 
older people in Australia 
2001 British Medical 
Journal 
CSA illumnia • Focus on quality of 
homes not 
effectiveness of 
regulation 
• Nursing home focus 
Nelson, W. 
H. et al 
The Relationship Between 
Volunteer Long-term Care 
Ombudsmen and Regulatory 
Nursing Home Actions 
1995 The Gernentologist CSA illumnia • Nursing home focus 
Alexander, E. 
R. 
Regulation and Evaluation 
Criteria for housing for the 
elderly: An International 
Comparison 
1997 Journal of Housing 
for the Elderly 
CSA illumnia • Evaluates housing 
regulations for all types 
of elderly housing, 
including non-
residential. 
• Comparison of 
regulations in various 
countries – no 
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evaluation of their 
effectiveness 
Read, J. 
Klein, B. 
Cook, G. 
Stanley, D. 
Quality improvement in 
German and UK care homes 
2003 International 
Journal of Health 
Care Quality 
Assurance 
CSA illumnia • Examination of quality 
assurance system for 
self assessment of 
quality in care homes 
• Includes nursing homes 
Rudder, C 
and Phillips, 
C. D. 
Citations and Sanctions in the 
Nursing Home Enforcing 
System in New York State: The 
Use and Effects 
1997-98 Generations CSA illumnia • Nursing home focus 
Wildfire, J. 
B. et al 
The Effect of Regulation on the 
Quality of Care in Board and 
Care Homes 
1997-98 Generations CSA illumnia • Looks at the effect of 
regulation on quality of 
care, but; 
• Examines all forms of 
board an care facilities 
Mollica, R. 
L. 
Regulation of Assisted Living 
Facilities: State Policy Trends 
1997-98 Generations CSA illumnia • Summary of policy 
trends not their 
effectiveness or impact 
Greeene, A. 
et al 
How do Family Members 
Define Quality in Assisted 
Living Facilities? 
1997-98 Generations CSA illumnia • Consultation on what 
constitutes quality in 
care, not inspection 
Edelamn, T. 
S. 
The Politics of Long-Term Care 
at the Federal Level and 
Implications for Quality 
1997-98 Generations CSA illumnia • History of Federal 
regulation policies, no 
evaluation of their 
impact or effectiveness 
Weisskopf, 
M. 
The Good Provider 1997-98 Generations CSA illumnia • Opinion piece 
• No primary research 
Freeman, I. Nursing Home Politics at the 1997-98 Generations CSA illumnia • Nursing home focus 
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C. State Level and Implications for 
Quality: The Minnesota 
Example 
• Discussion of 
regulation policies at 
the state level, not the 
impact or effectiveness 
Zimmerman, 
D. R. 
The power of Information 1997-98 Generations CSA illumnia • Testing a self-
assessment quality 
indicator not 
effectiveness or impact 
of inspection 
Applebaum, 
R. 
Assuring Homecare Quality: A 
Case Study of Case Strategies 
1997-98 Generations CSA illumnia • Focus on home care not 
residential care 
Hawes, C et 
al 
The OBRA-87 nursing home 
regulations and implementation 
of the Resident Assessment 
Instrument: effects on process 
quality 
1997 Journal of the 
American 
Geriatrics Society 
CSA illumnia • Assessment of 
effectiveness and 
process of regulation 
BUT focus on nursing 
homes and medical 
procedures not 
residential care. 
Fleishman, 
R. Walk, D. 
Mizrahi, G. 
Bar-Giora, 
M. Yuz, F. 
Licensing, quality of care and 
the surveillance process 
1996 International 
Journal of Health 
Care Quality 
Assurance 
CSA illumnia • Assessment of 
effectiveness and 
process of regulation 
BUT focus on nursing 
homes and medical 
procedures not 
residential care. 
Hauser, J. 
and Prutz, C. 
Programs for the Aged in 
Sweden and Switzerland 
1998 Developments in 
Health Economics 
vol.7 
Econlit • Examines health and 
social care programs 
for the aged, not 
regulation 
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Johne, G. The Assessment and the 
Regulation of Quality in Long-
Term Care 
1996 Developments in 
Health Economics 
vol. 5 
Econlit • Examines definitions 
and methods of 
implementation but not 
the impact or 
effectiveness of 
regulation 
Brown, D Achieving Excellence in Care: 
Inspection and Standard setting 
in Homes for Older People 
1996 Journal Royal 
Society of Health 
Social Policy and 
Practice 
• Analysis of 1993 
changes in standards 
for older people with 
mental health disorders, 
no assessment of 
impact or effectiveness 
O’Kell, S. 
(Joseph 
Rowntree 
Foundation) 
The impact of legislative 
change on the independent, 
residential care sector in The 
Independent Care Home Sector 
2005 Joeseph Rowntree 
Foundation 
Social Policy and 
Practice 
• No distinction between 
impact on nursing and 
personal care services 
O’Hagan, G. Improving Older People’s 
Services 
2001 Social Services 
Inspectorate 
(department of 
Health) 
Social Policy and 
Practice 
• Using inspection to 
determine whether 
policy has been 
implemented rather 
than evaluating 
whether the regulation 
is effective or how the 
impact regulations has 
effected the service 
• Looks at all types of 
care services 
Bainbridge, I. 
and Ricketts, 
Improving Older People’s 
Services: A overview of 
2003 Social Services 
Inspectorate / 
Social Policy and 
Practice 
• Report on quality of 
service across older 
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A. performance Department of 
Health 
person’s social care 
• Examines 
improvements/ changes 
which service providers 
and local authorities 
need to make – no 
assessment of the 
impact or effectiveness 
of inspection or 
changes to regulation 
• Examines NHS and 
social care 
Fry, A. Inspectors under inspection 1993 Care of the Elderly Social policy and 
Practice 
• Inadequate description 
of methods 
• Anecdotal discussion 
about whether social 
services should be 
responsible for 
inspecting their own 
services 
Griffiths, M. Current and Future Challenges 
in Commissioning Care 
Services for Older People: Case 
Study of West Sussex 
2001 Manageing 
Community Care 
Social Policy and 
Practice 
• Combines data on 
nursing and residential 
homes for older people 
Stein, J. and 
Brown, H. 
Crossing the divide: the role of 
inspection units in protecting 
vulnerable adults 
2001 The Journal; of 
Adult Protection 
Ovid – British 
Nursing Index 
• Focus on all of adult 
care, not just older 
people 
Bartlett, H. 
and Burnip, 
Quality of Care in nursing 
homes for older people: 
1998 Nursing Times 
Research 
Ovid  - Health 
Management 
• Focus on nursing home 
abuse 
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S. providers’ perspective and 
priorities 
Information 
Consortium 
• Assessment of 
regulation relating to 
abuse but only in 
nursing homes, not 
residential care homes 
Kerrison, S. 
H. and 
Pollack, Am 
M. 
Absent voices compromise the 
effectiveness of nursing home 
regulation: a critique of 
regulatory reform in the nursing 
home industry 
2001 Health and Social 
Care in the 
Community 
Ovid • Assessment of 
regulation but in 
nursing homes, not 
residential care homes 
Social 
Services 
Inspectorate: 
Department 
of Health 
Responding to Residents: A 
report of inspections of local 
authority residential care homes 
for older people 
1995 Department of 
Health Report 
Ovid - HMIC • National evaluation of 
residential homes to 
assess whether the 
needs of older people 
are being met – not an 
evaluation of 
inspection 
Read, J. and 
Cook, G. 
Promoting Partnership with 
older people through quality 
assurance systems: Issues 
arising in care homes 
1999 Nursing Times 
Research 
OVID - HMIC • Examination of quality 
assurance system for 
self assessment of 
quality in care homes 
• Includes nursing homes 
Restsinas, J. Assisted Living: a regulation 
dilemma 
2005 State Legislatures PAIS • Anecdotal, inadequate 
description of methods 
Bartlet, H. P. 
and Phillips, 
D. R. 
Regulating Residential Aged 
Care Homes in Hong Kong: 
Issues for the Asia-Pacific 
Region 
1995 Asian Journal of 
Public 
Administration 
PIAS • Explanation of the 
development of 
regulation in Hong 
Kong, but no research 
into effectiveness or 
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impact 
Emerzian, A. 
D. J. and 
Stampp, T. 
Nursing Home Reform: Its 
Legislative History and 
Economic Impact Upon 
Nursing Homes 
1993 Benefits Quarterly PIAS • Nursing home focus 
• Single point data 
collection 
Freeman, I. Nursing Home Reform: Fait 
Accompli or Frontier 
1997 Journal of Ageing 
and Social Policy 
PIAS • Nursing home focus 
Gibson, D. Regulating the Quality of Care 
in Aged Care (book) 
1998 Aged Care: Old 
Policies, New 
Problems 
(Cambridge 
University Press) 
PIAS • Nursing home / Private 
Hospital focus 
• Discussion of 1987 
Australian regulations 
for inspection of 
nursing homes – based 
on findings from The 
Nursing Home 
Regulation in Action 
Project 
Gazdar, C. 
and Fean, L. 
The cornerstone of care: 
inspection of care planning for 
older people overview report 
1997 Department of 
Health report 
Social Care 
Online 
• Assessment of social 
service departments 
planning and 
management of care, 
not of regulation 
Hughes, C. 
M and 
Lapane, K. L. 
The drive for quality care in US 
nursing homes in the era of the 
prospective payment system 
2002 Drugs and Ageing Social Care 
Online 
• Focus on nursing home 
and Medicare payment 
structure 
Wright, F. Lay Assessors and Care Home 
Inspections: Is There a Future? 
2005 British Journal of 
Social Work 
Social Care 
Online 
• Focus on Adult with 
learning disabilities not 
older people 
Netten, A. Costs of regulating care homes 1999 Registered Homes Social Care • Focus on all of adult 
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Forder, J. and 
Knight, J. 
for adults and Services Online care, not just residential 
care for older people 
Burgner, T. The Regulation and Inspection 
of Social Services 
1996 Department of 
Health 
Social Care 
Online 
• Focus on all of adult 
care, not just residential 
care for older people 
Parker, C. 
Barnes, S. 
Mckee, K. 
Morgan, K. 
Torrington, J. 
Tregenza, P. 
Quality of life and building 
design in residential and 
nursing homes for older people 
2004 Ageing and society Web of Science • Assessment of quality 
of life in relation to 
building design 
• Not examining 
regulation or inspection 
Mi Oh, K 
and Warnes, 
A. M. 
Care Services for frail older 
people in South Korea 
2001 Ageing and Society Web of Science • Discussion of care 
service provision, not 
regulation 
Stoudemire, 
A. and 
Smith, M. D. 
OBRA Regulations and the Use 
of Psychotropic Drugs in Long-
Term Care Facilities 
1996 General Hospital 
Psychiatry 
Web of Science • Looks at clinical 
regulations of drug 
administration in 
nursing facilities 
Hawes, C. 
Mor, V. et al 
The OBRA-87 nursing home 
regulations and implementation 
of the Resident Assessment 
Instrument 
1997 Journal of the 
American Geriatric 
Society 
PubMed • Focus on nursing 
homes 
Bernabei, R. 
Landi, F. et 
al 
Randomised Control Trial of 
impact of model integrated care 
and case management for older 
people living in the community 
1998 British Medical 
Journal 
PubMed • Trial of interventions 
for older people 
receiving community 
care in their own 
homes 
Davies, B. The Regulation and 
Deregulation of Social Care, a 
1999 PhD Thesis, 
University of 
SIGLE • Could not locate full 
record 
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PhD Thesis Birmingham 
George, M. Conflicting Interests 1996 Community Care Urbadoc - 
ACOMPLINE 
• Inadequate explanation 
of methods 
• Reports unhappiness of 
3 independent care 
providers regarding the 
joint role of purchasing 
and inspecting of local 
authorities 
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APPENDIX 5: ETHICAL APPROVAL DATA CONFIDENTIALITY 
AND RECORDING ABUSE 
 
Ethical approval 
This research was submitted to, and received approval from, the University Research 
Ethics Committee and the Association of Directors of Adult Social Services Approval 
panel. The following section builds upon these submissions and discusses the ethical 
considerations that had to be resolved before the data collection could take place. 
 
Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) check 
Although I was not working with children I was working with vulnerable older people and 
therefore I had a CRB check conducted on behalf of the Commission for Social Care 
Inspection. This provided participants with a legal document that confirms I have a no 
criminal record and signifies my appropriateness to work within a social care environment. 
 
Risk to participants 
There was very little direct risk to participants as a result of the interviews, I asked for 
opinions on the service and inspection, and for information about the individuals’ day-to-
day lives. I was cautious of the participants role as an ‘active subject’ and acknowledged 
the possibility that during the course of the interview participants may view certain events, 
or aspects of their life, in ways which had not occurred before, or be prompted to recall 
episodes they find distressing; none of the interviews appeared to cause distress and if they 
had there was a procedure in pace for me to immediately cease the interview: If I was told, 
or had reason to believe, that my question, or line of questioning, was causing distress then 
I would have immediately stopped the interview and asked the participant if they are 
prepared to go on. If they were I would also ask whether they would like me to stop the 
particular question or line of questioning. In the very unlikely situation that participants 
became distressed by the interview and were upset I would have inform the service 
manager immediately. 
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Preventing ostracism 
There was a remote possibility that participants could become ostracised by peers or staff 
for taking to me, especially if they were known to be critical of the service or other people. 
Therefore, the interviews with service users were conducted on a one-to-one basis and all 
data was subject to a strict level of confidentiality (see confidentiality and data protection 
sections – Appendix 5). I also made both the service and its users aware that my research 
had no impact on the outcome of inspection by CSCI or evaluation by any other third party 
body. Any judgements I make in the course of this thesis are in response to anonymised 
data and every effort to prevent the linking of data to any particular individual has been 
made. 
 
Participation over time 
As this is a longitudinal study I interviewed each of the participants at three points in time. 
I made potential participants aware of this intention at the beginning of the interview and 
make it clear that they must be prepared to take part in three interviews over a nine-month 
period. However, they retained the right to withdraw at anytime. 
 
Explanation of purpose to participants 
I opened up the interview with a brief explanation of the purpose of my study. I explained 
that I was looking at the impact of inspection on the care home and hoped to ask them 
various questions about their day to day life in the home, what they may like and dislike, 
and what they feel could be made better.  
 
I explained that I was using a semi-structured interview schedule in order to focus the 
interview, but that this is flexible and I also want to discuss whatever they deem to be 
important in response to my questioning. Each participant was also given a letter that 
outlined the study. 
 
Clarity and understanding 
I used clear and plain language when addressing my research participants, and avoided 
using acronyms or ‘insider’ language, which the participant might not have understood. If I 
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needed to use ‘insider’ language I made every effort to provide additional explanatory 
information. For example, when I was discussing care plans with residents I did not 
presume they knew what the term meant and made sure I took a blank copy along in order 
to assist in recognition. 
 
Interviewer issues  
The interviews were unlikely to cause distress to the interviewee, except if service user 
participants report instances of abuse. In this case I followed a slightly adapted version of 
CSCI guidelines ‘Reporting instances of abuse’ (see Appendix 5). 
 
 
Data Confidentiality 
 
I will not disclose the name or personal details of any institution or person and will make 
every endeavour to prevent the linking of any quotes or references to a specific individual 
or institution. In the writing of this research all identities, both institutional and individual, 
are be anonymous. However, as acknowledged by many researchers before me, it may, in 
some exceptional cases, be possible for an outsider, by process of deduction to link 
references within my final report to people or institutions. In this instance I will not 
corroborate any assumptions, nor under any circumstances divulge sources of data. 
 
Only I, Matthew Jeremy Norton have access to data recordings. No other third party, 
including the Commission for Social Care Inspection, have access to any raw data. The 
Commission for Social Care Inspection, as all other 3rd parties, will only have access to the 
final report, when all data has been completely anonymised.  
 
Written up transcripts are anonymised. The recordings are kept in my office in a locked 
filing cabinet, to which only I have access. They will be destroyed 6 months after my PhD 
thesis has been accepted.  
 
Reporting instances of abuse: where I will draw the line 
As I was planning on spending time with residents talking about their lives in residential 
care I decided as part of my ethical committee submission that I would develop a 
procedure to use if any instances of suspected abuse were divulged to me by a resident or 
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any other participant. To do this I took the general definition of abuse set out in the 
Department of Health’s No Secrets (2000) guidelines: 
 
Table 1. Definition of Abuse 
What is Abuse? 
• Abuse may consist of a single act or repeated acts and can occur against a 
single person or, in a service context, to more than one person at a time.   
• Abuse may be physical, verbal, sexual or psychological, or may be an act of 
omission or neglect.  
• It includes discriminatory abuse and abuse that occurs when a vulnerable 
person is persuaded to enter into a financial or sexual transaction to which he 
or she has not or cannot consent.  
• It can occur in any relationship and may result in significant harm to, or 
exploitation of, the person subjected to it. 
 
Source: Department of Health (2000). No Secrets: Guidance on Developing and 
Implementing Multi-agency Policies and Procedures to Protect Vulnerable Adults from 
Abuse (LAC [2000]7) see www.dh.gov.uk  
 
 
I then used the guidelines develop a workable set of criteria of abuse and neglect in 
conjunction with people at CSCI, which I used as guidelines to determine whether or not 
issues that were raised during my data collection should be reported: 
 
• Privacy and dignity not being respected when care staff support people with 
personal tasks such as going to the toilet, bathing or eating. 
• The right to make decisions that affect people’s lives not being respected. 
• Health care, nutrition or educational support provided not meeting people’s needs. 
• Being bullied or abused by other residents and/or care workers, which either goes 
undetected or is not tackled when noticed. 
• Receiving abusive comments or being treated differently (discriminated against) 
because of one’s disability, sexuality, age, gender, culture or ethnicity. 
• Being inappropriately sedated or being physically restrained to make life easier for 
the care worker. 
• Being shouted at, slapped or pushed on a regular basis as a means to get people to 
do what the care worker wants them to do. 
 
331 
 
If I come across instances of any of these issues I would immediately report this to the 
inspector responsible for the service, who could then decide whether to take the matter up 
with the manager of the service, or, depending on the severity of the claim, the appropriate 
authorities. 
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APPENDIX 6: PAPERWORK USED TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF 
SERVICE PERFORMANCE AGAINST THE NMS 
 
The paperwork used to evidence service performance against the seven inspection outcome 
areas: 
1. Choice of Home (Standards 1–6) 
a. Brochure with clear, up to date service information 
b. Statement of purpose 
c. Service User guide / other information services e.g. video 
d. Needs Assessment plus summary (either from social worker or carried out 
prior to resident moving in by qualified member of staff), which feeds into 
Care Plan to show home can meet needs 
e. Contract stating residents rights and responsibilities 
2. Health and Personal Care (Standards 7-11)  
a. Staff training and qualifications to demonstrate person centred approach 
b. Care plans – person centred, address needs, consistent 
c. Paperwork for aids and equipment to promote independence are in place, 
appropriate and up to date 
3. Daily Life and Social Activities (Standards 12-15)  
a. Service user involvement – meeting records 
b. Activity record 
c. Menu / meal record / nutritional advice 
4. Complaints and Protection (Standards 16-18)  
a. Complaints procedure – that welcomes complaints / criticism and deals with 
them effectively 
b. Full records of past complaints 
c. Policies and procedures for safeguarding adults – accessible to staff 
d. Staff training records – Protection of Vulnerable Adults (POVA) 
e. Policies on restraint 
5. Environment (Standards 19-26)  
a. Infection control policy 
b. Safety certificates 
6. Staffing (Standards 27-30) 
a. Recruitment procedure (including user involvement) 
b. Staff rota / contingency plans for absence 
c. Induction record – exceeding ‘Skills for Care’ guidance 
d. Staff training (internal / external) 
e. Supervision / meeting records 
7. Management and Administration (Standards 31-38) 
a. Business plan 
b. Practice handbook / training manuals 
c. Clear lines of accountability 
d. Accident record 
e. Monitoring (if owned by parent organisation) 
f. Risk assessments 
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APPENDIX 7: TABLES OF REQUIREMENTS MADE IN THE REPORTS FOR EACH CASE STUDY SERVICE 
 
Care Home 1: Service reaction to requirements made during Key Inspection April 2007 
 
Requirements made in report (Direct 
from report) 
Sources of evidence used 
by the inspector to made 
the judgment 
Action taken by 
home by 2nd data 
collection point 
Action taken by 
home by 3rd data 
collection point 
Was the issue still 
outstanding by 
end of case study? 
The home must ensure that care plans 
adequately reflect all of the needs of the 
individual. New time scale for 
completion: 31/07/07  
 
Theme: Care planning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The home must ensure that all the 
documentary evidence pertaining to 
staff recruitment is held on file as per 
the requirements of Schedule 2 of the 
Care Homes Regulations to ensure that 
residents are protected. The previous 
• Paperwork – Care 
plans 
• Interviews with 
residents, staff, 
relatives, manager 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Paperwork – staff 
records 
• Interviews with staff, 
manager 
 
 
Little action taken 
by manager, but 
he claimed work 
was ‘in the 
pipeline’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Little action taken 
by manager, but 
he claimed work 
was ‘in the 
pipeline’ 
 
Claimed 
improvements 
have been made 
but admitted they 
were slow. In 
process of 
bringing in 
consultant to 
advise on 
improving further 
 
 
 
Staff files all 
updated in line 
with schedule 2 of 
Care Home 
Regulations 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
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timescales of June 2005, 31st October 
2005 and 28th February 2006 and 
28/08/06 and 31/03/07 were not met. 
New time scale for completion: 
31/08/07  
Theme: Staff - Recruitment 
 
Provision must be made for the 
appointment of an individual to manage 
the care home.  
The previous timescale of 31st  
March 2006 and 31/08/06 and 
31/03/07 were not met. New time scale 
for completion: 31/08/07 
 
Theme: Management 
 
All staff must be provided with formal 
supervision to ensure that any training 
needs are identified. The previous 
timescales of June 2005, 31st October 
2005 and 31st March 2006 were not 
met. New time scale for completion: 
31/08/07 
 
Theme: Staff - training 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Paperwork – 
management 
registration, 
qualifications 
• Interview with 
manager 
 
 
 
 
• Paperwork – staff 
training records, staff 
development files 
• Interview with staff 
and manager 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Temporary 
manager was in 
the process of 
applying for 
registration  
 
 
 
 
 
No progress on 
this issue 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Registration still 
not complete – 
waiting for ‘fit 
persons interview’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A supervision 
schedule was in 
place but the 
manager admitted 
he was yet to 
implement a 
rigorous regime 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes (but almost 
addressed) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
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All staff must receive necessary training 
in safe working practices to ensure that 
service users and their health and safety 
are protected and promoted. This relates 
specifically to the need for staff 
involved in the preparation of food to be 
trained in food hygiene. New time scale 
for completion: 31/07/07  
  
Theme: Staff - training 
 
The home must develop a process for 
reviewing and keeping under review the 
quality of the home’s service provision.  
The previous timescales that have 
been set have not been met. New time 
scale for completion: 31/08/07 
 
Theme: Management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Paperwork – staff 
training and personal 
development records 
• Interviews with staff 
and manager 
• Observation of staff 
practices 
 
 
 
 
• Paperwork – quality 
assurance procedures 
• Interview with 
manager 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kitchen staff were 
enrolled for 
training course, 
but had not yet 
attended 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No action on this 
issue – manager 
disputed whether 
he needed to do 
anything and was 
especially hesitant 
to ask health 
professionals to 
spend time 
reviewing the 
service as he felt 
they were busy 
enough 
 
 
All kitchen staff 
had received food 
hygiene training 
and certificates 
were on display in 
office 
 
 
 
 
 
No action on this 
issue – manager 
disputed whether 
he needed to do 
anything 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
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The home must ensure that all staff 
receive training appropriate to the work 
that they are to perform. This relates 
specifically to the need for all staff to be 
trained in the administration of 
medicines. New time scale for 
completion: 31/08/07  
  
Theme: Staff – training 
             Medication 
 
The home must make provision for 
providing recreational activities that are 
suitable to the needs of the service 
users. The previous timescales set have 
not been met. New time scale for 
completion: 31/08/07  
 
Theme: Care planning 
 
• Paperwork – staff 
training and personal 
development records 
• Interviews with staff 
and manager 
• Observation of 
medication dispensing 
 
 
 
 
• Paperwork – activities 
records, daily records, 
individual care plans 
• Interviews with 
residents 
• Observation of daily 
routine and activates 
 
 
Manager was 
trying to find a 
course for his staff 
but was struggling 
to find a course he 
thought provided 
value for money 
 
 
 
 
The manager had 
begun an activity 
book to encourage 
staff to do more 
with residents. 
Claimed was in 
process of hiring 
an activities 
coordinator 
 
Staff had all 
receive 
medication 
training 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A part-time 
activities co-
ordinator had been 
employed and 
residents spoke of 
their being many 
more activities 
and 1:1 chats 
 
No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
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CH 2: Service reactions to requirements from inspection report April 2007 
 
Requirements made in report Sources of evidence used 
by the inspector to made 
the judgment 
Action taken by 
home by 2nd data 
collection point 
Action taken by 
home by 3rd data 
collection point 
Was the issue till 
outstanding by 
end of case study? 
All service users’ files must be regularly 
reviewed and these reviews recorded. 
New time scale for completion: 
30/06/07  
 
Theme: Care planning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Medication must not be left unattended 
and accessible in communal areas.  
An immediate requirement notice was 
served. New time scale for completion: 
11/04/07  
 
Theme: Medication 
 
 
• Paperwork – Care 
plans 
• Interviews – staff, 
manager, residents 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Observation of 
medication dispensing 
• Paperwork – 
medication policy, 
staff medication 
training 
• Interviews with staff 
and manager about 
service’s methods of 
Manager had 
directed staff to be 
more punctual 
with reviews. 
There was now a 
‘mini care plan’ in 
each resident’s 
room, so staff 
could check 
preferences at a 
glance 
 
Manager claims 
this was a one off 
mistake by 
member of staff 
and this staff 
member had been 
briefed on 
medication 
procedure 
Line Manager 
admitted that 
some files were 
not being 
reviewed on time. 
But he was 
developing a new 
system to improve 
this 
 
 
 
Medication 
procedure has 
been updated and 
all staff have been 
briefed on 
procedures 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
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Suitable arrangements must be made for 
the storage, ordering, recording and safe 
administration of medicines.  
This is a repeat requirement, previous 
timescales of 26/07/06 and 31/12/06 
not met. New time scale for 
completion: 30/05/07  
 
Theme: Medication 
 
 
 
 
The home must ensure that competent 
staff are on duty at all times in the 
number that would ensure that service 
users’ needs are met.   
(This was a requirement set on the 
previous inspection with deadline 
31/01/07). New time scale for 
completion: 30/05/07 
 
Theme: Staff – training / numbers 
dispensing medication 
 
 
• Observation of 
medication dispensing 
• Paperwork – 
medication policy, 
staff medication 
training 
• Interviews with staff 
and manager about 
service’s methods of 
dispensing meds 
 
 
 
• Paperwork – staff 
records, staff rota, 
service user needs 
assessments, risk 
assessments 
• Interviews with staff, 
residents, relatives, 
manager 
 
 
 
 
 
Manager had 
implemented a 
new policy to 
ensure all meds 
were stored in 
fixed-wall 
cupboards and not 
left on the trolley 
overnight 
 
 
 
 
Manager claimed 
that this was only 
because a member 
of staff was sick 
and usually staff 
levels are 
appropriate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Medication 
procedure has 
been updated and 
there is a new 
analysis sheet in 
each individual 
file to ensue meds 
are being 
dispensed 
accurately 
 
 
 
Line manager 
claims to do 
regular 
calculations to 
ensure staff to 
resident ratio is 
appropriate, using 
Skills for Care 
Guidelines 
 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
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The home must ensure that planned and 
sufficient number of staff are on duty on 
each shift. New time scale for 
completion: 30/05/07 
 
Theme: Staff - numbers 
 
 
 
 
 
The home must display a valid and up to 
date certificate of liability insurance. 
New time scale for completion: 
15/05/07  
 
Theme: Documentation 
 
• Paperwork – staff 
records, staff rota, 
service user needs 
assessments, risk 
assessments 
• Interviews with staff, 
residents, relatives, 
manager 
 
 
• Paperwork – relevant 
certificates 
 
Manager claimed 
that this was only 
because a member 
of staff was sick 
and usually staff 
levels are 
appropriate 
 
 
 
 
The certificate 
was held by the 
PCT but a copy is 
in the process of 
being sent to the 
home 
 
Line manager 
claims to do 
regular 
calculations to 
ensure staff to 
resident ratio is 
appropriate, using 
Skills for Care 
Guidelines 
 
 
Certificate now in 
home 
 
No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
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CH 3: Service reactions to requirements from inspection report May 2007 
 
Requirements made in report Sources of evidence used 
by the inspector to made 
the judgment 
Action taken by 
home by 2nd data 
collection point 
Action taken by 
home by 3rd data 
collection point 
Was the issue till 
outstanding by 
end of case study? 
The Manager must achieve an NVQ 
level 4 in care by December  
2006. Previous timescale for action of 
30/12/06 not met. New time scale for 
completion: 01/11/07  
 
Theme: Management 
 
The Registered Person must ensure that 
the competency of staff administering 
medication is checked on a regular basis 
in order to ensure safe practice. New 
time scale for completion: 01/05/07  
 
Theme: Medication 
 
 
 
 
 
The Registered Person must plan and 
• Paperwork – manager 
qualifications 
• Interview with 
manager 
 
 
 
 
• Observation of 
medication dispensing 
• Paperwork – 
medication policy, 
staff medication 
training 
• Interviews with staff 
and manager about 
service’s methods of 
dispensing meds 
 
 
• Paperwork – activities 
Manager had not 
made any progress 
on joining and 
NVQ course 
 
 
 
 
Claimed all staff 
had received 
training, had no 
plans to do any 
checks or 
supervision 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Claims they’ve 
Manager enrolled 
on a course but 
had yet to 
complete 
 
 
 
 
Still no action 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No further 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
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provide suitable activities for those 
residents who are partially sighted to 
ensure stimulation is provided. New 
time scale for completion: 30/06/07  
 
Theme: Care planning 
 
 
 
The Registered Person must plan  
a programme of refurbishment in  
which to replace   
• The worn dining room carpet  
• The worn bedroom furniture 
New time scale for completion: 1/08/07 
 
Theme: Environment 
 
The homes induction must be updated to 
include all of the required elements to 
ensure that staff are appropriately 
trained. New time scale for completion: 
30/06/07  
 
Theme: Staff - training 
records, daily records, 
individual care plans 
• Interviews with 
residents 
• Observation of daily 
routine and activates 
 
 
 
• Observation of 
environment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Paperwork – induction 
policy, staff training 
record 
• Interviews with staff, 
manager 
been trying to 
develop games 
that incorporate 
the blind resident, 
but the resident in 
question still felt 
left out 
 
 
No action taken – 
claimed to be in 
process of getting 
carpet and 
furniture replaced 
 
 
 
 
Manager claimed 
to be developing a 
new policy with 
the help of a 
manager from 
another service 
development and 
the resident still 
felt activities were 
not suitable 
 
 
 
 
 
No action taken 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Still no new 
policy in place 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
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CH 4: Service reactions to requirements from inspection report May 2007 
 
Requirements made in report Sources of evidence used 
by the inspector to made 
the judgment 
Action taken by 
home by 2nd data 
collection point 
Action taken by 
home by 3rd data 
collection point 
Was the issue till 
outstanding by 
end of case study? 
The terms and conditions document 
must contain reference to the charges 
made for personal transport. New time 
scale for completion: 31/07/07  
 
Theme: Documentation 
 
 
 
 
 
A copy of the report following a  
Regulation 26 visit must be available 
within the home. (This is an 
outstanding requirement from the 
last inspection). New time scale for 
completion: 31/07/07  
 
Theme: Documentation 
 
Bedroom doors must not be kept open 
• Paperwork – terms and 
conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Paperwork – 
Regulation 26 reports 
filed by parent 
company 
 
 
 
 
 
• Observation of doors 
The terms and 
conditions were 
being rewritten by 
Head Office, but 
as of my 2nd visit 
the home did not 
have new copy 
 
 
 
 
The manager 
requested all 
previous Reg 26 
surveys and they 
are now held at 
the home 
 
 
 
Bedroom doors 
An updated 
version of the 
T&C were now 
present in the 
home  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reg 26’s were not 
being completed 
every month 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bedroom doors 
No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
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by unauthorised means. Several were 
held open with wedges and some had 
not been closed. The home must seek 
advice from the fire and rescue services 
with regard to this. New time scale for 
completion: 11/05/07  
 
Theme: Environment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The home must have an electrical 
wiring certificate. The manager told the 
inspector that this work was currently 
underway. A copy of the certificate 
must be supplied to the CSCI as a 
matter of urgency. (Regulation 13(4)). 
New time scale for completion: 
11/06/07  
 
Theme: Documentation 
 
being propped open 
• Paperwork – risk 
assessment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Paperwork – 
certificates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
were no longer 
being propped 
open – this was a 
cause of distress 
to some residents. 
Manager informed 
me that a fire 
safety device was 
to be fitted so 
doors could be 
held open and 
would release in 
the event of fire. 
 
 
No certificate 
from head office, 
but had letter to 
say its been 
carried out 
 
 
 
 
 
 
now fitted with 
fire safety device 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Certificate present 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
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The certificate with regard to the 
maintenance of the nurse call system 
was out of date. This matter requires 
urgent attention. New time scale for 
completion: 11/06/07 
 
Theme: Documentation 
• Paperwork - 
certificates 
Nurse call 
certificate now 
present 
Nurse call 
certificate now 
present 
No 
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APPENDIX 8: TABLES OF CHANGES RESIDENTS WOULD LIKE TO SEE AT EACH CASE STUDY SITE 
 
Table: Changes residents would like to see in Care Home 1 
 
Resident Changes residents would like to see Match inspector 
criticisms? 
Changes by 2nd data 
collection point 
Changes by 3rd data 
collection point 
Resident 
satisfied with 
changes 
1 Resident feels they are neglecting 
some of his medical needs – they 
failed to renew his asthma inhaler 
after it ran out 
Yes – inspector made a 
requirement for better 
training in medication, 
but not based on this 
specific case 
The resident and his 
daughter had spoken 
to a senior carer 
(bypassing the 
manager) and the 
issue had been 
resolved 
The resident now felt 
the home were 
appropriately dealing 
with his medication 
needs 
Yes 
 Better food – resident was not happy 
with the quality of some meals and 
was resorting to having his daughter 
bring him evening meals 
No – inspector talked 
to resident about this, 
but decided that the 
food provided was 
adequate (other 
residents were happy) 
and resident’s 
complaint was due to 
his ‘expensive tastes’ 
No change No change (Yes) He 
accepted that it 
was his 
‘expensive taste’ 
rather than poor 
food 
 More staff - resident does not walk so 
stays in his room and complains he 
rarely sees staff during the day. 
Yes – inspector issued 
requirement for 
manager to reassesses 
No change There was now an 
extra member of staff 
on duty in the 
No – although 
there was an 
extra member of 
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staffing rations and 
skills mix 
afternoon (meaning 
there was now 3 
members on duty 
between 2pm and 
4pm) and 4 for the rest 
of the afternoon 
staff on duty in 
the afternoon the 
resident had not 
seen any change 
 Greater personalisation – resident 
does not always want a cup of tea 
mid-morning, but is afraid to refuse 
one or not drink it in case they 
stopped bringing them altogether 
Yes – inspector issued 
a requirement for 
manager to improve 
care plans with greater 
personalisation. But 
not in direct relation to 
this comment, which 
the resident did not 
make to the inspector 
No change No change No – still not 
prepared to 
refuse 
occasionally and 
explain his 
preference 
2 Lack of activities – Resident’s 
daughter thought the service lacked 
provision of both physical and metal 
stimulation for her mother who could 
no longer verbally communicate with 
staff 
Yes No change The home had 
employed a part-time 
activities coordinator 
Partially 
 More staff – bearing in mind her 
mother’s increased dependency and 
that of other residents the daughter 
thought there needed to be more staff 
on duty, especially during the 
Yes – inspector issued 
requirement for 
manager to reassesses 
staffing rations and 
skills mix 
No change There was now an 
extra member of staff 
on duty in the 
afternoon (meaning 
there was now 3 
Yes – relative 
had noticed a 
small 
improvement in 
time staff were 
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afternoon between 2pm and 4pm 
when there was only 2 staff 
members on duty 
between 2pm and 
4pm) and 4 for the rest 
of the afternoon 
able to spend 
with her mother 
 Poor hygiene - The daughter 
explained that her mother was only 
allocated 3 continence pads per day 
and that when she came to visit she 
often found her wet. This has not 
changed despite complaints from the 
residents daughter 
No – although issued a 
general requirement 
based on care planning, 
which if resolved 
should mean residents 
continence care would 
be reviewed. 
No Change The daughter reported 
that her mother was 
being changed more 
regularly and thought 
this was because of 
the influence of the 
new supervisor who 
had recently started. 
She had still found her 
wet on a couple of 
occasions but was 
much happier with the 
care 
Partially – 
acknowledge 
significant 
improvement 
but thought it 
could go further 
 No specific domestic staff – the 
daughter does all of her mothers 
washing because she claims the 
clothes ‘look like rags’ if done by the 
staff. She blames it on a lack of 
specific domestic staff. 
No    
 Poor management – the daughter felt 
the key problem with the service was 
the management and his obstinate 
Yes Relative had noticed 
little change 
There had been a 
marked improvement 
from the manager and 
Yes – although 
the progress 
needed to 
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nature – she claimed he refused to 
listen to criticism or requests 
he was engaging 
constructively with 
the daughter. 
Although she felt 
improvement was still 
required 
continue 
3 Lack of activities / stimulation – 
resident claimed there was not much 
contact with staff and a lack of 
activities 
Yes Resident claimed she 
had not noticed much 
change 
Resident said there 
seemed to be a little 
bit more being done, 
like sessions throwing 
a ball around, but she 
still felt provision was 
poor 
No 
 More staff  - resident thought there 
should be more staff because she was 
often kept waiting in her room for 
response to her call alarm 
Yes No change There was now an 
extra member of staff 
on duty in the 
afternoon 
Partially – she 
still complain of 
waiting but 
admitted this 
had reduced 
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Table: Changes residents would like to see in Care Home 2 
 
Resident Changes residents would like to see Match inspector 
criticisms? 
Changes by 2nd data 
collection point 
Changes by 3rd data 
collection point 
Resident 
satisfied with 
changes 
1 More staff – resident felt the home 
required more staff, especially at night 
because she often had to wait ‘quite a 
while’ for a response to her call bell 
Yes – requirement for 
home to review 
staffing procedure and 
skills mix of staff 
No – manager claimed 
the requirement issued 
in the report was a 
result of staff sickness 
on the day of 
inspection, which 
meant the home had 
one less member of 
staff on duty 
No – line manager 
claimed he does 
regular staff ratio 
calculations based on 
Skills for Care 
guidelines, and the 
current ratio meets 
those requirements 
No 
 More flexibility – resident felt she 
had to go to bed at 8 o’clock because 
it fit in with the routine of the home 
and although she felt she could go 
later ‘if I asked’, but she did not want 
to upset the homes routine 
No  - although 
requirement for regular 
reviews of residents 
care plans, which if 
done thoroughly would 
involve asking about 
bedtime routine 
No change No change – resident 
still going to bed at 8 
o’clock, although she 
did point out she 
could stay up if she 
wanted, but that she 
did not want to ‘make 
a fuss’ 
No – although 
not concerned 
enough to raise 
the issue with 
management 
2 Lack of inclusion – resident claimed 
she would like to go to some of the 
activities the home puts on 
downstairs, but she is often not asked 
No - although 
requirement for regular 
reviews of residents 
care plans, which if 
No Change Resident passed 
away 
Resident 
passed away 
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if she would like to be assisted to 
attend (as she could not walk unaided) 
done thoroughly would 
involve asking about 
activities 
 More staff – resident would have 
liked to spend more time ‘chatting’ 
with staff 
Yes – requirement for 
home to review 
staffing procedure and 
skills mix of staff 
No – manager claimed 
the requirement issued 
in the report was a 
result of staff sickness 
on the day of 
inspection, which 
meant the home had 
one less member of 
staff on duty 
Resident passed 
away 
Resident 
passed away 
3 More activities / stimulation – 
resident claimed he was often bored 
and would like the home to provide 
more activities. He liked most of the 
existing activities but wanted to be 
able to do more 
No - although 
requirement for regular 
reviews of residents 
care plans, which if 
done thoroughly would 
involve asking about 
activities 
No – resident claims 
there were no new 
activities introduced 
No – resident claims 
there is still only a 
similar amount of 
activities 
No 
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Table: Changes residents would like to see in Care Home 3 
 
Care 
home  
Resident Changes residents would like to see Match inspector 
criticisms? 
Changes by 2nd 
data collection 
point 
Changes by 3rd 
data collection 
point 
Resident 
satisfied with 
changes 
 1 More staff on duty – resident felt she 
often had to wait a while to be taken 
to the toilet or to be helped out of bed 
Yes No change No change No - Still felt 
there should be 
more staff, but 
this was 
common 
across every 
resident 
  More activities – resident claimed 
they only occurred very infrequently 
Yes Yes - resident 
claimed they are 
playing bingo and 
dominos more 
often, but there 
had been no new 
activities 
introduced 
  
 2 Staff member not treating resident 
with respect – resident felt that on 
particular carer was ‘winding me up’ 
and making her feel uncomfortable 
Yes Yes – resident 
claimed the 
manager had 
spoken to the 
member of staff 
and she was now 
Yes Yes 
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treating her with 
greater respect 
  Dietary restrictions - Resident felt 
staff were being very strict with her 
diabetic diet and would not allow the 
flexibility of an ‘occasional treat’  
No No change No change No 
  More activities for partially sighted 
– resident felt left out of what little 
activities are put on because she could 
not see to join in, e.g. bingo 
Yes  No change – 
manager claimed 
she was 
developing 
activities that 
include visually 
impaired residents 
but had not tired 
any yet 
No change – 
manager claimed 
she had found it 
difficult to 
develop activities 
that include the 
partially sighted 
residents 
No 
  Lack of service users involvement – 
resident felt she was unaware of ‘what 
was going on’ and wanted more input 
into her care 
No – resident was 
concerned about issues 
pertaining to her pension 
and weekly allowance, 
which she had stopped 
receiving. She was under 
the impression the 
manager was helping to 
sort this out, but felt the 
communication on this 
issue was poor. This poor 
No No – the pension 
issue had still not 
been resolved and 
the resident still 
felt she had a lack 
of input into her 
care 
No 
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communication 
permeated the residents 
care in general as she felt 
she should have more 
input into her diabetes 
treatment, which she had 
lived with for 20 years, 
and here care needs in 
general 
 3 None     
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Table: Changes residents would like to see in Care Home 4 
 
Care 
home 
1 
Resident Changes residents would like to see Match inspector 
criticisms? 
Changes by 2nd 
data collection 
point 
Changes by 3rd 
data collection 
point 
Resident 
satisfied with 
changes 
 1 More staff on duty – resident felt she 
often had to wait a while to be taken 
to the toilet or to be helped out of bed 
Yes No No No - Still felt 
there should be 
more staff, but 
this was 
common across 
the case studies 
 2 More staff on duty – resident felt she 
often had to wait a while after she 
rang the call alarm 
Yes No Resident passed 
away 
Resident 
passed away 
 3 Lack of interaction with staff – 
resident would have liked more 
opportunity to talk with staff 
No – although a 
requirement was issued 
for manager to review 
staffing levels 
No No No 
  Lack of user consultation – the 
resident complained that she was 
often taken down to sit in communal 
areas without asking her consent, but 
the resident did not want to complain 
to staff in case they stopped taking her 
all together. 
No – resident was 
interview by inspector 
but did not mention this 
to her. 
No No No – but would 
not mention it to 
staff and had 
not been asked 
as part of care 
planning 
process 
 
355 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
1999 'Health Act', London: HMSO 
2000 'Care Standards Act 2000 (Commencement No. 10 (England) and Transitional, 
Savings and Amendment Provisions) Order 2001', London: HMSO 
2001 'The Care Homes Regulations 2001', London: HMSO. 
2003 'Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Act 2003' c46, London: 
HMSO 
Abbott, E. and Bompas, K. 1943 The Women Citizen and Social Security, A Criticism of 
the Proposals of the Beveridge Report as the Affect Women, London: Women's Freedom 
League. 
Adler, P. A. and Adler, P. 1987 Membership Roles in Field Research, CA: Sage. 
Agar, M. H. 1986 Speaking of ethnography, London: Sage. 
Age Concern 2007 'Age Agenda 2007', London: Age Concern. 
Allen, J. 2008 'Older People and Wellbeing', London: Institute for Public Policy Research 
(IPPR). 
Allmark, P. 2002 'The Ethics of Research with Children', Nurse Researcher 10: 7-19. 
Antman, E., Lau, J., Kupelnick, B. and Chalmers, T. 1992 'A comparison of results of 
meta-analyses of randomized control trials and recommendations of clinical experts', 
JAMA 268: 240-48. 
Arksey, H., Kemp, P., Glendinning, C., Kotchetkova, I. and Tozer, R. 2005 'Carers’ 
aspirations and decisions around work and retirement', London: Department for Work and 
Pensions. 
Arksey, H. and O'Malley, L. 2003 'Scoping Studies: Towards a Methodological 
Framework', International Journal of Social Research Methodology 8(1): 19-32. 
Arnaert, A., Van Den Heuvel, B. and Windey, T. 2005 'Health and Social Care Policy 
for the Elderly in Belgium', Geriatric Nursing 26(6). 
Arnstein, S. R. 1969 'A ladder of citizenship participation', American Institute of Planning 
Journal 35(4): 216-24. 
356 
 
Assous, L. 2001 'Long-term Health and Social Care for the Elderly: An International 
Perspective', The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 26(4): 667-683. 
Atkinson, T. 2004 'Atkinson Review: Interim report. Measurement of Government 
Outputs and Productivity for the National Accounts', London: The Stationary Office. 
Audit Commission 1992 'Community Care: Managing the cascade of change', London: 
HMSO. 
Audit Commission 1997 'Take Your Choice: a commissioning framework for community 
care': www.joint-reviews.gov.uk. 
Audit Commission 2000 'Seeing Is Believing', London: Audit Commission. 
Audit Commission 2003 'Making Ends Meet', London: HMSO. 
Ayres, I. and Braithwaite, J. 1992 Responsive Regulation, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Baldock, J. 1997 'Social Care in Old Age: More Than a Funding Problem', Social Policy 
and Administration 31(1): 73-89. 
Banks, P. 2005 'Commissioning Care Services for Older People: Achievements and 
Challenges in London', London: Kings Fund. 
Barnes, M. and Walker, A. 1996a 'Consumerism versus empowerment: a principled 
approach to the involvement of service users', Policy and Politics 24(4): 375-93. 
Barnes, M. and Walker, A. 1996b 'Consumerism versus empowerment: a principled 
approach to the invovlement of service users', Policy and Politics 24(4): 375-93. 
Bebbington, A. and Kelly, A. 1995 'Expenditure planning in the personal social services: 
unit costs in the 1980s', Journal of Social Policy 24(3): 385-411. 
Becker, H. S. 1998 Tricks of the Trade: How to Think About Your Research While You're 
Doing It, London: University of Chicago Press. 
Bell, M., Shaw, I., Sinclair, I., Sloper, P. and Rafferty, J. 2008 'The Integrated 
Children's System: An Evaluation of the Practice, Process and Consequences of the ICS in 
Councils with Social Services Responsibilities (Full Report)': Report to Department for 
Education and Skills/Welsh Assembly Government. 
Blair, T. 1996 'Let us face the Future' 1945 Anniversary Lecture, Pamphlet No. 51, 
London: Fabian Society. 
357 
 
Blumer, H. 1969a Symbolic Iinteractionism: Methods and perspectives, Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Boyne, G., Day, P. and Walker, R. 2002 'The Evaluation of Public Service Inspection: A 
Theoretical Framework', Urban Studies 39(7): 1197-1212. 
Braithwaite, J. 2001 'Regulating nursing homes: The challenge of regulating care for 
older people in Australia ', British Medical Journal 323: 443-446. 
Braithwaite, J., Makkai, T. and Braithwaite, V. 2007 Regulating Aged Care: Ritualism 
and the New Pyramid, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Braverman, H. 1975 Labor and monopoly capital; the degradation of work in the 
twentieth century, New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Braye, S. and Preston-Shoot, M. 2007 'On Systematic Reviews in Social Work: 
Observations from Teaching, Learning and Assessment of Law in Social Work Education', 
British Journal of Social Work 37: 313-334. 
Brennan, T. A. and Berwick, D. M. 1996 New rules: regulation, markets, and the quality 
of American health care, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
British Institute of Human Rights 2006 'Older People and Human Rights', London: 
British Institute of Human Rights. 
Brown, H. and Stein, J. 1998 'Implementing adult protection policies in Kent and East 
Sussex', Journal of Social Policy 27: 371-396. 
Bull, R. and Shaw, I. 1992 'Constructing causal accounts in social work', Sociology 26(4): 
635-649. 
Burgner, T. 1996 'The Regulation and Inspection of Social Services', London: Department 
of Health, the Welsh Office. 
Campbell, R., Pound, P., Pope, C., Britten, N., Pill, R., Morgan, M. and Donovan, J. 
2003 'Evaluating meta-ethnography: a synthesis of qualitative research on lay experiences 
of diabetes', Social Science and Medicine 56: 671-84. 
Care Quality Commission 2009 'Thematic and Random Inspections': 
http://www.cqc.org.uk/guidanceforprofessionals/socialcare/careproviders/inspection/thema
ticinspections.cfm.  
Care Quality Commission 2008 'The outcomes framework - outcomes and performance 
characteristics for 2008 / 09 ', London: CQC. 
358 
 
Carey, M. 2003 'Anatomy of a care manager', Work, Employment and Society 17(1): 121-
135. 
Carey, M. 2006 'Everything must go: The privatisation of state social work', British 
Journal of Social Work 38(5): 918-935. 
Carvel, J. 2006 '£10,000 for widow, 89, 'fed talcum powder' by carers' The Guardian, 
London. 
Carvel, J. 2008 ' Interview Barbara Young: 'Talking softly and carrying a big stick'' 
Guardian, London. 
Cass, E., Robins, D. and Richardson, A. 2006 'Dignity in Care' Adult Services Practice 
Guide 9, London: SCIE. 
Challis, D., Clarkson, P. and Warburton, R. 2006 Performance Indicators in Social 
Care for Older People, Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Chalmers, A. F. 1982 What is this Thing Called Science: An Assessment of the nature and 
status of science and its methods, Milton Keynes: Open University Press. 
Cheetham, J. and Deakin, N. 1997 'Research note. Assessing the assessment: some 
reflections on the 1996 Higher Education Funding Council's Research Assessment 
Exercise', British Journal of Social Work 27(3): 435-442. 
Clarke, J. and Newman, J. 1997 The managerial state: power, politics and ideology in 
the remaking of social welfare, London: Sage. 
Coffey, A. and Atkinson, P. 1996 Making sense of qualitative data : complementary 
research strategies, London: Sage Publications. 
Commission for Social Care Inspection 2005 'The state of social care in England 2004-
05', London: Commission for Social Care Inspection. 
Cook, T. and Campbell, D. 1979 Quasi-Experimentation, Chicago: Rand. 
Costa, A. and Kallick, B. 1993 'Through the Lens of a Critical Friend', Educational 
Leadership 51(2): 49-51. 
Counsel and Care 1995 'Under Inspection: A Research Project into How Inspection of 
Residential Care Home for Older People is Perceived by Residents, Relatives and 
Manager', London: Counsel and Care. 
Craig, P., Dieppe, P., Macintyre, S., Michie, S., Nazareth, I. and Petticrew, M. 2008 
'Developing and evaluating complex interventions: new guidance', London: MRC. 
359 
 
Croley, S. P. 1998 'Theories of regulation: Incorporating the administrative process', 
Columbia Law Review 98: 1-168. 
CSCI 2005a 'Inspecting for Better Lives: Delivery for Change', London: CSCI. 
CSCI 2005b 'The state of social care in England 2004-05', London: Commission for Social 
Care Inspection. 
CSCI 2006a 'Highlight of the day?' London: CSCI. 
CSCI 2006b 'Performance Ratings for Adults' Social Services in England', London: CSCI. 
CSCI 2006c 'Relentless Optimism', London: CSCI. 
CSCI 2006d 'Vision and values', in 
http://www.csci.org.uk/about_csci/vision_values/default.htm 
CSCI 2007a 'Annual Report and Accounts 2006 - 2007', London: CSCI. 
CSCI 2007b 'How much will the council pay?' CSCI, 
http://www.csci.org.uk/choose_and_find_care/paying_for_care/how_much_will_the_coun
cil_pay.aspx. 
CSCI 2007c 'Key lines of regulatory assessment (KLORA): Care homes for adults', 
London: CSCI. 
CSCI 2007d 'Key lines of regulatory assessment (KLORA): Care homes for adults ', 
London: CSCI. 
CSCI 2008a 'Annual Report and Accounts', London: CSCI. 
CSCI 2008b 'How we inspect care services: Guidance for inspectors', London: CSCI. 
CSCI 2008c 'How we write inspection reports - guidance for inspectors', London: CSCI: 
Quality, Performance and Methods Directorate. 
CSCI 2008d 'Policy and Guidance : Assessing whether a care service needs to be 
registered', London: CSCI. 
CSCI 2008e 'Registering and Inspecting Care Services', Vol. 2008, London: CSCI. 
CSCI 2008f 'What to expect during an inspection', Vol. 2008, London: CSCI. 
CSCI 2009 'The state of social care in England 2007-08', London: CSCI. 
360 
 
CSCI, Audit Commission and Healthcare Commission 2006 Living well in Later Life: 
A review of progress against the National Service Framework for Older People, London: 
Healthcare Commission. 
Cullingford, C. (ed) 1999 An Inspector Calls: Ofsted and its Effect on School Standards, 
London: Kogan page. 
Curtis, L. 2007 'Unit Costs of Health and Social Care', Kent: PSSRU, University of Kent. 
Cushing, A. and Metcalfe, R. 2007 'Optimizing medicines management: From 
compliance to concordance', Therapeutics and Clinical Risk Management 3(6): 1047-1058. 
Davies, B. 1987 'Equity and efficiency in community care: supply and financing in an age 
of fiscal austerity', Aging and Society 7(2): 161-174. 
Day, P. and Klein, R. 1987 'The regulation of nursing homes: a comparative perspective', 
The Millbank Quarterly: 118-125. 
Day, P. and Klein, R. 1997 'Risk and Regulation: The Case of Supported Housing', 
London: The Housing Corporation. 
Day, P., Klein, R. and Redmayne, S. 1996 'Why Regulate? Regulating residential care 
for elderly people': Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
Dean, H. (ed) 2004 The Ethics of Welfare: Human Rights, Dependency and Responsibility, 
Bristol: Policy Press. 
Dearmen, P. 2005 'Computerized social casework recording: Autonomy and control in 
Australia's income support agency.' Labor Studies Journal 30(1): 47-65. 
Deem, R. and Brehony, K. J. 2005 'Management as ideology: the case of 'new 
managerialism' in higher education', Oxford Review of Education 31(2): 217-235. 
Denzin, N. K. 1970 The Research Act in Sociology, London: Butterworths. 
Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. 1994 Handbook of qualitative research, Thousand 
Oaks, Calif. ; London: Sage Publications. 
Denzin, N. K. and Lincoln, Y. S. 1998 Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Materials, 
London: Sage. 
Department of Health 1989a 'Caring for People', London: HMSO. 
Department of Health 1989b 'Caring for People: community Care in the Next Decade and 
Beyond', London: HMSO. 
361 
 
Department of Health 1989c 'Homes Are For Living In', London: HMSO. 
Department of Health 1997 'The New NHS. Modern. Dependable', London: HMSO. 
Department of Health 1998 'Modernising Social Services', London: HMSO. 
Department of Health 2000a 'Care Standards Act 2000', London: HMSO. 
Department of Health 2000b 'No Secrets: guidance on developing and implementing 
multi-agency policies and procedures to protect vulnerable adults from abuse', London: 
HMSO. 
Department of Health 2000c 'No Secrets: Guidance on Developing and Implementing 
Multi-agency Policies and Procedures to Protect Vulnerable Adults from Abuse (LAC 
[2000])', London: HMSO. 
Department of Health 2000d 'The NHS Plan. A Plan for Investment. A Plan for Reform', 
London: HMSO. 
Department of Health 2001a 'Building Capacity and Partnership in Care', London: 
HMSO. 
Department of Health 2001b 'Care Homes for Older People: National Minimum 
Standards', London: HMSO. 
Department of Health 2001c 'Care Homes for Older People: National Minimum 
Standards', London: Department of Health. 
Department of Health 2001d 'National Service framework for Older People', London: 
HMSO. 
Department of Health 2003 'Commissioning and the Independent Sector - A good 
practice checklist', London: HMSO. 
Department of Health 2004 'Protection of Vulnerable Adults (POVA) scheme in England 
and Wales for care homes and domiciliary care agencies: a practical guide', London: 
HMSO. 
Department of Health 2005 'Independence, Well-being and Choice: Our vision for the 
future of social care for adults in England', London: HMSO. 
Department of Health 2006 'Our Health, Our Choice, Our Say: a new direction for 
community services', London: HMSO. 
Department of Health 2007a 'How Social Care is Delivered', London: HMSO 
362 
 
Department of Health 2007b 'Independence, choice and risk: a guide to best practice in 
supported decision making', London: HMSO. 
Department of Health 2007c 'World Class Commissioning Competencies', London: 
HMSO. 
Department of Health 2007d 'World Class Commissioning: vision', London: HMSO. 
Department of Health Social Services Inspectorate 1991 'Concern for Quality: The First 
Annual Report of the Chief Inspector Social Services Inspectorate 1991/ 1992', London: 
HMSO. 
Department of Social Services 1998 'New Ambitions for our Country: a new contract for 
welfare', London: HMSO. 
Devine, F. 2002 'Qualitative Methods', in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds) Theory and 
Methods in Political Science, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Dixon-Woods, M., Agarwal, S., Young, B., Jones, D. and Sutton, A. 2004 'Integrative 
approaches to qualitative and quantitative evidence', London: Health Development 
Agency. 
Dixon-Woods, M., Fitzpatrrick, R. and Roberts, K. 2001 'Including qualitative research 
in systematic reviews: opportunities and problems', Journal of Evaluation in Clinical 
Practice 7(2): 125-133. 
Donabedian, A. 1991 'Reflections on the effectiveness of quality assurance', in R. H. 
Palmer, A. Donabedian and G. J. Povar (eds) Striving for Quality of Care, Ann Arbor, MI: 
Health Administration Press. 
Donovan, N. and Halpern, D. 2002 'Life Satisfaction: The state of knowledge and 
implications for Government', London: Cabinet Office. 
Durkheim, E. 1984 The Division of Labour in Society, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Easterlin, R. A. 1974 '"Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot?" ', in P. A. 
David and W. M. Reader (eds) Nations and Households in Economic Growth: Essays in 
Honor of Moses Abramovitz, New York: New York Academic Press. 
Eckstein, S. (ed) 2003 Manual for research Ethics committees, 6th Edition, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Edwards, H., Courtney, M. and Spencer, L. 2003 'Consumer expectations of residential 
aged care: reflections on the literature', International Journal of Nursing Practice 9: 70-77. 
363 
 
Esping-Anderson, G. 1990 The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Estabrooks, C. A., Field, P. A. and Morse, J. M. 1994 'Aggregating qualitative findings: 
an approach to theory development', Qualitative Health Research 4: 503-11. 
Etzioni, A. A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations. Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 
1961 
Etzioni, A. 1964 Modern Organizations. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 
Evans, T. and Harris, J. 2004 'Street-Level Bureaucracy, Social Work and the 
(Exaggerated) Death of Discretion', British Journal of Social Work 34(6): 871895. 
Ferguson, I. 2007 'Increasing user choice or privatizing risk? The antinomies of 
personalization', British Journal of Social Work 37(3): 387-403. 
Fisher, M., Qureshi, H., Hardyman, W. and Homewood, J. 2006 'Using qualitative 
research in systematic reviews: Older people's views of hospital discharge' How 
Knowledge Works in Social Care, London: SCIE. 
Fleishman, R., Heilbrum, G., Mandelson, J. and Shirazi, V. 1999 'Improving the 
quality of institutional care of urinary incontinence among the elderly: a challenge for 
government regulation', INternational Journal of Health Care Quality Assurance 12(3). 
Flick, U. 2002 An Introduction to Qualitative Research, London: Sage. 
Flick, U. 2006 An Introduction to Qualitative Research, 3rd Edition, London: Sage. 
Furlong, J. and Oancea, A. 2005 'Assessing Quality in Applied and Practice Based 
Research: A Framework Discussion', Oxford: Oxford University Department of 
Educational Studies. 
Furness, S. 2009 'A Hindrance or a Help? The Contribution of Inspection to the Quality of 
Care in Homes for Older People', British Journal of Social Work 39(3): 488-505. 
Garside, P. 1998 'Organisational context for quality: lessons from the fields of 
organisational development and change management', Qualitative Health Care 7: 8-15. 
Geertz, C. 1977 'Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture' The 
Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, New York: Basic Books. 
Geoboers, H., Miokkink, H., van Montfort, P. and al, e. 2002 'Comprehensive 
assessment of the quality of care in small scale primary care practices', Journal of Clinical 
Governance 10: 51-61. 
364 
 
Gershon, P. 2004 'Releasing Resources to the Front Line: independent review of public 
sector efficency', London: Regional Centres for Excellence. 
Ghose, K. 2005 'Witness Statement of Kate Ghose in the case between Elspeth Johnson et 
al -V- London Borough of Havering ' The High Court of Justice Administrative Court. 
Gibbs, I. and Sinclair, I. 1992a 'Consistency: a pre-requisite for inspecting old people's 
homes?' British Journal of Social Work 22: 535-550. 
Gibbs, I. and Sinclair, I. 1992b 'Residential Care for Elderly People: The correlates of 
Quality', Aging and Society 12(4): 463-482. 
Gilbert, T. 2005 'Trust and managerialism: Exploring discourses of care', Nursing and 
Health Care Management and Policy 52(4): 454-463. 
Giddens, A. 1986 The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of structuration, 
California: University of California Press. 
Giddens, A. 1994 Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics, Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
Gilbert, N. 1995 'Research, Theory and Method', in N. Gilbert (ed) Researching Social 
Life, London: Sage. 
Glendinning, C., Clarke, S., Hare, P., Kotchetkova, I., Maddison, J. and Newbtonner, 
L. 2006 Outcomes-focused services for older people, London: SCIE. 
Goffman, E. 1991 Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other 
Inmates, London: Penguin. 
Golden-Biddle, K. and Locke, K. D. 1997 Composing Qualitative Research, London: 
Sage. 
Gomm, R., Hammersley, M. and Foster, P. 2000 Case study method : key issues, key 
texts, London: SAGE. 
Goodwin, N. 2006 'Developing effective joint commissioning for adult services: Lessons 
from history and future prospects', London: Care Services Improvement Partnership. 
Gray, R., Wykes, T. and Gournay, K. 2002 'From compliance to concordance: a review 
of the literature on interventions to enhance compliance with antipsychotic medication', 
Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing 9: 277–284. 
Green, S. and Walsh, A. 1988 'Cybernetics and dependence: reframing the control 
concept', Academy of Management Review 13: 287-301. 
365 
 
Griffiths, M. 2001 'Current and Future Challenges in Commissioning Care Services for 
Older People: Case Study of West Sussex', Managing Community Care 9(4): 13-19. 
Grouta, P. A. and Zalewska, A. 2006 'The impact of regulation on market risk', Journal 
of Financial Economics 80(149-184). 
Guba, E. G. and Lincoln, Y. S. 1981 Effective evaluation, London: Jossey-Bass. 
Guba, E. G. and Lincoln, Y. S. 1989 Fourth generation evaluation, London: Sage. 
Gubrium, J. F. 1989 The Politics of Field Research, London: Sage. 
Gubrium, J. F., Buckholt, D. R. and Lynott, R. J. 1989 'The descriptive tyranny of 
forms', Perspectives on Social Problems 1: 195-214. 
Gubrium, J. F. and Holstein, J. A. 1997 The New Language of Qualitative Research 
Methods, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gubrium, J. F. and Holstein, J. A. (eds) 2002 Handbook of Interview Research: Context 
and Method, Thousand Oaks, California: Sage. 
Gunningham, N., Garbosky, P. and Sinclair, D. 1998 Smart Regulation: Designing 
Environmental Policy, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Hakim, C. 2000 Research Design: successful designs for social and economic research, 
2nd Edition, London: Routledge. 
Hammersley, M. 1992 What's Wrong with Ethnography?, London: Routledge. 
Hammersley, M. and Atkinson, P. 1983 Ethnography: principles in practice, London: 
Tavistock. 
Harden, A. 2004 'A review of tools for assessing the quality of qualitative studies: 
implications for systematic reviews' 12th Annual Cochrane Colloquium: Bridging the 
Gaps, Ottawa, Canada. 
Harding, T. and Beresford, P. 1996 'The standards we expect', London: NISW. 
Harlow, E. 2004 'Why don't women want to be social workers anymore? New 
managerialism, postfeminism and the shortage of social workers in Social Services 
Departments in England and Wales', European Journal of Social Work 7(2): 167-79. 
Harrington, C. 2001 'Regulating nursing homes: Residential nursing facilities in the 
United States', British Medical Journal 323: 507-510. 
366 
 
Harrington, C., Carillo, H., Thollaug, S. C., Summers, P. R. and Wellin, V. 2000 
'Nursing Facilities, Staffing, Residents and Facility Deficiencies: 1993 Through 1999', San 
Francisco: Department of Social and Behavioural Sciences. 
Harris, J. and McDonald, C. 2001 'Post Fordism, the Welfare state and the personal 
social services: A comparison of Australia and Britain', British Journal of Social Work 
30(1): 57-70. 
Hasler, F. 2006 'The Work of the User and Public Involvement Team' Engage Conference 
2006, Coventry. 
Hawes, C., Mor, V., Wildfire, J., Iannacchione, V., Lux, L., Green, A., Wilcox, V., 
Spore, D. and Phillips, C. D. 1995 'Analysis of the Effect of Regulation on the Quality of 
Board and Care Homes', Washington: Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and 
Evaluation, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 
Hawkins, K. 1984 Environment and Enforcement: Regulation and the Social Definition of 
Inspection, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Helliwell, J. F. 2002 'How's life? Combining individual and national variables in 
explaining subjective wellbeing', Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Henwood, K. and Lang, I. 2003 'Qualitative Research Resources: A consultation exercise 
with UK social scientists', Swindon: ESRC. 
Heron, G. and Murray, R. 2004 'The Place of Writing in Social Work', Journal of Social 
Work 4(2): 199-214. 
Higgins, J. P. T. and Green, S. (eds) 2006 Cochrane Handbook for Systematic Reviews of 
Interventions 4.2.6 [updated September 2006]. In the Cochrane Library, Issue 4, 
Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, LTD. 
Hirst, M. and Arksey, H. 2000 'Informal carers count', Nursing Standard 14(42): 33-34. 
HM Government 2008 'The case for change – Why England needs a new care and support 
system': 
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGui
dance/DH_084725. 
HM Treasury 2007 'PSA Delivery Agreement 19:  Ensure better care for all', London: 
HMSO. 
Hoe, J., Hancock, G., Livingston, G. and Orrell, M. 2006 'Quality of life of people with 
dementia in residential care homes', The British Journal of Psychiatry 188: 460-464. 
367 
 
Holland, J., Thomson, R. and Henderson, S. 2006 'Qualitative Longitudinal Research: A 
Discussion Paper', Swindon: ESRC. 
Holstein, J. A. and Gubrium, J. F. 1995 The Active Interview, London: Sage. 
Hood, C. 1991 'A public management for all seasons?' Public Administration 69(1): 3-19. 
Hood, C., James, O. and Scott, C. 2000 'Regulation of government: Has it increased, is it 
increasing, should it be diminished?' Public Administration 78: 283-304. 
Hood, C., Scott, C. and James, O. 1999a Regulation Inside Government: Waste-
watchers, Quality Police and Sleaze Busters, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hood, C., Scott, C. and James, O. 1999b Regulation Inside Government: Waste-
watchers, Quality Police and Sleaze Busters, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hough, G. 1995 'Dismantling child welfare', in S. Rees and G. Rodney (eds) The Human 
Costs of Managerialism, Leichardt, NSW: Pluto Press. 
Hudson, B. 2006 'User Outcomes and Children's services Reform: Ambiguity and Conflict 
in the Policy Implementation Process', Social Policy and Society 5(2): 227-36. 
Hudson, B., Dearey, M. and Glendinning, C. 2005 'A new vision for adult social care: 
scoping service users’ views' Research Findings from the Social Policy Research Unit, 
York: SPRU, University of York. 
Hudson, B., Hardy, B., Glendinning, C. and Young, R. 2002 'National Evaluation of 
Notifications for Use of Section 31 Partnership Flexibilities in the Health Act 1999', 
Manchester: National Primary Care Research and Development Centre, University of 
Manchester. 
Hughes, O. 1994 Public management and Administration, London: Macmillan. 
Hulme, R. 2005 'Policy Transfer and the Internationalisation of Social Policy', Social 
Policy and Society 4(4): 417-426. 
IFSW 1999 'International Policy on Older Persons', Vol. 2006, New York. 
Institute of Medicine 1986 'Improving the Quality of Care in Nursing Homes', 
Washington DC: National Academy Press. 
Institute of Medicine 2001 'Improving the Quality of Long-Term Care', Washington DC: 
National Academy Press. 
Isin, E. F. and Turner, B. S. (eds) 2002 Handbook of Citizenship Studies, London: Sage. 
368 
 
Isin, E. F. and Wood, P. K. 1999 Citizenship and Identity, London: Sage. 
Iverson, T. and Wren, A. 1998 'Equality, employment and budgetary restraint: the 
trilemma of the service economy', World Politics 50: 242-56. 
Jefferson, A. 1996 'Insights into inspection', Journal of Applied Research in Intellectual 
Disabilities 9(4): 354-355. 
Jimenez, S. J., Chaparro, F. P. and Smith, P. C. 2003 'Evaluating the introduction of a 
quasi-market in community care', Socio-Economic Planning Sciences 37: 1-13. 
Johnson, N., Jenkinson, S., Kendall, I., Bradshaw, Y. and Blackmore, M. 1998 
'Regulating for Quality in the Voluntary Sector', Journal of Social Policy 27: 307-308. 
Jordan, B. 2005a 'Public Services and the Service Economy: Individualism and the 
Choice Agenda', Journal of Social Policy 35(1): 143-162. 
Jordan, B. 2005b 'Social Theory and Social Policy: Choice, Order and Human Well-being 
', European Journal of Social Theory 8(2): 149-170. 
JRF 2004 'Older people shaping policy and practice', York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. and Tversky, A. (eds) 1982 Judgment under uncertainty: 
Heuristics and biases, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kavanagh, J., Harden, A., Oakley, A. and Trouton, A. 2005 'A Systematic Review of 
the Evidence for Incentive Schemes to Encourage Positive Health and other Social 
Behaviours in Young People: Protocol for a Systematic Review', London: EPPI-Centre, 
Social Science Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London. 
Kavanagh, J., Harden, A., Oakley, A. and Trouton, A. 2006 'A Systematic Review of 
the Evidence for Incentive Schemes to Encourage Positive Health and other Social 
Behaviours in Young People: Final Report', London: EPPI-Centre, Social Science 
Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London. 
Kessner, D. and Kalik, F. 1973 'A strategy for evaluating health service', Washington 
DC: National Academy of Science. 
Khan, K. S., ter Riet, G., Glanville, J., Sowden, A. J. and Kleijnen, J. (eds) 2001 
Undertaking Systematic Reviews of Research on Effectiveness: CRD's Guidance for those 
Carrying Out or Commissioning Reviews, CRD Report Number 4, York. 
Kirkpatrick, I. and Lucio, M. 1995 The politics of quality in the public sector: The 
management of change, London: Routledge. 
369 
 
Kitzinger, J. 1994 'Focus Groups: Method or Madness?' in M. Bolton (ed) Challenge and 
Innovation: Methodological Advances in Social Research on HIV/ AIDS, London: Taylor 
and Francis. 
Knapp, M. and Wistow, G. 1996 'Social care markets in England: Early post reform 
experiences', Social Service Review 70(3): 355-377. 
Kvale, S. 1996 InterViews: An introduction to qualitative research interviewing, Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Laing, W. 2004 'Calculating a fair price for care: A toolkit for residential and nursing care 
costs': Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
Landis, J. and Koch, G. 1977 'The measurement of observer agreement for categorical 
data', Biometrics 33: 156-74. 
Landsberger, H. A. 1958 Hawthorne Revisited, New York: Cornell University Press. 
Lash, S. 2002 Critique of Information London: Sage. 
Latour, B. and Woolgar, S. 1986 Laboratory Life: The construction of scientific facts, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Lau, J., Antman, E., Jimenez-Silva, J., Kupelnick, B., Mosteller, F. and Chalmers, T. 
1992 'Cumulative meta-analysis of therapeutic trials for myocardial infarction', New 
England Journal of Medicine 327: 248-54. 
Lawrence-Lightfoot, S. and Davis, J. H. 1997 The Art and Science of Portratiture, 
London: Jossey-Bass. 
Lawson, N. 1993 The View from No. 11, London: Corgi Books. 
Le Grand, J. 1997 'Knights, Knaves or Pawns? Human Behaviour and Social Policy', 
Journal of Social Policy 26: 149-169. 
Le Grand, J. and Bartlett, W. (eds) 1993 Quasi-markets and Social Policy, Baisingstoke: 
Macmillan. 
Lee, J.-H. 2008 'Time to Change, Time for Change', Time & Society 17(2-3): 363-384. 
Leichsenring, K. 2004 'Providing Integrated Health and Social Care for Older Persons: A 
European Overview', in K. Leichsenring and A. M. Alaszewski (eds) Providing Integrated 
Health and Social Care for Older Persons: A European Overview of Issues at Stake, 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
370 
 
Leichsenring, K. and Alaszewski, A. M. (eds) 2004 Providing Integrated Health and 
Social Care for Older Persons: A European Overview of Issues at Stake, Vol. 28, 
Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Levitas, R. 2001 'Against Work', Critical Social Policy 21(4): 449-67. 
Lewis, R., Alvarez-Rosete, A. and Mays, M. 2006 'How to Regulate Health Care in 
England? An international perspective', London: Kings Fund. 
Lincoln, Y. S. and Guba, E. G. 1985 Naturalistic inquiry, Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage 
Publications. 
Linde, C. 1993 Life stories : the creation of coherence, New York ; Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Lipset, S. M., Trow, M. and Coleman, J. 1956 Union democracy: The insider politics of 
the International Typographical Union, New York: Free Press. 
LIpskey, M. 1983 Street-level Bureaucracy; Dilemmas of the Individual in Public 
Services, New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Lister, R. 1990 'Women economic dependency and citizenship', Journal of Social Policy 
19(4). 
Lister, R. 2001 'Citizenship and changing welfare states', in J. G. Anderson and P. Jensen 
(eds) Changing Labour Markets, Welfare Policies and Citizenship, Bristol: Policy Press. 
Lister, R. 2002 'Sexual Citizenship', in E. F. Isin and B. S. Turner (eds) Handbook of 
Citizenship Studies, London: Sage. 
Litwin, H. and Lightman, E. 1996 'The development of community care policy for the 
elderly: A comparative perspective', International Journal of Health Services 26(4): 691-
708. 
Local Government Association, Association of Directors of Social Services and 
Society of County Treasurers 2006 'Social Services Finance 2005-2006: a survey of 
Local Authorities', Research Briefing: March 2006. 
Lofland, J. and Lofland, L. H. 1995 Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to Qualitative 
Observation and Analysis, Belmont, California: Wadsworth. 
Long, A., Godfrey, M., Randall, T., Brettle, A. and Grant, M. 2000 'Feasibility of 
Undertaking Systematic Reviews in Social Care', Leeds: Nuffield Institute for Health. 
371 
 
Lupton, R. 2005 'Social justice and school improvement: improving the quality of 
schooling in the poorest neighbourhoods', British Educational Research Journal 31(5): 
589-604. 
Lyman, S. and Scott, M. 1970 A Sociology of the Absurd, New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts. 
Macdonald, G. 1999 'Evidence-Based Social Care: Wheels off the Runway?' Public 
Money and Management 19(1): 25-32. 
Macdonald, G. 2003 'Using Systematic reviews to improve social care', London: SCIE. 
Mackintosh, M. 2000 'Flexible contracting? Economic cultures and implicit contracts in 
social care', Journal of Social Policy 29: 1-19. 
Mann, K. 2006 'Three Steps to Heaven? Tensions in the Management of Welfare: 
Retirement Pensions and Active Consumers', Journal of Social Policy 35(1): 77-96. 
Manning, N. 2003 'The Politics of Welfare', in J. Baldock, N. Manning and S. Vickerstaff 
(eds) Social Policy, 2nd Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Marquand, D. 2005 Decline of the Public: The hollowing out of Citizenship, London: 
Polity. 
Marshall, T. H. 1950 Citizenship and Social Class, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Mason, J. 1996 Qualitative Researching, London: Sage. 
Matland, R. E. 1995 'Synthesising the implementation literature: the ambiguity-conflict 
model of policy implementation', Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 
5(2): 145-174. 
May, T. 2003 Social Research, 2nd Edition, Milton Keynes: Open University Press. 
McAuley, L. and Ramsay, C. 2002 'Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care 
Review Group: Data Collection Checklist', Ottawa: EPOC, University of Ottawa. 
Miles, M. B. and Huberman, A. M. 1994 Qualitative data analysis : an expanded 
sourcebook, 2nd Edition, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Miles, M. B. and Huberman, A. M. 1996 Qualitative Data Analysis, London: Sage. 
Mintzberg, H., 1983. Power in and around organizations, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs 
372 
 
MORI 2001 'Poll for Readers Digest', London: MORI. 
Moriarty, J. 2002 'Assessment of Older People with Mental Helath Problems', London: 
National Institute for Social Work Research Unit, Kings College. 
Morris, A. 1999 'Race Relations and Racism in a Radically Diverse Inner City 
Neighbourhood: a Case Study of Hillbrow, Johannesburg', Journal of South African 
Studies 25(4): 667-694. 
Munro, E. 2004 'The impact of audit on social work practice', British Journal of Social 
Work 38(8): 1072-95. 
Netten, A., Forder, J. and Knight, J. 1999 'Costs of regulating care homes for adults', 
Kent: PSSRU. 
Netten, A., McDaid, D., Fernandez, J. L., Forder, J., Knapp, M., Matosevic, T. and 
Shapiro, J. 2005 'Measuring and understanding social services outputs (Discussion 
Paper)', Kent: PSSRU. 
Netten, A., Ryan, M., Smith, P., Skaturn, D., Healey, A., Knapp, M. and Wykes, T. 
2002 'The Development of a Measure of Social Care Outcomes for Older People: 
Discussion Paper 1690/2', Canterbury: PSSRU University of Kent. 
Newman, J., Glendinning, C. and Hughes, M. 2008 'Beyond Modernisation? Social Care 
and the Transformation of Welfare Governance', Journal of Social Policy 37(4): 531-558. 
Noblit, G. W. and Hare, R. D. 1988 Meta-ethnography: synthesising qualitative studies, 
California: Sage. 
O'Kell, S. 2002 'The independent care homes sector: Implications of care staff shortages 
on service delivery': Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
OECD 1994 'Caring for Frail Elderly People', Paris: OECD. 
OECD 2004 'OECD urges UK to do more to encourage older people to work longer': 
Aging and Society, Paris: OECD. 
Oliver, S. 1997 'Exploring lay perspectives on questions of effectiveness.' in A. Maynard 
and I. Chalmers (eds) Non-random Reflections on Health Services Research, London: BMJ 
Publishing Group. 
Oppenheim, A. N. 1992 Questionnaire Design, Interviewing and Attitude Measurement, 
New Edition, London: Pinter. 
373 
 
Orloff, A. S. 1993 'Gender and the Social Rights of Citizenship: The Comparative 
Analysis of Gender Relations and Welfare States', American Sociological Review 58: 303-
28. 
Orme, J. 2001 'Regulation or fragmentation? Directions for social work under new 
labour', British Journal of Social Work 31(4): 611-624. 
Ovretveit, J. 1995 Purchasing for Health, Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Owen, T. and Bell, L. 2004 'Quality of life in older age: Messages from the Growing 
Older Programme', London: Help the Aged. 
Parton, N. 2008 'Changes in the form of knowledge in social work: from the ‘social’ to the 
‘informational’?' British Journal of Social Work 38(2): 253 - 269. 
Patton, M. Q. 2002 Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods, London: sage. 
Pawson, R. 2002 'Evidence-based policy; In search of a Method', Evaluation 8(2): 157-
181. 
Pawson, R., Boaz, A., Grayson, L., Long, A. and Barnes, C. 2003 'Types and quality of 
knowledge in social care' Knowledge Review, London: SCIE. 
Peace, S. M. (ed) 1990 Researching Social Gerontology: Concepts, Methods, Issues, 
London: Sage. 
Pearson, K. 1904 'Report on certain enteric fever inoculation statistics', British Medical 
Journal 3: 1243-6. 
Performance and Innovation Unit 2000 'Winning the Generation Game', London: 
Cabinet Office. 
Petticrew, M. and Roberts, H. 2006 Systematic Reviews in the Social Sciences: A 
Practical Guide, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Pithouse, A. 1998 Social Work: The Social Organisation of an Invisible Trade Farnham: 
Ashgate. 
Platt, J. 1981 '"Case Study" in American methodological Thought', Current Sociology 40: 
17-48. 
Powell, J. 2002 'The Changing Conditions of Social Work Research', British Journal of 
Social Work 32(1): 17-33. 
Power, M. 1999 The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
374 
 
Prior, L. 2004 'Documents', in C. Searle, G. Gobo, J. F. Gubrium and D. Silverman (eds) 
Qualitative Research Practice, London: Sage. 
Punch, K. F. 2001 Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative 
Approaches, London: Sage. 
Ragin, C. C. 1994 Constructing Social Research, Thousand Oaks, Cal.: Pine Forge Press. 
Ray, M. and Phillips, J. 2002 'Older People', in R. Adams, L. Dominelli and M. Payne 
(eds) Critical Practice in Social Work, Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Redmayne, S. 1996 'Spotlight on Homes for the Elderly: an analysis of inspection reports 
on homes for the elderly' Bath Social Policy Papers, Bath: University of Bath. 
Reed, J., Cook, G. and Stanley, D. 1999 'Promoting partnership with older people 
through quality assurance systems: Issues arising in care homes', NT Research 4(5): 353-
63. 
Rees, S. and Wallace, A. 1982 Verdicts on Social Work, London: Edward Arnold. 
Reid, J. 2005 'Independence, Well-being and Choice Our vision for the future of social 
care for adults in England', in D. o. Health (ed): Department of Health. 
Rhydderch, M., Elwyn, G., Marshall, M. and Grol, R. 2004 'Organisational change 
theory and the use of indicators in general practice', Quality and Safety in Health Care 13: 
213-217. 
Richardson, F. 2006 'The Commissioning Context: Introduction', in H. a. S. C. C. A. 
Team (ed) The commissioning context, London: Care Services Improvement Partnership. 
Riessman, C. K. 2008 Narrative methods for the human sciences, Los Angeles: Sage 
Publications. 
Rizzo, V. M. and Rowe, J. M. 2006 'Studies of the Cost-Effectiveness of Social Work 
Services in Aging: A Review of the Literature', Research on Social Work Practice 16(1): 
67-73. 
Robinson, V. and Sergott, J. 2002 'Understanding the decision-making of asylum 
seekers', London: Home Office Research, Development and Statistics Directorate. 
Rouse, J. 1997 'Resource and performance management in public sector organizations', in 
K. Issac-Henry, C. Painter and C. Barnes (eds) Management in the Public Sector: 
Challenge and Change, London: International Thomson Business Press. 
Rubin, H. J. and Rubin, I. S. 1995 Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data, 
London: Sage. 
375 
 
Sapey, B. 1997 'Social work tomorrow: Towards a critical understanding of technology in 
social work', British Journal of Social Work 27(6): 803-14. 
Saraceno, C. 1997 'Reply: Citizenship is context-specific', International Labor and 
Working Class History 52: 27-34. 
Scharpf, F. W. 1999 'The viability of advanced welfare states in the international 
economy: vulnerabilities and options'' Working Paper 9-99, Cologne: Max Planck Institute 
for the Study of Societies. 
Schatzman, L. and Strauss, A. L. 1973 Field Research: Strategies for a natural 
Sociology, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. 
Schön, D. 1983 The reflective practitioner, New York: Basic Books. 
Schultz, A. 1972 The Phenomenology of the Social World, London: Heinemann. 
Schuman, H. and Kalton, G. 1998 'Survey Methods', in D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske and G. 
Lindzey (eds) The Handbook of Social Psychology, 4th Edition, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
SCIE 2003 'Interim Guidelines for SCIE Systematic Knowledge Reviews', London: SCIE. 
SCIE 2006 'Using qualitative research in systematic reviews: Older people's views of 
hospital discharge', in SCIE (ed) How Knowledge Works in Social Care Report 9, London: 
SCIE. 
Seidel, J. and Kelle, U. 1995 'Different Functions of Coding in the Analysis of Textual 
Data', in U. Kelle (ed) Computer-Aided Qualitative Data Analysis, London: Sage. 
Senate Select Committee on Private Hospitals and Nursing Homes (Australia) 1985 
'Private Nursing Homes in Australia: Their Conduct, Administration and Ownership', 
Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service. 
Sevenhuijsen, S. 1998 Citizenship and the Ethics of Care, London: Routledge. 
Shanas, E. 1962 The Health of Older People: Social Survey, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Shaw, I. 1984 'Literature Review: Consumer Evaluations of the Personal Social Services', 
British Journal of Social Work 14: 277-284. 
Shaw, I. 1996 Evaluating in Practice, Aldershot: Arena (Ashgate). 
Shaw, I. 1999 Qualitative Evaluation, London: Sage. 
376 
 
Shaw, I. 2003 'Qualitative research and outcomes in health, social work and education', 
Qualitative Research 3: 57-77. 
Shaw, I. and Norton, M. 2007 'Kinds and Quality of Social Work Research', British 
Journal of Social Work Advanced Access, January 2008. 
Sherwood, G. 1999 'meta-synthesis of qualitative analysis of caring: defining a therapeutic 
model of caring', Advanced Practice Nursing Quarterly 3: 32-42. 
Sholl, A. 2001 'An inspector calls: A practical look at social care inspection', British 
Journal of Social Work 31(1): 166-168. 
Siim, B. 2000 Gender and Citizenship, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Silverman, D. 2001 Interpreting qualitative data : methods for analysing talk, text, and 
interaction, 2nd Edition, London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications. 
Skidmore, P., Miller, P. and Chapman, J. 2003 'The Long Game How Regulators and 
Companies Can Both Win', London: Demos. 
Skills for Care 2005 'Skills Research and Intelligence, 2nd Annual Report', London: Skills 
for Care. 
Stake, R. E. 1994 'Qualitative Case Studies', in Y. Lincoln and N. Denzin (eds) The 
Handbook of Qualitative Research, London: Sage. 
Stake, R. E. 1995 The Art of Case Study Research, London: Sage. 
Stake, R. E. and Schwandt, T. A. 2006 'On discerning quality in evaluation', in I. Shaw, 
J. Greene and M. Mark (eds) The Sage Handbook of Evaluation, London: Sage. 
Stokes, D. E. 1997 Pasteur's Quadrant: basic science and technological innovation, 
Washington DC: The Brookings Institute. 
Strauss, A. 1987 Qualitative analysis for social scientists, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Strauss, A. and Corbin, J. 1998 Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and 
Procedures for Grounding Social Theory, London: Sage. 
Sutherland, K. and Leatherman, S. 2006 'Regulation and Quality Improvement: A 
Review of the Evidence': The Health Foundation. 
The Care Home Regulations 2001 2001, London: HMSO. 
377 
 
The Information Centre for Health and Social Care 2006 'Community Care Statistics 
2005: Home Help and Care Services for Adults, England', London: The Information 
Centre for Health and Social Care. 
Thomas, W. and Znaniecki, F. 1996 The Polish Peasant in Europe and America: A 
Classic Work in Immigration History, Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press. 
Thompson, N. 2005 Understanding Social Work: Preparing for practice (2nd edn), 
Baisingstoke: Palgrave. 
Thompson, N. and Thompson, S. 2001 'Empowering Older People: Beyond the Care 
Model', Journal of Social Work 1(1): 61-76. 
Thorne, S. 1994 'Secondary analysis: issues and implications', in J. M. Morse (ed) Issues 
in qualitative research methods, London: Sage. 
Thornton, P. and Tozer, R. 1994 'Involving Older People in Planning and Evaluating 
Community Care: A Review of Initiatives', York: Social Policy Research Unit, University 
of York. 
Tovey, P. and Adams, J. 2001 'Primary care as intersecting social worlds', Social Science 
and Medicine 52: 695-706. 
Townsend, P. 1963 The Family Life of Older People: An Inquiry in East London, 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Travers, M. 2007 The New Bureaucracy: Quality assurance and its critics, Bristol: The 
Policy Press. 
Tunstall, J. 1966 Old and Alone: A Sociological Study of Older People, London: 
Routledge and Keegan Paul. 
Turner, D. and Martin, S. 2004 'Managerialism meets community development: 
Contracting for social inclusion?' Policy and Politics 32(1): 22-32. 
Twigg, J., Atkin, K. and Perring, C. 1990 'Carers and services: a review of research', 
London: HMSO. 
U.S. DHHS Inspector General 1990 'Board and Care', New York: U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, Regional Inspector General for Region II, Office of 
Evaluation and Inspection. 
UN 2005 'World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision', New York: United Nations. 
378 
 
Unison 2007 BBC investigation: Care inspection cuts hit frail and elderly, press release: 
Available online at 
http://protectourpensions.org.uk/asppresspack/pressrelease_view.asp?id=1038  
Van Manen, M. 1992 Researching lived experience: human science for an action 
sensitive pedagogy, London: Althouse Press. 
Wade, E. 2004 'A Case Study Exploring the Conditions, Attractions and Simple Rules 
Shaping Professional Executive Committee Involvement in PCT Commissioning', 
Birmingham: Health Services Management Centre. 
Walker, R. M. 1998 'New public management and housing associations: from comfort to 
competition', Policy and Politics 26: 71-87. 
Walshe, K. and Boyd, A. 2005 'Systematic review of the literature on the impact of 
regulation; audit and inspection on the performance of healthcare provision', Manchester: 
Centre for Public Policy Management. 
Walshe, K. and Shortell, S. M. 2004 'Social Regulation of Healthcare organizations in the 
United States: Developing a framework for evaluation', Health Services Management 
Research 17: 79-99. 
Wanless, D. 2006 'Securing Good Care for Older People: Taking a Long-Term View', 
London: King's Fund. 
Warren, C. A. B. 2002 'Qualitative Interviewing', in J. F. Gubrium and J. A. Holstein 
(eds) The Handbook of Interview Research: Context and Method, Thousand Oaks, 
California: Sage. 
Watters, J. K. and Biernaccki, P. 1989 'Targeted Sampling: Options for the Study of 
Hidden Populations', Social Problems 36(5): 416-430. 
Weinberg, D. 2002 Qualitative Research Methods, London: Blackwell. 
Weiss, C. H. 1997 Evaluation: Methods for Studying Programs and Policies, 2nd edition, 
NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Weiss, C. H. 1999 'The Interface between Evaluation and Public Policy', Evaluation 5(4): 
468-486. 
Wilken, D. 1990 'Dependency', in S. M. Peace (ed) Researching Social Gerontology: 
Concepts, Methods, Issues, London: Sage. 
Williams, J. 2002 'Public Law Protection of Vunerable Adults', Journal of Social Work 
2(3): 293-316. 
379 
 
Wistow, G. 2005 'The New Vision for Adult Social Care', London: HMSO / SCIE. 
Wistow, G. and Barnes, M. 1993 'User Involvement in Community Care - Origins, 
Purposes and Applications', Public Administration 71(3): 279-299. 
Woolf, S. 2000 'Taking critical appraisal to the extremes: The need for balance in the 
evaluation of evidence', Journal of Family Practice 49(12): 1081-5. 
Woolgar, S. (ed) 2002 Virtual society? Technology, Cyberbole, Reality, Oxford: OUP. 
Wright, F. 2005 'Lay assessors and care home inspections: Is there a future?' British 
Journal of Social Work 35(7): 1093-1106. 
Yin, R. K. 2003 Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Third Edition, Vol. 5, 
California: Sage. 
Zeller, R. 1993 'Focus Group Research on Sensitive Topics - Setting the Agenda Without 
Setting the Agenda', in D. L. Morgan (ed) Successful Focus Groups: Advancing the State 
of the Art, London: Sage. 
 
 
